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
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
*Quia Liber est meus*

*James Binney*  
*Wm.*









Solid Philosophy  
ASSERTED,  
Against the FANCIES of the  
**IDEISTS:**  
OR, THE  
METHOD to SCIENCE  
Farther Illustrated:

WITH  
*Reflexions* on Mr. LOCKE's *ESSAY*  
concerning *Human Understanding*.

By J. Sergéant  
Somerville

LONDON,

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To the Right Honourable  
**R O B E R T,**  
Lord Viscount *Dunbar.*

My LORD,

**H**AD I thought that this Piece I  
here Dedicate to Your Lordship,  
was not above Your, or any Man's,  
Patronage, I had shewn less Respects to You  
in making You so Mean a Present. Were  
You Monarch of the Universe, TRUTH  
(which it Defends) could receive *no Pro-*  
*tection* from Your *Grandeur*. Her *Genius* is  
so Sublime, and Her self so Nobly-born,  
that, like Him from whom she descends, she  
is *Beneficial* to all, and *Incapable* of receiving  
*Advantage* from any. All Extrinsecal Sup-  
ports, in stead of *Honouring* her, *Debase* her.  
Her Well-compacted and Indissoluble Fa-  
brick is altogether *Divine*: Contrary to our  
Material Structures, it is *Built from the Top*;  
and, its Foundation laid as high as *Heaven*  
*it self*. The GOD of *Truth* has imprinted  
all *Natural Truths* in *Created Beings*, as in  
the Footsteps of his Infinite Wisdom; from  
whence, by the Vehicles of our Senses,  
they

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they are Copy'd and Transcrib'd into our Mind ; where, without our Labour, they beget all our *Natural Notions* ; and, as Speculation, and even Experience, assures us, they do also, at the same time, give us some Knowledge of the *Things themselves* ; which steadily and distinctly Reflected on, breed in us that best Natural Perfection of our Understanding, *SCIENCE* ; of which those Notions are, as it were, the *Seeds*.

Thus was Mankind put into a plain Road-way of gaining *Clear Intellectual Light*, by the Common Providence of our Good Creatour. To *improve* in which, and to keep our Thoughts from wandering into *Error*, the same Goodness of our Maker endowed us with a Faculty of Reflecting on the Operations of our own Minds ; and, on all the Guilded Train of our Spiritual Conceptions, and of the several Natures and Manners of them ; by which means those who were addicted to *Attentive Reflexion*, or *Speculation*, invented a Way, and settled Artificial Rules, how to *manage* their *Notions*, *Judgments* and *Discourses*. Which Rules laid orderly together, and found by Reason to be Agreeable to the Natures of Things according to the Being they had *in the Mind*, and, therefore, *Solid* ; did, in time, compose that excellent and most useful *Science* call'd *LOGICK*.

But,

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But, my Lord, the Crooked Byass of Men's *Wills* perverted their *Reason*, and made them disregard this Well-grounded and *Regular Method*, given them so freely by the Author of Nature. The Heathen Philosophers of old, whose God was Vanity, affected to set up several *Sects*, to pride themselves with the Empty Honour of being esteemed their *Heads*. The Christian Schools succeeded ; who, at first, discours'd gravely on those Subjects which were of a higher Nature ; but, whether the Circumstances did not bend their Thoughts *that way*, or from what *other Reason*, they settled no Scientifical Method to attain Philosophical Knowledges. Yet, those who follow'd *Aristotle's* Principles, (as the great *Aquinas* constantly endeavoured ) did generally discourse even in *such* Subjects, when they had occasion, very *solidly*. But, afterwards, when School-disputes grew to be the only fashionable Learning, the Multitudes of Combatants increas'd, and the Contests were maintain'd by several Great Bodies ; each of which thought it Creditable to their Party to set up and follow some Eminent Man of their own. Hence this Nature-taught Method came to be much neglected ; and he was thought to win the Prize who was the subtilest and acuteſt *Disputant*, and not he who could most solidly *Demonstrate*



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*Truth.* Hence, no Exact and Rational Logic being settled and agreed on, they were apt to take up oftentimes Wrong Principles; and the several *Conceptions* of our Mind were mistaken to be so many several *Things*. *Demonstration* was rather *talk'd* of for Form's sake, than *pursu'd* and *practis'd*; and, the the Use of *General Maxims*, which should establish our Discourses, was scarce once thought on; without which, *Demonstration* was Impossible. New Questions in Philosophy, of little or no use, were started; and bandy'd to and fro by Terms and Words not well understood; nor their Sense agreed on, by the Contending Parties. The Heat of Opposition fix'd Men in their own Opinions. Innumerable Quaint and Nice, and sometimes Impertinent, Distinctions were invented, to escape their being Entangled by the Arguments of their Adversary. Every man affected to be a *Proteus*, and took more Care to *elude* Opposition, than to *settle* and establish *Truth* on Immovable Grounds. The true Sense of *Aristotle's* Doctrine, not being taken from himself or his First Interpreters, but from some Modern Misunderstanders, was lost; and his Text drawn into several Meanings, to abet Contradictory Tenets. In a Word, nothing was *decisively concluded*, nor likely to be so, by this way of School-Term-Learning, as things were

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were manag'd by *Unmethodiz'd Disputation*.

Thus stood the Affair of Philosophy at the beginning of this present Century; which having been fertile of many Excellent Wits, two of the Chiefest of them, *Cartesius* in *France*, and our Ingenious Countryman *Mr. Locke*, having taken Scandal at these Miscarriages, and an Aversion against that Miracle of Nature, *Aristotle*, whose Doctrine Schoolmen had ill represented; and being withal Men of *Strong Brains*, enabling them to carry their Conceptions through, and to make them Coherent; they did, out of their Zeal for Truth, undertake to set up New Systems of *Philosophy*; tho' *Cartesius* in some sort, *furbish'd* up, *improv'd*, and *refin'd* upon the old *Corpuscularian* Way of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*; which I have fully confuted in the Appendix to my *Method*; and, I hope, beyond all possibility of Reply. But, these two Gentlemen, being better vers'd in the Mathematicks than in Metaphysics; and, thence, not apprehending how Corporeal Natures could *get into* the Mind, or *be there*; nor, reflecting that a *Spiritual* Nature, being incomparably *Superiour* in the Rank of *Beings* to that of *Corporeal* Things, must, consequently, have naturally and necessarily a Power to *comprehend*, after its manner, (or by way of Knowledge) that *Interiour* one; they were forc'd, thro' their want of Higher

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Principles, to build all Knowledge, not upon the *Things themselves* in their Knowing Power, but upon *Ideas* or *Similitudes* of them; tho' neither of them set themselves to make out or demonstrate how we could possibly have our *Notions*, or *First Notices* of the Things by them. Now, these Spiritual *Ideas* being, most evidently, neither the *Things known*, nor any *Mode* or *Accident* of those Objects; and, consequently, *nothing at all* of the Thing in *any* sort, were manifestly convinced not to be the Productions of Creative Wisdom, in which he had imprinted all *Natural Truths*, but *meer Fancies*, coin'd by their Imagination. These *Ideas* or *Fancies* then, and only these, they contemplated, and Grounded all Natural Truths, (which could have no Foundation but only in the *Things* which the First Truth had made) upon these *Fantastick Resemblances*: and, thence, they put all Formal Truths to consist in the *Agreement* of those Empty *Similitudes*; till at length, (as Fancy let loose to fly at its full Random, and driven forward with a quick Wit, does naturally and genuinely lead) they had introduced a kind of Fanaticism into Philosophy; built, in the main, or in great part, on a pretended *Inward Light* by means of those Imaginary and Visionary *Ideas*.

From this Introversion upon these unsolid *Aiery Bubbles*, and thence their neglecting  
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the *Things* themselves, and our *Solid Natural Notions*, Mr. *Locke* was brought to Confound *Corporeal* and *Spiritual* Natures; and consequently, (these two being the Adequate Object of all Philosophy) all Philosophical Knowledge was rendred impossible. And *Cartesius* left us no means to know whether Man is *One Thing* made up of Soul and Body, or *Two Things*, tack'd together by virtue of some *Accident*; which well consisted with their *Substantial Distinction*. Hence also it came, that GOD was brought in at every Hard Pinch, to act contrary to what the Natures of Things requir'd; without which, they could not lay their *Principles*, or make their Scheme *cohere*; that is, they would needs make GOD, as he is the Author and Orderer of *Nature*, to work either *Preternaturally* or else *Supernaturally*; which is a plain Contradiction. Nay, Mr. *Locke* finding no *Fancy* in his Imaginative Power that suits with our Notion of [*Thing*,] would perswade the World that no Man living knows what a *Thing* or *Substance* is; that is, that none knows what the Word *Thing* means; which is so Evident to our Natural Thoughts, that it is impossible for the rudest Person in the World to be Ignorant of it. In a Word, their *Fancy* so inveigled their Reason, that they came to deny *Self-evident Truths*; and held many other Propositions, which were absolutely *Impossible* and *Contradictory*. Where-

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Wherefore, seeing Philosophy reduced to this lamentable Condition; and, that *Solid Rationality*, and all *Truth* in *Natural* Objects, were thus in imminent Danger to be overrun and born down by Imaginary *Conceits*; and apprehending that GOD's Providence had fitted and enabled me to redress such great Mischiefs; I thought it became me to re-instate *Reason* in her *Sovereignty* over *Fancy*; and, to assert to her the *Rightful* Dominion Nature had given her over all our *Judgments* and *Discourses*. I resolved therefore to dis-intricate Truth, ( which lay too *deep* for *Superficial* Fancy to fathom ) from all those Labyrinths of Errour. I observ'd that Philosophy labour'd and languish'd under many *Complicated Distempers*, ( all springing from this way of *Ideas* ) and that they were grown Epidemical; nor could they be cur'd by the Application of Remedies to *this* or *that* Particular Part, or by confuting *this* or *that* Particular Errour. Hereupon, having found out the true Cause of all these *Maladies* of *Human Understanding*, I saw it was necessary to Stub up by the Roots that *Way* it self; and, by *Close* and *Solid* Reasons, ( the most *Decisive* Weapons in *Truth's Armory*, ) to break in pieces the brittle Glassy Essences of those Fantastick Apparitions; which, if a Right Way of Reasoning be settled, and understood, will disappear, and vanish out of the  
World,

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World, as their Elder Sisters, the *Fairies*, have done in this last Half Century.

I know, my Lord, *Reformation* made by a Single Man, tho' but in *Philosophy*, seldom gains Credit to him who attempts it. And, it must be confess'd, that, to pretend to *reform* where there is *no Necessity*, has an Ill Name; and is justly held to spring from Policy, Interest, Pride, or some such other Sinister Motive. But I am very confident, that whoever peruses this Treatise, nay, but even the *Preface*, will see, that the Occasion of this Undertaking was not only *Expedient*, but *Co-gent*. Nor can any Man justly tax him of Arrogance, or of Usurping a Dictature over other Men's Judgments, tho' he opposes Great Multitudes of Speculators, who offers *his Reasons* to convince *theirs*.

To *this Necessity*, now laid open, of Reforming Philosophy, I shall add *another*, of a much more weighty Concern; and which may also rectifie some zealous well-meaning Friends; who, judging of Things by their own Short Reach, think that the Advancing Truth in Philosophy is little better than *Time and Labour lost*; whereas, I, on the Contrary, do really think, that the Supplying what the World most wants, is the Greatest, and most Universal Good I can possibly do. This other Necessity then, of my rectifying our Modern Philosophy, (which will make others see;  
how

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how great a Good it is,) is *this*: Those Truths which are of a higher, and more Sacred Nature, can never be *rightly Explicated*, nor consequently (such Men not valuing Authority) be *duly recommended* to those who Dissent from them, unless *True Principles* of Philosophy be *Settled*, and *Unsound ones Confuted*. For, since no *Explication* of Faith can be made by *Faith it self*; all of them must necessarily be made by our *Reason*, shewing the Conformity they have to our *Natural Notions*, or to such Knowledges as we had from the Things in Nature; especially, since Dissenters draw their Chief Objections from the Repugnancy of those Points to our *Natural Principles*. 'Tis a known Truth, that as every *Definition* must be the *Self-same Notion* with what is *defin'd*, so must every right *Explication* too; it being, in reality, nothing but the *Unfolding* what was before *wrapt up Closer*. Whence follows, that, when he who has the ill Luck to have taken up *False Principles*, comes to explicate the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Resurrection, or any High Point of Reveal'd Faith; his *Explication* must always be *Contrary* to *True Principles of Nature*, and perhaps may have twenty real Contradictions in it; and, so, Common Reason (as was said) telling all Sensible Men, that the *Explication* must be the *same Sense* with the Point which it *Expli-*  
*cates*; the Tenet of Faith will *suffer* in the  
Opinion



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Opinion of Witty Men, by such an Untoward and Senseless Explication ; be *Ridiculous* to Adversaries ; and be held perfect *Nonsense* and *Contradiction*. Whereas, if the Philosophy, by which those Tenets are Explicated, be *True* and *Solid* ; then, since both *Natural* and *Reveal'd Truths* are *Children* of the *same Father*, (the *GOD* and *Author of All Truth*,) who cannot contradict Himself, and therefore those two Sorts of Truths *cannot but agree* ; it will follow, that the Explication of all Reveal'd Points, made according to True Philosophy, must needs appear to Intelligent Men to be *most Rational* ; and *most Consonant*, and not Contradictory, to True *Natural Principles* : Which will *Comfort* Faith in those who believe already ; *Recommend* it to all Ingenuous and Indifferent Seekers ; help to *Convert* to Christianity those, whose Reason was formerly Dissatisfy'd upon such Sinister Misconceits ; and, Lastly, *Confound* Adversaries, by putting them past Opposing it by any Principles of True Philosophy, and leave nothing for them to object against it, but *Idle* and *Ill-grounded Fancies*, whose weak Attempts are easily defeated. Whence, I could heartily wish, that, were *True Philosophy in Fashion*, all Sects (so the State thought fit) might have Free Liberty to Print the *best* Reasons they can muster up against Christianity ; Resting confident, that (*in that Happy State of Science*,

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or *True Learning*) nothing in the World could gain to Truth a greater Advantage. Till that Desirable Time comes, all I can do, is, to declare here publickly, that I shall take it for a great Favour, if any Learned *Socinian, Deist, or Atheist*, would please to send me those Reasons they, or their Leaders, judge of *most Weight*, why they cannot embrace the Doctrine of the *Trinity*, or *Christianity*; which they may do privately, and Unnam'd, to the Stationer who publishes this Treatise; and I do hereby promise them, I will give their Objections their Full Force, and publish an Answer to them: Onely, I will expect, that their Arguments shall be *Intrinsical* ones, or drawn from the *Opposition* such *Reveal'd Articles*, as they mislike, are conceiv'd by them to have to some *Principles* of Logick, Physics, or Metaphysics, which are either *Self-evident*, or which they will undertake to *reduce to Evidence*: These onely being such Objections as becomes a *Christian Philosopher* to speak to. For, if they be *Extrinsical* ones, and built on *Histories*, or on *Groundless Fancies*; or, if they consist in *Glossing Words*, in whose *Sense* we are not *Agreed*; it belongs to a *Critick*, or a *Historian*, and is not the Proper Employment of a *Philosopher*.

I would not be thought, by what is said lately, to cast any Reflexions on *Cartesius* or *Mr. Locke*, (whom I join here equally, and  
indif-

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indifferently, ) as intending any Diskindness to Christianity by their New Methods of Philosophy : It appears both by their Writings, and by their particular manner of handling their Subjects, that they meant ingenuously and sincerely to follow what they conceiv'd to be *True*. Onely I must say of both of them, that, if their *Way* of Philosophizing, and, therefore, their Philosophy *it self*, be shewn to be far from *True* and *Solid* ; then, in case any Chief Christian Tenet should come to be Explicated by *their Ways*, those Sacred Points *themselves* must necessarily, for the Reason now given, receive some Taint and Blemish by such *Ill-grounded Explications* : And the same, for the same Reason, I must say of *School-Philosophy* too, if it proceeds upon Principles that are not *Well-grounded*, or *Solid*.

It remains, my Lord, to give my Reasons why this Common Duty I here perform to the Learned Part of Mankind who are Candidates of *Science*, comes to be *particularly* address'd to Your Self : Which, in short, are these. I was much *in Debt* ; and it was an Honest Man's Part to endeavour to *discharge* it. I ow'd much to Your Lordship's Father, of Honourable and Pious Memory, who both encourag'd my first Endeavours, and favour'd me with a particular Friendship and Correspondence to His Dying-Day : And, I make account, such kind Obligements, writ in a

*Great-*

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*Grateful Heart*, ought to be as *Lasting*, and as *Binding*, as those Obligations drawn on *Paper*; and, withal, ought to devolve, by a Hereditary Right, to His Immediate Descendent, Your Self. I ow'd very much to Your Lordship's own Person, for the Kind Respect with which You have been pleas'd to honour me. I ow'd much to all Your Lordship's Nearest and Noblest Relations, both in the *Direct*, and in all the *Collateral* Lines. And, lastly, since every Man who writes for *Truth*, naturally loves to be *Understood*, I ow'd it to my Self, to present this Treatise particularly to Your Lordship; than whom, I know none of our *English* Nobility more *Acutely Intelligent*. It is of such a Nature, by its laying the Foundation of Philosophy from the deepest Bottom-Principles, that, to comprehend and penetrate it thorowly, there was requir'd a Judgment both *Solid*, and *Pointed*; both which Perfections meet in Your Lordship's Great *Genius*, in a *High Perfection*.

The Diligent Printer has overtaken my Lazy Pen, and stays for this hasty Scribble; which forces me, with an Unmannerly Abruptness, to write my self,

My L O R D,

Your Lordship's

Most Sincere Honourer, and  
most humbly devoted Servant,

J. S.



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T H E  
P R E F A C E.  
D I R E C T E D

To those Learned Men of both our Universities who have a Due Regard for TRUTH, and a Sincere Desire of KNOWLEDGE.

Gentlemen,

I. **A**fter I had Publish'd my METHOD to SCIENCE, which I Dedicated to your selves, I came to receive certain Information that very many Students in both the Universities, and not a few of those also who were to instruct others, did apply themselves to the Way of Ideas, in hopes to arrive by that means at Philosophical Knowledge. My best Judgment, grounded on very Evident Reasons, assur'd me, that that Method was far from Solid, and utterly Unable to give you the True Knowledge of any thing in Nature; being it self altogether Groundleis, and meerly Superficial. I saw clearly, that to addict your Thoughts to study Similitudes and Resemblances,

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ces, (which, as will be most evidently demonstrated, could not possibly give you any True or Certain Light to know the Things themselves,) was no better than (as it is in the Fable) Vitreum vas lambere, pulstem non attingere. It struck me with a very sensible Trouble, that the precious Time and Pains of such great Numbers of Men, who were the Flower of our Nation, who were hereafter to be Guides to others, and whose very Profession, and State of Life, had addicted them wholly to the Pursuit of Knowledge, should be imbued with such Principles as render'd the Attainment of it absolutely Impossible. I look'd upon my self as one who, having spent near half a Century in Speculative Studies, was capable to avert and redress so great a Harm; and, thence, I esteem'd my self bound in Duty to make you aware of the Way you have either chosen, or light into for want of a better; that you might consider seriously whether you ought not to retrieve your Steps ere you had wander'd too far in a Path which could never bring you to the End you aim'd at. This Consideration oblig'd me to strike at the Root, and to overthrow the whole Way of proceeding upon Ideas, by whomsoever advanced; and to demonstrate by many Clear, and, I hope, Unanswerable Arguments, and Multitudes of Instances, that it was Superficial, Fruitless, Insignificant, and meerly Phantastical.

2. When

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2. When I had near finish'd my METHOD, I gave a Cursory Look over Mr. Locke's Essay concerning Humane Understanding; and I hap'd to light on some places, which gave me a high Esteem for it; insomuch that I began to conceive some Hopes that his Ingenious Thoughts might, with some few Alterations, be reconcil'd to True Philosophy: For, I was at that time far from intending to make any Reflexions upon it, but highly extoll'd it where-ever I came; judging of the Whole, by the Scantlings I had seen of it (as it were) accidentally. But, the last September, setting my self to take a nearer and fuller View of the whole Book, I quite lost the Hopes, I had gladly entertain'd formerly, of According it with Philosophical Principles; and became much concern'd, that so Excellent a Wit should be half lost to the Commonwealth of Learning, by lighting unfortunately into such an Unaccountable Method. For, I saw evidently, that (besides the Oddness of the Way he took) his Fancy, the Vivacity of which was very Extraordinary, had, in very many Particulars, got such an Ascendent over his Reason, that, as he was Sceptical in divers Things which were Clearest Truths; so he seem'd in very many others to be Positive, the Contrary to which was plainly Demonstrable, and in a manner Self-evident. I was heartily sorry, I say, to see so considerable a Writer, whose Comprehensive Genius, and Clear Expression, would have

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*made Truth Irresistible, had he taken her part, mis-led so strangely as to take Fancies for Realities; and to think that Philosophy, which is the Knowledge of Things, consisted in a perpetual Contemplation of Empty Ideas, or Resemblances.*

3. *This wrought up my Thoughts higher, and made me conceive a greater Indignation against this New Way of Philosophizing; and that, very particularly, for his sake; tho' I saw the Cartesians as much wanted Rectifying in their Grounds, as he, or rather more. Wherefore, to gain such a powerful Assistant over to Truth's side, (of which, his Sincere Professions of Ingenuity would not let me despair,) I resolv'd to lay open those Blemishes of Errours I had observ'd in his Essay, retaining still a due Esteem for the many Beauties it contain'd: For, I do assure him, my Nature leads me, as willingly to acknowledge and give their just Elogiums to his κατὰ δυνάμιν, as to discover the ἐλαττώματα, he may have fallen into at unawares, as I doubt not but my Readers will see; and, that (tho' I declare Open War against the Way it self) I rather incline to Excuse, than to Aggravate his Faults or Mistakes. Indeed, the Duty I ow'd to Truth oblig'd me to note those Latter with such a Distinction, as I conceiv'd they did more or less injure that Sacred Concern. And, I was the more willing to enter the Lists against such a Champion; because, if I hop'd to gain*



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gain any Advantage over him, (*I had rather say, if I had the good Fortune to win him,*) 'tis impossible Truth should ever obtain a more clear Victory; For, no Man, who takes the just Dimensions of Mr. Locke's Great Wit, can think, that any thing but the Invincible Force of Truth can foil him.

4. *I have good Reason to fear, that this Declaring against whole Bodies of Ideists, at once, will be interpreted by some to favour of Singularity: It will be deem'd by others, a high Imprudence to make such a Bold Breach with a World of Acute Speculators; with whole Sects of Modern Philosophers, both in two Neighbouring Nations, and in our own Universities; and, in many Things, with most of the School-men too. Others will think, that I do very unwisely provoke Opposition; and, by such a brisk Attack, in a manner Challenge all those Great Men who are of a contrary Sentiment. But, what is all this to his purpose, who has devoted himself wholly to promote and defend TRUTH; and, is sure he does, upon Solid Reasons, judge that to be True which he maintains? This Objection seems grounded on this False Maxim, which some Men have set up very politickly, to establish their own Reputation with the Vulgar, as Sacred and Inviolable; viz. that [The Opinion of a Multitude has the Force of a kind of Authority, to bridle the Understandings of Private Men from Setting up a Contrary*  
a 3 *Doctrine.]*

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Doctrine.] Now, whatever some Men may think of this Position, I must declare my Sentiment of it, that it is the most pernicious Maxim that could be invented, to hinder the Progress of Rational Nature in that which should most perfect it; that it puts a stop to the farther Use of their Reason in all future Mankind; that it makes all Improvement in Knowledge Impossible, and utterly obstructs the Advancement of SCIENCE. No Reasoners, how many, or of how Great Name soever they be, have any Authority at all but by Virtue of the Reasons they produce; whence, that Single Man, whoever he be, that brings better Reasons, for the Tenet he advances, than all the former World has done for theirs, ought to have more of this (miscall'd) Authority, than that whole World of Opposers.

5. But, this postponing the Consideration of the Multitude of Dissenting Speculators to Evident Reason, is ten times more Justifiable, in case that Opposing Party does not so much as pretend to, much less produce Self-evident Principles, nor Demonstration, to Ground, or Conclude their Tenets; but builds on Voluntary Suppositions, and makes use of Wit, good Language, and other merely plausible Ways, to recommend their Conclusions to the Approbation of their Readers. Those who do not so much as pretend to Demonstration and Clear Principles, being unable to offer any Thing that is Cer-  
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rain, ought not (in my Opinion) meddle at all with Philosophy; nor appear before Learned Men with an Expectation their Doctrine should be Embraced; nor can they, in reason, Assert any thing, but only Propose.

6. But the main Consideration which takes off all Invidiousness from my Carriage in this Particular, is, that in this whole Contest between the Ideists and me, there is Nothing at all that is Personal. 'Tis not the Parts or Abilities of the Contenders, but their METHOD which is in Dispute. The Slowest and Lamest Traveller, who can but creep forward in a right Path, shall sooner arrive at his Journey's End, than Another whose Legs are nimble, and his Pace swift, if he takes a wrong Way at his first setting out. Rather his greater Strength and Agility do, in such a case, enable him only to run more widely astray; as the strongest Bow shoots farthest from the Mark, if the Shaft be wrong levell'd. Let the Talent of Wit in the Ideists be Incomparable, (as doubtless that of Cartesius was, to whom I may, with Justice, join Mr. Locke) if the Methods they take be not proper to attain true Science, their Errors, when they mistake, (as I am sure they do in their Principles, and, consequently, in most of their Conclusions,) must be to the same Degree more Enormous, as their Fancies are more Ingenious. 'Tis their METHOD then, or their Way of Proceeding and Building,

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upon Ideas, which I most blame and oppose. Or rather I deplore the Detriment accruing hence to the Learned Part of the World, that Men, endowed with such an Excellent Genius, did unluckily light into such an Indirect and Perplex'd Path ; seeing what vast Advances Science might have made, had such Men taken up Right Principles, hit upon the Right Way at first, and apply'd their Strong Brains to pursue it. 'Tis not then their Endowments which come into Competition, to which I deserr as much as is possible : For, I much more admire the Skill of such Architects as can build a Castle in the Air, and make it hang there by Geometry (as it were) than all those common sort of Artists, who can raise such a Structure upon Firm Ground.

7. What our several Methods are, the Title of my Book tells my Reader in short, viz. that, (as I have hinted in my Dedictory ) Theirs is to ground all their Discourses on Ideas ; that is, (as themselves express it, and as the Word [Idea] declares,) on Similitudes or Resemblances ; which Similitudes, (as is abundantly demonstrated in my three first Preliminaries,) are meer Fancies : Mine is to build them solely and entirely on the Things themselves, in which, as the Footsteps or Effects of his Essential Verity, the Creative Wisdom of the God of Truth, has planted and imprinted all Created Truths whatever. This Method I observe so exactly throughout my whole METHOD,



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**THOD**, and this present Treatise, that I disown and renounce any Discourse in either of these Books, which is not built either upon the Things as they are in Nature, or according to the Being they Naturally have in the Understanding : And, I shall owe much to that Man, who will show me that I do any where decline from this solid and well-grounded Method. As for Formal Truths, found in our Judgments or Discourses, I build them on most Evident Principles, or strive to reduce them thither ; and on the Connexion of the Terms found in Propositions, by which only Truth can be express'd ; keeping still an Attentive Regard to the Things themselves. And I desire that the Differences between the Ideists and me may be decided by the Impartial Umpirage of Rigorous Logick. A Test, which, as I am sure their Cause cannot bear, so I am confident they will never accept of or stand to. For, it may easily be discern'd by any serious Reflector, that their Procedure and manner of Discoursing is not by way of laying Principles, and drawing a Close and well-knit Train of Consequences, as I do in all the main Points of my Method, and in this present Treatise on occasion ; but, by Unproved Suppositions, and Loose Discourses made up of well-express'd Wit, Ingenious Remarks, Quaint Novelties, Plausible Explications, and such other Superficial ways ; which, tho' they take with Vulgar Readers, are (to speak plainly)

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*more fit for Flashy Rhetorical Declamation, than for Manly and Solid PHILOSOPHY. Nor do I think it did ever so much as once enter into the Thoughts of the Ideists, much less their Hope, that their Discourse could be reduced to Self-evidence, or to that Artificial Form of Close Discourse call'd a Demonstrative Syllogism; which is the Touchstone to distinguish what Ratiocinations are truly Conclusive, what Inconclusive or Fallacious. Without which, what do we know?*

8. *I am very well aware what Prejudice I bring upon myself, by Addressing you in this Confident manner at the very first Dash of my Pen; and some well-meaning Friends have advertis'd me, that this Carriage of mine has been reflected on, especially by some meer School-men; who, tho' they in reality know nothing, are more proud of their Probabilities, than the most Scientifical Man living is of his Demonstrations; tho' their utmost Performances amount to no more than that of the ridiculous Fortune-tellers of old,*

-----Aut crit, aut non;  
Divinare etenim magnus mihi donat Apollo.

*Whence I do fully expect, that the Humour of our Modern Speculators will judge this Assuredness of mine to be a high Presumption of my own Performances; nay, some will think it a proud*  
Disregard

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Disregard of others even to talk of Demonstration. Indeed, I must own I have a high Opinion of my Principles and my Method, which Nature and GOD's good Providence have laid and establish'd. But, as for my Conclusions and Deductions, as I will not justify them all with the same Firmness as I did the others; so, I must declare, that did I not really judge them Demonstrative when I call them so, I should not think I ought to propose them as such; nor at all to the Learned. The World has been sufficiently pester'd already with Books of Philosophy, nay, Volumes, blown up to a vast Bulk with Windy and Frothy Probabilities, and petty Inconclusive Topicks; which, like Rank Weeds, have over-run that Rich Soil where Science ought to have been Sown; and I esteem it too poor and mean a Vanity to plant Briar-fields to enlarge a Wilderness. If I overween in calling my Proofs, Demonstrations, I am willing to take the Shame to my self, if it deserves Shame; tho' perhaps I had been more blame-worthy, if, really judging them Demonstrative, I had miniced the Truth, and out of an Affected Modesty, or a Diffidence for which I saw no Ground, I had diminish'd their Force in the esteem of my Readers; and so hinder'd the Profit, which, startled at the Uncouth Sound of Demonstration, they might otherwise have reap'd by looking into them. For, DEMONSTRATIONS  
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are Strange Rarities in this Sceptical Age ; and when those who are to show them do proclame to the World where they are to be seen, Curious People will run in Flocks to view the Monster.

9. He that knows what Demonstration is, and verily judges his Argument is such, and yet, out of Niaiserie and Shamefastness says at every turn, [ I think, or, perhaps this is true, or may be True ] should, if I might advise him, wear a Mask ; for he does as good as tell his Readers, [ Gentlemen, I offer you an Argument, but I fear 'tis not worth your Acceptance. ] A strange Complement from one Philosopher to another ! It was not out of my Natural Humour and Inclination, but perfectly out of Deliberate Design to win my Readers to Attentive Examination, and invite those who were dissatisfy'd to Opposition, ( which is the best means to clear Truth ) that I deliver'd my self with that Bold Assurance. And I did really intend that Sceptical Men should ask, ----Quid profert dignum tanto promissor hiatu ? That, setting themselves thence to Sift the Nature of my Method, and the Force of my Arguments more narrowly, they might better sink into their Understandings ; as I am Confident they will, if ever they have perused my Method to Science; and, by that or any other means, do solidly know what is requisite to a true Demonstration.



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FO. *Another Reason why I put on this Vi-  
zard of Confidence, so little suting with my  
Natural Complexion, was this. The want of  
true Science, and the Despair of finding any,  
had brought such a Luke-warm and Indifferent  
Humour into the World, (and I wish it were  
not too common) that, tho' all Men affect to  
talk of Truth, and seem in Ordinary Discourse  
to value and magnific her; yet, when it comes  
to the Point, scarce one Man dares heartily  
profess himself her Champion, and declare he  
will defend her Cause with Evident Reason,  
against all Opposers. For, alas! how few Men  
are there, who will profess to Demonstrate in  
Philosophy, or to reduce their Discourses to Evi-  
dence? Without doing which, and abiding by  
the Tryal, perhaps there is not one Word of  
Truth in all Philosophy, nor any thing but  
Learned Romance in all the Universities of  
Europe. Many Men, indeed, do make a Pro-  
fession of Knowledge, because 'tis Honourable;  
and every Scholar is engag'd to do so, or he will  
quite lose his Credit. But, when it should come  
to Performance, not one Man in ten thousand  
shews that Zeal for the Advancement of Truth  
as answers to the Profession he made to love  
and esteem it; but, tho' he sees Errour and  
Ignorance, and Probable Talking overspread  
the Face of Philosophy, and stifle Truth and  
Knowledge both, he sits still Unconcern'd. Now  
and then indeed there is a Writer who attempts*  
to

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*to confute this or that particular Errour ; some Casual Circumstance addicting him to that Employment : But, what Man sets himself to lay the Ax at the Root, or writes against Uncertain Methods and Groundless Babbling ? What Man goes about to make Mankind aware of the Mischief that comes to Rational Nature by the Sophisticate Ways of talking prettily, neatly, and wittily ; tho', perhaps, not a Word Groundedly and Solidly ? Nay, what Man is not well-Appay'd and Pleas'd with a well-penn'd Piece ; tho', were the Reason in it sifted to the Bottom, perhaps there is not one Evident Truth in it to build that Discourse on ; that is, not one Word of Sense in it ; but only such a way of Plausible Discourse or Language-Learning, as may serve equally and indifferently to maintain either side of the Contradiction ?*

**II.** *Lastly, (which is the Chief Point,) Who is there that applies himself to find out a CERTAIN METHOD to arrive at Truth, and attain Knowledge, without which all our Studies are to no purpose ? Logick is the Proper Art to give us this Method ; and I see Students do generally make use of any Logician, so he but talks dily of the Operations of the Understanding ; of Propositions, Syllogisms, and Demonstration ; tho', perhaps, he gives not one Word of Reason for his Unprov'd Sayings, to enlighten the Understanding of the Learner, or inform him, (ex Natura rei,) whence and why this*  
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*and the other Rudiment, or Rule, must be so : Such an Author may indeed enable a Learner to say as he says, and talk after him in imitation, as it were ; but he can never instruct him to understand what's True, and why it is True, or to demonstrate himself ; which was the main Design of my METHOD.*

12. *But my greatest Complaint against others, and my best Excuse for putting my self forwards with such a Confident Ayr, is, that I see not that any Learned Men do endeavour to make Head against Scepticism ; which, thro' this Universal Connivence, or rather Civil and Kind Toleration, and (in some sort) Encouragement, creeps by insensible Degrees into even the most Learned Societies, infects the best Wits of our Nation, threatens to bear down all true Philosophy, to extinguish the Natural Light of Men's Understandings, and drown their best Faculty [ Reason ] in a Deluge of Profound Ignorance. For, if this Vogue should obtain still in the World to look upon any loose Discourse for brave Sense, so it be but sprucely dress'd up in neat Language, and Sauc'd with a little Piquancy of brisk Wit ; and let it pass current for True Learning and Knowledge ; Scepticism will not only insinuate it self slyly into all sorts of Men, but be recommended to the World by such an Universal Approbation of well-clad gentle Ignorance. Nor does this mischievous Inundation stop its Career in bereaving us of Natural*

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ral Truths; but, having once darken'd in us the Knowledge of Nature, it disposes Men to doubt of, and too often to deny the Existence of the Author of Nature himself; who is best made known to Mankind by Science, or the **Exact Knowledge** of his Creatures; from which we glean all the Notions, and, consequently, all the Knowledge, we, by Ordinary Means, have, or ought to have. All these Mischiefs, (I may add, and all Immorality too,) are owing to the Insensible Growth of this Lethargy of our Understanding, **SCEPTICISM**; which benums and chills our Intellectual Faculties with a Cold Despair of ever attaining Evident Knowledge of any thing; for which, as its Natural Perfection, our Soul was fitted and ordain'd. I saw this Gloomy Evening overcasting the Clear Sky of Science, and drawing on the Cimmerian Night of Dark Ignorance, and Black Infidelity; and thence it was, that, to awaken Men's Souls out of this drowzy Sleep and Torpor of their Mind, I did so often, boldly and fearlessly (tho' as I judg'd, truly,) declare and proclaim aloud, that Demonstration in Philosophy might be had, and that I had actually Demonstrated in such and such Particulars.

13. Lastly, 'Tis for this Reason, and to rescue all Sincere Lovers of Truth from this spreading Contagion of Scepticism, that with an unusual Boldness, I did (as was said before) attempt to write a Demonstrative Logick; to  
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comprehend which, whoever shall bestow half that Pains as Men usually do who study the Mathematicks, (for such Connected Discourses are not to be perused, with hopes of profiting by them, with a Cursory Application,) will, I am sure, be able to set all his Natural Notions in a Right and Distinct Order; know how to connect two of them with one another in a Solid Judgment; and both of them with a Third to frame a Conclusive Discourse; and not only have the True Nature of Demonstration knowingly fix'd in his Mind, by comprehending the Reason of it; but, by having it there, he himself will be enabled to work according to that Nature, or to Demonstrate himself; without Ability to know or do which, none ought to pretend to be a Philosopher. Lastly, To carry this Good Work forward as far as was possible, I have here, as a Supplement to my METHOD, and an Introduction to my Reflexions, added Five Preliminary Discourses; shewing the true and solid Bottom-Ground on which all Exact Knowledge, or Philosophy, is built; and, that the Things themselves, and not Ideas, Resemblances, or Fancies, (which can never make us know the Things,) are and must be the only Firm Foundation of Truth, and of our Knowledge of all Truths whatsoever.

14. I must not pass over another Complaint made of me by some of the Cartesian School; viz. That in the Preface to my METHOD, I so  
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*deeply Censure Malbranche as a Phanatick in Philosophy ; nay, the whole Way it self as disposing to Enthusiasm. To the First Part of my Charge, I reply, That I cited that Author's own Words ; which are such strong Proofs of a Fanatick Genius, that I cannot believe any Arguments of mine can add Weight to the Full Evidence and Force they carry'd with them, to manifest that his Philosophy is built upon Inspiration ; or, as himself expresses it, comes to him by Revelation. And, for my pretending that the whole Cartesian Way of Philosophizing is of the same Leven, I can need no other Compurgator than that French Author, who with much Exactness wrote the Life of Cartesius, and was his good Friend and Follower. The Book is now made English ; where in the 34th Page he tells us, that To get rid of all his Prejudices, ( that is, to Unlearn, amongst other Things, all that the Clear Light of Nature had taught him ) Cartesius did undergo no less than to UNMAN himself. A pretty Self-denying Beginning ! And Pag. 35, 36. that he wearied out his Mind to that Degree in his Enquiry after this Happy Means, ( viz. that his Imagination should represent to him his Understanding quite naked ) that his Brain took Fire, and he fell into a Spice of Enthusiasm ; which dispos'd his Mind, already quite spent, in such a manner, that it was fit to receive Impressions of Dreams and Visions.*  
*Where*

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*Where we see it confess'd, that his Method of Unknowing all that Nature had taught him, brought him to Enthusiasm, and Enthusiasm to Visions and Revelations; so that Malbranche did but follow his Masters Example, and copy'd his Method. The Author proceeds. He (Cartesius) acquaints us, that on the 10th of November, 1619. laying himself down brimful of Enthusiasm, (which is little better than stark mad) and wholly possess'd with the Thoughts of having found that day the Foundation of that Wonderful Science, he had three Dreams presently one after another; yet, so extraordinary, as to make him fancy they were sent him from Above. He supposed he discern'd thro' their Shadows, the Tracks of the Paths GOD had chalk'd out to him, in his Enquiry after Truth. And is it not a powerful Motive to make all Wits, (especially, if they be of a Melancholy Temper) who are inclin'd to embrace his Doctrine, which was first sent from Heaven, to gape after Revelations too, as well as Malbranche did? He goes on. But the Divine Spiritual Air which he took a Pride to give to those Dreams, was so near a-kin to that Enthusiasm wherewith he believ'd himself to be warmed, that a Man would have believ'd he had been a little Crack'd-brain'd. And, lest any should wrong the Original of his Doctrine, or degrade it from the Honour of being given him by Divine Inspira-*

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*tion, this Author takes off any unfavourable Conjecture of ours, that might make it spring from any Sublunary Cause, in these Words : One would have believ'd he had drunk a Cup too much that Evening before he went to Bed ; but he assur'd us he had been very sober all that Day, and that Evening too, and had not drunk a drop of Wine three Weeks together. This looks as if Cartesius himself, who so cautiously inform'd him of this afterwards, was fond to have it thought that his Doctrine, and especially his Method, (which was the Minerva of which his Brain was then in Labour,) had been given him from Above, by Supernatural means.*

15. Now, Gentlemen, I beseech you, tell me, in good Sober Sadness ; Can you think GOD ever intended that the onely Method for Men to get Knowledge, should be to lose their Wits first in looking after it ? That, to Unman our selves, so as to seem Crack'd-Brain'd, or Drunk, is the Way to become Soberly Rational ? That, to reduce our selves to perfect Ignorance of all that the Goodness of Nature has taught us, (which is, in plain Terms, to make an Ass of one's self,) is the onely Certain Way to become a Philosopher ? Certainly, unless we be all insatuated with Enthusiastick Dreams and Visions, made up of Ideas, we should rather think that it is a far more Solid, and more Natural Way, to begin our Quest of Truth from those  
Know-



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*Knowledges which are Evident, and such Grounds as are Magis Nota, and thence proceed by our Reason to Minus Nota, than it is to take our Rise from Affected Ignorance, and Unknowing again all those  $\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\ \epsilon\upsilon\upsilon\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma$ , or Common Notions, which Right Nature had given us to ground all other Knowledges on. No wonder then, this Freakish Method, taken up by Whimsical Fancy, had for its Germen Effect, Fantastick Dreams, Visionary Madness, and Enthusiastick Folly; which this Writer of his Life (who, doubtless, was himself a Zealous Cartesian) calls here A Happy Means, the Foundation of that Wonderful Science, the Path Chalk'd out by God; and the Descanting on them, to be done by A Divine Spiritual Air; tho' he confesses, at the same time, they were Dreams, Visions, and Fits of Enthusiasm; and that they made him that had them seem Crack'd-Brain'd, or Drunk. All these wild Caprichio's of Cartesius, sprung naturally from a Lively and Heighten'd Fancy, screw'd up by frequent Sollicitous and Melancholy Thoughts; and were the Effects of his Introversion upon his Ideas; which is quite Opposite to his Regarding the Things in Nature, that are without us. Nor do I doubt, but that all his Followers, did they (as they ought) imitate their Master, and follow his Example, in laying aside first all their former Natural Knowledges, would also (as any Man must who takes that Unnatural*

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*Method*) fall into Fits of Enthusiasm, Dreams, and Visions, and Run Mad for Company. For, IDEAS, which, being Similitudes, are no more but Fancies, Appearances, and Representations, are, consequently, far more Proper Materials for Dreams and Visions, and such Roving Flights, than they are for Science, or Solid Philosophy.

16. Tho' I forestall what comes hereafter, I am tempted to annex here, to this Character of the Cartesian Manner of Spirit in Philosophy, a short Passage mention'd by Mr. Locke, Book 4. Chap. 7. §. 17. viz. That he has discours'd with very Rational Men, who have actually Deny'd they were Men. Now, certainly, this is something beyond Enthusiasm, and Extravagant even to Madness, that any Man should deny himself to be what he is : But, 'tis Prodigious, that Mr. Locke should give such Men the Elogium of being very Rational. Whence, since he cannot but sincerely judge, that the Way he proposes and maintains in his Essay, is the most Rational of any other ; we are to conclude, that those very Rational Men did follow this Way of his, and were great Idealists ; or else, that Mr. Locke judges that those Men who actually deny'd themselves to be Men. might, for all that, according to his Way of Ideas, be very Rational notwithstanding. 'Tis worth our while to observe the Consonant Effect of the Ideal Way, in the Followers of Cartesius and Mr. Locke,  
and

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*and (in some sort) in both the Authors of those Philosophical Sects themselves : The One UNMANS himself ; and the Others Deny themselves to be Men, and yet are Character'd by Mr. L. to be, notwithstanding, very Rational : Which are so perfectly Parallel, that I am at a great Loss which to prefer. And, now, do you think, Gentlemen, that, (besides the Regard we owe to Truth,) out of the Common Love we ought to bear to Mankind, and to Rational Nature, that it is not high time to look to our Wits, and to make head against this Way of Ideas ; when we find two such Great Men as Cartesius, and Mr. Locke, thro' this Fantastick Method they had chosen, fall into such Incredible Extravagancies, as either (in a manner) to Abdicate, by Unmanning one's self ; or, to commend the Abdication of their own Natures ; at least, to think them very Rational that do so ?*

17. *Far be it from me to judge, that all, or most of the Performances of those two admirably-Ingenuous Men, are of this Extravagant Nature. 'Tis my sincere Judgment, that Few Men write Like them ; and, None, Better, where their Ill-grounded Methods do not intermingle, and pervert their Reason. And, I freely acknowledge, that Mr. Locke's ESSAY, on which I make so many Reflexions, contains many Excellent and Uncommon Truths in it : Tho' I do not think he owes any of them to his Way of Ideas ; but, that he proceeded in such*

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*Occasions, upon his Natural Notions, in the same manner the Aristotelians do; and, thence, made Right Judgments and Reflexions upon them by his own Acute Wit. This Unfortunate Choice of their Method did, as I conceive, proceed hence, that such Active and Quick Fancies do not patiently brook the Rains of Logick and Metaphysics; the former of which (much against the Grain) restrains them from taking their Wild Career, by the Discipline of its Artificial Rules; the other keeps them from Roving, by the Self-evident Maxims it forces their Understanding to accept of. Whence, if these two do not bridle and keep them in, it is not to be expected in Nature that such High-mettl'd Fancies should be held within strict Bounds, or kept to the Slow and Sober Pace of Solid Reason; but, that they will take their Vagaries, and run over Hedge and Ditch, whithersoever the Swift Career of that Nimble Faculty hurries them. This Discourse I make the more willingly, that those Students who read this, may clearly discern, that all their Application to gain Knowledge will be purely Lost Labour, and Time thrown away, if their First and Chief Care be not to take a Wise and Solid Method at the Beginning.*

*Having thus finish'd my long Address, for which I beg your Pardon, I shall now apply myself to make some few Discourses, relating to my following Book.*



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18. **MAN** being One Thing, compounded of a Corporeal and a Spiritual Nature, and every Thing acting as it is, it follows, that both those Natures must concur to every Operation that flows from him, as he is Man; and, consequently, be produced by some Faculty belonging properly to each of those respective Natures: Nor can it be doubted, but that, as those Faculties, or Powers, which are peculiar to both those Natures, are as different as are the Natures themselves; so the Immediate Objects peculiar to those Different Faculties, must likewise be as widely Different from one another, as are those Powers to which they belong; and, consequently, be as vastly Opposite, as the Natures of Body and Spirit can distance them. It being then agreed to by all Parties, that the Faculties or Powers which join in our Production of Knowledge, are those we call the Imagination and the Mind, or the Fancy and the Understanding, I cannot doubt but it may be demonstratively concluded, from the known Nature and Constitution of this Thing called **MAN**, that, to every Thought or Act of Knowledge we have, (those being such Operations as properly and formally belong to us as we are Men,) there must two sorts of Interiour Objects concur; whereof, the One is of a Corporeal, the Other of a Spiritual Nature; and that, otherwise, those Acts could not be said to be Humane Acts, or the Acts of that Suppositum, or Compound Thing, called Man; but of  
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one of those Natures only, a-parted from the other as to its Operation, and consequently, as to its Being. Which Supposition is directly contradictory to the Natural Constitution of Man; as he is distinguish'd, on one side, from a Brute, who has nothing but Material Phantasms, or Ideas; on the other, from an Angel, or Intelligence; in whom there is nothing of Matter or Fancy, but all in it is purely Spiritual.

19. The Distinction of these two Objects of the Fancy and of the Understanding being granted, in some manner, by all Sides, I cannot but wonder how it hapt to escape the Thoughts of all the Philosophers both Ancient and Modern, to explicate fully and clearly the Exact Difference between those two Objects of the Fancy and of the Understanding; there being scarcely any one Point in Philosophy of half that Importance for the attaining of Truth, and avoiding of Error: For both these being truly in us, whenever we have an Act of Knowledge; and withall, being as far Removed from one another in their Natures as Body and Spirit are; if Speculative Men, either thro' mistake, or thro' Inadvertence of this vast difference between them, or out of Loathness to take Pains to look deep into the Intrinsical Natures of Things, imprinted in their Minds when they have Notions of them, shall happen to mistake what they find Uppermost or most Superficial, and therefore is easiest to their Fancy, (as Phantasms or Material Representations

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presentations are ) for Notions ; which, being of a Spiritual Nature, do not make so obvious and familiar an Appearance as those Gay Florid Pictures did, but are to be gather'd by Reason, or made Understood by Reflexion and Study ; such Speculators, I say, will be at the same loss, and not much wiser than those Birds were that peck'd at Xeuxis's Grapes to feed themselves ; mistaking the Outward Pourtraiture or Idea for the Inward Nature of the Thing : For, no Knowledge of the Things could ever be expected from Ideas, taken ( as themselves take them ) for Similitudes ; since those Terms or Words, which we use, and must use, when we speak or discourse of any thing whatever, were intended, by the Agreement of Mankind, to signify the Things themselves about which we are Discoursing, and not to signify meer Likenesses or Similitudes of them. However this has been neglected by others, I see 'tis my Duty to say something of this Distinction of Phantasms from Notions. I have in my 19th Reflexion, §§ 9, and 12. endeavour'd to shew it. To which I have here thought fit to annex some few *χρημα*, or Distinguishing Marks to know one from the other.

20. My first Criterion shall be the Sensibleness of the former, and Insensibleness of the other. When we shut our Eyes, or walk in the Dark, we experience we have Ideas or Images of our Way, or of other things we have seen, in our Fancy ; and this, without the least Labour  
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*of ours, or any Reflexion : And there is also beyond that, something else in the Mind, which tells us of what Nature, or what Things those are, which appear'd superficially to our Fancy ; which costs us Labour and Reflexion to bring it into the view of the Understanding, so that we cannot get perfect Acquaintance with it, unless we define it. Nor is this Sensible, as the other was, but only Intelligible : Not superficial or uppermost ; but hidden, retruse, and ( as we may say ) stands behind the Curtain of the Fancy : Nor easie to comprehend at the first Direct Sight of our Inward Eye, but costs us some Reflexion, or some Pains, to know it expresly and distinctly. Which latter sort, in each of these regards, are those we call Simple Apprehensions, Conceptions, or Notions.*

21. *The next Criterion shall be this : We find we have in us Meanings ; now the Meanings of Words, or ( which is the same, taking that word objectively, what's meant by those Words,) are most evidently the same Spiritual Objects as are our Notions, and 'tis Impossible those Meanings should be the same with Ideas or Similitudes, but of a quite different Nature. Let it be as Like the thing as 'tis possible, 'tis not the Likeness of it which we aim at in our Language : For we do not intend or mean when we speak of any thing, to talk or discourse of what's Like that Thing, but of what's the same with it, or rather what that thing it  
itself*



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self is; which the meer Similitude of a thing cannot possibly be. For a Similitude being Related to the Thing, is so far from being that Thing, or the Same as It is, that it is relatively Opposite to it; that is, quite Distinct from it. Now, that what's essentially and formally Distinct from a Thing, nay Opposite to it, should of it self, and by it self alone, give us the First Knowledge of It, (as they put their Ideas to do;) or that the Meaning of the one should be the Meaning of the other, is utterly Unintelligible, and against Common Sense. Wherefore the Meaning, which is the Immediate and Proper Object of the Mind, and which gives us, or rather is the First Notice of the Thing, must be of a quite different Nature from an Idea or Likeness of it; and since there can be no Middle between Like and the Same; nor any nearer Approach or Step, proceeding from Likeness, towards Unity with the Thing, but it falls into Identity, it must necessarily be more than Like it; that is, the Same with it; which an Idea or Likeness cannot possibly be, as was proved lately.

22. The Third Criterion which confirms the other, shall be this: None denies but Brutes have Ideas or Similitudes in their Fancy; but they can have no Meanings, because they have no Spiritual Part or Mind, only which can mean. Hence, all the Sounds or Noises they make, express only Passion, or some Corporal  
Eagerness

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*Easiness or Uneasiness which they feel, and not their Thoughts or Meaning : As appears by this ; that they can never come to know what the Words we use do mean or signify ; nor can those of them that can speak, adapt the Words they pronounce to our meaning, nor answer us pertinently ; which Reflexion serves to shew us farther the vast Difference between Ideas and Meanings, or between Phantoms and Notions.*

23. *My Third Criterion is taken from the Evident Difference between an Idea or Similitude of a Thing, and its Definition ; of which see Method to Science, Book 1. Less. 2. § 24. towards the End.*

24. *My Fourth Criterion is, That we are as certain we have General Notions, as that we have Particular ones ; nay, we can conceive them as General ; that is, we can conceive their Generality. If then we have an Idea or Likeness of Universality, or Generality, What is it like ? It must either be Like the Thing, or must be like Nothing, and so is no Idea or Likeness at all. But it cannot be like the Thing in any respect, because in the Thing there is nothing that is General or Universal ; but all that is there is Particular and Determin'd ; which is quite Unlike, nay, Opposite to Universality or Generality. 'Tis Evident then, that we have no Idea or Likeness of an Universal in our Meaning or Notion, when we use*

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use or hear the Words that signifie it. On the other side, we have a Notion of Homo, Animal, and Ens; and still a Clearer one according as they are more General. Wherefore, 'tis likewise evident, that our Notions are of a quite different Nature from Ideas or Similitudes.

25. I shall leave the pursuing this Point any farther, and give the Reader some Taste beforehand of what (perhaps) he will be cloy'd with in the following Book; especially it will be proper to season his Understanding with some few Notions concerning the main Question between the Ideists and me, viz. Whether our Knowledge is made by the Things being in our Mind when we know it, or an Idea or Similitude of it only. In order to which I ask the Ideists, Whether the Modes or Accidents are Distinct Entities from the Substance or Thing? To which I am sure Mr. Locke will say, They are not. Hence I argue, Therefore, if the Modes or Accidents be not Distinct really from the Substance, the Substance or Thing is not really, (or in re,) distinguish'd from the Modes or Accidents: Therefore they are (as they are in Nature, or in re) the same Thing, or Identify'd. Therefore they are only distinguish'd by the Understanding conceiving the same Thing diversely; therefore 'tis onely the Conceptions of our Understandings which are Distinct. Therefore taking the word [Conception] objectively; that is, for the Thing Conceived; all we  
conceive

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*conceive is still the Thing. Therefore all our Notions, both of the Substance and of its Accidents or Modes, that is, all the Notions we can have, (they being the same with our Conceptions,) are nothing but the Thing conceiv'd diversly. Therefore, if that Thing be a Body, all our Notions of it are meerly that Thing call'd Body diversly conceiv'd. Therefore the putting Space, Succession, &c. where there neither is nor can be any Body, is to put Body where there is no Body; and, is a meer Fancy, and Contradictory. Therefore those Philosophers who proceed upon our Grounds, do still Conceive, Judge and Discourse of the Thing. Therefore the Knowledge they gain by such Notions is the Knowledge of the Thing; the Judgments they make by connecting those Notions, are Connexions of the thus-distinguish'd Parts (as it were) of the Thing; and the Discourses they make, Discourses concerning the very Thing. Therefore the Philosophy of such Men is truly and entirely the Knowledge of the Things, or True Philosophy. Wherefore those who have only in their Minds SIMILITUDES or IDEAS, and do only Connect or Discourse of them, which Ideas are not the Thing, nor conceiv'd to be It either in whole, or in part, are convinced to build their Discourses (thus grounded) upon Nothing. Therefore they have no Solid Knowledge of any Thing. Therefore, in proper Speech, they know Nothing. Therefore all*  
*their*



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*their Philosophy ( thus built ) is purely Fantastick.*

*I infer farther, that, since this Distinction of the Thing into Substance (precisely consider'd) and its Modes or Accidents, is perform'd only by the Understanding; therefore it is made within the Understanding. Therefore since this Act, that thus Distinguishes them, is not Transitive to the Thing which is out of it, the Thing must be in the Understanding to be there Distinguish'd; otherwise we should Distinguish we Know not what; which ( it being done by a Knowing Power ) is impossible, and a perfect Contradiction. Therefore the Thing it self must forcibly be intellectually in the Mind: Therefore, there can need no Ideas or Similitudes to make us know it; for to be in a Knowing Power is to be known, without more ado.*

*'Tis incredibly Strange, and even Monstrous, that Mr. Locke's Thoughts and mine, like Antipodes, should move Diametrically Opposit to one another in this Point. He tells us, B.4. Ch.23. in his Margin, that there is no Abstract Idea of Substance; nor can we ( as he there says ) by the Sensible Qualities have any Idea of the Substance of Body, more than if we knew nothing at all. And, the Essences or Entities of Particular Substances ( as clearest Reason demonstrates, ) are incomparably harder to be known, than Substance in the Abstract; whence we must, consequently, know less than nothing*

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of Them, if we know nothing at all of the other : It being impossible to know what This Thing or This Man is, if we be Ignorant what Thing or Man is. Nor have we any Innate Ideas ( as he confesses ) to make [ Substance ] known. If, then neither Innate nor Acquir'd Ideas can make us know any thing at all of it, and we can know nothing but by Ideas ; 'tis plain, we cannot know Thing or Substance at all, and so we must rest contented with knowing Nothing. For, Substance being unknown, 'tis impossible to know any Mode or Accident ; they being essentially certain Manners how a Thing is ; and, so, including Substance and Thing in their Definition. Again, Mr. L. holds we can frame no Idea of Substance, or at most but a most blindly Obscure one ; and I hold that the Notion of it is most Clear, nay, the Clearest of any but that of Existence, express'd by the word [ is. ] He thinks that the nature of Accidents is known by themselves, tho' the Substance ly in the dark from us : And I judge it Demonstrable that, as they have no Entity of their own, but by means of the Thing, Ens or Substance, so they can have no Intelligibility ( which is a Property of Ens ) of their own, but meerly by virtue of the Substance or Thing with which they are Identify'd. In a word, He thinks Substance is most Unknown, and I say, 'tis self-evidently Known. He says it cannot be known Clearly ; and I say it not only can,

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can, but must be known clearly; nay, that nothing else can be known but It, or by being It.

By this Discourse it appears, that this Point being (of its own Nature) of Universal Concern; and, therefore, drawing Great and most Important Consequences after it, which, acting here as a Philosopher, I do not mention; either He or I must be in a most Dangerous Errour. Wherefore, being perfectly assured that the Method I take will not permit me to erre Enormously; and, very certain that I follow very faithfully that Method; I humbly beg of Mr. Locke, by that Candour and Ingenuity, of which (I doubt not, sincerely too) he has made so frequent Professions, that he would please to apply his Thoughts anew (for if Second Thoughts be Better, the Last may be Best of all) to review his Way of Ideas; and, comparing it with what I have propos'd and prov'd in my Method to Science, my Preliminaries, and my several Reflexions on his Essay, he would unbiasedly consider, whether (since he cannot suspect his own Excellent Parts) this New Way of Philosophizing be not the Sole Cause of all his Mistakes, and misleads him into all these Great Errours; to entertain which this Phantastick Method has inveigled his good Reason.

I have no more to Preface, but to beg Pardon for oftentimes repeating the same thing over and over in the ensuing Book, Mr. Locke civilly Apologizes for doing the same; and my  
chief

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*chief Excuse is, that, being to trace and follow his Discourses, I could not well avoid it ; hoping withall; at the same time, to clear the Point better ; either by some New Thought, which then occur'd, or by giving a better Turn to my former Arguments. Besides, I must confess, that I did now and then affect these Repetitions, to make some Particulars which were of most Weight sink better into the Judgment of my Readers, by re-minding them often of such Important Truths. I am forced to use the Word [Idea] often, because Mr. Locke (with whom I am discoursing) does so always ; tho' generally I join Notions to it. But, this one Note will keep my true Sentiment from being misunderstood ; that I allow Ideas or Resemblances in the Fancy or Imagination ; but, I absolutely deny there are any Spiritual Ideas or Similitudes in the Mind on which we ground any Truth, or which are the Materials of Knowledge ; but NOTIONS only, or the Things abstractedly or inadequately conceiv'd by the Understanding.*

Your Well-wishing Friend

and Faithful Servant,

J. S.



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# Solid Philosophy

## ASSERTED.

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### Preliminary Discourses.

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#### Preliminary First.

*Of the Impropriety and Equivocalness of  
of the word [ I D E A . ]*

1. **T**HE Author of the *Essay concerning Human Understanding*, having sincerely levelled the aim of his Endeavours at the attainment of Truth in Philosophy, which can only be had by clearing the way to *Science* ; hence, this being the sole End we have, both of us, prefixt to our selves, the best Method ( in common ) which I can take in my *Reflexions* on that Learned Treatise is, to keep my Eye still directed to that end, and to take my measures from the Order and *Rapport* which our respective Positions, or Discourses, may be conceived to bear to that best Design.

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2. This premis'd, my first Preliminary Reflexion shall be upon his making use, throughout his whole Work, of the word (*IDEAS*) as the Chief, or rather only *Materials*, of which, according to him, we are to frame immediately all our Knowledge. Which being so, it follows that, if the sense of that word be not it self *Clear*, but *Equivocal*; and if, as taken in *one* Sense, it be manifestly *nothing* at all to *Science*, nor can be any *Material* of it; and, as taken in the other, it *may* and *must* conduce to it, nay, be the *Sole* immediate Ground and Origin of *all Science*; I cannot but think, that the promiscuous usage of that Word in such Disparate Senses, ( it being of so general Concern, and running through that whole Book ) must necessarily encumber and perplex in a high Measure the way to Scientific knowledge.

3. One of his Secondary Designes was (as he expresses himself in his *Epistle to the Reader*) to *remove the Rubbish* in order to the building up *Science*, and to beat down the *Vanity* and *Ignorance* of those who have reduced *Philosophy*, which is nothing but the *Knowledge of Things*, to insignificant School-Terms. This is certainly a very necessary and a very laudable Design; it being evident to all ingenuous Lovers of Truth, that never was there more need of a Reformation, than there has been of *Philosophy* in these last *Centuries*; to second him in which I have not failed on my part to contribute my endeavours. Yet, notwithstanding  
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I do not think we ought, without great and necessary occasion, alter those words which have been accepted and used by the Learned World (such as it was) hitherto: Especially such words as are *proper* and *Univocal*, such I take the word [*Notion*] to be; much less to substitute another, which I must think is *less proper*, and withall highly *Equivocal*, or *Ambiguous*, I mean the word (*IDEA*.) I know this ingenious Author apologizes for his frequent using it; and I am apt to think he did this out of Civility towards our Modern Philosophers, who have brought it into fashion: For, he gives no reason why he did not rather constantly use the word (*Notion*;) which, importing a part of *Cognition*, does most certainly better suit with a Treatise about *Human Understanding*.

*Much less chang'd  
for others less  
proper.*

4. As for the Sense in which he takes the word (*IDEA*) he professes that he *uses it to express whatever is meant by Phantasm, Notion, Species, or whatever it is that the mind can be employ'd about in thinking.* Which manifests that he uses that word very *Equivocally*: For a *Phantasm*, and a *Notion*, differ as widely, as *Body* and *Spirit*; the one being a *Corporeal*, the other a *Spiritual* Resemblance; or rather, the one being a Resemblance, or a kind of *Image*, or *Picture*; the other the *thing Resembled*, as will be seen hereafter. Again, 'tis agreed to by all the World, that Brutes have *Phantasms*, but they can have no *Notions*; for these are the *Elements*, or *Materialls*, whose agreeable Connexion furnishes our Mind with *Science*; of which Beasts, which have no

*Mr. L's Acception  
of the word [Idea]  
very Ambiguous.*

*Mind*, are incapable ; and therefore it were both unnatural, and to no purpose, to put *Notions* ( which are the Primary Affections of the *Mind* ) in those *meer Animals*. I am more at a loss to find, that, in the last page but one in his Epistle to the Reader, he seems to contradistinguish *Notions* to *Ideas* ; which how it consists with the indifferency he grants the word (*Idea*) here to signify *Notions*, I cannot at all comprehend.

5. I must confess, it is generally a fruitless contest to dispute about a *Word*, which is nothing but a Sound, or a Character, were but the determinate Meaning of it told us by the user of it: Let it be A, or B, or what he pleases, provided the distinct Sense of it be clearly manifested by the Writer, or Speaker, it were, in that case, Logomachy, and impertinent Cavil, to except against it. But, when the Author's own Explication of it does, ( contrary to the Nature of Explications ) declare it is used ambiguously, it laies a force on me to remark it ; lest it may lead the Reader, ( as it infallibly must ) into great Errors, unless it's double Sense be warily distinguished in the ensuing discourse ; which I have not observed to be done any where by this otherwise accurate Author.

6. From this undistinguish'd Ambiguity of the word ( *Idea* ) it follows naturally, that even his own excellent Judgment, and consequently, his Reader's, must necessarily sometimes deviate ; and, tho' his general intention was only to pursue the *Knowledge of Things*, yet he must needs be sometimes misled at unawares to entertain *Fancies* for *Real Knowledges* ; as will occasional-  
ly



ly be shown hereafter. For the present I cannot omit one particular, it being of such main importance.

7. The Author believes *all sorts of Animals* to have, in *some degree*, *Perception*.

Now *Perception* (as I conceive) signifies *Knowledge*; for, under what sort of *material Action* to rank it, I confess my self at a loss: But, let it be only the *first*

*The putting Brutes to have Knowledge, associates them with Mankind.*

*step and degree towards Knowledge, and the in-let of all the Materials of it*, still he says, the *dulness of the faculties of some Brutes, makes them remote from that Knowledge which is to be found in some Men*: So that it seems in *other Men* there may possibly be *no more Knowledge* (at least in *some things*) than in *Brutes*; nor does he any more than *probably conjecture*, that *Beasts* have not the *power of comparing, which may be observed in Men, belonging to general Ideas, and useful to abstract Reasonings*. Now, this so jumbles together *Spiritual Natures* with those which are *meerly Corporal*, that, if this be so, we shall be at some loss to know our *own Kind*, to define what *Man* is, or to distinguish our selves from our younger *Brothers* in knowledge, *Brutes*, or *our Souls* from *theirs*: For, if by *Ideas* there be meant *Notions*, (as his *Expressions* leave it indifferent) and that a *Man's* knowledge consists in having these *Ideas* in him, and *Brutes* have also such *Ideas*; and, that, moreover, they may possibly have also, in some sort, a power to *compare* those *Notions*, and both \* *judging* and *discoursing* most evidently consist in *comparing our Notions*, I see no *Operations*

\* *Method to Science*,  
B. 2. Less. 1. §. 12.

peculiar to a *Man*, but what *Brutes* may perform in a *lower degree*; and since *Degrees* do not vary the *Species* ( for otherwise *dull Men* would be of another *Species* from those who have more wit ) we could, consequently, never know what *Man-kind* meant; or who is a *Man*, who not, unless in outward appearance; nor, lastly, how our *Souls*, or *Minds*, do differ from their *Fancies*, or *Imaginations*. Again, Mr. L. affirms, *E. 2. Ch. 11. §. 11.* that it seems as evident to him that *Beasts* do reason, as that they have Sense; than which, certainly, nothing in the world can be more evident, or undeniable. Now, if this be so, all those who hold that ( a *Rational Animal* ) is a proper and adequate Definition of ( *Man* ) ought to hold *Brutes* to be *Men*. Mr. L. will say, that *Brutes* can only reason in *Particulars*, having no *General Ideas*, because they cannot *Abstract*; nor do we see they make use of any *General Signes* to express *Universal Ideas*: Indeed, they have no such Signes as *Words*, to notify they have any such *Ideas*; but, if we may conclude from their *Outward Actions* ( on which only Mr. L. seems to ground his good Opinion of them that they have Reason, ) we may as well gather from the same ground that they have *General Ideas* too. For example, when a *Horse* sees a *Man* a far off, he can only have an *Idea* that it is *something*; for the *Object* cannot, at that distance, imprint a *more particular Idea* of it self, but that *most General* one, and therefore 'tis evident the *Horse* must either have a *General Idea* of it, or none at all; whereas yet he must have *some Idea* of it, because he sees it, though confusedly. Coming nearer, the *Object* imprints a *more distinct Idea* of a *Man*;

yet

yet not so distinct, as to represent *this* Man in particular. At length coming very near, the same Object is apt to imprint an *Idea* of *this* particular Man; which shews plainly, that all those *Ideas* the Object gave him *before* were *General* ones: To proceed, we may observe, that while it appear'd only to be *something*, which was a very *abstract Idea*, the Horse carry'd it *abstractedly* too, and remain'd unconcern'd. When it appear'd to be a *Man*, it began to be a little concern'd, having to do with such kind of things as us'd to do it either Good or Harm; and therefore it stares at it ( a common carriage in sheep especially ) as if it study'd, or consider'd, what to make of it, in order to its own Interest, or Self-preservation. But, when the Object imprints an *Idea* of *this particular* Man, who either us'd to bring him Provender, or come to catch him to make him work, he either comes towards him, or runs away; which different behaviour of theirs ( if outward Actions were, in this case, worth building on ) is as good a sign that Brutes have *General Ideas*, as we can expect from dumb Animals. Besides, when a Cat, or Dog is hungry, and hunts about for Meat, how can Mr. L. imagin they long only for one *particular* sort of Meat, and not *any* sort of Meat in *common* that is agreeable to their nature? I am sure their indifferency to any such Food ( in case they *know* at all ) gives us as good ground to think they have a *General Idea* of such a *sort, kind, or species* of Food, as it does for any Knowledge they have of *particulars*. Hence is shown, that Mr. L's Criterion, or distinctive Mark to know them from *Men*, ( *viz.* the having *General Ideas* ) quite failing, we ought to

esteem Horses, and other Cattle, to be Four-footed Men, or else Men must be two-legg'd Beasts. Moreover, since he grants here §. 5. they can *compare* those *Ideas* they have, tho' *imperfectly*, and but in *some circumstances*; and all *Judging*, and *Discoursing* must, by his Doctrine, consist in the *comparing Ideas*; he must think there are some of them who are very *judicious* Gentlemen, and use natural Logick, and, tho' not very artificially, make Syllogisms too. In a word, if we have no peculiar Faculties Intrinsical to our Nature, nor any Primary Operation belonging to *it*, and *it only*, to distinguish us from Brutes but Extrinsical shape only, all *Beasts* might be *Men*, and *Men Beasts*: And then we ought in duty to consider how to correct our Carriage towards our *dear Brethren in Nature*, Brutes; which will bring in the *Turkish* Charity to Dogs, and twenty other Fooleries: And, 'tis an excellent Argument to prove the Identity of our Natures, that Mr. L. brings of some Gentlemen he was acquainted with, *who deny'd themselves to be Men*; and I wonder he would civilly give them the Lye, by passing upon them the Complement that they were notwithstanding *very Rational Men*; for, were it possible any Man could be a Beast, 'tis most certain these Men were such. But I wonder not all at such extravagant Conceits; for as Reason, grounded on our Natural Notions of the Thing, is reduced, if pursued home, to First and Self-evident Principles; so *Fancy*, if follow'd close, advances at length to pure *Folly*, and ends finally in perfect *Madness*.



8. As for us *Men*, we can certainly affirm, that *we do truly perceive, or know*, because we *know* certainly, by experience, or rather by Reflexion, that *we do know*; but we do not *thus* know that *Brutes* know; and whoever thinks he can gather it by *Reason*, ought, I conceive, er'e he goes about it, to study exactly two previous points. First, he ought to consider very attentively, how, or upon what Grounds he can imagine *Particles of Matter*, tho' never so subtil and artificially laid together, can be capable of *Perception*, or *Knowledge*, or how this Suits with the Nature of *meer Body*. We can only gather this from *Local Motions* proceeding from *Brutes*, with some kind of Regularity: Now an exact Watch (in proportion to its few parts) does, by vertue of a Spring within, which is part of its self, afford the same argument to one that is not aware of its contrivance. For, it shews us, and regularly too, the Minutes, Quarters, Half-hours, Hours, Days of the Month, and tells us the time aloud by Striking the Bell: Nay, a Repeating-Clock does, without Mistake, or Mistake, *answer* the Question (as it were) which by pulling the String you *ask* it; and, tho' you are never so importune in repeating your question often, yet it still answers truth, with more steady exactness than *Banks* his Horse could, by seeing the Motion of his Masters Eye. Yet, if any Man had drawn thence a Conclusion that those Engines had *perciev'd*, or *known*, we are satisfied that he had been perfectly mistaken. An *Italian* here had an Engine which would both a wake one at the hour he designed to rise, and

*The first Consideration pre-requir'd, ere we ought to think that Brutes know.*

also strike fire, and light his Candle for him; which I believe is more than the most docil Brute could ever be taught to perform. The Case had been still more difficult, had this Watch, or Engine, which seemed self moving, been put into all these Motions by Subtil and Indiscernable Agents; as Iron is by the *Effluvioms* of a Loadstone, or as *Memnons* Musical Statue was by the *Raves* of the Sun; for in that Case the Vulgar, discerning no Material Cause that set it on work, would presently have had recourse to some *Knowing power* in the Engine; in the same manner as when they hear noises in a House, and cannot find out what caused them, they immediately conclude 'tis a Spright. Whence results this plain Rule, that er'e we can with reason conclude, or think any thing, except our selves, has Perception, or Knowledge, by our seeing it perform any Outward Action, we ought first to be certain that we can comprehend all the Operations of Bodies, and all the several Combinations and Contrivances of them; and that we see that those Actions are impossible to be performed by Bodily parts, laid together by an infinitely wise Artificer; before we fall to imagin that any meerly Animal Body is more than a Natural Engine; or that it does any more perceive, think, or know, than does a Watch or Clock.

9. The Second thing necessary to be done er'e we ought to think Brutes have any knowledge, is, to consider exactly the incredible variety of the several *Organical* parts, found in the bodies of Animals; which, with the peculiar Uses of each, and the Contexture of them with the other parts, do swell so many Books of Anatomy already, without any hopes or prospect of reaching them

them *all*: And, besides, it is necessary also to weigh attentively the Chymical parts (if I may be allowed to call them so) of an *Animal*, consisting of *Blood*, the Humours in it, and especially the *Spirits*; which last are apt to be moved, upon every occasion, by the least touch of all the Bodies about it, nay, by the most minute particles of them, lodged in the brain and excited there a fresh; and are withall apt to be carried thence in convenient Vehicles throughout the whole, to set on motion those parts which are more solid: When he has done this, let him Consider all these diverse-natured parts laid together by the All-wise Contriver of Nature, in order to the Animal's pursuing what's Agreeable to its nature, and avoiding what's Disagreeable to it: When, I say, all these particulars are well weigh'd, and duly reflected on, I believe we shall be at a loss to pitch upon any *outward Motion* with such wise Contextures, and the Complexion of such innumerable Material Causes may not naturally produce.

10. To give some ease to our fancy, startled at the Strangeness of many Actions we see done by Brutes, let us reflect on what happens to Men, walking in their *Sleep*, when the passages to our Knowing Power are intercepted; and our wonderment will to a great degree, cease.

*That our selves both asleep and awake, do, without Knowledge, perform as strange Operations as Brutes do.*

How regularly do the Phantasms at that time, move our Brutal part, the Body: Many Authentick Examples of which I could recount worthy our highest admiration; they being such as, were we awake, and had our rational fears about us, we neither durst attempt, nor could possibly perform, without extream hazard. But, not to insist

sist on these, let us reflect on our selves, even when *perfectly awake*, and we shall discover that, however we are set on work by Motives, or Reasons, yet we know not at all how the *outward* parts of our Body ( only *which* we experience in Brutes, and ground the conceit of their having Knowledge upon them ) do perform any of their Operations. What Man living, though supposed the wisest ( much less the Generality ) knows *how*, or *by what* passages he is to send Animal Spirits into the *Muscles* ( whence all our Motion proceeds ) or into *what* Muscles, or what *quantity* of them is requisit to do such an Outward Action? What Feats of Activity does a Rope-dancer show us? How many ways does he distort, wind, turn, poize, stretch, and ply the parts of his Body? To do which, the Animal Spirits are to be sent now into *this*, now into *that* Muscle, to move *this* or *that* Limb, or Joint; sometimes *great quantity* of them to make a vehement, or quick Motion; sometimes *fewer*, to move them more moderately; sometimes *none at all* into any of them, when he has a mind to surcease all Motion, and sit still. Yet he knows, no more than a Brute, or a Stone does, *how* he is to do any of this, nor can give the least account *how* it is done. All this is transacted by the wise Contrivance of the Body; which is so framed as to be subservient to the Design the Man, as he is Knowing and Rational, had projected. And the same is done in *Brutes*, when either actual Impressions are made upon them from the Objects; or those former Impressions are again excited in the Brain; which done, all the frisking motions of Pursuance and Avoidance which they perform, do follow by a Course of  
Natural



Natural or Material Causes ; and, withal, according to those *measures* and *degrees* as are proportioned to the Efficacy of the first impellent Cause, the *Object* in their Imagination ; the Agreeableness or Disagreeableness of which, to the Nature of the Animal is that which sets all the Engine on work at first.

II. Nor can the Objection bear any force that some Actions of Brutes resemble

*Reason*, even though it seems more *then* is found in *Men* ; since we experience that a Watch, which is the work of an Artificer, performs the Operations proper to it,

*The Resemblance of Reason in some Actions of Brutes, no Argument of their Knowledge*

and tells us the time of the day with more exactness, than the best *Reason* we have can do without such helps. So that the Watches acting *according to reason*, demonstrates indeed there was Reason in the *Framer* of it, but argues none at all in the *Engine* it self : Wherefore, however the Actions of some Brutes may bear a *show* of Reason, this can only argue that they are the workmanship of a *Rational*, or *Wise Maker* ; but, not that themselves acted *knowingly*, or *rationally*, while they did these Actions : For my self, I must declare, that I have as much admired the wisdom shewn in the Action of a young Vine, exerting and twisting its little Fingers about other things near it, to support it self as it grew up, as ( all the forementioned Circumstances weighed and abated ) at any Operation of a Brute ; and I doubt not but a *Campanella* ( who maintained that every thing in Nature had *perception* ) or some such other man of fancy, would discourse, and descant on it thus : [ “ The poor weak limber  
“ Vine

“ Vine knew, and was well aware, that, not being able to support it self, it would, when it increast in length, fall down flat on the ground, and so be exposed to be trampled under foot, and hurt ; and, therefore, did *very prudently* cling about other Vegetables, or Poles near it, to sustain it self, and avoid that inconvenience. ] And, I dare affirm that we lose the best part of our Natural Contemplation, by putting Brutes to have *Knowledge* ; for, what wonder is there that such things as have a *knowing Power* in them should know, or, who admires it in a Man ? Whereas, it justly raises our mind to high Admiration and Adoration of the Divine Artificer, to see things which are made of *meer Matter*, act with as much Wisdom and Prudence for their own preservation, as the wisest Knower can by his best Wit, of which he is so proud, and sometimes with much more. No doubt but the growth and operations of dull Vegetables, do administer to devout Reflecters occasions of very high Contemplation ; and shall the Operations of *sensitive* Beings, which are incomparably *more* excellent, and *more* admirable, as being the Top and Master-piece of this Material World, afford little, or none at all ? Now, if their *Nature* be to have *Knowledge* in them, and it be a thing common to all Creatures, and expected that GOD should give to every thing what is its *Nature*, there is little or no particular ground for our wonderment. GOD has given Brutes a *Knowing Power*, and that *Power* makes them *know*, and there’s an end of our Admiration, and consequently of our Contemplation, and of that devout Admiration, to which our Astonishment at  
 the

the several Actions of those Natural *Automata* would otherwise raise us.

12. I beg pardon for this long digression; I thought fit to dilate thus largely on this point; both because it is a very concerning and useful Preliminary; as also to manifest how the using the word (*Idea*) hand over head (as we may say) and taking it *Equivocally* and indifferently for *Phantasms* and *Notions*, leads this Great Man (as it must needs have done every Man) into great mistakes. For *Phantasms* Beasts may indeed have, they being no more but *Effluvia* emitted from other Bodies, and received by the portalls of the *Senses* into the Brain; where the Animal Spirits stand readily waiting to move the Brute, according as those *Tinctures* are agreeable, or disagreeable, to the Compound: but *Notions*, or (which is the same) *Meanings*, or *Apprehensions*, they cannot have; for *these* being made by Direct Impressions upon our *Spiritual* part, the *Mind*, (only which can *mean*, or *apprehend*) to judge they have any such, would conclude they had a *Spiritual*, and consequently an *Immortal* part in them, which I am sure we shall both of us deny. Besides, had they *Meanings*, or were capable of any, they would be capable of the *Meanings* of our Words; at least those amongst them which are most Docil, and could Speak, would not fail, if well taught, and educated, to *know* much of our Language, and *Answer*, in some few occasions, *Pertinently*; which none of them ever did *designedly*, and, if they *had* to do so by accident, none thinks they *meant* as they *spoke*, but all mankind *laughs* at the odd  
Chance

Chance, as at a pleasant Jest. Those that teach them might point at the things when they pronounce their Names, as Nurses do to little Infants; and why might not Beasts learn them, as well as Children; at least learn as much in many years, as they do in two, or three? Indeed, some Words and Sounds, which are very often used to come into their Brain, accompanied with some pleasing or harmful *Phantasm*, do, by vertue of that concomitant *Phantasm*, affect them, and make them act; not from their knowing what these words, or interjections *mean*, but by vertue of the *Phantasms*, or *Effluvioms*, that came along with them, and moves them; or, because they being lodged together in the Brain, that Word or Sound, or some other Vehement Motion of ours, *excites* again the same *Phantasm* which puts them upon acting. Nor can we draw any parallel from some wild and Savage *Men*, seeming as rude as *Brutes*; the Question is of their *Nature*, not of their *Circumstances*. Could it be well proved that those Brutish Savages, tho' instructed afterwards, could never be brought to perform any actions more rationally than *Brutes* do, nor could ever be taught any Language to a tolerable degree, so as to answer at all *Pertinently* or *Intelligently*, the difficulty would be greater? But this I never heard, or read, asserted by any. Or, could it be well attested, that *Brutes* could fancy, or make choise of a Female for being more *beautiful*, or were taken with the *Harmony* of Musick, or did comport themselves accordingly, I must confess I should much wonder. I remember that about the year 1663. visiting my Noble Friend Sir *Kenelm Digby*, he told me he was much surprised,



prized, and uneasy at a Relation made him by a Gentleman, whom he could not suspect guilty of that Vanity, as to tell an untruth to make his Story admired; which was, that he saw Apes dance the Ropes at *Southwark Fair* ( which was then held ) and that they framed their Gestures and Motions exactly according to the Musick. For ( says he ) this, if true, shows they know *Proportion*, which argues *Reason*, and will oblige us to seek for new Principles. At his earnest intreaty I went to examine the business, and found it thus. A fellow stood below on the ground with a String ( which was put about the Ape's Neck ) in one hand, and a Switch in the other; who, understanding the Musick, made a little twitch with the String, or a menace with the Switch, when he would have the Ape retire, or advance, to keep time with the Fiddles: Nay, far were those Mock-men, the poor Apes, from being guilty of any thing that Resembled *Reason*, that, when they made them dance with a lighted Wax-candle in their hand, neither their Tutor's Instructions, nor their own Docility could teach them to hold the lighted end of the Candle upwards, though they often felt the inconvenience: for, the melted Wax scalded their Legs, and made them, in the middle of their dance, steal now and then a little Scratch where it burnt them; which they did with such a Serious and Innocent grace, that it gave much divertisement to the Spectators. This Story I relate the more willingly, to warn others not to give easy credit to particular Men's Narrations, whether Travellers, or others; much less to suspect their own Principles upon such Sleight Advertisements. I

returned to my Friend, and eased him of his Quandary; for which he was very thankful; and blamed himself much for giving credit to a Tale, to the prejudice of Evident Reason.

13. To proceed, and pursue my Theme more closely, I would be glad to know, at least in Common, what kind of things, in this Author's opinion, those [*Ideas*] are. Are they *Corporeal*, or are they *Spiritual*, or under what Head shall we rank them? If *Corporeal*, they cannot be in the Mind; as Accidents, or Modes of it; the Mind being of a *Spiritual* nature. If they be *Spiritual*, Brutes, which have not a *Spiritual* Nature, can have no *Ideas*. Perhaps it will be answer'd they are not *things*, but certain Modes of things: But this satisfies not; for Modes are Affections of the Thing, or certain *Manners* how it is; wherefore they must be futable to the Nature of the Thing of which they are Modes; for a Thing *cannot be such as it cannot be*: And so the question returns, what that *Thing* is of which those *Ideas* are the Modes: Is it *Corporeal*, or is it *Spiritual*? If it be *Spiritual*, then again Brutes can have no *Ideas*, because they have no *Spiritual Natures* in them, and so they can have no *Spiritual Modes*: If *Corporeal*, then our Mind, which is *Spiritual*, can have no *Ideas* in it; *Corporeal Ideas* being improper Modes for a *Spiritual* Nature. I do chiefly insist upon this Objection, to shew more manifestly that the Word *Idea*, should have been Distinguish'd at first, and *Counterpos'd* to *Phantasm*, and not *confounded* with it: Besides, my Genius leads me when I discourse about any thing, even tho' I oppose it, to know distinctly *what* that thing is, least I oppose

oppose I know not what; and I must declare that I can make no conception of the word *Idea* by what our Moderns, and particularly this Learned Author, has given me concerning it. For, he abstracts from affording his Reader a *distinct* and *clear* view of it; without which his Book, which runs wholly upon that Word, cannot be perfectly intelligible; nor, oftentimes, his main Discourses infer any *determinate* Conclusions.

14. It may perhaps be replied, That every Man experiences he *has* those *Ideas*; as also that he comes to *know*, by having them in his Mind; and therefore it is a folly to enquire so scrupulously about such things as are, in some sort, *Self-known*; and that it is enough to say they are *Resemblances* of things, made in us by the Object without us. To which I reply, that we indeed experience the *An est* of something in our *Mind* (and, by the way, of something of another nature in our *Fancy* too) by which we know things; but, whether it ought to be called an [*Idea*] or suits with the proper meaning of this word; or, after it *is* called so, the *Quid est* of that [*Idea*] or what it is (at least as to the Common Notion or *Genus* of it) or what to make of it by the light yet given me by this Author, or any other I have had the good fortune to see, I must profess I am not able to discern. All the knowledge I have of it from him, besides that given above which confounds me, is this, That he calls it frequently a *Resemblance*, *Portraiture*, *Image*, *Appearance*, and such like; which still leave

*Experience that we have Ideas, gives no distinct Account what they are.*

*Nor to say, they are Resemblances.*

me more dissatisfied than ever : For, who can have the *first* knowledge of a thing by a *Picture*, or *Resemblance* of it ? Let any Man see the picture of a Tree, or an Apple, who *had* never seen those things themselves, nor ever *should* see them any *other* ways ; and what knowledge could it give him, but only of things of a far different nature from a Tree, or Apple, *viz.* a Cloth, Board, or Paper, thus figured and colour'd ? Or, how can any Man know that such things *are*, or have any being *in nature*, by a bare similitude of them. I may see the picture of such a shap'd *Man*, but whether that Man *is*, or ever *was*, the picture cannot inform me ; so that it might be some *Fancy* of the Painter, for ought I know by the Picture. Indeed, had I known such things *formerly*, then a Resemblance of them might, in that case, revive, and call into my mind the knowledge of them ; but, how it should beget the *first* knowledge of them, as our late Philosophers put those *Resemblances* to do, is altogether impossible and inexplicable.

15. Again, since Mr. L. affirms that we know nothing, either by Direct or Reflex Knowledges, but by having *Ideas* of it ; it must follow, that when by a Reflex Act I know my *first Idea* got by a *direct* Impression, I must have an *Idea* of that Direct *Idea*, and another *Idea* when I know that Reflex one, of *it* ; and still another of *that* ; and so still on, all the time while I go on reflecting upon my former Knowledges. Now, what sense can we make of an *Idea* of an *Idea*, or what means a *Similitude* of a *Similitude*, or an *Image* of an *Image* ? Each succeeding



ing Knowledge must be different from the former, because it has still a different *Object* to represent, and that *Object* cannot be known without its proper *Idea*; and, it is not only the immediately preceding *Act* which must be thus different, but the immediately-preceding *Idea* too, which is the *Object* of each succeeding *Act*; And, in what shall we conceive the difference of those successive *Ideas* to consist? It may perhaps be said, that plain reason tells us it must be so, though we know not the particular manner *how* it is done. I answer, The same Reason tells us far more plainly, that it looks very untowardly, and aukwardly, it *should* be so; or that there should be a *Resemblance of a Resemblance*: And my advancing this Objection does oblige me to show, in due place, *how* both our Direct and Reflex Knowledges may be performed after a Connatural manner, without straining either good Sense, or the Nature of Things. Were it a *Material Resemblance*, it might, by rebounding from one place to another, cause a Resemblance of its self; but here 'tis quite otherwise; for the *first* (*Idea*) it coming by a Direct Impression from the Corporeal *Object* without me, must resemble *It*; and the *Idea* of that *Idea* ( or else of my *First* Direct *Act* ) which is the *Object* of my First *Reflex Act*, must be a Similitude of an *Idea* that came from the *Object* in Nature, and is like: *it*; and the second Reflex *Idea* must resemble an *Idea*, which was like an *Idea* that represented a thing of a quite different, or of a Corporeal Nature; and so endways; which would put all our Reflex *Ideas* into Confusion, as involving still others in them.

16. 'Tis yet as great a difficulty, if not greater, how the Soul should have a

*No Operation internal or external begins from the Soul alone.*

power in its self ( as Mr. L. conceives ) to reflect upon its own Actions, that is, to form *Ideas* of its former *Ideas* ; it being ( as I verily judge ) metaphysically demonstrable, that an *indivisible Nature cannot work upon it self*, or produce in its self a *new Act*, or a *new Idea* by its own *single power* ; or, by it *self*, move the Body at pleasure, as we seem to experience in those motions we call *Voluntary* ; or so much as have any *succession* of Acts, but *by means of the Body* ; only which ( and not the Soul ) is Quantitative, and, consequently, of it self, capable of *succession*. The farther explicating and elucidating which Points, are reserved to their proper places.

17. Many other Arguments against these *Ideas*, will, I believe, occur hereafter,

*Mr. L. not only, nor directly opposed by this Discourse*

which I at present omit, because I would not fore-stall. But, e're I leave this point, I must do the right to this ingenuous Author to declare, that it was besides his intention in his Treatise to discourse *particularly* about the nature of his *Ideas*, and therefore I cannot be said properly to *confute*, or *over-throw*, what he never went about to *advance*, or *establish* : Though I cannot but judge, that it had been far more satisfactory to his acute Readers, and most highly important to *Science*, to have done so ; and most necessary for his Book, since without distinguishing his *Ideas* from

*To ground all Knowledge on Ideas not distinguished from Phantasms, makes Science impossible.*

*Phantasms*, and letting us know distinctly what his

his *Ideas* are, his whole Essay is *unintelligible*, and all his Discourses built on the ambiguous word [*Idea*] are inconclusive. And, had his penetrating Wit set it self to that study, I doubt not but it would have exceedingly conduced both to clear his *own* thoughts, and to have enlightned *others*. I desire then it may be understood, that it is not in order to *him* only I have enlarged on this point, but to meet with the mistakes of *others* also, who do customarily use the word [*Idea*,] and yet, as I have good reason to fear, do not perfectly understand their own meanings. Lastly, I thought it fit to dilate first on this point, that I might prepare the way to my next Discourse, to which it naturally leads.

## COROLLARY.

**F**ROM this whole Discourse collected into a Summary, I deduce this Corollary, that, since the word *IDEA*, according to this Author, signifies a Resemblance, *Similitude*, or Image, and, consequently is indifferent to *Corporeal* and *Spiritual* Resemblances, that is, to what's in the *Mind*, and what's only in the *Fancy*; and that, only that which is in the *Mind* can be the proper Material of all our *Knowledges*; hence that word is most improper to be used in Philosophy, which is the *Study of Knowledge*. Also, that as taken *thus undistinguished*, it does in another regard highly prejudice all true *Knowledge of Things*, or *Science*; in regard it confounds *Corporeal* and *Spiritual* Natures, which contain the two General Objects of all our *Knowledges*; and are, besides, *most vastly disparate*. Pre-

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## PRELIMINARY *Second.*

*That the Elements, or Materials, of all our Knowledges are properly to be called, NOTIONS; and what those Notions are.*

1. **B**UT, if the word [ *IDEA* ] be Equivocal and Improper to be used in Philosophy, as being unfit to signify the first Conceptions of our Mind, ( which are, as Mr. L. says well, the *Materials* of Science ) and consequently, are apt to make us entertain *Erroneous Fancies* for *Real Knowledges*; it will be ask'd what other word we can invent which is *Univocal*, Proper, and not liable to signify a *Superficial Resemblance*, nor dangerous to seduce us by taking *Fantastical Appearances* for the true *Knowledge of the Things*; but is, of its own Nature, fit to express distinctly those *Solid Materials*, by the Composition of which the Structure of *Science* is to be raised? I reply, the word [ *Notions* ] is *such*, and answers all these Intentions; and therefore this is the *only* word to be made use of by Philosophers, who seriously and sincerely pursue the *Knowledge of Things*, and not their own witty Conceits, or *Imaginations*. 'Tis *Univocal* and *Unambiguous*, because Men of Art, or Philosophers, who are the best

Reflecters



Reflecters on the Operations of our Mind, and have the truest Right to express those Thoughts their Art has given them, have constantly used it hitherto to signify our *simple Apprehensions*, or the first Operation of our Understanding; and *never* to signify Material Resemblances, or *Phantasms*: Whence also it claims to be *Proper*. And, indeed, it has title to be such even from its very *Origin* and *Derivation*: For, none can doubt, or ever question'd, but that the *Compound* word [ *Cognition* ] does properly signify *True* [ *Knowledge*, ] and therefore the *Simple* word [ *Notion* ] must most properly signify those *simple* Parts, Elements, or Materials; the orderly putting together of which in a Knowing Power does compound, or make ( *Cognition*, ) Whereas the particular Sense or Meaning of the word [ *Idea* ] which denotes a Resemblance, or Similitude, does not, in its immediate and proper Sense, in the least intimate any Order to Knowledge *at all*; nor any Material, Part, or peculiar Object of it. Nor, lastly, does the word [ *Notion* ] signify a bare Similitude, or Resemblance, which can be, and usually is, in the Fancy; but ( as will be seen shortly ) the *very thing it self existing in our Mind*; which is most undoubtedly a Solid Material, or Firm Ground to build the *Knowledge of Things*, or Science upon it.

2. I hope I shall have candid Readers, and therefore I am not apprehensive that any will be so captious as to object, that I do here use an Equivocal word, as well as others, by taking [ *Cognition* ] which signifies an *Act* of Knowledge, for the *Object* of that Act.

The word [ *Notion* ]  
and [ *Cognition* ]  
are taken here  
Objectively.

'Tis

'Tis a Fate, to which all words are obnoxious, to have *some* Ambiguity, or double sense one way or other. Thus we call in our common Speech a Parchment by which we hold our Estates [ *A Writing*, ] and a Sentence of *Seneca*, his, [ *Saying* ]; and so take those words for the thing *Written*, or *Said*; tho' they may also signify the *Acts* of writing, or saying. But, this is not such an Equivocalness as breaks squares between me and the *Ideists*, or that on which my Exception proceeds. The Univocalness which I assert to the word [ *Cognition* ] and [ *Notion* ] is such a one as is taken from their *Radix*, [ *Nesco* ] which, notwithstanding little Gramatical variations, does still import some *Knowledge*, or an Order to it; and the genuine signification of those words, thus varied or declined, is still kept within that same Line. Quite otherwise than is found in the word [ *I D E A* ] which is *Indeterminate* to those vastly different Lines of *Corporeal* and *Spiritual*, (which makes it highly Equivocal; ) besides that it has no Rapport at all to the Line of *Knowledge* from its *Radix*, or Original Sense. To clear then the meaning of the word [ *Notion*, ] as 'tis used here from this *Sleight*, and ( in our case ) *Unconcerning* Ambiguity, I declare, that, there being two Considerations in *Knowledge*, viz. the *Act* of my Knowing Power, and the *Object* of that Act, which, as a kind of *Form*, actuates and determines the Indifferency of my Power, and thence specifies my Act; I do not here take the word [ *Notion* ] for my *Act* of Simply Apprehending; but for that *Object* in my mind which *informs* my Understanding Power, and about which that Power is Employed; in which *Objective* meaning I perceive

Mr.

Mr. *Locke* does also generally take the word  
[ *I D E A*. ]

3. Since I have formerly blamed the Ambiguous  
explication of the word [ *I D E A*. ]  
'tis but just it should be required *What Notions are.*  
of me to give a more Deter-  
minate and Distinct one of the word [ *Notion*. ]  
which I shall do in blunt Terms thus; [ *A Notion*  
*is the very thing it self existing in my understanding.* ]  
I expect at the first hearing such a monstrous  
Position, which seems to the Antiperipateticks  
something above Paradox, and as Mysterious as  
a Supernatural Point of Revealed Faith, it will be  
entertained by some of them with a kind of A-  
mazement, by others with a Smile. On the  
other side, I am so little concerned how any re-  
ceive it, that I must resolutely declare that, unless  
this *Thesis* be as *True* as it is *Strange*, it is impossi-  
ble any Man living should *know any thing at all*.  
By which the Reader will see that the Credits of  
the *Aristotelians*, and their Adversaries, as to their  
being held *Solid Philosophers*, does entirely lie at  
Stake upon the decision of this main point.  
Which therefore must crave the Attention, and  
Sobrest Consideration of those persons, who take  
themselves to be concerned in the affair of *Science*,  
or in the Search after *Truth*.

4. Er'e I address my self to prove my Position,  
I must bespeak my Reader's Con-  
sideration, that, in a Question of  
this Nature, which depends up-  
on our Reflexion on what is, or  
is not in our *Spiritual* part, the  
the *Soul*, he must lay aside his  
pleasing *Phantasms*, and all the *Imagery*, which  
Fancy is to have  
no hand in dis-  
courseing about  
Spiritual Con-  
ceptions.  
with

with such a fine *Raree-show* uses to entertain and delight his *Fancy*. The point is of a *higher* Nature than to managed by such *Familiar Appearances*. The *Ideas* of Figure, Colour, nay, of Quantity it self must sit out as Bunglers, when such a Game is to be played, in which they have no Skill. This Contest must be carried on by *Means* as *Spiritual*, as is the *Subject* of it; that is, by *exact Reason*, or severe *Connexion of Terms*. And, to think to draw *Intrinsic* Arguments; or to frame pertinent Answers to them, from what we find in *Material* Imaginations, when the Question belongs to that part of *Metaphysicks* which treats of *Spiritual* Natures, and their Operations, is as absurd, as 'tis to contend that the *Knowledge* of a Man is *Great*, or *Little*, because his Body is *Bigg*, or *Dwarfish*; or to fancy that *Science* is to be measured by *Yards*, or *Inches*. And, tho' I cannot fear any such Rational kind of attacque as *Close Connexion of Terms*, for the Negative, yet I grant my self obliged to produce no less than *Clearest Evidence* for the Affirmative; provided we rate Evidence, not from what seems easiest to *Fancy*, but from the said *Connexion of Terms*; only which can *establish* our *Judgments*.

5. I am to note first, that, as the Moderns grant we know nothing without having [ *Ideas* ] of them *within our minds*; so I willingly acknowledge, that we cannot know any thing that is *without us*, but by having in our understanding *Notions* of those things. Now, say I, those *Notions* must be the *very things* themselves ( *as far as they are known* ) in our *Soul*; which they deny, as incredible and Monstrous.

I note,



I note, secondly, that in my *Thesis*, I take the word [ *Thing* ] in the largest Signification, as it comprehends not only *Substances*, which only are properly *Things*; but also all the *Modes*, or *Accidents* of Substance, which are improperly such. These Notes premised, I come to my Proof:

6. *First Argument.* When I *simply apprehend* the Thing, or any Mode or Accident of it, this *Operation* of my Understanding is *within* my Mind, and compleated *there*; therefore the Thing Apprehended, which is the *Object* of that Operation, must be

*A Notion is the Thing it self in our Understanding;*

*Proof 1. Because Knowing is an Immanent Act.*

*there* likewise: For, otherwise, this Operation of my Mind, it being Immanent, and not Transient, or passing *out of* my Mind to the Thing *without* me, cannot be employed about *that Thing*, contrary to the Supposition. Nor could the Thing be truly said to be *Apprehended*, unless this Operation, called my Apprehension, had the *Thing* for its *Object*; and this *within* my Understanding, it being an *Internal Operation*. But, that which is *within* me when I know it, is the *Notion* of it: Therefore the *Notion* of it (taken, as is declar'd above, objectively) is *the Thing it self in my Understanding*.

7. *Second Argument.* I know the *very Thing*; therefore the *very Thing* is in my *Act* of Knowledge: But my *Act* of Knowledge is *in* my *Understanding*; therefore the *Thing* which is *in* my Knowledge, is also *in* my Understanding.

*Proof 2. Because the Thing Known must be in our Knowing Power.*

8. Tho'

8. Tho' I will not allow it to be any way an  
an Answer to these Arguments,

Proof 3. *Because  
a Resemblance  
is not the Object  
of Knowledge, nor  
sufficient to cause  
it.*

to alledge, that 'tis sufficient that  
the [ *Idea* ] or Resemblance of the  
Thing be in my Mind, because  
it does not in the least shock the  
Connexion of its Terms, or shew  
them Incoherent; but is a mere  
shuffling Pretence, thrown in to avoid their Force:  
Yet I shall condescend to shew it impertinent, and I  
argue against it thus.

9. *Third Argument.* That only is Known, which  
I have in my Knowledge, or in my  
Understanding; for, to know  
Otherwise, Ideas only could be said  
to be known. what I have not in my Know-  
ledge, is a Contradiction: There-  
fore, if I have only the *Idea*, and not the *Thing*, in  
my Knowledge or Understanding, I can only  
know the *Idea*, and not the *Thing*; and, by Con-  
sequence, I know nothing without me, or no-  
thing in Nature. Again,

10. *Fourth Argument.* Philosophy is the Know-  
ledge of Things: But if I have  
nothing but the *Ideas* of Things  
Proof 4. *Because,  
otherwise, all Phi-  
losophy would be  
destroy'd.* in my Mind, I can have Know-  
ledge of nothing but of those  
*Ideas*. Wherefore, either those  
*Ideas* are the *Things* themselves, as I put *Notions* to  
be, and then I have gain'd my Point; or else they  
are not the *Things*, and then we do not know the  
*Things* at all; and so adieu to the Knowledge of  
*Things*, or to Philosophy.

11. I expect not any direct Answer to these Reasons, yet I doubt not but Wit and Fancy will furnish a prejudiced Person with Evasions; and the next will, possibly, be this, that we know the Things that are *without us*, by means of the *Ideas* or Resemblances of them which are *within us*. To overthrow which Pretence, I argue thus:

Proof 5. *Because*  
*Similitudes cannot*  
*possibly give us*  
*the First Know-*  
*ledge of Things.*

12. *Fifth Argument.* We cannot have the *First* Knowledge of any thing by a Picture, or Resemblance, as was shown, Preliminary 1. §. 14. Wherefore, Notions, or Simple Apprehensions being the *First* Notifications of the Things to our Mind, we cannot know the Thing *by their means*, as is pretended, were they not *more than Resemblances*; that is, were they not the *very Thing*.

*As was prov'd formerly.*

To overthrow this Pretence utterly, and withal, to uphold and fortify this last Argument, I advance this:

13. *Sixth Argument.* We cannot possibly know at all the Things themselves by the *Ideas*, unless we know certainly those *Ideas* are *Right Resemblances* of them. But we can never know (by the Principles of the *Ideists*) that their *Ideas* are *Right Resemblances* of the *Things*; therefore we cannot possibly know at all the Things by their *Ideas*. The Minor is proved thus; We cannot know any *Idea* to be a *Right Resemblance* of a Thing, (nor, indeed, that any thing whatever *resembles* another *rightly*,)

Proof 6. *Because,*  
*ere we can know*  
*the Idea resembles*  
*the Thing*  
*right, both of*  
*them must be in*  
*the Mind, to be*  
*there Compar'd.*

rightly,) unless they be *both* of them in our Comparing Power; that is, in our Understanding or Reason, and there view'd and compar'd together, that we may see whether the one *does* rightly resemble the other, or *no*. But, this necessitates that the *Thing it self*, as well as the *Idea*, must be in the Understanding, which is directly contrary to their Principles; therefore by the Principles of the *Ideists*, we cannot possibly know that their *Ideas* are Right Resemblances of the Thing. Now, if the *Thing it self* be in the Understanding, there needs no *Idea* of it; for to be *there*, or to be in a knowing Power, is to be *known*. Again,

14. *Seventh Argument.* No Relation can be known without Knowing both

Proof 7. *Because both the Correlates must be in the Understanding.*

the Correlates: Therefore no *Idea*, which being a *Resemblance* of the *Thing* must necessarily be related to it, can be known without

knowing also the *Thing* to which 'tis related as that which is resembled by it. Therefore the Thing resembled must be known, not only *besides* the *Idea*, but by *other* means than by it; which can be no way but by the *thing it self* existing, in the understanding. Which Argument

Proof 8. *Because the Prototype, must be first known.*

is enforced by this Consideration, that when the One of the two things that are Related, or *Alike*, is the *Prototype*, the other taken from

it, or (as it were) *drawn* by it; the *Prototype* must be *first* known ere we can judge that the other *is like it*. But the *Prototype* in our Case is the *Thing without us*, therefore the *Thing* without us must *first* be in our mind ere we can judge of the other's resembling it.

15. *Ninth*



15. *Ninth Argument.* Notions are the *Meanings*, or (to speak more properly) *what is meant* by the words we use: But *what's meant* by the words is the *Thing it self*; therefore the *Thing it self* is in the Meaning; and consequently in the *Mind*; only which can *mean*.

Proof 9. *Because* Notions *are* what's meant by Words.

16. It may be perhaps replied, that the *Ideas* are only meant by the *Words*; because when we speak, we intend to signify our Thoughts. I answer, that, however it may be pretended that what is meant *immediately* by the words, is our *Thoughts*, when our *own Thoughts* or Judgments about any matter, are the things desir'd to be known; yet, when the *Things* are the Objects enquired after, as, when a Master teaches a Scholler *Natural Philosophy*, or any other *Truth*, the Intention of the Speakers does primarily *aim* and *mean* to signify the *Things* or *Truths themselves*; and not *our Thoughts* concerning them; and, therefore, the *Things themselves* are in the *Intention* and *Mind*, or are the *Meanings* of the Speakers, or Discourfers. And this passes generally in all other occasions, except only when the Knowledge of our Interior Thoughts is ultimately aimed at. Thus, when a Gentleman bids his Servant fetch him a Pint of Wine; he does not mean to bid him fetch the *Idea* of Wine in his own head, but the Wine it self which is in the Cellar; and the same holds in all our Commerce and Conversation about things without us.

Proof 10th. *Because* when the thing it self is intended to be made known, the Thing it self is the first meaning, or what is first meant by the words.

17. *Eleventh Argument.* Our Words are *ad placitum*, and have no Natural Connection with the Things they signify, but are order'd to express them by the *Agreement* of Mankind: Therefore what's signified by them, must be *fore-known* to that Agreement. But the *Ideas*, or Resemblances we have, cannot be *fore-known* to this Agreement, since they could not be at all known, (being *in the Mind*,) but by the *Words*; which, not being yet agreed on, can make known, or signify nothing. Therefore the *Things* which we had naturally *Fore-knowledge* of, and not the *Ideas*, are that which is signified by *Words*. On the other side, since 'tis no less certain that the *Words* do signify what's *in the Mind* of the Speaker, or his *Notions*, they must signify *the Thing in the Mind*; and, consequently, also the *very Things* which are *without us*, and which were known to us *before* the Agreement about the *Words*, were in our Mind, when we went about to *name* them: And, were not this so, *Words* could signify *nothing*, which is a Contradiction.

*Corollary I.* Hence that great Contest in the Schools, whether our *Words* do immediately signify our *Conceptions*, or the *Things in re*, (as they phrase it,) is put past all Dispute. For, if the *Objective* Part of our Conceptions, which are our *Notions* of the Thing, be the *self-same* with the *Thing in re*, neither the *one*, nor the *other*, is immediately signified;

Hence the Question, Whether the Things, or our Notions, are immediately signified by Words, is *Trivious*.

nified ; because there is no *one*, and *other*, but the *same*. And if the Question be put of the Thing *as in re*, and *as in the Understanding* ; 'tis answer'd, This Question takes in those several *Manners of Existing*, which enters not into the Objective Notion, nor prejudices the *Identity* of the Thing under *either State* ; and so the Question is again frivolous.

18. *Twelfth Argument*. The same is evinced from the *Verification* of our Words , as, when I say [*The Glass is in the Window,*] the Word [*the Glass*] must mean the very *Substance* of that Glass existent without us, and not the *Idea* of that Glass ; for it would be *False* to say, *the Idea of the Glass is in the Window*. Therefore the *very Glass it self* which is in the Window, must be also *in my Mind*.

Proof 12. From the Verification of Propositions.

19. *Thirteenth Argument*. But, because *Resemblances* and *Likenesses* please them so well, we will try what Proofs may be drawn from those very Words which themselves do most affect. They hold, the *Idea*, or *Likeness* of the Thing is in the Mind. Let us consider then the *Likeness* of a *Man* in the Understanding ; or rather, because we both agree that we have no *Compleat Ideas* or *Notions* of any *Suppositum*, let us take one of Mr. *Locke's Simple Ideas*, v. g. *Extension*. I ask, Is the *Idea* of *Extension*, as to its Representation, in all *Respects* like that Mode as it is in the Thing ; or is it not ? If not, then we can never know that Mode ( at least, not clearly and fully ) by that *Idea* ; which yet we must do, ere

Proof 13. Because what's perfectly like, is the same.

we can discourse of it as a *Simple Idea*. And, if it is *perfectly*, or in *all* respects, like it; then 'tis in *no* Respect unlike it; and, by Consequence, in *no* Respect Different from it, (for that Difference would be an *Unlikeness*;) and, if it be in *no* respect Different, it follows, out of the very Terms, that it is the *very same*, in the Mind, and out of the Mind, which is so much boggled at in our *Notions*: So that, at unawares, the Explicators of *Ideas* by *Resemblances*, must be forced to come over to our Position, even while they would avoid it.

20. *Fourteenth Argument.* To make this yet Clearer, and to set it above all possible Confute, let us take the Word, [*Existence*,] or Actual Being. They know what that Word means, and consequently, they they have an *Idea* of it in their Understanding; for 'tis *this* which they say Words signify. This *Idea* then must either be in *all* respects like to Existence, or in *some* respects; that is, in *part* only: Not in *part*; for *Existence* has no imaginable Parts in it, nor any divers Respects or Considerations; no, not even those Parts made by the nicest Metaphysical *Abstraction* of our Mind, called *Act* and *Power*; but 'tis One, *most Simple*, *Indivisible*, and *most Absolute Act*; and thence 'tis called by the Schools an *Actuality*, as if it were the very Nature of *Act* it self, without the least Alloy of the more imperfect Notion of *Potentiality*, or *Power*. Wherefore the *Idea* of *Existence* must either be in *all* respects Like Existence, or not at all Like it; if not at all Like it, then, having no *Idea* or Resemblance of it, we can never know what the Word *Existence* means: If it be in  
all



*all respects* Like it, then, by our former Discourses 'tis *in no respect* Unlike it; and therefore, *in no respect* Different from it; and therefore 'tis the *very same* with it.

21. *Fifteenth Argument.* It may, perhaps, look like an Amusement, or Surprise, to pretend the Thing is *the same*, when 'tis *perfectly like*; for I do not expect that every Reader will speculate so deep, as to see that

Proof 15 *The same Reason asserted by the Natural Sayings of Mankind.*

all *Likeness* is *Unity of Form* as far as the *Likeness* reaches. Wherefore, to put them out of this Mis-conceit, we will endeavour to convince them that this Position is not a Trick of *Art*, but plain honest *Nature*: It has been still my usual Method to shew, that the highest Speculations I advance, are abetted by the *natural* Notions, Sentiments, and Sayings of *Mankind*; nor will I decline to bring my present Position to be tried by the same Test. Let us take then two *Quantities*, (Yards for Example;) in case we find them *perfectly Alike* under the Notion or Respect of *Quantity*, we make account we can in true Speech say they are the *same Quantity*. Or, take two Pieces of Cloth, of such a Colour; and, if they be *exactly alike* in that respect, unprejudiced Nature obliges us to say they are *of the same Colour*; and the same holds in all Substances and Modes whatever. Since then the *Ideists* must grant that their *Ideas* are *perfectly like* that which they know by them, (as they must be, as far as the Thing is *known* by them, because the Thing is known *only* by their Resembling, or being *like it*,) it follows from the Consent of Mankind, that those *Ideas* must, consequently, be the *same* with the *Things out of the Mind* which

are known by them; which is what we put our Notions to be. Wherefore, the *Notion* we have of the *Thing*, must be the *self-same* with the *Thing known*.

22. It may be replied, that the *Notion* of a Thing (a Stone, for Example) has a *Spiritual Manner* of Being in the *Mind*; whereas the Thing, or Stone, *out of* the *Mind* has a *Corporeal Manner* of Being, and therefore 'tis in *some* respect Different from the Thing; and, consequently, not *perfectly* the *same* with it; and so can only be barely *like* it, or resemble it. I answer, 'Tis granted that it is *Unlike* it, and so *Different* from it, and therefore *not the same* with it, as to the *Manner of Existing*; but I deny that either its *Existing*, or *Manner of Existing* do enter into the *Notion*, (except in the *Notion* of **God**, to whom Existence is *Essential*,) or do *at all* belong to it, or the *Thing* either; but that the *Notion* is the Thing, precisely according to what is *Common* to it both *in* the *Understanding*, and *out of* it, abstractedly from both those *Manners of Existing*. To explicate which, we may consider,

1. That no created *Thing*, nor consequently, *Mode* or *Accident* of it, has, of its own Nature, any *Title to be at all*, (much less to be after *such or such a Manner*;) for then *Being* would be *Essential* to them, and not the Gift of their Creator; whose Prerogative of *Self-being*, or *Essential being*, is Incommunicable to his Creatures.
2. Hence the *Things*, and consequently their *Modes*, do perfectly abstract from *being*, and *not being*, much more from all *Manners* of being.
3. This

3. This appears evidently by those Words which signify them, the *Meaning* of which Words is the same with our *Notions*. For Example, Take *Gabriel*, *Peter*, *Bucephalus*, an *Oak*, a *Stone*, a *Turd*, *Whiteness*, or what other Thing, or Mode of Thing we please; 'tis evident that the *Sense* of them (which is the same with our *Notion* of them) does not at all include, hint, or intimate *Existence*, or *Non-Existence*. Wherefore, 'tis set above all farther Dispute, and (as far as I can fore-see) beyond all imaginable Objection, that our *Notion of the Thing is the self-same with the Thing in Nature which is conceived by us.* Q. E. D.

23. Now, if our Soul, when it knows any Thing has the very nature of that Thing in it, and therefore is intellectually *that thing* ( for to be such a thing is nothing but to have the Nature of such a thing in it ) it follows that, considering her precisely as *knowing* a Stone, a Tree, Fire, &c. she is that Stone, Tree and Fire intellectually, Whence we may discover how Rational, and how Necessary and Important a Truth that saying of *Aristotle* is, that *Anima intelligendo fit omnia*. In a word, 'tis due to the Nature of our Soul, as it is *Spiritual*, and to the Eminency of her Essence, to comprehend after her manner the whole Inferiour Nature of Bodies, ( and much more ) or to be an *Intellectual World*, as soon as she is *her self*, and depur'd from her dull Material Compartment, as is shown in my \* *Method*. Nor can this \* B. 3. L. 4. § 14. making the Soul to know *so much* ( nay, *much more* ) be deemed an Extravagant

The Eminency of the  
the Spiritual Na-  
ture of the Soul,  
gives her a Power  
to be all Things  
intellectually.

Conceit, or too high a Privilege for her, by any well instructed Christian, who reflects, ( as is also clearly Demonstrable in Metaphysicks ) that she is made for, or is capable of a Knowledge *infinitely higher*, viz. the beatifying Sight of GOD ; in comparison of which the Knowing the whole Universality of Creatures is but a meer Trifle.

24. I much fear that such Readers, who are not raised above Fancy, and have not well reflected how all Truths, and all our Judgments and Discourses that are rightly made, do consist in the *Connexion of Terms*,

*Shown that Things  
may have two  
different Man-  
ners of Existing.*

will look upon all Efforts of *Close Reason*, as Chimerical, and think them to be only a kind of Chiquaning, and little Tricks of Logick. Wherefore, to comfort the uneasy Fancies of such weak Speculators, I desire them to consider how *all things* were in the Divine Understanding before they were Created, and are *still there*; and how their *Ideas*, that is, their *Essences*, had there *another*, ( and that a more incomparable *manner of being* ) then they had in *themselves* afterwards. From which Divine *Archetypes* they were copied into Nature, and thence *transcribed*, by Impressions on our Senses, into Human Understandings. This Reflexion will ( I hope ) let them see how it is not impossible, but Consonant to Reason, that the *self-same thing* may have both a *Natural*, and an *Intellectual manner of Existing*. I note by the way, that, whereas I have insisted so much on the Impropriety and Novelty of the word [ *Idea*, ] our Modern *Ideists* will alledge that *Plato* did make use of that word before them, and that they do but eccho him, while they use it af-  
ter



ter him. But, I believe they will find upon Examination, that *Plato* meant by that word the *Essences*, or *Natures* of Things ; and, in likelihood, those very *Essences* in the *Divine Understanding* ; however some thought he misapplied it to *Universal Ideas*, or *Essences*, subsisting *alone*, and not in the *Individuals*. Now, did our Moderns take it in the *same Sense* he did, that is, for *Essences*, and not for *Resemblances* only, I should not except against them as to that particular ; but, to *use* his word, and affix *another Sense* to it, is, as I conceive, to abuse it.

25. *Corollary II.* From this whole discourse, and the many several Arguments in it, it appears evidently, that unless the word [ *Idea* ] be taken as we take the word [ *Notion*, ] that is, unless *Ideas*, or *Notions*, or whatever else we please to call them, be the *very things* in our understanding, and not meer *Resemblances* of them, they can never reach or engage the Thing *it self*, or give us *Knowledge* of it ; that is, they can never make us *know any thing* ; any more than a Picture can make us *know* a Man we never *saw*, nor ever *shall* or *can see* but by means of that Picture ; that is, *not at all*. And therefore, as I cannot but judge what I here advance to be *True*, and withall most necessary to be told, so I am obliged, without asking leave of any, to do that Right to Truth as to *declare* that those many Schemes of Doctrine, woven upon such *Ideas* as their Groundwork, tho' they be never so Ingenious and coherent within themselves, and may be of some use in Logick to distinguish our Notions, are both meerly Superficial, and perfectly useless in Philosophy, which

No Solid Philosophy can be built on Ideas.

which is the *Knowledge of Things*; and can only serve to please the Dædalian Fancies of the ingenious Contrivers and witty Descanters upon them; but can never bring us to the Solid *Knowledge of any one Thing* in Nature, nor verify *any one* Predication, or Judgment we make; nor enable us in our Speculative, or even Common, Discourses about *any Thing*, to speak one word of good Sense. Not that I think that Mr. Locke does still take the word [ *Idea* ] in that unaccountable meaning; but, that the acuteness of his Natural *Genius* does generally carry him (perhaps unreflectingly) to mean by that word the same I mean by *Notion*; tho', to say the truth, he totally abstracts from meddling designedly with this abstruse point.

26. *Corollary III.* Hence also we may gain some light what *Knowledge* is. For, it has been demonstrated that our *Notions*, on which all our *Knowledges* are grounded, and of which they are Compounded, are the very *Natures* of the thing *known*; and, consequently, that our Soul, considered precisely as *knowing* those *Natures*, or having them *in her*, as in their Subject, *is*, as *such*, those very *Things* which are constituted by those *Natures*. Wherefore, our knowing that those things *are*, or are *such* or *such* (which is Compleat Knowledge) is the *having* those things and their Predicates of *Existent*, or of their being affected with *such* or *such* Accidents, *so* in the Judging Power as they are in the things *without*; that is, the things *within her* must *be* as the things in Nature *are*. Wherefore, when the Soul knows any thing in Nature she must *be* that thing *as it is*.

is *Another* thing distinct from her; So that in a word, *To know* is *Esse aliud ut aliud*; *To be another thing, as it is another.* For Example; *To know* the Bell is in the Steeple, she must not only have the Bell existent in the Steeple *within* her, but also that the Bell in the Steeple is *without* her; or is in her as *another thing*, which is neither *her*, nor any Thing or Mode *belonging to her*. To explicate which hard point we may reflect, that all the Essential Notions of a Thing ( were it possible to comprehend them all ) of a Body for example, are *Intrinsic* to it; as also all those *Modes* or *Accidents* of it, the Complexion of which does constitute the Essence of that Body; and even taking them *singly*, as meer Accidents, they depend for their *being* on that Body as on their Substance; But it is not so with the Natures of those Bodies, or their Modes or Accidents, *as they are in the Soul.* For, they are no Determinations or Modes suitable or belonging to *her* Nature as 'tis *Spiritual*, nor depend *Solely* on *her* as on their *Subject* for their Existence, as all Modes in their Natural Subjects do. Whence follows, that when she *knows* them, they are purely in her as *Extrinsic* to her, or as *other Things*; and *as having* their genuin Existence *elsewhere*, or *out of the Mind.* And, in this consists the Excellency of a Spiritual Nature, ( from which we may demonstrate her Immateriality, and, by Consequence, her Immortality ) that by reason of the Superlative Nobleness of her Essence she can comprehend the whole Nature of Bodies ( tho' she may know other higher Natures also ) all its Accidents, its Existence without us, and whatever can belong to it; and yet so as to stand *a-loof* from it, and preserve her Distance  
and

and Height above it ; and is withall through the Amplitude of her Nature, able to engraft on her infinitely capacious *Stock of Being* all other things ; and give them, besides their own, ( if they be inferior Natures or Bodies ) a far Nobler Existence *in her self*. This Definition of *Knowing* will, I doubt not, look like Gibberish to short-sighted Speculators, who have not reflected steadily on the Souls *Spiritual Operations*, and on what *Manner things* are in the Mind: But, if each step to it be ( as I cannot doubt but it is ) demonstrable, the *Evidence* of the *Premisses*, and the *Necessity* of the *Consequence* ought to obtain of every Learned Man not be startled at the Strangeness of the Conclusion, because *Fancy* is dissatisfyed. That *Inferiour* Faculty is to be curb'd and kept within its own narrow Sphere ; and forbid to meddle with *Spiritual* Subjects which are beyond its reach and Skill ; and are only manageable by Reason grounding it self on such Notions as are *above Matter*. And, if it appears by this Rigorous Test that our *Notions* are the *very things as distinct from us*, all the rest of it will follow of Course by a Natural and Necessary Consequence.



## PRELIMINARY *Third.*

*That all our Science is grounded on the Things themselves ; and How this is performed.*

1. **B**UT how can the *Things* be in our Understanding ? since the [*Thing*,] in its first and proper signification, being an *Individual Substance*, is the subject of Innumerable Modes, or Accidents, which we can never reach, or comprehend ; and therefore it can never be known by us compleatly, as Mr. *Locke* has very elaborately demonstrated at large ; and, as my self have also proved in my \* *Method*. This being so clear and confess'd a Truth, it seems to follow hence against us both, that neither the *Ideists* have any *Idea* of it *Resembling* it fully, nor we any *Notion* of it, which is truly and entirely the *same* with it intellectually ; and so neither of us can, properly speaking, pretend to know *any Thing* as we ought.

*An Objection against the Possibility of the whole Thing being in one mind, cleared.*

\* B. 1. L. 2. § 7.

2. To clear this important Difficulty, on which the whole Affair of *Science*, and the Confutation of Scepticism, seems mainly to depend, it is to be noted.

*Some Notes premiss'd to clear this Objection.*

3. First, That the Notion of the *Individuum*, Thing or *Suppositum*, can never, for the Reason now given, be *Distinct* and *Compleat*, but *Confused* and *Imperfect*. For, let us take

*Our Knowledge is such as our Notions are.*

any

any Individual thing, *v.g.* a Stone, we shall find that it has in it what answers to the Notion of a Thing, (or what *has Being*) as also of *Extended, Dense, Hard, Opacous, Dinted, &c.* it is *Divisible* into innumerable Particles; its peculiar *Mixture* consists of many *diverse-natured Parts*, with such an *Order or Position* amongst them, &c. of all which our Senses, with their best Assistances, can not afford us clear Knowledge; nor, consequently, imprint any *Clear Notion* of that *whole Thing* in our Mind.

4. Secondly, That, since to *know* a Thing, is to have the Notion of it in our Mind, our *Knowledge* must be *such* as the *Notion* is: If the Notion be *Clear, Intire* and *Distinct*, our Knowledge too is *such*; and, if the Notion be *Obscure, Partial* and *Confused*, our Knowledge

• must be *Obscure, Partial*, and *Confused* likewise.

5. Thirdly, We can have such a Notion of every Individual thing, if it be not (as the smallest Atoms are) too little to be perceptible by our Sense, as (tho' it be *Confused* as to it self) may serve to distinguish it from all other *Things*, and to make us know it *Exists* separately from all others, and independently on them; Moreover, that it is the *Suppositum*, or Subject, which has its *own Nature or Essence* in it, and also all the *Modes* or *Accidents* belonging to it. Thus, when we see a Bag of Sand, or Wheat, poured out, our Senses acquaint our Mind, pre-imbued by some common Notions, that

*We can have such a Notion of a Thing (or Essence) as distinguishes it from all other things.*

*Confused Notions suffice for a Remote Ground of Science.*

that each Grain can exist separate ; and *has*, sustains, or gives Being to its *own* Accidents, without the Assistance of any of its Fellow-Grains.

6. Fourthly, This Confused Knowledge of the Thing, in gross, is sufficient for such a Degree of Science of it, as we can have in this State. For tho' we cannot have a *distinct Knowledge* of it *all*, taken in the *Lump*, and therefore do not pretend to have Science of it *thus*

Only Distinct or Abstracted Notions are the Immediate Ground of Distinct Knowledge or Science.

*considered*, nor of each Considerability in it taken by Detail ; yet, we know that Confusedly it *contains* in it self what answers to all the many *distinct* Conceptions we make of it, which are the Ground of *all* the *Science* we have ; they being all stored up and amassed in the *Thing*, and apt to be drawn or parcell'd out thence by our *Abstractive* Considerations of it.

7. *Lastly*, That our *Distinct Knowledge* (or *Science*) is built on our *Distinct Notions* of the Thing fram'd in our Minds by Impressions on the Senses, which are *many*, and the Manners of their affecting us also *manifold*. Hence our Soul, in this

Science thus grounded, is truly called, The Knowledge of the Thing.

State, can have no *Distinct* or Clear Knowledge of the *Thing*, but by *piece-meal*, or by *Distinct*, Different, Partial, Inadequate, or (as they are generally and properly called) *Abstract Notions* ; as Mr. *Locke* has frequently and judiciously exemplify'd in the several Conceptions or Notions we have of *Gold* ; which we may consider, as yellow, heavy, solid, malleable, dissolvable in *aqua Regia*, &c. Whence, tho' it be, perhaps, impos-

sible

sible for us to reach all the Considerabilities that may be found in it, which ground our Different Notions; yet each Notion we have of it, being Distinct from all the rest, and being truly *the Thing*, as far as 'tis thus Consider'd; hence we can have Science of the *Thing*, tho' confusedly of the *whole*, yet *Distinctly* of it in *part*, by such a Notion, as far as it is conceived by that Notion; notwithstanding our Ignorance of *other* Considerations of it; those Abstract Notions being in our Mind, (unless they hap to be Subordinate, as *General* and *Particular* ones are,) perfectly *Distinct* from, and *Exclusive* of one another. Thus we can have Abstract Notions of Length, Breadth and Thickness in Bodies; or (which is the same) we can conceive Bodies *precisely* as they are Long, Broad and Thick; and Mathematicians can frame many Sciences of Bodies, as *thus conceived*; and discourse Orderly and Clearly of each of those distinct Notions, that is, of the *Thing*, as *precisely such*; without meddling with Rarity, Density, Solidity, Fluidity, Heat, Cold, Moisture, Dryness, or any other Physical Consideration found in the same Body: Tho' each of these last also may, for the same Reason, (*viz.* their *Clear Distinction* from all the rest,) be discours'd of with equally Clear Evidence; and ground as many several Subordinate Sciences in Physick, as the other did in Mathematicks.

8. By what's said, it appears, that all Science, or all Philosophy, being grounded on these Abstract or *Distinct Notions of the Thing*, it can be truly said to be the *Knowledge of Things*; and that unless this be so, there

*Abstracted Ideas, tho' Exclusive of one another, do include or communicate the Thing.*



there can be no Philosophy. This Position Mr. *Locke* has ingenuously asserted: Whether he holds to it exactly, or no, will be seen shortly. Tho', in case he should be found to deviate from it, 'tis not peculiar to him, but a far more Common Error in our Modern School-Philosophers; and, I fear, in *all* the *Ideists*: For these Gentlemen, as soon as they have got such *Ideas* into their Heads, and express'd them by *Abstract* Words, as Rationality, Extension, Roundness, Length, &c. they, finding this Abstract Conception in their Mind, and experiencing that they can discourse about it Scientifically, do presently begin to imagine that those *Ideas* have got rid of the *Thing*, and hover in the Air (as it were) *a-loof* from it, as a little sort of shining Entities; and thence have of *themselves* a Title to be a Competent *Ground-work* to build *Science* on. They Character them to be *Resemblances*, which is a Conceit *easy* to Fancy; and so they set themselves to contemplate them, and employ their Wits to descant on them. They discourse of *them*, and *them only*; for they do not endeavour to shew clearly how those *Ideas* do engage the solid Nature of the Thing. Whence it must needs happen, that in case those *Ideas* chance to be meer *Material* Resemblances, or Phantasms, the Knowledge built on them is purely Superficial and Imaginary; nor can have any more TRUTH in it, than a Looking-glass, which represents to us a well-proportioned Edifice; or a Dream, which (as it sometimes lights) is composed of Fancies pretty well Coherent with one another. Lastly, which is worst of all, they make Truth, which can have no Foundation, but in the *Things*; which Creative Wisdom or Essential Truth is

made and establish'd, to consist in the meer Agreement of those *Ideas*. Whereas they ought to make it consist in this, that those Abstracted Conceptions, or Notions of ours, are the *Thing* it self thus partially consider'd; and also, that our Judgments or Discourses of them, and all Truths whatever, do wholly consist in this, that those Partial Conceptions of ours are found to be Identify'd in the *Thing* we Judge or Discourse of. 'Tis the *Thing* we *divide*, (as it were,) or take in pieces by those Abstract or Partial Notions of it; and, therefore, 'tis the Parts (as it were) of the same *Thing* we put together again, and Identify when we *compound* Propositions or Judgments.

9. In a word, They make the Abstractedness of those *Ideas* to be *Exclusive* of the *Subject* or *Thing*; whereas I make it only *Exclusive* of other *Notions*, but to *Include* and signify the *Thing* or *Subject*, according to some Consideration, or (as it were) Part of it; in the same manner (to use a grosser Example) as the *Hand* or *Foot* signify the *Man* or *Thing* to which they belong, according to his Power of Handling, or Walking. Hence I hold, that *Whiteness*, *Breadth* or *Hardness* in the *Wall*, do signify and import the *Wall* it self, precisely *quatenus*, or as it is *White*, *Broad* and *Hard*. Whence I affirm, that all *Science*, which consists of those *Abstract* and *Mutually-distinct* *Notions*, as of its Materials, is truly a *Solid* (tho' inadequate) Knowledge of those very Things; and not of *Notions*, or *Ideas*, aparted from them really, or as *Distinct* kinds of Beings Existing separately from it: Which if they were, we should be never a Jot the wiser for knowing all the *Ideas* in

in the World, nor ever arrive at true Philosophy, it being the Knowledge of *Things*, and not of *Resemblances*: Especially, since (as was demonstrated in my former Section) those Resemblances can never give us Knowledge of the *Things themselves*.

We may draw farther Arguments to prove our Position, that all our most Abstract Notions do *include* or *connote* the Thing or Subject, from all our Abstract Notions or Ideas, whether they be Essential, or Accidental. To begin with the former.

10. *Arg. 1.* 'Tis impossible to conceive *Humanity*, for Example, without connotating *Homo* its *Suppositum*; therefore that Abstract *Idea*, [*Humanity*,] must signify the Thing, or [*Homo*,] according to what's his Essential Constitutive. The Antecedent is prov'd. The Notion or *Idea* of the Definition is the very Notion or *Idea* of the Thing defined, but the Definition of *Humanity*, viz. the *Compleat Essence of a Man*, includes *Man* in its Notion; therefore [*Humanity*,] which is the Thing defined, does also *include* the Thing, or [*Man*,] in its Notion. Wherefore [*Humanity*,] tho' express'd abstractedly, because 'tis but *one Part*, as it were, of the Entire *Suppositum*, (though it be the principal part of it,) does signify the Thing, or Man, according to his Compleat Essential Form or Constitutive. The same Argument may be made of any other Essential *Idea*. Let us examine next the *Ideas* or Notions of the *Modes* or *Accidents* of Things, and try whether they *exclude* the Thing, or *include* it.

Prov'd, because Abstract Notions, if Essential, do evidently include the Thing.

11. *Arg. 2.* The *Idea* or Notion of [ *Modes,* ] is, that they are the *Manners how a Thing is* ; and of [ *Accidents,* ] that they are those which do *advene to the Thing*, or ( if I may be permitted to strain a Word, to express properly and fully my meaning ) *Accidents are Unessential Conceptions of the Thing.* Wherefore, the *Idea* of both of them do *include* the Thing in their *Explications*, and consequently in their *Notions*, and not *exclude* it. Or thus, There can be no *Modes* of a *Nothing* ; therefore the Notion or *Idea* of a *Mode* involves essentially the *Thing* of which it is a *Mode*, and to which, as such, it relates. Wherefore, the *Material Part* of it is the *Thing*, the *Formal Part* [ *as thus modify'd* ] or [ *as existing thus* ] or ( which is the same ) *as thus conceiv'd.*

12. *Arg. 3.* This is confirm'd, because *Modes* are justly conceiv'd to have no Being of their *own*, but to Exist by the Existence of their *Subject* : But, when we have a Notion of any *Mode* in Nature, we conceive it as some way or other *Existing* ; therefore their Notion must connote the *Subject* or *Thing* by whose Existence only they do Exist.

13. It would not be hard to multiply Arguments to prove this nice Point, fetch'd both from Metaphysics, and also from Logick, and the Verification of all Propositions, did I conceive it to be needful. But, I see plainly, that all the Arguments in my former Preliminary do conspire with their united Force, to make good this Fundamental Position. For, if this



this Truth be once firmly establish'd, that our Notions are the *Things* themselves, *as far as* they are conceiv'd by us, it *must* follow, that all our Science being built on those Notions, has for its Solid Basis the very *Thing it self*; and not any *other* Things or Nothings, *distinct* from the *Thing known*; such as are their pretty *Spiritual Looking-Glasses*, those Unaccountable, Inexplicable, Unnecessary, and Useless Things, call'd *Ideas*. And, I hope I may rest confident that those Proofs of mine will abide the Shock of the most Strenuous Opposition; since, unless that Grand Leading Truth be Certain, 'tis demonstrable that no Man living can know *any thing at all*. For, 'tis confess'd, that nothing can be known, but by the Means of *those Ideas* or Representations of it: And those Arguments evince, that unless the *Thing it self* be in our Mind *first*, those *Ideas*, or Resemblances cannot possibly give us any Notice, or Knowledge of it.

14. *Note First.* On this Occasion we may reflect on the Sagacity of that great Speculator and Observer of Nature, *Aristotle*; and may gather, at the same time, his true Sentiments in this Particular; that, when he came to range all our Natural Notions into his Ten Common Heads, he did not express the *Modes* or *Accidents* by *Abstract* Words, but *Concrete* ones; lest his Scholars should hap to think they were certain Kinds of *Entities* Distinct from the Subject: whereas they were Nothing but the Subject or Substance it self, considered as thus affected, or thus *modify'd*: For, he does not call them ποσότης, ποιότης, *Quantitas, Qualitas*, as we do; but τὸ ποσόν, τὸ ποιόν, *Quantum, Quale*; nor

Hence Aristotle expresses the *Modes* or *Accidents*, by *Concrete Words*

ἀναφορῇ, *Relatic*, but τὰ πρὸς π, *Relata*; or more simply, πρὸς π, *Ad aliquid*: Which last is abetted by our Common Language; as, when we ask, [What is he to me?] the Answer is, [Your Friend,] your Father, &c. Where the Words [to me,] express formally what we call *Relation*; and the Words [is he,] both signify that the Relation is a Mode or Accident *intrinsic* to the Subject, however it be Consider'd in order to another; and with-all, that it has no Being, but that of the *Thing* or Subject signify'd by the Pronoun [He:] Which amounts to this, that what we call in an Abstract Word [Relation,] is nothing in reality, but the *Thing* Considered thus, or in order to another *Individuum*, which we call to be thus *Modified*, or conceived to be according to such a manner Related. The same is observable in the rest, τὸ ποιεῖν, τὸ πάσχειν, τὸ ἔχειν, *Agere, Pati, Habere*, τὸ πότε, τὸ πῶ, *quando, ubi*, which have the Force of *Concretes*; for 'tis only the Subject that can be conceived or said to *Act, Suffer*, be in such a *Place* or *Time*, or have such a kind of *Habiliment*: Whereas, were it not for that reason, he could have express'd them in Abstract Terms, (perhaps more handsomely;) as, ὁ χρόνος, ὁ τόπος, ἡ ἀρετή, τὸ πάθος, ἡ ἔξις, ἡ ἡμις, *Tempus, Locus, Actio, Habitus*, had it not been his Intention to avoid Abstract Terms, lest the manner of Expression should represent it as a kind of *Thing*, Distinct really from the Subject, and so lead Men to take a *Fancy* for a *Reality*, as it happens in the Mis-acception of the Word [Space,] which breeds the Conceit of *Vacuum*. And, he was less solicitous to do this in the first Predicament, call'd by him οὐσία, because there was no Danger Men should take the *Essence* of the Thing to be a distinct Thing from the

the Thing it self, as there might be in the others. So that this ought to be embrac'd and establish'd, as a most certain and most Fundamental Maxim by all who pretend to true Philosophy, that *Whatever Conception of ours has not the Thing, or Res,* (either consider'd in part, or in whole,) in its Notion, has *no Reality* in it, and is a *meer Fancy*.

*Note Second,* Hence we may gather the proper manner of Signifying, found in

Abstract and Concrete Words, as such, viz. that the Concrete Word

*The Point elucidated by Abstract and Concrete Words.*

(*Album* for Example) signifies directly the *Subject*, and indirectly the *Form* or *Mode* conceived to be in it: And the Abstract Word *Albedo* signifies directly the *Form* or *Mode*, and indirectly the *Subject*; which indirect manner of signifying is properly called *Connotating*.

15. This uncommon Doctrine might, perhaps, sink better into the Reader's Con-

sideration, if it were illustrated by an Instance. We will take

then Mr. *Locke's* Position of an Infinite *Imaginary Space*, or *Vacuum*.

*Hence Space without Body, or Vacuum, is a Contradiction.*

To make good which Tenent, he imagins that *Vacuum* signifies a *Space without Body*: Which, to my Judgment, is as much as to say, it signifies a *Contradiction*, or *Chimera*. For, I positively deny we can have any *Notion* of *Space*, without including *Body*, however we may have a *Fancy* of it: And I as positively affirm, that *Space* can signifie nothing but *Body*, according to such a *Mode* called *Space*, or *Quantity*. For (to wave my former Proofs) I ask him whence he had first the *Notion* or *Idea* of *Space*? He is too acute to hold *Innate Ideas*: It was *Acquir'd* then, or wrought in him; And by

what, but by the *Thing*, that is, by the *Body*? It was the *Body* then which he saw; it was the *Body* thus modify'd, that imprinted it *self thus* on his Senses, and caused such a *manner of Idea* in his Mind. Wherefore, to conceit that we can have an *Idea of Space without Body*, whereas he never had an Impression or *Idea of Space*, but what was *in Body*, and a *Mode of it*; and so Identify'd with it, is to relinquish our *Solid Natural Conceptions*, and run to *Fancies*; to abandon the Firm Ground of all our Knowledge, the *Thing*, and to pursue instead of it an *Aiery Nothing*; (for *Modes or Manners*, without the *Thing* of which they are *Modes*, signify a meer *Nothing*, and can be *Nothing* else;) or, (which is the same) 'tis to discard our *well-grounded Notions*, and to entertain in their Room meer *Phantastick Resemblances*. The Notion of *Space* then being an Impression of and from the *Thing*, is the *Thing* or the *Body* conceived according to that abstracted Respect or *Mode*, called *Space*? Wherefore, to put *Space beyond all Bodies*, or where there is *no Body*, is a plain Trucking our Natural Notions, for Appearances that are Groundless, and coined by our Imagination. Perhaps he will say, we can clearly Abstract the *Idea of Space* from that of *Body*; which is so far true, that our Precise and Formal Notion of the *Body*, as it is precisely a *Thing*, or Capable of Existing, is not the Notion of *Space*, which is a *Mode of the Thing*. But, why must it therefore be *Nothing* of *Body*, when 'tis evidently one kind of Conception or Consideration of it; that is, when 'tis nothing but *Body*, as grounding the Notion of *Space*? In a word, Since *Space* is not of it self *A Thing*, or *Res*, it must and can only be *Modus Rei*; and therefore, to Fancy an



an *Idea* of it, which *excludes* Body, is to make it a Mode of *Nothing*, and consequently *no Mode*; which is to destroy the Notion of Space, while he goes about to refine it. This for the present, till we come to reflect farther upon that Tenet in its proper Place.

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## PRELIMINARY Fourth.

*Of the Particular Manner how all sorts of Notions are bred in us; and by what way those Elements of Knowledge do first come into the Soul.*

I. **T**HE former Grounds being laid, shewing *what Knowledge is, and in what it consists*; the next thing that comes to be consider'd is, *The State of the Question.* to shew, in particular, the Manner *how* we come to know at first; or, by what Connatural Steps, the *Things*, or (which is the same) our Notions of them, which are the Materials of Knowledge, are introduced into our Minds. And, let it be noted, that it is not my Intention here to shew, what *compleat* Knowledges, or *Judgments*, are in our Soul *before others* in Priority of Nature; which I have already done in my *Method, Book 2. Lesson 4.* What I aim at *here* is, to acquaint the Reader very particularly with my Thoughts *how* our Mind comes first to be imbu'd

bu'd with both *Direct* and *Reflex* Notions, which are the Elements or Materials, of which our *Compleat* Knowledges or Judgments are compounded.

2. The Difficulty of conceiving how *Corporeal* Things that are *without* us, could get into our Soul which is *Spiritual*, and affect it, was so puzzling to the Greatest Philosophers hitherto, that it has made them rack their best Wits to invent some congruous Way how this could be performed. *Aristotle*, who ought to have done this, since he advanced that Position above-mentioned which required it should be done, gives us no *particular* Account of it ; but being resolved, it seems, to follow the fullen Principle he had taken up, *viz. Acroases ita esse edendas ut non sint editæ*, left it to Posterity to find it out. Which affected Humour of his, whether it proceeded from Envy of Knowledge to the World (an unpardonable Fault in a Professor of Knowledge) or from Vanity, or out of Policy to bring more Scholars to his *walking School*, has certainly brought much Disparagement to his Doctrine, hindred its Currency, and help'd forward by the Schools, (who undertook to explicate him, and did it untowardly) has pester'd the World with diverse Schemes of Philosophy, either newly invented or furnish'd up afresh. Whether he did explain after *what manner* we come to know, to his *Scholars*, I know not ; only it may seem wonderful, if he had done it, that none of them should have deliver'd it down tous. But, letting *Aristotle* alone with his Faults, which blemish'd his other great Vertues, and come to the *other* Philosophers since his time.

3. These

3. These Learned Men saw clearly, that all Corporeal Agents work by *Local Motion*, and that no Operation of theirs could be transacted without such Motion, at least *accompanying* all their Actions, they being all of them *Successive* or *Quantitative*; and they could not conceive how *Local Motion* should be received or wrought in a Soul, whose Nature, (it being *Spiritual*) is incapable of it. For, it must (as the very Notion of it imports) be made *first* in one part of the Subject, *afterwards* in another; which can with no Sense be apply'd to the Soul, which (it being *Indivisible*) has *no* Parts *at all*. They were not so well skill'd in Metaphysics, as to reflect, that it was very congruous to Reason to affirm, That the Notion or Nature of *Things* (speaking of Created Beings) did abstract from *all* Existence; and therefore, that the same thing might have *different manners* of Existing, and be *in* our Soul *Spiritually*, tho' out of it *Corporeally*: And, those few who *did* apprehend the *thing* might thus exist in the Soul *when in it*, were still at a *Nonplus* how it could *get into it*. Perhaps the Difficulty of explaining this, might be one Reason, why *Cartesius*, not knowing how to *give an Account* of this, thought fit rather to study, how he might avoid giving *any Account at all* of it, and thence recurr'd to the Position of *Innate Ideas*. At least, this is the best Excuse I can make in his behalf, for embracing a Tenet so totally præternatural; in case (as his Words give us just occasion to think) it were really his Doctrine.

*Later Philosophers  
were at a great  
puzzle about it.*

4. The Schoolmen, whose way it is, when they are at a Plunge how to find out a Reason for any difficult Point, to create some *Entity* which God and Nature never made, and then to alledge 'twas *that Entity* which did the business; invented their *Species Intentionales*; which, if they were not the *same* with our *Notions*, or the *Things* in our Knowledge, were *meer Resemblances* coined by Fancy, as our Modern *Ideas* generally are. But this raised a new Difficulty, instead of *laying* the old one: For, besides that those *Species* were such unaccountable things, that none knew what to make of them, or under what Head to rank them, they could do the Question no Service at all: For, if they were *Corporeal*, they could only affect the Soul by way of *Local Motion*; of which, being *Spiritual*, she is not capable. And, if they were *Spiritual*, it will be ask'd, How they *came* to be such, being caused by a *Corporeal* Agent; as also, *how*, being sent from a *Body*, they could get into the Soul, or by what Vehicle? Being thus at a Loss, they invented another Entity, called *Intellectus Agens*; whose Office it was to depure the Phantasms from their Dross of Materiality, that they might become fit, thus refined, to be receiv'd in the Soul. But this still multiply'd more Difficulties, and solv'd none. For, *First*, What *other* Reason had they from Nature to put such a Power in the Soul? Or what *other* thing was it good for, but to purifie the *Species*? If it had *no other* Office, nor served for any thing but to do this Job, 'tis manifest 'twas invented *gratis*, to get rid of the Difficulty that stunn'd them, and taken  
up



up for an *Asylum Ignorantiæ*, when they were hard put to it, and wanted something else to say. Secondly, Were those Phantasms, before they were Spiritualiz'd, *in the Soul*, or *Intellectus*, or *out of it*? If *in it*, the old Question returns, *How get they thither*? If *out of it*, How could the Soul's Acts of Understanding, which are *Immanent Acts*, become *Transitive*, and affect a Thing which is *without her*? Thirdly, Since the Understanding, or this *Intellectus Agens*, can only work by Knowledge, how could it have this Power to alter the Natures of things, or turn them from Corporeal into Spiritual, when as yet it had *no Knowledge* at all *in it*, as before those *Species* were refined and fitted to be received in it, it had none? Lastly, Are those *Species* they put, when purify'd, perfectly like the Thing, or imperfectly? If perfectly like, then they are the same with it, as our *No-tions* are; and so, the Thing it self is *in the Soul*, and then those *Species* of theirs are to no purpose; for the Thing being there in Person (as it were,) there can need no Proxy of *Species* to stand for it; nor can it bear any Sense to call the *Thing* a *Species* of it self. If they be imperfectly like the Thing, they are no more but *Resemblances* of it; and then, 'tis already abundantly demonstrated, that the Thing can never be known by them: So that they could make nothing cohere how our first Rudiments or Materials of Knowledge could get into the Soul, or how the Thing could come to be known by them.

5. The *Ideists*, on this Occasion, have taken two ways, and both of them very short ones; which is to skip over all those Difficulties at one Leap.

How the Ideists  
behave themselves  
as to this Point.

The

The *Cartesians* tell us in one Word, That *God* gave the Soul her *Ideas* (or, as some of them say, *some* of them) at the same time he gave her her Being; and that, by having those *Ideas* in her, she comes to know; and, so, by making this quick work, the Question is at an End. This is soon *said*, but not so easily *proved*. Some Rubs I have put in the way of this Pretence, to hinder its Currency, in the Preface to my *Method*, and in the Book it self, as Occasion presented; and shall add many more, in case their Opposition shall invite me to it. But; what needs any more, since Mr. *Locke* has already Confuted that Position beyond possibility of any Rational Reply? Other *Idcists* there are, who think it their best Play to *abstract totally* from that hard Question; and, finding, by Experience, that they have *Ideas* and Resemblances in their Head when they know, they content themselves with *That*, without proceeding to examin distinctly *what* they are, or *how* they bring us to the Knowledge of the Things in Nature. These Men do certainly act more prudently than the former; for, 'tis much more wise and safe, in order to the Common Good of Learning, to wave an obscure Point totally; than, by advancing false Positions, in a matter of universal Concern in Philosophy, to affirm what cannot be maintain'd. Tho' I must declare, that I cannot see but that such a Fundamental Point, which influences the whole Body of *Science*, ought not to be pretermitted. For which reason I have thought fit to lay the Grounds for it in the two first Lessons of my *Method*, reserving a more particular Account of it till further Occasion should be presented; which seems to offer it self at present.

6. Yet I do not judge this Opportunity so pressing or proper, as to oblige me to treat such a large Point *fully*, or to set my self to *demonstrate* and smooth every Step I take in this untrodden and rugged way. This of right belongs to that part of Metaphysicks that treats of the Nature of the *Soul*; and, particularly, as it is the *Form* of such an *Animal Body*; which may not improperly be called *Physicks*, or *Animaſticks*. Besides, it were too great a Boldness to pretend to pursue such an abstruse Point quite thorough with *Evident Demonstration*. Yet I think I may promise my Readers, that the Positions I shall lay down *orderly* to clear it, will have that Coherence amongst themselves, and be so Agreeable to the Natures of Things, and to the Maxims of divers other Sciences; that it will be hard, in just Reason, to find any considerable Flaw in it. I take my Rise from the remotest Principles that can concern that Point, and these are my Thoughts.

*How far the Author engages to clear this Difficulty.*

7. It belongs to the Divine Wisdom to carry on the Ordinary Course of his World by *Causes* and *Effects*; and, on the Matter's side, by *Dispositions* to further Productions. Thus Wood is heated by *Degrees*, ere it becomes *Fire*, and breaks out into a *Flame*; and, in the Generation of every thing in Nature, there are many *Previous Alterations* of the Matter, ere it acquires *Another Form*, or becomes *Another Thing*.

*The First Cause carries on the Course of Second Causes by Immediate Dispositions.*

8. Where-

8. Wherefore it belongs also to the same Wisdom and Goodness of **God**, as he is the *First Cause*, that if, in the Ordinary Course of the World, the Subject be dispos'd for something that cannot be compass'd by the Power of Second Causes, to step in to Nature's Assistance, and help her *immediately* by his own Hand. Thus, when the Individuality is compleated, that is, when the Potentiality of the Matter is Ultimately Determin'd and Particulariz'd by Second Causes, so that it is become distinct from *all other Entities*, or apt to be *This*, and so fitted for *Existence*; which Existence, Second Causes *cannot give*: **God**, whose Generous Bounty stands ever ready to bestow unenviously on his Creatures all the Good they are capable of, does give them Existence *immediately by himself*.

9. Therefore, if there can be such a Disposition in the Brain of an *Embryo*, that (grown riper) it is apt, as far as is on the *Matters* side, to act *Comparatively*, which is the Disposition for *Rationality*: And that this cannot be done, but by having a *Form* in it of a Superior or *Spiritual* Nature, which Second Causes *cannot produce*; it is certain, **God** will, by himself, assist it, by infusing *such a Form*.

10. There *can* be such a Disposition in the Brain of an *Embryo* to work *Comparatively*, that is, to *Judge* and *Discourse*; since we experience that we do this actually *now*, in part, by the means of the *Brain*, or something that's near it, or belongs to it.

11. Where-

*And therefore he assists Nature, if Dispos'd, when it cannot reach.*

*Therefore, if the Matter can be Dispos'd for a Rational Soul, GOD will give it.*

*There can be such a Disposition in Matter.*



11. Wherefore, since this cannot be done without having those Materials in us, of which, Compounded or *Compared*, we are to *Judge* and *Discourse*, which we call Simple Apprehensions, or *Notions*; it follows that there must be such a Disposition in some Bodily Part, as to convey into the Soul such *Notions*.

*Therefore, some Material Part, by which immediately the Soul has Notions from the Object.*

12. Wherefore, since Bodies, in their *whole* Quantity, or Bulk, cannot be convey'd by the Senses into the Brain, the Author of Nature has order'd that all Bodies, upon the least Motion of Natural Causes, Internal or External, (which is never wanting) should send out *Effluvi-ums*, or most minute and imperceptible Particles; which may pass through the Pores of those Peruious Organs, called the *Senses*; and so, be carried to the Brain.

*Therefore Effluvi-ums are sent from Bodies, to that Part.*

13. This Natural Compound, called [*Man*,] is truly *One Thing*, and not aggregated of *more* Things Actually Distinct; since the *Form*, called the *Soul*, did (tho' not so *Naturally*, yet) as *necessarily* follow out of the Disposition of the Matter, (taking it as Seconded, and its Exigency and Deficiency supply'd by the *First Cause*,) as the Form of *Fire*, or of any other Body in Nature, does out of the Dispositions properly Previous to that Form: And, therefore, does as truly (by Informing that Matter) Make or constitute the Man *One Thing*, as any other *Corporeal* Form does any Body in Nature.

*Therefore Man is truly One Thing, which is Corporeo-Spiritual.*

14. Therefore there must be some Chief Corporeal Part in Man, which is immediately united with the Soul, as the Matter with its Form, and, therefore, is Primarily Corporeo-Spiritual, and includes both Natures. Whence, when that Part is affected, after its peculiar Nature, Corporeally; the Soul is affected after its Nature, that is, Spiritually, or Knowingly; which Part Cartesius thinks is the *κωνδύλον*, or Glandula Pinealis.

15. Therefore the Manner how, and the Reason why those Corporeal Effluvia do come to affect the Soul, and cause in her Spiritual Notions of the Thing, is because of the immediate Identification of the Matter and Form, in that part; whence follows, that the one cannot be affected, but the other must be affected too after its Different manner, proper to its Distinct Nature. In the same manner (abating the Diversity peculiar to each of those Natures) as, when the Matter of Wood is wrought upon, the Firm of it, or the Complexion of Accidents, (making up one Thing with it,) does also suffer Change. Whence, by the way, is seen the Reason of that received Maxim, that *Actiones & Passiones sunt suppositorum*: So that 'tis the whole Thing which acts or suffers, tho' according to this or that Part of it; and hence it is that the Whole Thing is conceiv'd, tho' by an Inadequate Notion we conceive but but one Part of it (as it were) distinctly.

11. This

16. This Part immediately inform'd by the Soul as 'tis Spiritual, (which we will call *the Seat of Knowledge*,) must, whatever it is, be of a Temper the most *Indifferent* to all Bodies, and to their several Modes as can be conceived; and (as far as Matter can bear) *Abstract* from them all; both that it may be con-naturally *more sensible* of the *Different Effluvi-ums* by which their *several* Natures are to be understood; as also more fit to beget in the Soul *Universal* Notions, such as are those of *Ens*, or *Being*; by which all the Negotiation of our Interiour Acts of *Judging* and *Discoursing* is managed. Tho' I am apt to judge that those General Notions are also caus'd when the Impression is *Confused* or *Indistinct*, as those of *Ens* or *Being* are; and the same is to be said of the Rest in proportion. Thus, when we see a Thing a-far off, and have but a *Confused* View of it, it only appears to us to be *something*, we know not, particularly *what*, or *A Thing*; without making us know *in the least*, *what Kind* of Thing or Body it is. Afterwards, coming nearer, we discern *it moves it self*; whence we gain the Notion of a *Living Thing*: Then, approaching still nearer, we, by a *more distinct* Impression, know 'tis a *Horse*. And, lastly, when it is within convenient Distance to give us a perfectly *Distinct* View of it, we know 'tis such a *Particular Horse* of our own.

*The Peculiar Temper of that Part consists in Indifference.*

17. That Part, called the *Seat of Knowledge*, must, moreover, be the most *Sensible*, and the most *Tender* that can be imagin'd, that (as was said) the least *Effluvi-ums* may affect it:

*That Part very Tender and Sensible, yet not Tenacious.*

And yet it must not be of a *Glutinous* Nature, so as to *entangle* them, and make them *stick there*; but that, reverberated thence, they may light in some near adjacent place, to serve, by their *renewed* Impulses afterwards, for the Use of *Memory*, and to excite again *former* Knowledges; as also, (as will be shewn,) to cause *Reflex* Acts. That it must not be in the least *Glutinous*, appears hence evidently, that, did the *Effluvioms* stick there, we should, whether we would or no, perpetually contemplate or think of those Objects; which would also hinder our Perception of *others*, by mingling the former *Effluvioms* with those which supervene.

18. The orderly disposure of the world, by Gradual steps arising from less perfect Natures to those which are more Noble, and more Perfect, does evince that this Part call'd the *Seat of Knowledge*, is the most *Supremely Noble* production of Material things, and nearest ally'd (as it were) to Spiritual Nature that can be imagin'd; so that all the best Perfections that are to be found in Corporal things, are center'd in it. Whence, tho' it is too rude to affirm with a certain learned Physician, that the *κωρυδαίον*, is a baser part of Man's Body than the *Intestinum Rectum*; yet I cannot approve of *Cartesius* his Conceit, that it is a *Glandule*; which is one of the Ignoblest parts we have; but judge it has a peculiar Temperature of its own; not only specifically distinct from other parts, but that they are scarce in any degree to be parallell'd to it.



19. Whether amongst its other Special Qualities it partakes of the Nature of those Bodies which in the dark do reflect Light; and that the Glossy and Lively Appearances and Resemblances, which we call *Fancies*, or *Phantasms*, do spring thence, I leave to others to determin. I think it is the Interest of those who make the *Septum Lucidum* to be the Seat of Knowledge, to embrace that Opinion.

Perhaps 'tis Reason of Light, or Lucid.

20. Those *Effluvioms* sent out from Bodies, have the *very Natures* of those Bodies in them, or rather are themselves Lesser Bodies of the *Self-same Nature*, ( as the smallest imperceptible parts of Bread and Flesh, are truly Bread and Flesh )

The Effluvioms have in them the Natures of the Bodies whence they are sent.

which are cut off by Natural Agents from the great Lump; and, therefore, by Application of themselves, they imprint the *very Body it self*, or a Body of that Nature, on that material part which is the *Seat of Knowledge*. Whence the Soul being, at the same time, affected after *her manner* ( or *Knowingly* ) as that part was affected, she has also the *very Nature* of that Body ( as far as the Sense exhibits it ) put in her by that conformable Impression, when she has a *Notion* of it.

21. Therefore those *Effluvioms* striking the Seat of Knowledge, and immediately

( as has been said ) *falling off from it*, do affect it as a Thing *distinct from the M n.* For they are not there as belonging at all to the In-

They affect that Part, as Things Distinct from the Man.

trinsic Constitution of the Body, but as meer Strangers

strangers to it : Whence the Soul has the Nature of that Body in her ( and consequently is that Body ) as 'tis *another* Thing from her, which illustrates the Explication of *knowing* given formerly ; and that 'tis *to be another thing as it is another*.

22. The Reason why those *Effluvioms*, containing the Essence or Nature of the Bodies whence they flow, do not breed a Notion in the Soul of their *whole* Essences is, because they are convey'd to that part by many different Conduits the *Senses* ; which being *diverse*, and each of them ( according to their circumstances ) apt to be affected *diversely*, do therefore receive and imprint them after a *different Manner*. For example, those which, by the smart motion of the Air, do come in thro' the Drum of the Ear ; and consequently by the Auditory Nerve which is joined to it, and immediately conveys them to the Seat of Knowledge ; do affect it with a kind of Vibration, or ( as we may say ) *Soundingly*. Those which come in by the Eye, affect it *Luminously*, or as accompany'd with Light, and so of all the rest ; whence are caused in our Soul all our *Distinct*, or *Abstracted* Notions of the Thing, or ( which is the same ) of the Nature of the Thing, in *part*, or according to *such* a Consideration of it ; on which, because of the *Distinctness*, and consequently *Clearness* of those impressions, all the *Science* we have of the Thing is grounded.

*The Peculiar Nature of our Soul, renders those Notions perfectly distinct and Indivisible.*

23. There is, moreover on the *Soul's* side, which is the *Subject* that receives those Impressions, another thing highly conducing to make our Notions yet *more Clear*

Clear and perfectly Distinct, which deserves our best Reflexion. 'Tis this, that, the Nature of our Soul being *Indivisible*, it gives an Indivisibility to all those Notions, or Natures in her; which, as they existed *without her*, and were convey'd into her by *Effluvijs*, being Corporeal, were *Divisible*, and therefore something *Indistinct* and *Confus'd*: This appears clearly in most of the Objects about which the Soul is conversant, perhaps, in all; *viz.* in Figures, Points, Lines, Superficies, Instants, Measures, Comparisons, Predications, Respects, Negations, Denominations, Relations, &c. For example, There is not, perhaps, in all Nature any Body Perfectly, or Mathematically, *Flat*, *Spherical* or *Triangular*; or just a *yard*, nor any Duration mark'd out to be just an *Hour*; but, by reason that Bodies are affected with *quantity*, which is perpetually variable by a world of Agents of diverse Figures assailing it; as also because of the Divisibility of Quantity *in infinitum*, it is warp'd from those Exact Figures, or deviates from those Just Measures: Whereas, on the contrary, those things, as they exist *in the Soul*, are *adjusted* and *stinted* even to an *Indivisible*; so that the very least imaginable Consideration, added or detracted, quite alters the Notion to another *Species*. Now, nothing can be so *concisely Distinct* from another, or more impossible to be Confounded with it, than what is so comprized within its own Bounds, as to be *This* and no *other*, or *so much* and no *more*, even to an *Indivisible*. Whence 'tis demonstrable that the Thing, as in our Soul, or as standing under our Notion, or Conception, is a most *Proper* Ground for that Distinct and Clear Knowledge

called *Science*. This is evidently seen throughout the whole Body of the *Mathematicks*; and the same will be found by Reflexion in all other Sciences whatever.

I note here on the by, that *this* Power or Faculty of the Soul, which is so proper and so natural to her, of Reducing all things in her from the Indistinctness found in them, as they stand in Nature, or from *Divisibility* to *Indivisibility*, does ground most evident Demonstrations of her *Immateriality*, and consequently, of her *Immortality*, were it pursu'd home. But this is not my business at present.

24. That Part, called the Seat of Knowledge, can be affected with many *cohererent Impressions at once*, which

Whence Complex  
Notions come.

cause in the Soul Complex, or Compoundd Notions. This is too evident to need any Dilating on it, I call those Impressions *cohererent*, which are caused by *Effluvioms* making singly different Impressions either from the *same Thing*, or the *same sort of Thing*. But, it is on this occasion to be well noted, that, lest our Knowledges or Discourses be lost in a Crowd, or run astray in a pathless Wood of Notions disorderly aggregated, the *Art of Logick* is absolutely necessary, to range and distinguish our Notions into Common Heads, and to descend from those General Heads all along by

*Intrinsicall Differences* \*; that is, to divide them by *more and less* of the Common Notion, so to keep them still *within* that Line or

Head; without which they must needs interfere and breed Confusion. This Method of *Distinguishing*

\* *Method to Science*, Book 1.  
Less. 3. § 2.



*guishing* and *keeping distinct* our Notions, is as necessary for Scientifical Discourses, as 'tis for an Army to be Marſhalled in Rank or File ; without which 'tis but a Medly or Confused Multitude. Whence, those who ſlight this Methodizing their Notions, must necessarily, in rigorous Reason, talk *Ramblingly* ; tho' perhaps ingeniously, according to such a sort of Wit as Men use when they would maintain Paradoxes ; or, as *Erasmus* us'd to praise *Folly*.

25. It being demonstrable in Metaphysics, that whatever is only *in Power* to have a new Act, cannot of *it self* produce that Act in it self, unless it be wrought upon first by *some other Agent which is in Act* ; and much less can such a Power do this, as is of an *Indivisible* or Spiritual Nature, in regard it has *no Parts*, one whereof being in Act *it self*, may produce an Act in the *rest* ; as it happens in the Wheels of a Watch, or in our Bodies, when *one* part of them moves *another* : It follows hence, that our Soul can produce no *new* Act, either of Memory, or of Reflexion upon her own former Acts, nor of Thinking or Willing, &c. without being *first* affected by some Object *without* her, or *anew* by some Part or Particle *within* the Man ; which, being in *Act* it self, may cause those *new* Acts of Knowledge in her.

*The Soul cannot Alone produce any New Act in her self,*

26. The *Effluvioms*, which, by affecting the Seat of Knowledge, gave her to know at first, are the *properest* Agents to produce connaturally these *new* Acts of Reflexion or Memory ; in case it can be found that they are duly qualify'd for such an Efficiency.

*But by the Phantasms exciting her anew.*

27. Those *Effluvia* (as was prov'd above) not sticking on that part which is the *Seat of Knowledge*, do consequently fall off from it, and are lodged near it; whence 'tis consonant, that That Part also having its *Effluvia* when thus sollicit'd by the Impulse of those Atomes sent from without; and therefore (all Natural *Action* causing *Reaction*;) when they rebound thence, they carry away some minute Particles of the said Part. Wherefore these Outward *Effluvia*, thus imbu'd, and qualify'd with some tang of the *Seat of Knowledge*, when they come to be Excited again by some Exterieur or Interieur Causes, must affect it afterwards accordingly; and thence they become duely qualify'd to cause a Notion of it as *Fore-known*, which we call, to reflect upon it, or remember it. By which we see how *Reflexion* and *Reminiscence* are caused by the new Impulse of those former Atoms to the *Seat of Knowledge*, tinctur'd with some Particles of that Part it self. For which Reason, the oftner this is done, the Memory of it is more Easie and Lively. Whence is seen, that there is no need of multiplying *succeeding Ideas*, to know the *preceding* ones, when we have Acts of Reflexion; a new Impression of the *Effluvia* or *Phantasms*, thus qualify'd, repeating still the same former Notion with the Connotate of *Foreknown*.

28. *Memory* and *Remembrance* are inexplicable, without putting those first-imprinted Atoms to reside still in the Brain, and to be excited there anew. For, were this put to be perform'd by a *meer Motion* upon the

Memory and Reminiscence, inexplicable, unless Phantasms remain in the Brain

the Nerve (as most of our Modern Philosophers think,) the Object being *gone*, that Motion would quickly *cease*. Nor could the *same Motion* be connaturally *reviv'd* but by the same Object, which is seldom *at hand* to make it again as oft as we have occasion to *remember*, as Experience shows us. Much less could the Remembrance of *Sounds* or *Tunes*, in *Man* or *Birds*, be possibly explicated, unless those repell'd Atoms, lying in Order, and striking afresh the Auditory Organ, did repeat the same Impression they had formerly. For, to put Millions of *Motions* to continue *perpetually* playing in the Fancy, and (as they needs must) *interfering* with one another, would destroy all Harmony, and breed a strange jarring Confusion.

Note, that Reminiscence is oft-times made in us by using our Reason, *gathering* or recollecting former Notions by others that orderly succeeded them; in the same manner as we investigate Causes from their Effects: Whereas in Brutes it is performed meerly by a new Appulse of the former Atoms to that part in which the Imagination consists; which being the most *supreme* in the Animal, has a Power to *Agitate* the Animal Spirits, and move the Body agreeably to those Impressions; as is found also in *Man*.

*The manner how  
Reminiscence is  
made in Brutes.*

29. The same Excitation of those particles *thus imbu'd*, causes also *Reflex Knowledge* of our former Operations. And indeed *Reflexion* on our past thoughts is the same as *Remembrance* of them; for we can neither *Reflect* on a Thing without *Remembring* it, nor *Remember* it without *Reflecting*

*How Reflexion is  
connaturally made.*

reflecting on it. But this Reflexion, for the reason  
 lately given, must proceed from some Object or  
 Cause *Extraneous* to the Soul; that is from *Efflu-  
 viums* in the Memory thus reexcited. For it is  
 to be noted that as Divines (or rather Christian  
 Faith) tell us, that Christ having two distinct Na-  
 tures in the same *Suppositum*, all his Operations  
 proper to him *as such*, were therefore *Theanthro-  
 picae*, or such as were agreeable and belonging  
 to *both* the Divine and Humane Natures: So *Man*,  
 consisting of both a Corporeal and Spiritual Na-  
 ture, and thence being a *Corporeo-Spiritual* Thing,  
 all his Operations, for the same Reason, must be  
*Corporeo-Spiritual*. Whence he has no Act *purely  
 Spiritual*, or uncompounded with the Co-ope-  
 ration of that Corporeal Part, which receives those  
*Effluvioms* (call'd by us *Fancy*) or without it's  
 Concurrence. Which gives us farther Light, to  
 see how our *Soul* cannot reflect on her own  
 Operations, but the *Fancy* must go along; and,  
 by what's said, it will be easie to conclude from  
 which of those parts the Operation must begin  
*anew*, viz. from *that* part from which it *did be-  
 gin at first*. Hence came that Saying of the Schools,  
 That the Soul has Notions, or *knows*, *Speculando  
 Phantasmata*: which are pretty Fanciful Words;  
 and, tho' they may perhaps have a good Meaning,  
 yet 'tis very unphilosophically express'd: For it  
 makes the Soul to *speculate*, which (if it have  
 any Sense at all) signifies to *know* the Phantasms  
 or *Ideas* in the Imagination, when as yet she has  
 no Knowledge in her *at all*. All her Notions,  
 which are the *first* Elements of Knowledge, be-  
 ing caus'd in her by those *Effluvioms*, previously  
 to her Knowing either *them*, or any thing *else*.



13. From what's said above, 'tis seen that those *Direct Notions*, which are thus naturally imprinted, are Common to all Mankind in the main, (however they may in each Man differ in *some Degree*) and consequently, the *Words* we agree on to express those *Natural Notions* are, for the same reason, *Proper Words*; whereas those *Notions* made by meer *Reflexion*, as are those of *Spiritual Natures*, are therefore *Improper*, as having no proper *Phantasms* to imprint them connaturally on the Mind: whence also the *Words* that express them, are such as are taken or *Translated* from *Natural Objects*; and therefore they are *Improper* or *Metaphorical*.

*Direct Notions, common to all Mankind, and their Words Proper: Reflex ones Improper, and their Words Metaphorical.*

31. From this exact *Distinctness* of our *Notions*, even to an *Indivisible*, or from this, that *one* of them is *not another*, our Mind has an Appendage of a *Negation* tack'd to every *Notion*, so that it becomes very familiar to her: whence she can have a *Negative Notion* of every thing she conceives, while she considers it as *limited*, or reaching *thus far, and no farther*; or being *This*, and *no other*. Of which *Nature* are all the *Modes of Ens*, they being *limited Conceptions* of it; no *Notion* being perfectly *Positive* but that of *Ens* or *Being*.

*Whence we come to have Negative Notions.*

32. Hence the Soul can have also the *Notions* of *Indivisibility*, *Immortality*, *Immensity*, and innumerable such like. But, it is very specially to be remark'd, that we can have no *Notions* of those *Negatives* as

*But Negative Notions, as they are Negative, do not abstract from the Subject.*

taken

taken *abstractedly* from the Thing or Subject; for, otherwise, *Non Entities* (formally as such) might be the Object of the Understanding; which is impossible; for [ *Nothing* ] formally as such (I add, nor *Vacuum*) can have no *Effluvioms* sent from it to the Brain, nor consequently any *Intelligibility*; nor can any possible Notion be fram'd of it. Wherefore *Baldness* signifies the Head, *quatenus* having no Hair on it; *Blindness*, the Eye, *quatenus* having no Sight; *Immensify*, the Thing, *quatenus* not capable to be measured, &c. Hence

33. The Notion we have of [ *Nothing* ] or *Non Ens*, is only that of *Ens* in it's whole Latitude, with a Negation annexed to it; in the same manner as in particular Entities, [ *Incorporeal* ] signifies [ *non Corpus* ] or as [ *Indivisible* ] signifies [ *Non-Quantum* ] &c.

24. Hence it is that we come to conceive, and sometimes express *Non Ens* as an *Ens*; as Grammarians do when they define a *Noun* to be the Name of a Thing, and yet make *Nihil* (which signifies *Nothing*) a *Noun Subjective*, and put Adjectives to it. Whence Philosophers must

take very great Care, lest, seduced by our manner of Conceiving *Non-Ens* as a Thing, they come to fancy, or judge it to be formally something; as do the Asserters of *Vacuum*, and too many others in like Occasions. For then (I beg their Pardon for my Plainness) their Discourses upon it can be no wiser than are those Ingenious Veries, made to shew how rare a Thing *Nothing* is; nor, indeed, so wise: For those Poets did this

*Ludicrously,*

*Ludicrously*, to shew their Wit ; but these do it *Seriously*, and make account, that, in doing so, they shew their Skill and *Wisdom* ; which I must think is meer *Folly*.

35. The Notions of *Genus*, *Species*, *Subject*, *Predicate*, and generally of all Terms of Art which are not Fantastick, but wisely conducing to clear and range our Notions in Order, to gain Science, are Nothing but several Abstract Notions of the *Thing*, precisely considered according to some *Manner of Being* it has in our *Understanding*. For *Animal* and *Homo* are evidently Abstract or Inadequate Notions of *Peter*, taking him as he exists in *Nature* : But, when we call *Animal* a *Genus*, or, *Homo* a *Species* ; or, when, in this Proposition, [ *Petrus est Homo*, ] we say *Petrus* is the *Subject*, and *Homo* the *Predicate*, we speak of them precisely, as they exist in the *Understanding* ; For, in *Nature*, or out of the *Understanding*, there can be no Universals, but only Individuals, none else being determin'd to be *This* or *That Ens*, or capable of Existing : Nor can *Propositions* be any where, but in the *Mind*. Whereas, in the *Understanding*, the Notion of [ *Animal* ] is really larger, and that of [ *Homo* ] narrower ; which Artists call *Genus* and *Species*. And, in the fore-said Proposition, *Petrus* and *Homo*, which are its Parts, are as truly in our *Mind* the *Subject* and *Predicate*, as that Proposition it self is there ; or as the *Thing*, as existing in *Nature*, is *White* or *Black*.

36. This then is the *Test* to try all the Speculations made by Logicians, and other Reflecters or Artists, viz. to examin whether they suit with,

*Logical Notions are Real ones.*

*The Test to try Artificial Notions.*

and

and are built on the Natures of the *Things* themselves, *as they exist in our Mind*; that they conduce to order our Notions so, as may clear the *Way to Science*; and that they be not meerly Impertinent and shallow grounded Fancies, as they too frequently are; particularly, the

\* See Method to Science, B. I. L. 7. §. 13, 14.

\* *Entia Rationis*, which make such a Noise in the Schools.

Corollary II. Whence, upon the main, is clearly discovered, how all true Philosophy is nothing but the *Knowledge of Things*; either as they have their Being in *Nature*, which is done by *Direct Acts*; or else in the *Understanding only*, which are known by *Reflex* ones.

37. Besides those Impressions which cause our *Direct* and *Reflex Acts*, there are others which breed meer *Whimsies* coin'd by the *Fancy*, and are purely Chimerical. For our *Fancy* having Innumerable *Effluvioms*, or *Atomes* in it, of many *Sorts*, which are oft-times agitated disorderly; hence it comes, that it conjoins and imprints *Incoherent Phantasms* on the Seat of Knowledge, and so makes Apprehensions of them in our Minds; such as are those of a Golden Earth, a *Hircoceruus*, an Elephant supporting the World, a Chimera, and such like. This most commonly happens in Dreams, conceited Prophecies, and Enthusiastick Revelations; especially those caused by the Spleen. Nor is *groundless Speculation*, exempt from this Enormity. Generally this happens when our Thoughts

How our Soul comes to have Phantastick Notions, or (as we call them) Fancies.



Thoughts are Unattentive to the *Things in Nature*, whose Direct Impressions keep our Fancy *Orderly*, and *Firm*. Now, there is little Harm in our *apprehending* those extravagant Connexions; the Danger is, lest Speculators, seduced by Imagination, do come to *Judge* that the Things are *so* in Nature as they *fancy* them; which must necessarily fill their Minds with Caprichio's, and Frantick Conceits. The Ways to avoid these Inconveniences, are, *First*, To attend heedfully to the *Direct Impressions* from the

*How to avoid being deluded by them.*

Things without us; and to examine whether the Connexion of those Fancies be agreeable to their Natures, or no. *Secondly*, To make Right and Strong Judgments concerning those *common Notions* we had from Nature, which keep our Thoughts and Discourses *Steady* and *Solid*; especially, to keep an Attentive Consideration, that, as all these Notions came from the Thing, so they are still the Thing, conceiv'd according to somewhat that is *in* it; and to take care we do not make them forget their Original, nor disown the Thing, from whence only, as being *Modes* meerly depending on it, they had any kind of *Being* at all; nor, consequently, *Intelligibility*. *Thirdly*, To observe the Methodical Rules and Maxims of True Logick, which teach us how to *distinguish* our Notions exactly, and to *keep them distinct*, lest we blunder in our Discourses; and which do withall shew us what are the Ways how to *frame true Connexions*, or *right Judgments* and *Discourses*. But, the last and best Means to keep us from being mis-led by *Fancy*, or following its Vagaries, is, the Study

of *Metaphysicks*; which, being built on the Highest, Steadiest and Clearest Principles, abstract from all *Fancy*, and will scarce ever permit those who are well vers'd in it, to fall into Errour. And, let it be observ'd, that nothing in the World more perverts all true Science, than does the admitting those *disorder'd Fancies* because, being *cleanly express'd*, they have sometimes a *Lively Appearance*, for *Solid Truths*; nay, laying them often for *Grounds*, and *Self-evident Principles*. This, this, I say, is the main Source of all *Hypothetical Philosophy*, and of all Erroneous Schemes of Doctrine, not grounded on the *Natures of the Things*; which, therefore, must needs be, at best, *Shallow*, and *Superficial*; and, if pursu'd home to their Principles, *plain Nonsense*, the usual and proper Effect of *Ungovern'd Fancy*.

38. Of those Things that do **not** come in by our Senses, as *Bodies* do, but are of a *different* or *opposite* Nature; of which therefore we can have no Notion but by joining a Negation to the Notion of *Body*, (such as are Indivisible, Incorporeal, Immaterial, Immortal, and, in general, all Spiritual Things, and their proper Modes,) we can have no proper *Effluvioms*, or Phantoms, as is evident. Wherefore also, the *Notions* we have of them, and, consequently, the *Words* by which we express them, are all *Improper*, or *Metaphorical*; which, if not reflected on, will breed Innumerable Errours. The best Notion we can frame of them, is that of *Thing*, with a Negation of *Body*,  
and

*How we may discourse evidently of those Natures, of which we have no Proper Notions.*

and of *all* the *Modes of Body* joined to it ; which does not so much tell us *what it is*, as what it *is not* ; or rather, it gives us a *Blind*, but *Certain Knowledge* of what kind of Nature it *must be*, because it tells us of what kind of Nature it *cannot be* ; the Differences which constitute that Nature, and its Opposite, being *contradictory*, which forces it to be either of the *One* or of the *other*. Yet this hinders not, but we may discourse consequently, or Scientifically, of those Things that connote the Negation of *Body*, fall as well as of the Bodies themselves : For, as we can conclude evidently from the Notion of *Body*, that it is Divisible, Changeable, Placeable, Moveable, thus or thus Qualify'd, &c. so we may conclude, with Equal Evidence, from the Notion of a Thing which is *not a Body*, that it is *not* Divisible, *not* Extended, *not* Moveable, *not* Placeable, *not* affected with any Physical Qualities, &c.

39. *Lastly*, As for the Notion we have of **GOD**, however the *An Est* of such a Supreme Being be many ways *Evident* and *Demonstrable* ; yet the Notion of the *Quid est* of such a Being is the most Obscure that can be imagin'd. For, *First*, Since he must have *Innumerable* Perfections in his Nature, and the Notion we have of every ordinary *Suppositum* in Nature is therefore Confused, and Obscure, because it grounds *many* Notions which we cannot clearly conceive at once, or have a Distinct Apprehension of them ; it follows, that much less can the Divine Nature be clearly conceived by us in this State, which

*We can have no Proper Notion of GOD's Essence.*

comprehends *all* the best Perfections found in the whole Universality of Creatures, and infinitely *more*. *Secondly*, 'Tis yet harder to frame a Notion of a *Being*, in which those Innumerable Perfections are not found *Single*, but are all of them *center'd* in *one* most *Simple*, and most Uncompounded *Formality*; which contains in it self eminently all the Excellencies that can possibly be conceived in Creatures, and Millions of times *greater*, and *more*. *Thirdly*, As we can have no *Notion* of a *Created Spiritual Nature*, but by a *Negation* of what's Proper to *Body*; so we can have no Notion of the *Divine Nature*, but by *Denying* of him all that belongs properly to the Natures of such a *Body* and *Spirit both*; and by acknowledging them infinitely short of resembling, or even shadowing him. *Lastly*, We have no *Notion*, or *Expression*, that can *sute* with him; no, not even the most Metaphysical ones. *Ens* includes *Potentiality* to Existence; and, all *Potentiality* signifying *Imperfection*, must be utterly *denied* of him. *Existence* seems to come nearer; yet, because it signifies a *Formality* supervening to *Ens*, as 'tis *Existent*; and so is, as it were, a kind of *Compart*, it cannot be Proper for his infinitely-*Simple* Being. And even *Self-existence* signifies a kind of *Form* or *Mode* of the Subject *that Self-exists*. So that we have no kind of *Notion* or *Expression*, that can perfectly agree to *God's* Infinite Essence; but we are forc'd to content our selves to make use of sometimes *one* Attribute, sometimes *another*, that signifies some Perfection, with [*Infinite*] annex'd to it, which is *not found* in Creatures, or which is *denied* of them, or is *Incommunicable*



cable to them. Whence comes that Maxim of the Mysticks, that *God is better known by Negations*, or by affirming he is *none* of those Positive Perfections we find in Creatures, than by applying any of our *Positive* Notions to him. And this is all we can do in this State, till Grace raising us up to Glory, we come to know his Divine Essence, *as it is in its Self*; (or, as we phrase it, *See him Face to Face*;) in contemplating which, consists our Eternal Happiness.

40. Thus much of our Notions, which we call the *First Operations* of our Understanding, and how they are caused in our Soul. How our *Judging* and *Discoursing* (which are the other two) are made in it, is shewn at large in the Second and Third Books of my *Method to Science*.

*The Author speaks not here of Comparing Notions, or of Judgments.*

41. If any Learned Man is dissatisfied with this Discourse, or has a mind to oppose it, I think I have Right to require of him two Things: *First*, That he would not object his own *Fancies* or *Dis-like* of it, or think that this is sufficient to invalidate it; but, that he would go to work like a *Man of Reason*, and shew that This or That part of it does contradict Such and Such a *Principle* in Logick, Physicks, or Metaphysicks. This is the only Solid Way of *Objecting*, all other being but Empty Talk, and Idle Cavil. *Next*, I think I have Right to demand, (since

*The Author's Apology for this Discourse; and what can be the only way to go about to confute it.*

it is fundamentally necessary to Philosophy that this Point be clear'd,) that he would set himself to frame some Orderly and Coherent Discourse of his own, built upon Evident Principles, how, or by what particular Means, the first Knowledge of the Things without us, comes into our Soul. In doing which, he will oblige the World very highly, and my self very particularly: And, unless he does this, he will be convinced to find fault with what himself cannot mend: Which will manifest that he either wants true Knowledge, or (which is a far greater Defect) Ingenuity.

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## PRELIMINARY *Fifth.*

*Of the Proper and Genuine Signification of those Words which are of most use in Philosophy.*

I. **T**HE main Hindrance of Science, viz. The Mistake of *Fancies* for *Realities*, or of meer *Similitudes* for *Notions*, being provided against; the other Grand Impediment to true Knowledge, which is the taking Words, us'd in Philosophy, in an *Ambiguous* or *wrong* Sense, is to be our next Care. The Inconveniences which arise hence, and the ways how to detect and avoid Equivocation, are in my \* *Method* discours'd of *in common*; and I have here in my Second Preliminary clear'd also *in common* the Signification of all *Abstract* Words, and shewn, that they mean the thing it self, *quatenus* such or such; or, *according* to such or such a Consideration of it as is express'd by that Word. My present Business, to which my Circumstances oblige me, is to clear, *in particular*, the Notion or Meaning of those most Important Words, which being made use of by Learned Men, and taken by them often-times in different Senses, do so distract them in their Sentiments;

*The Design of the Author here.*

\* *Book I. Less. II.*

and, by drawing their Intellectual Eye, now to *one* side, now to the *other*, make them so frequently miss the Mark while they aim at true *Science*. Not that my Intention in this Preliminary is, to pursue the Mistakes of *others*, but only to settle the True and Genuine Sense of such Words, to be applied afterwards to the Mis-accepters of them, as occasion requires; tho' I may hint now and then some Abuses of them, that so I may the better clear their proper Signification.

2. I begin with [*Existence*] express'd by the Word [*is*] which is the Notion of the Thing, precisely consider'd as it is *Actually Being*. This is the *most simple* of all our Notions, or rather indeed the \* *only* Simple Notion we have, all the rest being but *Respects to it*. For, it has no kind of Composition in it, not even that Metaphysical one, of grounding divers Conceptions or Considerations of it, as all others have. Whence all Notions being, by their Abstraction, *Distinct* and *Clear*; this *most* Abstracted Notion is so *perfectly* clear and self-evident, that, as it cannot *need*, so it cannot *admit* any Explication. They who go about to *explain* it, show themselves Bunglers, while they strive to approve themselves Artists. For, by telling us, that 'tis *Esse contra Causas*, they put [*Esse*,] which is the Notion defin'd, in the *Definition*; which is most absurd, and against all Art and Common Sense: Nay, they make it more obscure than it was before, by adding [*Extra Causas*] to it, which are *less clear* than *it self* was. By the Word [*Causes*,] I suppose, they mean *Natural* ones; and so, tho' it gives no Clearness to the Signi-

The Meaning of  
the word [*Existence*.]

\* *Method. I. B. I.*  
*L. 2. § 14.*



Signification of the Word [*Esse*,] yet it may at least consist with good Sense; and may mean, that the Thing was, *before*, or while it was not yet produced, *within the Power* of those Causes, or in the State of *Potentiality*; and that *Existence* is that Formality, or most formal Conception, by which the Thing is put out of that imperfect State, of having only *A Power to be*, and is reduced to the perfecter State of *Actuality*, or *Actual Being*.

3. As it is impossible to misconceive this self-evident Notion, 'tis equally impossible to mistake the meaning of the word [*Existence*] which properly expresses that Notion; for, if they take the word [*is*] to have any meaning, relating any way to the Line of [*Ens*,] or any Signification at all that is, of its Nature, purely *Potential*, they quite destroy it's Notion: And, if they take it, in any Sense, for an *Actuality* *not* belonging to the Line of *Ens*, they must necessarily take it to mean [*is not*,] there being no *Third* or *other* such Notion to take it for; in the same manner, as if one takes not *Ens* to mean *A Thing*, he must take it to mean *Nothing*. Now, tho' the Goodness of Humane Nature, which abhors Contradiction, reclaims vehemently against such an unnatural Depravation of Common Sense, as to take [*is*,] while thus express'd, for [*is not*]; yet, taking the meaning of the Word [*Existence*] as it is *disguised* by another Word, which is, by consequence, *Equivalent* to it; those Deserters of Humane Nature, the *Scepticks*, do take occasion from the altering the Expression, to misapprehend even what is *Self-evident*.

*The Extreme Danger of Misconceiving it.*

dent. For 'tis the same Sense, ( when we speak affirmatively ) to say a thing is *True* or *Certain*, as to say *it is* ; since nothing can be *True* or *Certain* that *is not* ; and, therefore, when these Men talk of *Moral* and *Probable Truth*, and *Probable* or *Moral* *Certainty*, which mincing Expressions mean [ *possible not to be so* ] they in effect say, that [ *what is, may, whilst it is, possibly not be ;* ] Which manners of Expression, tho' they may seem to some but a meer Unconcerning School-Speculation ; and Unreflecting Men may think it deserves no other Note, but that of being *Ridiculous* ; yet, I judge my self obliged to declare, that it is moreover most enormously Mischievous ; and that it quite perverts and destroys ( by a very immediate Consequence ) the Nature and Notion of *all Certainty* and *Truth* whatsoever, and of *Being* too ; and quite overthrows all possibility of Knowing *any thing at all*. Had they said [ *I think it true or certain* ] none would blame them ; rather 'tis a Credit for such Men even to *think* heartily there is any *Truth* or *Certainty* at all in Philosophy ; but to joyn ( as they do ) *Moral* or *Probable*, to *Truth* and *Certainty*, as a kind of *Mode* affecting them, is to clap these most unconfociable Things, *Light* and *Darkness*, into one *Dusky* Compound, to abet Nonsense, and palliate Ignorance.

4. The Notion immediately next in order to *Existence*, as that which has the very least Potentiality that can be [ *Ens* ] or [ *Thing* ] in the Line of Being, is that of *Ens*, or *Thing*. Wherefore the meaning of that word can be no other but that of [ *Capable to be* ] for, no *Created* Thing has *Actual Being*, or *Existence*, in its Essential-Notion, but  
of

of its own Nature may *be* or *not be*; as, besides what's proved in my \* *Method*, is seen in the very Notion of *Creature*; which signifies *That which has its Being from Another*; which, therefore, can, *of its self*, be only *Capable of Being*. That the Notion of *Ens* is distinct from that of *Existence* is demonstrated \* *elsewhere*, and is farther evident

\* B. 3. L. 7.

\* *Ibid.*

hence, that the Notion of *what has Existence* must be different from *what's had* by it, or from *Existence* it self. All Mankind has this Notion of *Thing* in them; for they experience that every *Thing can exist*, by seeing it *does so*; and they know also they *are not of themselves*, whether they hold a first Being, or no; because they do generally see that Causes produced them. Wherefore all that can be said, or thought of the word [ *Ens* ] is, that it signifies the *Thing* precisely, as 'tis **Capable of Being**.

5. Whence follows, that the Abstract Terms, [ *Entity* ] or [ *Essence* ] do properly signify [ *A Capacity of Being*, ] which is the Abstract Term of [ *Capable of Being*. ] Tho' *Entity* is often us'd as a Concrete for the *Thing it self*. Moreover, *Essence* is the *Total Form* of *Ens* its *Suppositum*, or Subject, which adequately and intirely constitutes it such; as *Humanitas* is the *Total Form* of *Homo*. I call it the *Total Form*, to distinguish it from the *partial Form* of *Body*; which, with the *Matter*, its compart, do compound the entire Notion, or *Total Form* of *Corporeity*.

The Meaning of  
[ *Entity* ] or [ *Essence*. ]

6. To understand which more clearly we are to Note that the Notion and Signification of the word [ *Matter* ] signifies the *Thing*, or *Body* precisely, as it is a *Power to be a Thing*; and *Form* signifies the same Thing, according to that in it which determines it to be a Thing *Actually*. We are to reflect too, that *Power* and *Act*, considered in the Line of *Being*, are the same as *Matter* and *Form*; only the Former words are purely *Metaphysical*, because they express the parts of *Ens* as *Ens*; in regard no other conceptions in the Line of *Being* can possibly be framed of a *Body*, but as it is *Determinable*, or *Determinative*, which are the very Notions of *Power* and *Act*; whereas *Matter* and *Form*, tho' in *Bodies* they signify the same as the former, seem rather to incline to the parts of such an *Ens*, or *Body*, *Physically* consider'd.

7. To show *literally* what's meant by this saying, that *Matter* and *Form* constitute the compleat *Ens*, or make the Subject *capable of Existing*, I discourse thus. Nothing as 'tis *Indeterminate* or *Common to more* can be ultimately *Capable to be*: v. g, neither a *Man in Common*, nor a *Horse in Common*, can possibly exist, but *This Man*, or *This Horse*: Whatever therefore does determine the *Potentiality*, or *Indifferency* of the Subject as it is *Matter*, or, which is the same, a *Power to be of such or such a Nature*, ( which is what we call to have such a *Form* in it ) does make it *This* or *That*, and, consequently, disposes it for *Existence*.  
Where-



Wherefore since the *particular Complexion* of the several Modes and Accidents do determin the *Power* or *Matter*, so as to make it Distinct from all others, it does by Consequence determin it to be *This*, and, so, makes it *Capable of Existing*; that is, an *Ens* or Thing. I enlarge not upon this Point, because I have treated it so amply in the Appendix to my *Method to Science*.

8. Hence is seen what is, or can, with good Sense, be meant by that Meta-

physical, or Entitative part called by the Schools, the *Substantial or Essential Form*; which they say,

*The Literal Meaning of Substantial or Essential Forms.*

does, with the Matter, make up that compound *Ens*, call'd *Body*; and that, in *Literal Truth*, it can be nothing else but that Complexion of the *Modes*, or *Accidents*, which conspire to make that peculiar or primigenial Constitution of every Body, at the first Instant of its being thus ultimately Determin'd to be *This*. For, this Original Temperature of the Mixt or *Animal*, being once settled by the Steady Concurrence of its Causes; *whatever* Particles or *Effluvioms*, or *how many* soever, which are *Agreeable* to it, do afterwards *accrue* to it, are so digested into, or assimilated, to its Nature, that they conserve, nourish and dilate, and not destroy it. Whereas, if they be of an *opposit* Nature, they *alter* it from its own temperature, and in time quite *destroy* and *corrupt* it. To explicate which more fully, let us consider *how* the Causes in Nature, which are many times of a *Different*, sometimes of a *Contrary* Temper to the Compound, do work upon a Body; and how they make (as they needs must) *preternatural* Dispositions

positions in it ; till, when those Disagreeable Alterations arrive to such a pitch, as quite to *pervert* the former Complexion of Accidents, which we call its *Form* ; a new Form, or new Complexion succeeds, determining the Matter to be *Another Thing* ; till it self also, wrought upon in the same Manner, comes to be *Corrupted*, and so makes way for a New Off-spring. To which, in the very Instant it is ultimately Determined to be *This*, the First *Being*, whose overflowing Goodness stands ever ready to give his Creatures all that they are *Disposed* or *Capable* to have, does, with a steady Emanation of Being, give his Peculiar Effect, **Existence**.

*Corollary.* The Reason why our Moderns do so oppose *Substantial* or *Essential* Forms, are reduced to two Heads :  
*The Reason why some Moderns oppose Substantial or Essential Forms.* First, Because they conceived the *Form* was a kind of *Distinct Thing*, or at least a *part of a Thing* Supervening to the Matter, its Component, and Compounding the *Ens*, after that *gross* manner as *Two Things* in Nature do Compound a *Third* : Whereas, in reality, they are nothing but divers *Notions* or Considerations of the Thing, formally, as it is a *Thing*. Wherefore, to say, a Body is Compounded of *Matter* and *Form*, is no more, in *Literal Truth*, than to say that there can be *no more* Considerations of a Body, taken formally, as it is a *Thing* ; or taking it in the Line of *Ens* precisely, but of a *Power* to become such a Thing ; and of the *Act* or *Form*, Determining that Power : However the Thing may have in it what grounds the Notions of many *Modes* or *Accidents* ;

*cidents* ; which are also the Thing *materially*, tho' not *Formally* according to the Notion of *Ens*. Nor let any object, that this is to maintain that *Things* are compounded of *Notions*, as some may misunderstand us ; for, let it be remember'd (as is demonstrated above,) that the *Notion* is the very *Thing*, as it is in our Understanding, *according*, or as far as it is conceiv'd by us ; that is, 'tis the very Thing, *partially Consider'd*. The other Reason which the Moderns had for this Mis-conceit, was, because the Schools generally explain'd themselves very ill, by making a new Entity of every different Conception ; not comprehending well the Difference between *Metaphysical Composition* and *Divisibility*, and *Physical*, or rather *Artificial* ones ; such as Apothecaries use when they put many Ingredients into a Pill ; or Carpenters, when of *Many* divers Materials they compound a House ; which is the applying, *outwardly* or *inwardly*, more *Things* (properly so called) together : Whereas *Metaphysical Divisibility* is never reduced to *Act*, but by our Understanding framing Distinct or Abstract Notions of one and the same Thing. And *Metaphysical Composition* is no more, but that there is found in the Thing (though *Physically* and *Entitatively* *one*, and *uncompounded*) what *grounds* those *distinct Notions* ; which being but divers *Respects* or *Considerations*, it follows, that the Thing in Nature may, without any Contradiction, (or *Possibly*,) be Chang'd according to *One* of them, and not according to *Another*.

*The Meaning of Metaphysical Composition and Divisibility.*

9. Hence, Lastly, is clearly seen what is the *Principle of Individuation*, about which there have been such warm Disputes, viz. That 'tis nothing but that *Complexion of Modes or Accidents*, which make up the peculiar Constitution of a Body at the first Instant of its being such an *Ens* or *Thing*, as is explicated at large, § 8. by which 'tis, consequently, fitted for such a *particular Operation* in Nature.

10. *Ens* or *Thing* has many other Names, tho' all of them *less proper*. As, First, *The Meaning of the word [Substance.] The word Improper.* [*Substance,*] which, coming from the Verb [*Substare,*] respects only its *Modes* and *Accidents*, and not what concerns *its self*, or its *own Order* or *Capacity to Existence*. Wherefore, 'tis very Improper; and, unless the common Usage of it make some Amends for the Impropriety of the Expression, certainly it is most highly Unfit. *Aristotle* calls it *ὅτις*, which coming from *εἶναι*, keeps it within the Line of *Being*. As I remember *Boetius* was the first who render'd *ὅτις* by *Substantia*. The Schools either us'd it in Imitation of him, or else they took it up when they were to treat of the Ten Predicaments; and, Nature instructing them that the last Nine had no Order to *Being* in their Signification; and so, as taken in their peculiar Notions, could not exist *alone*, without needing a kind of *Support* (as it were:) hence they call'd this Support, by a Name suitable enough to their Thoughts, *Substance*; and the others, that had *not* *Being* in their Notion, and so had no Title to *Being* by their *own* Merits, or to *uphold* themselves in being, *Accidents*; of the



the Impropriety of which Word more hereafter. I wish there were no worse in it; and that, they did not fancy all those abstract Notions, which are only the Thing *in part*, to have in them the Notion of *Things* too, or to be so many *In-tire Things*; tho' they were *Feebler* and the other *Stronger*. However it were, they went to work Illogically: For, they should have considered, that all of them (taking them as they were Distinct from the Notion of Thing) could be nothing but several Conceptions of ours, or (which is the same) the Thing as *diversly considered*; and then they might have easily reflected, that we could not (in general) have more Conceptions than those of *Res* and *Modus Rei*; that is, of the *Thing*, and of the several *Manners how* a Thing is; which would have clear'd this Truth to them, that the *Manner* or the *How* a Thing is, is nothing *without* the Thing, as is deduced formerly. However, the Word [*Substantia*] with a sound Explanation, may pass, since *Use* will have it so; and will do little Harm, so it be but rightly understood to mean what we properly call *Ens*, *Res*, or *Thing*.

II. On this Occasion, 'tis my Opinion, that both Mr. *Locke* and my self should not be too severe against the Modern School-men, for using the Words [*Substantia*] and [*Inherentia*]; or, as he ingeniously ridicules it, [*Sticking-on* and *under-propping*.] The manner how the *Thing* and its *Modes* do relate to one Another; being only found *in our Mind*, and according to the *Being* they have *there* (for out of

*That the words*  
[ *Supporting* ],  
and [ *Inhering* ]  
*taken metaphorically, may be*  
*allow'd, and*  
*ought not to be*  
*Ridicul'd.*

it there is no Distinction at all of the Thing from its Modes ) is *Spiritual* ; and so, can no other way be express'd, but *metaphorically* ; and our selves *do* and *must*, in such a case, frequently use such *Metaphors* to express our Conceptions ; which a Critick might banter sufficiently, by taking them *Literally*. Indeed, if those School-men did understand them in that crude Literal Sense, ( as I fear many of them did ) from which Apprehension, I believe, his Zeal against them proceeded, they deserve to be the Sport and Laughter of all Men of Sense ; for I know nothing else they are good for. Now the Truth is, there is a kind of Natural Order in our Notions, tho' taken from the same Thing ; so that we have the Notion of *Res* or *Thing* antecedently ( in Priority of Nature ) to *Modus Rei*, or the *Accidents* ; and we conceive the *Mode* or *Manner* to presuppose the Notion of the *Thing*, and to have *no* Being but as it is *in it* and affects it. Whence, being conceiv'd to be *in it*, and to have *no* Being by any *other* means, we may, by a Metaphor not much strain'd, say it does, as it were, *Inhere* in it ; and that the Thing *supports* its Modes in their Being. Nor will it do us any Harm *loqui cum vulgo*, to speak as vulgar Philosophers use ; provided we do *Sentire cum doctis*, or make wiser Judgments of the *Literal Sense* of those Words, than they perhaps ever meant.

12. The word [ *Suppositum* ] is another Name of *Ens* or *Thing*, in a manner,   
The meaning of  
Suppositum or  
Hypostasis. ( tho' not altogether ) the same with *Substance*. For [ *Substance* ] is, I conceive, meant for the *Essential* Notion of the Thing, as it is contradistinguished

guisht from *Accidental*, or *Unessential* ones; and *Suppositum* does, over and above, relate also to the very *Nature* of the Thing, (or to the Complexion of Accidents which constitutes its Essence) and not only to the *Modes*, as each of them singly is a meer *Accident*, and had Being *by it* or *in it*. Whence the Notion of *Suppositum* is the most *Confused* of any other; and signifies that which has all the Forms in it *Whatever*, whether they be Essential ones or Accidental; and not only those *Modes* (or Accidents) which naturally belong'd to it at *first* as *Properties*, (or inseparable *Accidents*) but those also which *accru'd* to it *since*, and are merely Accidental to it.

13. Hence there can be no difficulty in the meaning of the word [*Suppositality*] which is the Abstract of the *Suppositum*: For, it signifies manifestly the Thing according to the precise Notion of the *Suppositum*, or of *what has* all the aforefaid Forms in it: How agreeable this discourse is to Christian Language and Principles, will easily appear to Solid Divines.

14. The word [*Individuum*] which is another name of *Ens*, us'd by the Learned, and, as is seen in those usual words [*the same Individual thing*,] is got into our vulgar Language, is a *Logical* Expression; distinguishing the Notion of a *Particular*, (only which is properly a *Thing*) from the *Generical* and *Specific* Notions; in regard both these latter do bear a *Division* of their Notions into *more* Inferiour ones; and *so*, that each of the Inferior ones contains the *whole* Superiour Natures in it which the others do signify;

*The Meaning of*  
[Suppositality.]

*The Meaning of the*  
word [Individuum.]

as the whole Definition, Notion or Nature of an [Animal] or of [a Sensitive Living Thing] is found in *Man*, and also in *Brutes*; and the whole Definition or Notion of *Man*, is found in *Socrates* and *Plato*. But, the particular Natures of *Socrates* and *Plato* (which are signify'd by those words) and their Definitions, could they bear any, cannot be divided into more which have the particular Natures of *Socrates* and *Plato* in them: And, therefore they are called *Individuums*; that is, such as cannot be divided into more, which have the Natures signified by those words in them, as could the *Generical* and *Specific* Notions of *Animal* and *Homo*; whence *Individuums* are the Lowest and Narrowest Notion that can possibly be in the Line of *Ens*.

15. The *Individuum*, is call'd by the Latin Schools [ *Substantia prima* ] and the Superiour Notions in the Line of *Ens*. [ *Substantiæ Secunda* ] which signifies that only *Individuums* are in propriety of Speech *Entia* or Capable of Existing; For, since, ( as was shown above ) nothing that is Common or Undetermined can exist, none of the others can have any Actual being at all but in the *Individuum*, as a kind of Metaphysical Part of its Intire Notion; and a Part ( in what Sense soever that word be taken ) can not possibly be but in the whole. If this then be their meaning, as I believe it is, nothing can be more true and Solid. Only I must note that it is less properly and less Logically exprest; and that *Aristotle* speaks more exactly when he calls the Former *ἡ πρώτη οὐσία*, or *primò Substantia*, and the latter *ἡ δεύτερη οὐσία*, or *Secundò Substantia*; which



which words denote, that the former is *Ens* in its *Primary* and *Proper* signification of that word, and the latter only *Analogically*, that is in a *Secondary* and *improper* Sense; which *prima* and *Secunda Substantia* do not express: For, both these may be properly *Entia* still, for any thing those words tell us, tho' one of them may have an Order of Priority to the other as *Prima* and *Secunda*; in some such Sense as we call **God** the *Primum Ens*, considering him in order to *Creatures*.

16. From Words used by Philosophers which belong to the Line of *Ens*, we come to those which are made use of to express the *Modes* or *Manners how* a Thing is; which, in a generall Appellation, the Schools have call'd **Accidents**. This Word is, certainly, very improper: For, who can think that *Quantity* or (as they will needs call it) *Extension*, is *Accidental* to Body, or (as some may take that Equivocal Word) that 'tis but by *Chance*, or by *Accident*, that Bodies have any Bigness in them at all? The best Sense I can give it, in pursuance to my own Grounds, is this, that [*Accidental*,] which is the Denominative from [*Accident*,] may mean such Notions as are *Not Essential*; or (which is the same) they may mean the Thing consider'd as to that in it which has no ways any Order to *Being*, nor expresses any such Order by the Word which signifies its Notion. And, were this Sense universally accepted, and attributed to the Word [*Accidents*,] it would be a *True* and *Solid* one: For, 'tis evident, that none of the Words that signify any of those Accidents, does in the least import in its Signification either *Being*, or any Re-

The Word [*Accidents*] is improper.

spect or Order to it, as does *Ens*, and all those Words which do formally and properly express it, or belong to it. Whence the Notions signify'd by such Words, are not *Essential* ones, or relating properly and precisely to the *Essence*; but *Modish*, (as we may term it,) or expressing some Manner [*How*] the Thing is; which is a quite different Notion from that of *Ens*, or Thing, or of what formally is found in that Line. I do believe that divers of the Wisest, and most Learned Schoolmen did take the Word [*Accidents*] in this Sense, tho' the Propriety of that Word, fetch'd from its *Radix*, did not *invite*, much less *oblige* them to do so. I doubt also, that the *Usage* of that Word in that warrantable Sense I have now assign'd, was not so *Common*, and universally Current, even among the School-men, as to *force* it to bear that Sense; as appears by their thinking that *Accidents* were certain kinds of little Adventitious Entities; much less among the Modern Ideists; who (through their Shortness in Logick and Metaphysics) do make Quantity, or Extension, the *Essential* Form of *Body*; which is, to put *Bigness* in the Line of *Being*; or, to make *Bigness* and *Being*, or the *Mode* and the *Thing*, to be in the same Line of Notions, and Intrinsic to one another: Whereas, a *Thing* must first be conceiv'd to be, e'er it can be after *such* a Mode, or *Manner*.

17. For the Reason lately given, I cannot but judge, that the Word [*Mode*,] or  
 The Word [*Mode*] (as some call it) [*Modification*,]  
 more proper. is far more proper than the Word  
 [*Accidents*,] to signify those last  
 Nine Common Heads of our Natural Notions.  
 Which Impartiality of mine, on this, and other  
 Occasions,

Occasions, giving some Advantage to the *Cartesians*, and other Moderns, over other Philosophers, who call themselves *Aristotelians*, will, I hope, obtain their good Opinion of me, that I do sincerely follow my best Reason, and not Pique or Prejudice, while I oppose them in *other* Things: And I am sure, 'tis my *own* Reason I ought to follow, till clearer Reasons of *theirs* shew mine to be *none*; which I have no Reason to fear; for, I hope, it will appear to every Acute and Ingenuous Examiner, that no Writer ever distinguish'd his Notions more *Exactly* and *Clearly*, or *Connected* them more *Closely* and *Immediately*.

18. The *Primary* Mode of all those Things we converse with, or *Bodies*, is call'd **Quantity**. This Word is very Proper, and fully Significant; for, all the Bodies in Nature have some *Quantity* or *Bigness* in them, more or less: Nay, even the least Atome, or *Effluvium*, that can be conceiv'd, has *Bigness* in it, *as well* as the greatest Body, nay, as the whole World; tho' not *so much*, or *so great* a Degree of it. Wherefore, this Word [*Quantity*] is Comprehensive; and so, fit to signify the *Commonest* Affection of Body: But, this is not enough; 'tis withal, very Simple, or Uncompounded: Moreover, the Word it self has, on its side, no kind of Equivocalness, taking it as it is applied to *Body in Common*; which Requisites are not found in any *other* Word used by us, to express that Mode. Only we are to note, that *Bigness*, or Bulk, is only proper to *Body*, as it has in it all the three Dimensions; whereas, *Quantity* reaches to *how Long*, or *how Broad*, as well as *how Thick*: And therefore *Quantity* is ab-

*The Word [Quantity] is very Proper.*

olutely the *propereſt* Word to expreſs this Primary Mode: However, it is much neglected by our *Moderns*, who are grown ſtrangely fond of *Extenſion*.

19. The Word [*Extenſion*] is very improper to ſignifie it: For, *Extenſion* properly denotes the Action of Extending; to which is directly oppoſit, in our uſual Speech, that *Action*, call'd *Contraction*. Or, if it be taken for the *being Extended*, ſtill its proper Signification muſt be a *Paſſion* cauſ'd by the *Action* of Extending; which cannot ſute with that *Simple* and *Primary* Mode we call *Quantity*; which is Naturally Antecedent to, and *Independent* of thoſe *Subſequent* Modes call'd *Action*, and *Paſſion*. Again, All *Intrinfecal* Modes are conceiv'd to be certain kinds of *Forms* affecting Body, as their Subject; and *Forms* are very ill expreſs'd by a Subſtantive deriv'd from a Verb; and by ſuch an one eſpecially, as muſt neceſſarily (at leaſt) Connotate *Action* or *Paſſion*, if it does not rather directly, or moſt properly ſignifie them. Moreover, let them take *Extenſion*, *Stretching out*, or *Exporrection* how they will, ſtill Common Senſe teaches us, that we may take *Contraction* or *Straitning* in the ſame manner as they do: Whence follows, that if *Extenſion* means or implies *Impenetrability of Parts*, *Contraction* muſt mean *Penetrability of Parts*: Which Notion none of us will admit to have any Ground in Nature, tho' the Maxim tells us, that [*Contraries are employ'd about the ſame Subject.*] Now, the Word [*Quantity*] is not entangled with any of theſe Inconveniences, but freed from them all, as will appear to any Sober Reſlecter. And, on this Occaſion,



sion, I beg Leave of our *Ideists*, to tell them, that it is not *safe*, nor *prudent*, to leave off an *Old* and *us'd* Word, till they are sure they have found Another which is *better*, or *more proper*. *Cartesius* made choice of [*Extension*] wittily, that he might thus more cleaverly bring all *Phylicks* to *Mathematicks*; and others (perhaps, *ut est Natura hominis*, fond of a Novelty) follow'd him unadvisedly; tho' they were not guilty of any such Design of their own, or aware of his. And I am sorry Mr. L. affects only the Improper Word [*Extension*], and quite neglects that more Proper Word [*Quantity*.]

20. Many other Names, at least Attributes, are given to *Quantity*; such as are *Divisibility*, *Impenetrability*, *Space*, and *Measurability*; the former of which signifies it in Order to Natural Action and Passion, and respects properly the *Parts* into which it *may be divided*; or, which is the same, its *Potential Parts*; in which, perhaps, the Nature of *Quantity* would be found to Consist, were I here to treat of the *Nature* of those Modes, and not only of the *Names* us'd in Philosophy. *Impenetrability* properly signifies such an *Order* or (as it were) *Situation* of those *Parts*, as that one of them is *without*, and not *within* another; which grounds that Secondary Notion, which some do improperly call *Extension*; and *Extension* or *Quantity*, if of any considerable largeness in respect of the Body it contains, is call'd *Space*; which differs from the Notion of *Place* in this, that *Place* (if properly such) is *just* as much *Quantity* as contains the Thing *placed*, and has a respect to some determinate

The Meaning of Divisibility, Impenetrability, Space, and Measurability.

determinate and known Points: Whereas *Space* has not in its Notion to be *adjusted* to the Body that is in it, not restrain'd to any *set Distance*. So that *Space* is *Place at large*, and *Place* is *Space restrain'd*. *Measurability* grounds the Reckoning or Computing *how many* of such a Standard of Quantity as we had design'd in our Thoughts, would, if repeated, *equal* the *whole* of which we intend to take a Survey.

21. Now, Quantity being the *most Common* of all *Corporeal Modes*, and which Antecedes and grounds all the others, it cannot, for that very Reason, be properly *defin'd*; so that (as Mr. Locke acutely observ'd) we know such things *before* we are ask'd, better than we do *after*; for the Asking puzzles our Natural Thoughts, which were Clear enough before of themselves; and *Reflection*, which, when there is occasion, is *wise*, and *enlightens* us, does but serve to blunder us when there is no need or occasion for it. Notwithstanding, I have, in my *Method*, endeavour'd to give it some kind of Explication, by *differencing* it from all other *Intrinsic* Modes, (which are its *Genus*, as it were, or rather, a *Transcendent* Notion to all such Accidents,) in this, that it tells *How* the Thing is, according to some *Common* Consideration, in which *All Things* we converse with do agree. By which 'tis distinguish'd from *Quality*, which acquaints us *How* a Thing is as to what respects its *own peculiar* Nature; and from *Relation*, which expresses *how* one *Individuum* respects another *Individuum*. But this (as was said) is out of my present Business in this Preliminary, which

is only to shew what *Names* are *Proper*, or *Improper*; and not to treat of the particular *Nature* of each *Mode*, of which I have, in their due places, sufficiently discours'd in my *Method*.

22. These, as far as occurs to my Memory, are the Chiefest Words used by Philosophers, whose Proper or Improper Acception has most Influence upon the Advancement or Hindrance of *Science*. Notwithstanding, there are *others* far more Equivocal than any of the rest, called **Transcendents**, or Words Applicable to all, or many of the Common Heads of our Natural Notions; which are hardest of all to explicate, as wanting any Common *Genus*, or any thing like it, to explicate them by. I intended once to dilate upon them in this Preliminary, as being a Subject very worthy of our Reflexion, and yet scarce treated on by any as they deserve: But, seeing, upon Review, how Prolix I have been already in my Preliminaries, I am forced to content my self with Noting them in short; leaving it to others to enlarge upon them. They are these, distributed into their several Ranks.

23. *First*, *Ens*, taken, in its whole Latitude, for the *Thing*, and its *Modes*. *Secondly*, The *Properties* of *Ens*, taken in that large Signification; such as are *Unum*, *Verum*, *Bonum*, and their Opposites, *Non-Unum*, or *Diversum*, *Falsum*, and *Malum*. For, the Notions of all the *Modes* being improperly *Entia*, have, by Consequence, only improper *Essences*, or *Entities* of their own; and, consequently, *Properties* of those Improper *Essences*. *Thirdly*, *Idem*, *Diversum*, and, in general,

*What* [Transcendents] *are.*

*The Five Sorts of Transcendents.*

ral, *Relatum* ; taking this last Word in the largest Sense, for all kinds of *Respects* whatsoever. In which Signification, all *Things*, or properly called *Entia*, do relate to *Existence* ; and all their Modes or Accidents do *respect them* diversly, as certain *Manners* how they are. Of which Nature also are the aforesaid Common Words, [ *Mode*, ] and [ *Accident*, ] which are Transcendents in respect of the Nine last Predicaments. Fourthly, *Complectum*, *Incomplectum*, *Partial* and *Total*, *Generical* and *Specific*, *Superior* and *Inferior*, *Simple* and *Compound*, and such like. Most of which kind of Transcendents seem rather to respect the Manner of *Being* which *Things* have in our Understanding, than the Manner of *Being* they have out of it. Of the last Sort are, *Which*, *What*, *That which*, *Something*, *Somewhat*, &c. which are the most Confused Words imaginable, and signifie any Notion, but that of meer *Nothing*. By these we make a Bastard or Illegitimate Definition of *Ens* ; and say, that a *Thing* is [ *That which is capable of Existing*, &c. ] I call it an Illegitimate or Improper Definition, because the Notion of the *Genus* ( which is one part of a proper one ) has a Determinate Sense: Whereas [ *That which*, ] which, for want of a better, supplies the place of the *Genus*, has none. For,

'Tis to be noted, that in all Transcendents, ( unless, perhaps, some of those of the Fifth Sort, which have a kind of blind, *Confused* Sense, ) the *Name* only is Common or Applicable to more, and not the *Notion* ; for, having *no one* Notion that is *Common* to all those Common Heads, they have *none* till it be Determin'd ; since *no Notion* can exist in the *Mind*, unless it be *This*, or *That*, or *one*, any more than a *Thing* can exist in *Nature*, unless

it



it be determin'd to be *such* a Particular or Individual Thing. Much less has any of them proper Differences, dividing them by *more* and *less* of the Common Notion, as every Notion that is *truly Common to more*, may, and must have.

23. Whence extreme Care must be taken, how Students in Philosophy do use these Transcendent Words; and that they do *distinguish* their Sense most exactly, when they have Occasion to make use of them.

Great Care to be had, that Transcendent Words be not held Univocal.

For, they having an Indifferency to *many* Senses, and those as vastly disparate as the Common Heads themselves are; that is, (as the Schools properly phrase it) Senses differing *toto Genere*, (I may add, *Generalissimo*) it must follow, that every time they do use them *confusedly*, or with a Conceit that they are *Univocal*, their Discourse must needs *straggle* widely, now one way, now another, and thence confound all our *Commonest* Notions, which, of all others, ought to be kept *Distinct*; the want of doing which, hinders all Coherence or Connexion of Terms, in which only *Science* consists, and breeds innumerable, and most Enormous Errours. It would be tedious, I doubt, to my Readers, tho' perhaps not hard for me, to show what Prodigious Inconveniences do arise from the Mis-acceptations of *one* of those many Different Senses such Words may bear, for *Another*, I will only bring one Instance; hoping that by this, as by a Seamark, my Readers may avoid the Shoals and Rocks of Errors in other like Occasions.

25. The Word [*Compounded*] may either mean the Composition of *Matter* with its *Essential Form*; or, that of the *Essence* with its *Suppositum*, which is conceived to *have* the *Essence* in it: or, of the Superiour Notions of *Ens* with the *Individuum*; All which are Compositions belonging to the Line of *Ens*. Coming next to the *Modes* or *Accidents*, the *whole Ens* or *Suppositum* may be considered as *Compounded* with its *Primary Mode* called *Quantity*; or with some *Quality*, or *Relation*. Or, with some *Action* or *Passion*, *Time*, *Place*, *Situation*, or *Habit*. Whence accrues to the Subject the Denominations of *Agent*, *Patient*, *Living*, or being at *such a time*, or in *such a Place*, *Sitting*, *Armed*, &c. All which Nine last Compositions are *Modifying* or *Accidental* ones, and not *Essential*, or such as concern directly and precisely the Notion of *Thing* or *Being*, as did those of the *first* sort. Now come *Cartesius* and his Followers, who, loath to say the Body and Soul are two *Suppositums*; and, wanting Skill in *Metaphysics* to comprehend *what* the Union of *Entitative* Parts is, or *how made*, (which are Points too hard for *Mathematicians*, and of which *de la Forge*, tho' he talks prettily, can make nothing at all) they would have the Soul and Body compound One *Thing*, because they *Act together*, or *assist* one another mutually to produce some sorts of *Actions*. Whereas *Action* being only a *Mode*, and so presupposing the *Res*, or *Thing*, which it modifies, can only determin and denominate its Subject to be *Acting*; and therefore Joint-acting can only constitute and denominate the Soul and Body *Co-Acters*;

*Acters* ; which is a vastly disparate Notion from the Constituting and Denominating them **One Thing**, as common Sense informs us. We will put an Instance : My Hand and my Pen do both of them concur to the *Action* of Writing, and so compound *one Joint-Acter* ; nay, they *depend mutually* on one another as to the producing this *Action* : For the Hand cannot write without the Pen, nor the Pen without the Hand : Besides, they are in some sort *fitted to one another*, in order to perform this *Action* ; for, the Fingers are so fram'd, as to hold and guide the Pen very commodiously ; and the Pen (taking in its Handle and the Nib-end too) is fitted very commodiously to be held and guided by my Hand, so as to draw the Letters such as they ought to be. Lastly, which is *much more*, and a Parallel *very* agreeable to the Co-action of Soul and Body, they both of them do *modifie each other's Action*. For, the *best Scribe* writes but scurvily with a *Bad Pen*, and the *Best Pen* writes but scurvily in an *unskilful Hand*. And yet the Hand and the Pen are not one Jot the nearer being *one Thing*, notwithstanding their Concurrence to this *Joint-Action* ; tho' it be qualify'd with Mutuality, Fitness of the Co-Agents, and the Modification which the *Action* receives from both of them jointly, and each of them severally. Besides, they put the Cart before the Horse, while they pretend that the *Acting as one Thing* is to *make them one Thing*. For since the *Res* is, in Priority of Nature and Reason, before *Modus rei* ; and *Being* before *Acting* ; and that nothing can *Act* otherwise than *it is* ; 'tis Evident from plainest Principles, and even from the very *Terms*, that they must first *Be one Thing*,

c'er

e'er they can *Act as one Thing*, or *Be* such a Compound, before they can *Act* as such a Compound. And so, the Point sticks where it was, *viz.* How the Soul and Body come to be thus *Compounded into one Ens*; of which I have given some Account, *Preliminary 4. § 8, 9, 10, 13.*

26. On this Occasion I cannot but Reflect, that the *Cartesians* were very Unadvised to meddle with such a Point, as puts them quite past their *Mathematicks*; as likewise, that tho' they have fram'd a *Logick* or *Method* suitable to explicate their *Mathematical Philosophy*, yet they are but very *bad Distinguishers* of our *Natural Notions* into *Common Heads*, which is one Principal Part of true *Logick*; as appears by their rambling so irregularly from one to the other, as has been shewn *elsewhere*, in their making *Extension* or *Quantity*, which is a *Mode*, the Form which is *Essential* to their *First Matter*; and *here*, in putting *Composition* according to the *Notion* of *Action*, to be *Composition* according to the *Notion* of *Ens*. And whoever impartially Examins the *Distribution* of their *Notions* into *Heads*, will find it not to be such as *Reason* naturally forced, (as ours is,) but such as *Design* voluntarily and ingeniously *invented*.



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# REFLEXIONS

O N

Mr. *LOCKE*'s

E S S A Y

CONCERNING

Humane Understanding.

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REFLEXION First,

O N

*The FIRST BOOK.*

1. **T**HIS Book gives me little Occasion to make any Reflexions, but such as I must be forced to make through his *whole Essay*; which is, on the Penetrative and clear Wit, and happy Expression of its Author, in his pursuing the Design which he had prefix'd to himself. I could wish, indeed,

*The Excellent Wit, and Unbysse'd Integrity of the Author of the Essay acknowledged.*

I

that

That he had thought fit to take his Rise *higher*, or (to speak more properly) had laid his Grounds *deeper*. But, it is to be expected, that every Author should write according to those Thoughts or Principles with which the Casual Circumstances of his fore-past Life had imbu'd him, or as his Natural *Genius* leads him. His steering such an Impartial Mean between *Scepticism* and *Dogmatizing*, does certainly argue a very even Temper of Judgment, and a Sincere Love of Truth. And, I shall hope, that, whoever peruses attentively my *Method*, ( *B. 1. Less. 2. from §. 5. to §. 11.* ) will discern that I have so exactly *measur'd out* the Pitch of Knowledge attainable by us in this State, that I am as little a Friend to *Over-Weening*, as I profess my self a Declar'd Enemy to *Scepticism*.

2. I am a little apprehensive, from some Words in his Introduction, expressing his Dis-like that Men let loose their Thoughts into the vast Ocean of Being; and his Conceit that this brings Men to Doubts and *Scepticism*, that he has taken a Prejudice against **Metaphysics**; whose proper Object is, those Notions of the Thing which abstract from *Matter* and Motion, and concern *Being* only. Were I assur'd that I did not mistake him, I would, for his sake, enlarge on that Point, and display fully the Excellency of that most *Solid*, most *Clear*, and most *Incomparable Science*; which I shall only touch upon at present, by giving my Reader a Summary of its Principal Objects.

3. It treats of the Formal or *Essential Parts* of Physical Entities, or Bodies, in *Common*, and in *Specie*; Of the *Essential Unity* and *Distinction* of them, and whence 'tis taken; particularly, of the *Essential Constituents* of *Elements*, *Mixts*, *Vegetables* and *Animals*; and *when*, and *how*, they come to be *Essentially*, or *Individually Chang'd*: Thence, advancing to the Chief Animal, *Man*, he treats of his *Form*, the *Soul*, and of its *Proper Action*: Of the Superior Part of it, the *Mind*; and, of its *Progress* towards its *last End*, or its *Declension* from it. Thus far demonstrated, it proceeds to treat of the *Separation* of the *Soul* from the *Body*; and, to shew evidently its *Immateriality*, and, consequently, its *Immortality*. Of the *Science* of a *Soul* separated, and the *Eminency* of her *Acts* in that State, above what she had in the *Body*; and, lastly, of the *Felicity* and *Infelicity* *connaturally* following out of her *Actions* *here*, and the *Good* or *Bad Dispositions* found in her at her *Separation*; as also, of the *Immutability* of her *Condition* afterwards. It treats of the *Notion* or *Nature* of *Existence*, and how 'tis *Accidental* or *Unessential* to the *Natures* of every *Created Being*; and thence demonstrates a *First Being*, or a **God**, to whom 'tis *Essential to be*; that is, whose *Nature* is *Self-Existence*. Whence follows, by necessary Consequence, that his *Nature* is *Infinitely Pure* or *Simple*, *Eternal*, *Infinitely Perfect* and *Immutable*, *All-knowing*, *Willing* ever what's *most Wise*, and therefore *most Free* in all his *Actions*; and that the *Divine Essence* is *Unconceivable* by any *Notion* we can frame

*The Incomparable  
Excellency of the  
Science of Meta-  
physick; shewn  
from the Objects  
it treats of.*

or have of it; and *Unexpressible* by any Name we can give it which is *Proper*, and not *most highly Metaphorical*. Lastly, It demonstrates, there are *Pure Spiritual Beings*, which have no *Matter* or *Potentiality* in them, call'd *Intelligences*, or *Angels*; and likewise, (in *Common*,) of their *Number*, *Distinction*, and *Subordination*; as also, of their *Proper Operations*, both *Internal* and *External*.

4. These, and such as these, are the Objects proper to that *Supream Science*, *Metaphysicks*; which any Man of Sense would think ought to make it deserve the Esteem of the Best, and most Elevated Portion of Mankind; and not to be ridicul'd by Drollish Fops; who turn all they understand not into Buffoonery. All these high Subjects it treats of, I say, if possible, (as I believe it is,) with more *Close*, more *Necessary*, and more *Immediate* Connexion, than the *Mathematicks* can pretend to; since the Evidence and Certainty of the Principles of *this Science* (as also of *Logick*) do depend on, are subordinate to, and are borrow'd from the Principles of the *other*; which is the *Sovereign* and *Mistress* of all other Sciences whatever.

5. It will, I doubt not, be apprehended, that such High Knowledges are *above* our reach, and Impossible to be attain'd by us, in *this State*. They are, indeed, *above Fancy*; and, I believe, this Objection is made by *Fancy*, or by Men attending to the *Resemblances* of *Fancy*, which fall short of representing to us such Sublime Objects. But, why they should be above our *Reason*, I cannot imagin;

The Knowledge  
of these high Ob-  
jects attainable  
by Natural Rea-  
son.



imagin; or, why they should be deem'd so My-  
 sterious, as not to be Knowable without a Di-  
 vine Revelation. It is manifest, that we can have  
 Abstract Notions of Existence, Thing, Immaterial,  
 Incorporeal, Knowledge, Will, Operation, &c.  
 that is, we can Consider the Common Subject  
 [*Thing*] as Existent, Capable of Being, and (if it  
 be a *Spirit*) as Immaterial, Incorporeal, Know-  
 ing, Willing, and Operating, &c. as well as Ma-  
 thematicians can a *Body*, as Extended, Round, or  
 Triangular, &c. And, then, I would know why  
 we cannot, by attentive Consideration, and due  
 Reflexion on those Things, as *thus conceiv'd* by  
 us, frame a *Science* grounded on the Things *thus*  
*apprehended*, as well as *Mathematicians* can upon  
 a *Body* consider'd as grounding *their* proper Ob-  
 jects; or, as grounding their Notions of such  
 and such *Modes* of Quantity; such as are the De-  
 grees, Proportions, or Figures of it. Let us not  
 Blaspheme in our Thoughts the Bounty of Infinite  
 Goodness. It was the Devil's first Calumny against  
**God**, that he *envy'd* Mankind Knowledge: Let  
 not us carry it on, by entertaining such an un-  
 worthy Conceit of Essential Goodness; but,  
 dispose our selves by seeking a *Right Method* to  
 Knowledge, and pursuing it with Industrious  
 Study, and we may be Certain of Success. While  
 I was writing my *Method to Science*, the Attempt  
 to shew the *Reason* all along, for such Notions as  
 were taken from the Thing, according to the  
 manner of Being it had *in my Understanding*, and,  
 therefore, was to be carried through with per-  
 petual *Reflexion* on the Things *there*, did appear  
 so discouraging, that I was sometimes half sorry  
 I had undertaken it: But I saw the World *needed*

it, and knew all Truths were *Connected*, and therefore was confident of *God's* Assistance in such a necessary and useful Occasion. Indeed, Providence has left us no Means to know what is done in the Moon, or other Stars, (tho', perhaps, they are as busie there, as we are in this Sublunary Planet, the Earth,) because it is not to our purpose to know such Things. But, whoever considers those Metaphysical Objects, will, at first sight, discover how *Useful* the Knowledge of them is, both in regard of their Influence upon all *Inferior Sciences*, and to raise us to *Contemplation*; as also, to Explicate, Establish, Defend and Comfort *Christian Faith*. For, there is a *Gradation* of Truths, as well as a *Connexion* of one Truth with another.

*The Natural are Foundation-Stones,  
To bear the Supernatural ones;  
Which, tho' they to Heaven's Top aspire,  
'Tis the same Ground, rais'd Stories higher.  
Bless'd Soul! which, to the Throne Divine,  
Winds it self up by its own Line!*

All these high Encomiums of Metaphysics, if it shall please God to protract my Span of Life some few Inches longer, I doubt not but to shew, are no more but its just Due; and, amongst the rest, its Clearest Demonstrative Evidence and Certainty: Particularly, that the Study of that Science is so far from increasing *Doubts*, or leading to *Scepticism*, (as, perhaps, Mr. L. may apprehend,) that, on the Contrary, the Knowledge of it is the most effectual Means imaginable to *settle* all *Doubtfulness*, and to Convert or Confound the greatest *Scepticks*.

6. Mr. *Locke's* Tenet of no *Innate Notions*, nor, consequently, *Innate Principles*, does perfectly agree with my Sentiments; both as to the *Thesis* it self, and the *Reason* for it; which is, that God has laid *Connatural Causes*, to give us our *Notions*; and, therefore, it did not become his Sovereign Wisdom to do such a *needless Action*, as to ingraft them by his *own Hand immediately*. Besides which, that Judicious Author Accumulates so many other Pregnant and Solid Reasons, to fix that Position of ours in an Immoveable Certainty, that I see not but it may, for the future, deserve the Repute of *An Establish'd and Leading Maxim in Philosophy*.

Mr. *Locke's* Tenet  
of no *Innate*  
*Ideas*, *Solidly*  
*Grounded*, and  
*Unanswerable*.

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# REFLEXIONS

## ON THE

## SECOND BOOK.

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### REFLEXION *Second,*

### ON

### *The First* CHAPTER.

1. **I** Agree perfectly with this Learned Author,  
*That our Observation employ'd either about*  
*External Sensible Objects, or a-*  
*bout the Internal Operations of our*  
*Minds, perceived and reflected on*  
*by our selves, is that which supplies*  
*our Understandings with all the Ma-*  
*terials of Thinking.* As also, that a Man *first* thinks  
 when he begins to have any Sensations. That the  
 Impressions made on the Senses are the Originals  
 of all Knowledge. That the Mind is of its own  
 Nature fitted to receive those Impressions. That  
 in receiving *Ideas* or Notions at first the Mind is  
*Passive.* That 'tis all one to say, the *Soul* and  
 the

*In what the Au-  
 thor agrees and  
 disagrees with  
 Mr. Locke.*



the *Man* thinks. And, Lastly, *That Men do not always think* ; which last *Thesis* he confutes here very elaborately : But, I cannot at all agree to some Positions he makes use of to oppose this last *Tennet*, and, indeed, needlessly ; for he produces good store of *solid Arguments* sufficient to confute it.

2. For First, He makes *the having Ideas and Perception to be the same thing*. I

apprehend he means, that when we have *Ideas*, we must perceive we have them ; because he says afterwards, that the *Soul must*

*We may have Notions, without perceiving we have them.*

*necessarily be conscious of its own Perception*. Indeed had he said the *Having Ideas*, when he is *Awake*, and *Attentively reflects* on those *Ideas*, it had been a Certain and Evident Truth : Otherwise, 'tis manifest that we retain or have our *Ideas* or *Notions* in our Mind when we are *soundly asleep*, ( it being a strange and extravagant Paradox to say, that we get them all again as soon as ever our Eyes are open ; ) and yet we *do not then* know them ; and, to say *we do*, is to come over to his Adversary, and grant the *Thesis* he is Impugning : For, if a Man does *think* when he is *sound asleep*, 'tis without Question that he may *think always*.

3. Next, I must utterly deny his Position, that *We cannot think without being sensible or conscious of it*. To dis-

*We may Think, without being Conscious that we Think.*

prove which I alledge, that when a Man is quite absorpt in a serious Thought, or ( as we say ) in a *Brown Study*, his Mind is so totally taken up with the Object of his present Contemplation ( which perhaps is something *without him* ) that

that he can have no Thought, at that very Instant, of his own *Internal* Operation, or that he is *Thinking*, or any thing like it. I have been call'd sometimes from my Study to Dinner, and answered, *I am coming*. Upon my Delay, they call'd me again, and ask'd, Why I came not, having promis'd it? I deny'd I heard, or saw, or answered them; yet, upon Recollection, I remember'd afterwards that *I did*. I *knew* then that they call'd me, since I understood their Words, and answered *pertinently*; yet, it is most manifest, that I did not at the Time of the first Call understand that I understood it, or *know* that I *knew* it, since it came only into my Mind afterwards by Reminiscence or *Reflexion*; which argues I had the Knowledge of it *before* by a *Direct* Impression, otherwise I could not have *remember'd* it.

4. Tho' this *Thesis* of Mr. Locke's is mention'd hereafter, it were not amiss to speak my Sense of it where I first meet it. He judges, that we know our own Thoughts, (which are *Spiritual*) by *Experience*; And I deny we have any Experience but by *Direct* Impressions from *sensible* Objects, either coming from them at first, or re-excited. He thinks it impossible to *know*, but we must at the same time be *Conscious*, or (which is the same) *know we know*: And, I judge it impossible we should *know we know* at the same time we have that Act *only*, till afterwards we come to reflect upon it by a *new* Act; which is to know it, *not by Experience*, but by *Reflexion*. My Reason why I am so positive in my Assertion, is this: Nothing can be *known* by any Act of Knowledge but the

Object

*Object* of that Act: For the *Object* of Knowing, and the Thing *known*, are the same almost in the very Terms, and perfectly the same in Sense. Put case then I know by a *Direct* Impression what we call *Extension*; in this case *Extension* is the *sole Object* of that Act of Knowledge, and not my *Act* of Knowledge *it self*; therefore I am not *conscious* I know; that is, I do not *know* I know when I have the Act of knowing *Extension*: For, were it so, *Extension* would not be the *Sole Object* of that Act, but the *Complex* made up of *Extension*, and the *Act it self* by which I know *Extension*: which Objects being of *Disparate* Natures, ought to be the Objects of *Different* Acts. Besides, this would hinder any External Object, or Corporeal Mode to be known *Distinctly*; for the *Idea* of it would be Confounded and Mingled with a kind of Spiritual Compart, *viz.* my very *Act* it self; for this Act being known (according to him) at the same time with *Extension*, must needs make up *part* of the *Object* of *this Act*. Lastly, If we know our own Act *Experientially*, we should confound *Direct* Knowledges with *Reflex* ones. For (if I understand Mr. *Locke* rightly) he with good Reason makes the *Internal* Operations of the Mind to be the proper Objects of the *Reflex* Acts; and, that the genuin Difference of those two sorts of Acts does consist in this; that by *Direct* ones, we know the Objects which are *in Nature*, or *without us*; and by *Reflex* ones, what's *in the Soul*, or *her Operations*; and not the Things *in Nature*, otherwise than as they are *in that Act*: But if I be *conscious*, or *know that I know* when I know the Object *without me*, I must by the *same Act* know what's *within me* and what's *without me* both at once;

once ; and so my Act of *Direct* Knowledge would be *Reflex* ; or rather, that *one* Act would be *both Direct* and *Reflex*, which makes it Chimerical.

5. The same Argument demonstrates, that we cannot be Conscious of our *Reflex* Acts at the very time we produce them. For, my First *Reflex* Act has for its *sole* Object that Operation of the Mind, which I had immediately before by a *Direct* one ; and my *Second* Reflex Act has for its Object the *First* ; and in the same manner, each succeeding Reflexion has for its Object that Act which immediately preceded. Wherefore, if the First Reflex Act had for its Object, at the same time, both the *Direct* and *it self* too ; that is, did we, when we first Reflected, know by *that very Act it self* that we *did* thus reflect, then the Second Reflex Act would be forestall'd, and have no Proper Object left for it. To clear this better, let us assign one Reflexion to be the *Last* : It were not the *Last* Reflexion, unless the Object of it were that Reflexion which was the *last but one*. Wherefore, unless that Reflexion that went *last before* was *known* by that Act, and the *last of all* remain'd *unknown*, the Last would have *two* Objects, viz. The *Preceding* Reflexion and *its self* too. This seems to me as plain Reason as plain can be ; and, I believe, Mr. *Locke's* Different Thoughts proceeded, from not adverting with what Incredible Celerity our Reflex Thoughts do generally succeed the *Direct* ones, and one another. Whence it comes, that, not aware of the imperceptible Time between them, we are apt to conceit, that the Reflex Act is *experientially* known by the



the very Act it self. Since then, nothing can be known by *any* Act but the *Object* of that Act, and, (as might easily be shown) it would Confound our Natural Notions strangely, to say, the *Act* is its *own Object*; it follows, that it cannot be known by *its self*, but must be known (if at all) by the *next* Reflexion. Whence results this Certain and Evident Corollary, that, *It is impossible we should ever come to know our last Reflexion.*

Hence, we can never come to know our last Reflexion.

6. These are my Reasons why I recede from Mr. *Locke* in his Opinion, that *A Man cannot think without being Conscious of it.* But, the Consequence he seems to draw thence, that therefore **Consciousness** is that which causes **Individuation**, I must absolutely deny; and cannot but judge, that it draws after it a Train of farther Consequences, which are altogether Extravagant. Of which more, when we come to examin his *Principle of Individuation.*

'Tis utterly deny'd that Consciousness causes Individuation.

As for the Position, [*That Men do always think*] which he impugns, and, in my Judgment, quite overthrows, I cannot but wonder what the Asserters of it mean. They grant the *Soul* has Modes and Affections peculiar to her *own* Nature; and, consequently, of which she is properly the *Subject*: Why she may not therefore retain them in her habitually (as it were) without exerting or exercising them, as well as the *Body* may those proper to *its* Nature, is altogether Unconceivable. Indeed, were

The Unreasonableness of the Opinion, that Men do always think

were the Soul, in this condition she has here, a *Pure Act*, as Angels are, it would consist with good Reason; but being here in a *Potential State*, (as appears by her being *Capable* still of *New Knowledge*, and her being but a Part of that *one Actual Thing* call'd *Man*, and depending on the Material Compartment in her Operations) I cannot see on what Principle, either Physical or Metaphysical, they can pretend to ground such a Paradox. This makes me fear, that this Tenet favours strongly of that odd Opinion, That the Soul here is a *Pure Act* as the *Angels are*, or a Distinct Thing from the Body; that is, a *Forma Assistens*, and not *Informans*; tho' they are loath to own it barefacedly, but shift it off with witty Explications of their own Doctrine; which, when brought to the Test of Close Reason, vanish into Air; at which ingenious ways of Evasion it must be confess'd they are very great Artists.

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REFLEXION *Third.*

## O N

*The Second, Third, and Fourth, CHAPTERS.*

1. **I** Must except against his making, or naming the Objects of our Senses, *simple Ideas*, having already prov'd that the only absolutely *simple Idea* or *Notion*, is that of *Existence*: To which are *Respective* (which argues some Complexion or Composition) one way or other, all our *other* Notions of the Thing which we have, or can have; as is shown in my *Method*, B. 1. *Less.* 2d. from §.14. to § 20. I could wish he had taken the *Distinction* and *Order* of his Notions from *Nature*; which Teaches us that the Notion of [ *Res* ] is before [ *Modus Rei*; ] and that the Consideration or Notion of [ *Thing* ] is more Knowable than that of *any Mode*; and the Mode of *quantity* is that which naturally antecedes, and grounds, all the *other* Modes that can be conceiv'd belonging to Body. Nor will it excuse this Deviation from *Nature*, that we have no exact Notions of Individuals; since we can abstract the Notion of *Entity* or *Capacity of Being* from the Thing, as well as we can its *Solidity*, or any of the rest. And certainly, that Notion which Expresses *Reality*, or an Order to *Being*, should claim a Right to be consider'd in the *first* place: I cannot but judge that the

*No Notion Simple  
but that of Exist-  
ence.*

*The Order of our  
Notions is to be  
taken from Na-  
ture.*

Methodizine

Methodizing of his *Ideas* on this manner, would certainly have made his ensuing Discourses *more Orderly*, and consequently *more Clear*. But, every Man is Master of his own Thoughts, and of his own Method. Nor did Mr. *Locke* intend to write an Exact Logick, which is what I aym'd at ; and therefore took that way that best suited with his own ingenious Conception; which was, that, as all our Notions ( as we both of us hold ) come into our Mind by our Senses, so he apprehended it the properest way to treat of them as they are the Objects of *This* or *That*, or *many* different Sensations.

2. His 4th. Chapter of *Solidity* gives me Occasion of making some few Reflexions; which I shall touch on slightly, or omit, because they recur hereafter.

First, His using the word [ *Solidity* ] in his New Sense seems very Improper. For, all our Words do either Signify our *Natural Notions*, which are *Common* to all Mankind, whose Meaning therefore is to be taken from the Usage of the *Vulgar*; or else *Artificial* ones, invented by Artists to express the Notions they are Conversant about: Whereas the Word [ *Solidity* ] taken as it is *here*, seems to agree to *neither*. I do not remember it is ever us'd in an *Artificial* Sense but by Mathematicians, who signify by it the Triple Dimension of Quantity; which is quite different from his Sense of it: And the *Vulgar* Understand and Use the Word [ *Solid* ] as opposit to [ *Fluid*; ] and say that the Earth is *Solid*, or *Firm*, and the Water *Fluid*, or apt to be Diffus'd; both which Senses are vastly different from

*The Word* [ *Solidity* ] *arbitrarily and abusively taken by M. L.*



from *Impenetrability* of the Potential parts of Quantity; which is the meaning he gives it: So that, as far as I have read, no Man ever used the Word [*Solidity*] in his Sense but himself; and it is not at all allowable to Him, Me, or any Man, to give a *new* Sense to any Word not given it *before*. For, this discourse of mine shows it can have no *Proper Sense* at all; and on the other side he does not take it in a *Metaphorical* Sense, as we use to do when we transferr it to *Spiritual* Things, and call a Notion or a Discourse *Solid*. All Words are indeed *Ad placitum*; but 'tis *Mankind* that must *please* to agree in their Signification; nor must they be at the *Beneplacitum* of *Particular* Men, or *Private* Authors.

3. He declines, with some reason, the Word [*Impenetrability*] because it is *Negative*: But why might not then *Extension* have serv'd, which bears the same Sense? For that,

*His Solidity not as  
all Essential to  
Body.*

whose Notion or Nature it is to have its parts *without one another*, cannot bear the having them *within one another*, or their being *Penetrated within themselves*; which is his Notion of the Word [*Solidity*.] He conceives his *Solidity* to be *most intimately connected with, and Essential to Body, and no where to be found or imagin'd but only in Matter*. But why his *Solidity* should be deem'd *Essential* to *Body* at all, he gives no reason, and I am well assur'd no Man living *can* give any; For it confounds the Line of *Substance* or *Ens*, with that of *Quality*; which jumbles all our Commonest Notions together, by making the *Thing* and its *Mode* to be the same *Essential* Notion. Nor is it *Solidity only that is necessarily found in Matter*; for

neither can Extension, Divisibility, Measurability, Space, Impenetrability, &c. be found any where but in things made of *Matter*. But, what I most wonder at, is, why [ *Quantity* ] should be totally wav'd and neglected, That Word having been used by all the Learned World, till of late, is ( as has been shown, *Preliminary 5th. §. 18.* ) most Proper; and, either directly, or by Immediate consequence, involves all the rest in its Signification. For, if a Body have Bigness or *Quantity* in it, it must be *Extended*, and cannot be *Contracted* into a Point, Line or Surface. It must be *Divisible*, or *One* in the Notion of *Quantity*. And, if it must be *Extended* and cannot be cramped into an Indivisible, its parts cannot be *penetrated* within one another; however it may be pierced or Divided by another Body, by shoving its potential parts towards either side. Lastly, it must be *Measurable*, or Proportionable to a Body of the same *Quantity*. So that I see not what imaginable Priviledge can accrue to *Solidity* above the rest: And, it seems to me a New and Groundless assertion, that *Impenetrability* ( tho' we abate the Negative manner of Expression ) is *Essential* at all to Body, more than *any* of the *rest*; that is, *not at all*.

4. This acute Writer, in pursuance of his Doctrine about *Solidity*, proceeds to prove there may be *Pure Space*, or *Vacuum*; because we can have an *Idea* of *Space* left by a Body without the *Idea* of another Solid Thing, or a Body, coming in its Room. I Answer, we may Indeed have a *Fancy* of such a Thing, as we may of many other

Contra-

Space without  
Body, or Vacuum,  
is a mere  
Groundless Fan-  
cy.

Contradictions, so they be not exprest in directly opposit Terms, v.g. of a Golden Animal, or a Chimera, &c. But, I utterly deny that we can have a *True* and Solid *Notion* of it, taken from the *Thing* it self; as all *Ideas* must be, that are not *Phantastick*. He thinks there is no Necellity, one Body should follow another that is moved from such a Space; and that the Maintainers of it do build their Assertion on the *Supposition* that the *World* is full. What other Men hold of the *World's* being Full, I know not, nor what they mean by it; but I will candidly deliver my Sentiment, and the Demonstration for it *a priori*, which is this: I take my *Notion* of Quantity from the Thing, or Body; and, I have shewn above, that that *Notion* is the *Nature of the Thing*, as 'tis Quantitative, or Affected with such a *Mode*. Here is my *firm Ground*, and here I *fix my Foot*.

5. Proceeding hence, and reflecting on this Nature of Quantity in my Mind; I discourse it thus: I am to find out in what its (Analogical) *Essence* or *Entity* consists; and I discover, it must be in that which expresses its proper *Unity*: Seeing then *Divisibility* best expresses its *Unity*, (for, what is *Divisible*, or *Capable to be more*, is, *eo ipso*, *One*,) I have found out the *Essential Notion* or Nature of Quantity; and, since what is *Divisible*, or not yet *Divided*, is *Continued*; and what is *Continued* as to its Quantity, is not *Discontinued* or *Divided* according to its Quantity; therefore *Continuity* is its proper *Unity*; which consists in being *Indivisum in se*, or within its own *Notion*, and *Formally* constitutes its Subject *such*. Wherefore, since the *Essence* of Quantity is the

The Contrary to  
that Tenet De-  
monstrated.

Commonest Affection of *Body*, taken in its whole Latitude, as including *all Bodies*, it follows, that *Continuity*, which is its *Unity*, must be found in them *all* likewise ; that is, *all Bodies*, or the whole Nature of *Body*, that is, the *Entire Bulk* of *Body*, must be *Continued*. And therefore, 'tis as great a Contradiction, that some *Bodies*, or some *Parts* of *Body*, should *not be Continued*, (or, which is the same, that there should be a *Vacuum*,) as that *Triangularity* should be in some one *Body*, and yet it should not be *Triangular* ; that *Whiteness* should be in a *Wall*, and yet it should not be *White* ; or *Unity* in a *Thing*, and yet it self should not be *Unum*. This is my Way of Demonstrating against *Vacuum* within the World, to *prove*, and not *suppose*, the World *Full*, or *Continued* ; which I draw out of the Abstract Notion of *Quantity*, or of *Body* consider'd as *Quantitative* ; and out of those Notions, most Intimately and Essentially Connected with it. Which, why it should not be as Evident as any Demonstration in *Mathematicks* ; or why we cannot draw as clear a Demonstration from the Nature of *Quantity* in *Common*, as we can from the Nature of *such a Quantity*, I desire any Man, who is so wise as to know that all Science and Demonstration do consist in the *Connexion of Terms*, to inform me. I say, any *such* Man ; for, if he *knows not* This, it is impossible he should know *any Thing at all* in *Philosophy*, or even in *Logick* ; and so he is not worth discoursing with.

*Therefore 'tis impossible there should be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum.*

6. Hence is seen, that it is impossible that a Sucker in a Pump may draw up Water, and yet the next Body not follow. We may

*Fancy*



*Fancy* it if we please ; but our *Fancy* cannot change the *Natures of Things* : It cannot make Continuity *not to be* Continuity ; Quantitative Unity, *not to be* such an Unity ; nor Quantity, *not to be* Quantity ; any more than his Solidity can be Non-Solidity, or the Parts of Body penetrate one another. Had Mr. *Locke* had a Notion of *Space*, taken indifferently from *Body*, and something that's *not Body*, as we have of Sensitiveness from *Man* and *Brute* ; he might, in that Case, have fram'd an *Abstract* Notion of it, Common and Indifferent to *Body* and *Vacuum* ; for, then, it had been grounded on the *Thing*, and had been a *solid* and *true* Notion ; but, since he had the *Idea*, or Notion of *Space* from *Body only*, and therefore (as was largely prov'd above) it could be of nothing else, but of *Body thus Modified*, it must be confin'd to *Body*, with which (as all Modes are) it is *Identified* ; and therefore, the *Idea*, or Notion of it, can never be applicable to what *is not a Body*.

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REFLEXION *Fourth,*

## ON

*The Seventh and Eighth CHAPTERS.*

Mr. Locke's *First*  
*Chapter commenda-*  
*able.*

\* *Method to Sci-*  
*ence, B. I. L. 2.*  
*§. 14.*

1. **H**AVING \* already shewn, that our only *Simple* Notion is that of *Existence*, I have no Occasion to make any Remarks on his 7th Chapter, but that 'tis highly Commendable in the Author, to reduce his Speculations to Piety and Contemplation: This being not only our Duty, but that Best End, to which all Solid Speculation naturally leads us.

2. As for his 8th Chapter, I grant, that all the *Ideas*, or *Notions*, we have, are *Positive in the Understanding*, (at least, in *part*;) but the Reason of it is, because they do, all of them, *include the Thing*, as 'tis thus *consider'd*; without which, we could have no *Ideas* of *Privations* or *Negations* at all: For, *Non-Ens*, formally as such, or as totally *Excluding Ens*, can have no *Intelligibility*, nor, consequently, any *Notion*, by which we can understand it: And *Privations* differ from *Negations* only in this, that they include in their *Notion* a *Capacity* of the *Subjects* having such or such a *Mode*, annex'd to its *not having* it; which *Capacity* clearly *Connotes* the *Thing*, since there cannot be a *Capacity*, without some *Thing* that *is* Capable, or *has* that *Capacity*.

Privative Notions  
must Connote the  
Subject.

capacity. Add, that I see not how, *Ideas* being Resemblances, an *Idea*, consider'd by us as a Positive real Being, can ever resemble or represent Privations, they being of (at least) Subcontrary Natures. What I hold, is, that, when we conceive a Thing, as having some Privation in it, the *Idea* of it is partly Positive, partly Privative; and the Material Part of it is the Thing; the Formal, as Privative, or, as thus Modify'd. For, *Ideas*, I mean, *Notions* of Privations, without including the Thing, are Unconceivable, and Impossible; as whoever looks into their \* Definition, will discern clearly. Of this Nature (in Common) are all the *Notions* we have of the Modes, or Accidents; no *Notion* being truly or perfectly Positive, but that of *Ens*, or *Thing*.

\* See Prelim. 3.  
§. 9, 10, 11.

I cannot grant that our *Ideas*, or *Notions*, (or even Phantasms,) are caus'd in us by meer *Motions*, continued from our Senses, to the Brain, or the Seat of Sensation; but must judge, for the Reasons alledg'd \* above, that this is perform'd by those Imperceptible Bodies there spoken of, or by the *Effluvia* themselves convey'd thither, and afterwards lodg-

Meer *Motions* made upon the Senses, Insufficient to give us Knowledge of the Objects.

\* Prelim. 4. §. 26, 27, 28, &c.

ed there. In embracing which Opinion, of our Knowledge being wrought by meer *Motions* made by the Objects, his Excellent Wit suffers it self to be led astray by our Moderns. His Reason (which I conceive is also theirs) is, because it is not more impossible to conceive, that God should annex such *Ideas* to such *Motions*, than Pain to a piece of Steel dividing the Body, with which that *Idea* has no Resemblance.

*semblance.* How unlike a Reason this is, appears at first sight ; and, I am sure this Parallel has *no* Resemblance *at all* with the Thing it is brought for. I know of no *Annexing* the *Idea* of Pain to a piece of Steel ; but, must think 'tis a most highly extravagant Conceit. The Business passes thus in Nature. A piece of Steel being *Denser*, and withall *sharp*, is a *proper Cause* of *Dividing* the *Body* ; the *Dividing* of it, is a *proper Cause* of its being disorder'd, and render'd unable to *assist* the Soul, or the Man, in his necessary Operations : This breeds naturally a Conception in the Soul, or the Man, that he is hurt ; which *Naturally* produces in the Knower, who is highly concern'd in it, *Grief* or *Pain* : So that all is here carry'd on by a Train of *proper Causes*, to *proper Effects* ; and needs no *Annexing by God*, more than to conserve the Order of Second Causes which himself has establish'd. On the other side, there is no *Natural Resemblance* of such a Motion to such an *Idea*, as is confess'd ; nor is the former a *Proper Cause* of the other ; which puts them to have recourse to this Voluntary *Annexion* to them by **God**. Add, that it is an odd kind of Argument, to alledge, that *it is not impossible to conceive* that **God** may do this, or that, without proving he *has* done it : Nor is it at all allowable in Philosophy, to bring in a *Dens è Machinâ* at every turn, when our selves are at a loss to give a Reason for our *Thesis*. Nor is it to be expected, that **God** will alter the Nature of Things, for the Interest of any Man's Tenet ; but, since his Wisdom, in his Ordinary Government of the World, carries on the Course of it according to the Nature of Second Causes, it must first be *prov'd*, that what we maintain, is

Agree-



Agreeable to the Course of Natural Causes, e'er we ought to think or imagin that **God** will have any hand in it: And, if we can *prove* this, we need no Immediate or *particular* Recourse to **God's** favouring us, by doing This, or That, to make good our Argument.

4. I must deny too, consequently to my former Doctrine, that *Sensible Qualities* are *nothing in the Objects*, but *Powers to produce various Sensations in us*; unless it be meant, that they have Powers to send out such *Effluviūms* into the Brain, by the Senses, as imprint their very Natures in our Mind; and not barely to produce Motions in our Nerves. Nor can I conceive why the *Ideas* of the *Secondary Qualities* should have *nothing like them, existing in the Bodies themselves*; nor be *Resemblances* of them. If this be true, why are they call'd [*Ideas*,] which either signifies *Resemblances*, or *Nothing*? Again, since the Bodies are put to *cause* them, how can we think they are *nothing like them*? Can any Man think the *Effect* is *nothing like the Cause*, when every *Effect* can be nothing but a Participation of the Cause, or something coming *into* the Subject from the Efficient, which was *in it* some way or other before? Lastly, If these *Secondary Qualities* be *compounded* of the Primary ones, (*viz.* of Solidity, Extension, Figure and Mobility) *in our Understanding*, why should not those *Primary Qualities in re*, as well compound those *Secondary ones in the Thing*, or *out of our Understanding*? And, if they do, (as 'tis evident they must, since they are all *there*,) then, why are not those *Secondary Ideas* full as like those

Secondary

Secondary or Compounded Qualities found in the *Thing*, as the Primary *Ideas* were like the Primary Qualities in the *same Thing*; and, consequently, resemble them, as well as the others did their proper Originals? I much doubt, that the Author rather consulted his *Fancy* in this particular, than his good *Reason*: And, because those *Effluvioms*, or the *Figures* of Parts, which cause our Sensations, are too Subtile and Indiscernable to cause Distinct Phantasms of themselves, as the Primary ones did, but are of a Confus'd Uniformness in Appearance, he judges hence, they are *Nothing like* the others: Whereas, Reason will inform Reflecters, that, since Colour is nothing but the *Surface of a Body*, as 'tis apt to reflect *Light*; the manner of Reflexion found in the Surface of a *White Thing*, which is apt to reflect much *Light*, is, to our *Reason*, and in our *Notion*, such as it was in the *Thing* imprinting it; and, consequently, (every thing Acting as it is,) such as came from it. Whence, those who, by Reflex Thoughts, and using their *Reason*, do go about to explain or define the Nature or Notion of *Whiteness*, do make it consist in such a Reflexion of *Light*, bringing *Effluvioms* with it from a Surface so advantageously Figur'd: And so, the *Notion* of *Whiteness* is the *same* in the *Thing*, and in the Understanding; viz. those *Effluvioms* thus Figur'd, or *Modified*, however, the Appearance of it in the *Fancy* reaches not the true *Nature* of the *Thing*, as 'tis *White*; which, indeed, *Fancy* never does.

5. The Reason why the *Pain*, which we feel, is not in the Thing that Caus'd it, and Sensible Qualities are so, is, because these last are Proper, Univocal, and Immediate Effects of Bodies sending out *Effluvioms* of their own Natures; but *Pain*, being an Affection of the Soul, springing from a Perception that its dear Com- part is hurt, and disorder'd, is an Improper, Re- moter, and Equivocal Production. The Alter- ing, Disordering, or Spoiling the Temperature or Continuity of the Bodily Parts due to their Nature, is, (as was shewn,) the Immediate and Proper Effect of those Offensive Agents; but 'tis Accidental to their manner of Operating, that they cause *Pain*, or *Pleasure*, even remotely; and, it *lights* only, that *sometimes* they do this, be- cause the Subject, or the Body, in which they produce these their proper Effects, *happ*s to be Identified with a *Knowing* Nature, only which is properly capable to *Grieve*, or be *Delighted* when a Harmful or Pleasing Impression is made on the Body, which is Part of the *Man*, and, in some sort, *himself*. The like is to be said of *Man- na*, and other such Instances. The Alterations or Disorder made in the Guts and Stomach, are Na- tural, Proper, and Immediate Effects of it; but the Pain ensuing thence, which is a *Spiritual* Dis- position of the Mind, is a *Remote*, *Accidental*, and *Improper* Effect of it.

*The Pretence of GOD's Volunta- ry Annexing Im- proper Causes to Effects, is Unphi- losophical.*

6. By this Time Mr. *Locke* sees that I agree with him, that the Bodies in Nature have a Power in them to *cause* our several Sen-

*The Power in the Object to cause Sen- sation and Know- ledge, is Impro- perly such.*  
sations;

sations; and, that this *Power* is that which we call such a *Quality* of it. But I disagree with him, that they are only *Powers* to cause such a *Motion*; and affirm, it is a *Power*, when duly Circumstanced with other Requisites, (as, with *Light*, to convey Visible Qualities; *Moisture*, *Gustable* ones, &c.) to send out *Effluvia*, of their own Nature, to the Brain; (which, therefore, are Inherent in, and Proper Parts of those Objects,) whether they cause *Actual* Sensation, or no. The Sun sends out his Beams, which, scatter'd thinly, at this remote distance from the Fountain, are therefore one of Mr. *Locke's* Secondary Qualities, which we call *Light*; yet, contracted by a Burning-Glass, they perform the Proper Effect of Fire, *Burning*; whence we ought to conclude, they are of the Nature of Fire. Can we then deny, or doubt, but that the Body of the Sun, which communicates, or sends them out, is it self Fire; or, that, being such, those Rays, and the Sun, have *no Similitude* with one another? Or, that, when they strike the Eye, they stop *there*, and are not carry'd *into the Brain*? *Hippocrates* tells us, that *Omnes partes corporis sunt permeabiles*; meaning, that they are pervious to the *Humours*; which are *gross* Things, in comparison of the Sun-Beams. How can it then be doubted, but that they reach the Fancy; and thence, the Soul; and imprint their Notions or Natures there: And, tho' some may deny they are the *same* in the Mind, as they are in Nature; yet can it, with any Shew of Reason, be deny'd they are *at all like* the Cause that produced them? The like Discourse holds in all other Sensible Qualities, to what Sense soever they belong.



7. To close this Discourse, I am apt to think, that Mr. *Locke* intended to oppose those who hold, that the Sensible Qualities are a little kind of Distinct Entities. Next, I declare, that, tho' the Thing has *accidentally* a Power in it, to make it self perceiv'd; yet, taking the Thing as an Object, (as he does,) it is but *Improperly* called a Power; and not *Properly*, as are our Powers, or Faculties, of Seeing, Hearing, Knowing, &c. are: For, the Act being the End for which the Power was given, the Faculties, or Powers, are *better'd*, and *perfected*, by being reduced to Act; and so there is a real Ground for their being Related to the Object: Whereas, neither the Object, or Thing, nor any Sensible Quality in it, is a Jot the better, or any way Alter'd, by being *perceiv'd*, or *known*; any more than a Cart rolling through the Street, is the *better*, or *otherwise* than it had been, because the *Effluvioms* it sends out do make a Representation of it in a Shop full of Looking-Glasses, as it passes by. Whence Logicians say, that there is no Real Relation of the Object to the Sense, or Intellect; because there is no Real Ground for such a Relation, nor any Dependence of the Object on those Powers, in any kind; \* as is shewn in my Method.

\* B. 1. L. 7. §. 9,  
10, 11.

REFLEXION *Fifth,*

## O N

*The Tenth* CHAPTER.

**P**ASSING over this Ninth Chapter about *Perception*, I confess my self at a great Loss how to understand divers Passages in his Tenth, which treats of *Retention*, or how to make him coherent with himself. For, First, he tells us our *Ideas are nothing but Actual Perceptions of the Mind*. By which Words he seems to make no kind of Distinction between the *Act* of *Perception* and the *Object* of it; whereas the *Act* is the *Exercise* of our *Power* of *Perceiving*, actuated by the *Object* about which it is then employ'd; which *Object* determines the *Indifferency* of the *Power* to *this* or *that* *Act* in particular; which the *Schools* call *Specifying* the *Act*: But the *Object* is the *Thing known* by the *Act*; and 'tis a strange *Paradox* to say, that the *Act of Knowledge* and the *Object* or *Thing known* are the same; especially, if the *Thing known* be something *without* us: Next, I cannot reconcile his making our *Ideas* to be nothing but *Actual Perceptions*, with his making our *Ideas*, quite through his *Book*, to be the *Object* of our *Thoughts*, and expressly stating them to be *such* in the beginning of it, *Chap. 1. § 8.* Secondly, he says, That those *Ideas* cease to be any thing, when there is no *Perception* of them.

*Ideas or Notions  
are not Actual  
Perceptions, but  
the Object per-  
ceiv'd, and du-  
rably remaining.*

them. If so, why does he put us to have *Memory* or *Retention*, if, after the Act is past, there be nothing to keep in *Memory* or *Retain*. Thirdly, in Consequence of this his Ground, he affirms, that *this laying up Ideas in the Repository of his Memory, signifies no more, but that the Mind has in ma-*

*It destroys the Nature of Memory, to make it consist in the Reviving Ideas.*

*ny Cases a Power to Revive Perceptions, with a Connotate annex, of having had them before.* Certainly, this Signification of the word [*Memory*] is peculiar to himself, and contrary to the Sentiments of all Mankind; who, were they examined by the Poll, would, I believe, unanimously declare, that by *laying up a Thing in Memory*, they meant, (as the Words naturally import) the *Retaining* something which has its being yet *within us*, and may be brought into play again upon occasion. Can the *Memory* be said to *Retain* what *is not*? Or can there be a *Repository of Nothing*? Is *Reviving* the Notion of *Retaining*, they being rather of a Contrary Sense to one another? Or can *Remembring* be conceived to be the same Notion with *Reproduction*? These seem to me such monstrous Abuses of Words, that I would willingly think my self mistaken, rather than to father them on so Learned an Author, did not my Eyes assure me I do not dream or oversee. Nor can the same Individual Act ever be *reviv'd*; it depending on many Circumstances, determinable to such a *Time* or *Place*; the former of which can never recur, or be reproduced. Lastly, What means this *Power in the Mind to revive Perceptions*? The *Man*, indeed, has a Power, when

*The Mind cannot revive Perceptions.*

re-excited by outward Objects like the former, or by Passion, Disease, or by some other Casual Circumstances, to rummage the *Ideas* lodged in the Brain; and, so, by their new Impression on the Seat of Knowledge, to cause such an Act, as by it to know the same Thing again; as also to know it was *foreknown*, as was

\* *Prelim.* 4. § 26, explicated \* above: But to put  
27, 28. the Soul to *revive Ideas*, or even

to *act*, so that the Action shall

begin from her *peculiar* Nature, is Præternatural to her Condition, to her Manner of *Existing*, and consequently, to her manner of *Operating here*; which, as it must be ever *with* the Bodily part or the Fancy, so it must *begin* still *from it*, as it did at first; with this only Difference, that in the first Impressions made on the Sense, and thence on the Seat of Knowledge, the Man (and particularly as to his Soul) is perfectly *Passive*; whereas afterwards by vertue of those Phantasms, and their former Impression, which have already affected the said Seat of Knowledge, (which is part of himself) and have been *re-affected* by it, the Man is partly Passive, partly Active in remembering; as Mr. *Locke* does, I think, also acknowledge; tho' he explicates it otherwise than I do, *viz.* By the Mind's setting it self on work, which I judge, and have shewn to be Impossible, *Prelimin.* 4. § 25, 26, 27.

2. I must not omit here to remark, that when

*Ideas in the Fancy  
may fade, but  
Notions are never  
blotted out of  
the Soul.*

Mr. *Locke* says, that *Ideas* fade in the *Memory*; or, (as he ingeniously expresses it) that [ *the Pictures drawn in our Minds are laid in fading Colours* ] he most evidently



dently discovers, that by *Ideas* here he means *material* Representations or *Phantasms*, and not those *Spiritual* Objects of our Understandings, *Notions*. For, there is no doubt but that Phantasms, they being only Imperceptible Particles, of the same Nature with the Corporeal Agents whence they are sent, do follow, (and that very easily) the Fate of their Originals; and are liable to be defaced, alter'd or corrupted, as *these* are: Whereas it is impossible, that *Ideas* or *Notions*, which have a *Spiritual* Being in our *Mind*, should be liable to any such Decay, Corruption or Mutation. If any thing could prejudice, destroy or efface them, it must in all Reason be thought that their *Contraries* would do it: Whereas clear Reflexion tells us, that Contraries *in the Mind* are so far from Expelling, Blurring, or Altering one another *there*, that they not only very Friendly dwell together, but moreover that, by their Co-habitation there, they make one another *magis elucescere*, and Establish one anothers Natures. *Hot* and *Cold*, *Moist* and *Dry*, which are perpetually fighting, and make such Bustles and Turmoils in the *Material* World, are very consistent, and agree amicably in the *Soul*. The Corporeal Instruments which brought our *Notions* thither may perish; but when they are once *in her*, they are as immutable and Immortal as her self. So that the Pictures in our Minds are so far from being drawn in *fading Colours*, that they should rather be said (if we would use a Metaphor to express their Durableness) to be engraved in Brass, Marble, or Adamant; being as lasting as Eternity. Which Tenet, were I writing Metaphylicks, I should not doubt but to demonstrate; and withal

to show how useful it is to explicate Christian Faith: Particularly those Points of laying open the Book of Conscience at the last day; when, as the Sybil sings, [*Cunctaque cunctorum cunctis arcana patebunt.*] And how Infants are connaturally saved by virtue of *Baptism*.

## REFLEXION *Sixth.*

ON

### *The Eleventh and Twelfth CHAPTERS.*

1. **T**HE 11<sup>th</sup>. Chapter gives me no occasion to make any Reflexions, but only on his attributing Knowledge to *Brutes*; about which I have been too large already. He denies indeed that they have the power of *Abstracting*, or of having *General Ideas*. But, if they have true Knowledge, or any more than King *David* meant, when he says, *The Sun knows his going down*, I see no reason why they may not have *General Notions*, and *Abstract*, and *Compare* too.

If *Brutes* can know, they may have *General Notions*, and *Abstract*, and *Compare* too.

For, if they have any Degree of *Reason*, as he grants they have, they may do all this; and I am sure, and have already shown, their *Outward Actions* do as much countenance their having *Reason*, as any signs they give us do shew that they cannot *Abstract*, or have *General Ideas*; since *General Ideas* (as every good Reflector may observe) are nothing but *Imperfect Ideas* of the *Thing*; and

and in a Thousand occasions, the Object or Thing affords them no more, but Imperfect or *General Ideas*, and therefore they must have them. I am much pleas'd with his Distinction between *Wit* and *Judgment*; and I could wish that our Men of Fancy, who affect to bring Religion, and all they understand not, to Drollery, would apply it to themselves.

2. The Author discourses very acutely, how our Reason and Judgment are misguided by our not *distinguishing* our Notions *exactly*; whence we may infer, that that part of Logick which teaches us how to *distinguish* them *accurately*, and to *keep them distinct*, is of exceeding great use; and that the Study of it is to be earnestly pursu'd by all Pretenders to *Science*; especially by new Beginners: Of which, I hope, I have elaborately treated in the First Book of my *Method*.

*The distinguishing our Notions guides our Reason and Judgment right.*

3. In order to the 12th. Chapter; there is no doubt but that we can *unite several simpler Ideas or Notions into one*, and signify them by *one Name*; but I deny that, if we conjoin them otherwise than as they are, or *may be, united in External Objects*, or in the *Thing*, we can have any Complex *Notions*, tho' we may have a Fancy, of them, or a kind of *Imitation* of some thing which once affected our Senses. For, since I cannot but think I have demonstrated that our *Notion* is the *Thing* as conceiv'd by us, or the Thing existing in the understanding; If I have any Complexion of more Simple Notions in my *Mind*, not found to be united in the *Thing*; the *Idea* in my Mind is

*All Complex Ideas, or Notions, must consist of simpler ones, united in the Thing.*

not conformable to the *Thing* it self, nor is it, as I have prov'd it to be, *that Thing* ; and then to what end should I have such an *Idea*, as if I come to predicate it of the *Thing*, the Proposition would be False, which consequently would fill our mind with Falshoods. Next, as has been often prov'd formerly, I deny the Soul can *Unite* or *Act* of her self, or by her peculiar power (tho' the *Man* may ) but is oblig'd to take what's given her by Impressions on the Seat of Knowledge. In which case, what the *Thing* or *Object*, by a Genuin Impression, gives her, is *Orderly*, *Solid*, and a Seed of *true* knowledge or *Science*; but that which the *Fancy* gives her, *otherwise than* as the *Thing* did directly imprint it, is *Disorderly*, *Superficial*, and a Ground of *Erreur*. Indeed, she is forc'd to *apprehend*, whenever the Phantasms strike the Seat of Knowledge, tho' their Motions and Complexions be never so *Disorderly*, or even *Monstrous*. Now, whenever this is done, *Judicious* Men direct their Eye to the *Thing*, and examine whether the Conjunction of such or such *Ideas*, is truly found *in re*; or is agreeable to those *Direct* Impressions it had received *thence*; which if it be, the Soul entertains it, after Examination, and lets it *sink* into her; it being the *true nature* of the *Thing*, and so a *Ground to Truth*, to see which her Essence was made; If it be not, she rejects it; for it grounds a Contradiction to the Nature of the *Thing*, which is the only Ground of *Truth*; and makes or counterfeits it to be what it is *not*; and it is directly *against* her Nature to admit Contradictory Judgments. Now, what *Judicious* Men, by their recourse to the *Thing*, thus reject, those *Unskilful Thinkers*, who are led by

*Fancy*



*Fancy*, do admit ; and by this means their Souls become full of Phantastick Conceits which never can be brought to any Coherence or Connexion of Terms. For no Terms can *Cohere*, unless the *Notions* meant by each of them be really in the *Thing it self* ; and those Coherences made in the Mind by any other way, or of any other Materials, are far from *Solid* or *True*, as we experience in People that are *Splenetic* or *Enthusiastick*.

4. Wherefore, whenever the *Ideas* are connected otherwise than they are or may be *in re*, the Object of that Act can have no Metaphysical *Verity*, *Unity*, nor consequently

*Otherwise they are*  
Groundless Fancies.

*Entity* in it ; the two former of which, being Properties of *Ens*, cannot be where *Ens* or *Thing* is not. Whence the Objects of those Fantastick Acts is some *non-Ens* taken for an *Ens* ; which, if pursu'd home by a good Logician, must end in a Contradiction. For example, I can have Notions of *Hircus* and *Cervus* aparted from one another ; but, if I will unite them in my Mind *otherwise* than Nature exhibited them, and take them *conjunctly*, ( as *Fancy* may ) and frame a Complex *Idea* of a *Hirco-Cervus*, or *Goat-Stag*, it must needs be perfectly Fantastical and Chimerical. This will farther appear, if we take one of Mr. L's Complex *Ideas*, viz. *Beauty*, consisting of a certain Composition of Figure and Colour. Now, if such Figure and Colour had not been found, or might not be found united by Nature in the same *Thing*, the *Idea* of it could not have been conformable to what's in Nature, or the *Idea* of any *Reality*, but purely Fantastical and Counterfeit. The same may be said of his *Idea* of Lead, with its proper Qualities ;

lities; or of the Ordinary Idea of a Man, describ'd here to be a Substance or Thing with Motion, Thought and Reasoning join'd to it: Which Qualities, were they not join'd in the Thing they belong to, or identify'd with it, the Complex Ideas of them would be nothing but meer Groundless Fancies.

This Point is so Important, that it will deserve to be clear'd as perfectly as possible: I shall therefore allow it a more elaborate Explanation, tho' I spend less Pains and Time in my other Reflexions.

When I consider an Individual Thing in Nature, ( *v. g.* A Man ) according to the Notion of *Being*, I have two Notions of him, *viz.* That he is capable of Existing, and that he actually Exists; the former of which he has by means of Second Causes, which, by Determining the Matter, gives him his Determinate Nature or Essence. The other he has immediately from the First Being; and I have a Complex Notion of him accordingly. Next, considering the same thing precisely as a Body, or such an *Ens* as we call by that Name; I find in it somewhat by which it is Corruptible, or Changeable into another, and somewhat by which it is Determin'd to be This sort of Thing, or Body, or to be what it is: And, I conceive and call Body according to the former of these Considerations Power or Matter; and, according to the later, Act or Form; and I frame a Complex Idea of it, as 'tis a Body accordingly. Hitherto I treat of the Thing as a Metaphysician, and regard it only according to some Order it has to *Being*. Proceeding further

*The Manner how all Complex Ideas or Notions are made, elaborately explain'd.*

ther on, and dividing still the common Line of *Ens*, or ( what I am now arriv'd at ) [ *Body* ] by *Intrinsic* Differences, or by *more* and *less* of the Generical Notion, of which Quantity or Divisibility is the Primary Affection, or that of which all the other Modes are made ; I find that some Bodies must be *more* Divisible or *Rare*, other *less* Divisible or *Dense* ; and by this means we approach something nearer to *Natural* or *Physical* Considerations of that thing as 'tis call'd *Body* ; and the Science that treats of it, as being *immediately under* Metaphylicks, and *immediately above* Physicks, may not unfitly be called *Archi-Physical* ; as giving the immediate *Principles* to Physicks. This way of Considering *Body* grounds the Notions of *Simple* Bodies, called *Elements* ; which differ in Nothing but *Rarity* and *Density* ; and also, the Notions of *Compound* Bodies made up of those Simple ones. So that now my former Complex Notions of *Capable to be* and *Actual Being* ; and, of having *Determinate* and *Indeterminate* Respects to that *Ens* as it is *Body*, call'd *Form* and *Matter*, has annex to it in the Thing many *Secondary* Qualities, made up of those *Primary* ones ; such as are, Heat and Cold, Moisture and Driness, &c. and so we are come to that Science call'd *Physicks* or *Natural Philosophy* ; and my former Complex Notion of such an *Individuum*, takes in these *Second* Qualities, over and above what it contain'd before. Advancing farther, we come to consider this Thing or Body with its Parts so *diversify'd* by those *First* and *Second* Qualities, or so *Organiz'd*, that one part ( the common Causes of the World suppos'd ) is able to work on another ; which kind of Thing we call *Self-moving* or *Living*. And, still

proceeding on by a *farther* Complexion of such Parts, we come to a Thing that is *Sensitive*, or Moving it self by the least *Effluvioms* affecting those tender Organs call'd the *Senses*. All which give so many New Additions to my former Notion of that Individuum, and make it more Complex. Moreover, we can find in this *Sensitive* Thing, or this *Animal* now spoken of, both as to its *peculiar* Matter and Form, a Disposition to work *comparatively*; that is to *judge*, and *reason* or *discourse*; and, consequently, to have in it a *Knowing* Power, which is to be a *Man*: And, Lastly, Such a *peculiar Degree* of this Power of *Comparing*, which restrains the *Specifick* Notion of *Man* to be *this Individual* Man. So that, by this time, such a Vast Assembly of Modes or Accidents (the Croud of which make that *most Complex* Notion, call'd the *Suppositum*, so blindly *confused*) do meet in my Complex *Idea* of this Individual Man, that, tho' I see he is a *Thing*; and a *Distinct* Thing, because I see he *exists* and *operates* Independently of all *other* Things; yet, I can have no Distinct and Clear Notion of his *Essence*, but by taking it in pieces, (as it were,) both as to those several Considerations belonging to him, according to the Line of *Being*, as was now explain'd; and also, as to those Conceptions I make of him, according to all the *Phylical Modes* or Accidents which are in him: Which *Modes*, so to gain an exacter Knowledge of him, as Affected with those Modes, (and the same may be said of all other Things,) we divide, and sub-divide, as we see agreeable to their Distinct Natures or Notions.

This Discourse may, if well weigh'd, be, perhaps useful for many Ends. But, to apply it to  
our



our present purpose: All this Multitude of *less Complex*, or *more simple Ideas*, belonging to the Line of Substance, are found Connected in this *Individuum*; and, did we *add* the least of them by *our Mind*, which was not found Conjoin'd in the *Thing*, my Notion or *Idea* of him would, so far, be *Fantastick*, and *False*; because there was nothing found in the *Thing* that answers to such a Complexion, (only which can make it *Real*,) but only in my *Fancy*, counterfeiting such a Complexion, and mis-informing my *Understanding*; as it happens in the Illusive Representations, made in those who are troubled with the Spleen, Melancholy, or Phrenzy; as likewise, in timorous People, when they think they see Sprights; or in Horses, when they boggle. Add, that the Mind cannot, *of its self*, begin to act, (as was proved formerly:) but all New Acts, or Excitation of Former Notions in her, are the Acts of the *whole Man*, and must naturally arise *first* from the *Bodily Part*, or the *Fancy*; either Imprinting Phantasms, which it receives from the Objects, *orderly* and *genuinly*, on the Seat of Knowledge; or *Disorderly*, as its Irregular and Extravagant Motions happen to conjoin them. Whence we say that a Man who does not correct such incoherent Connexions by *Judgment*, is *led by Fancy*, or *Caprichious*.

6. While we are discoursing about the manner how we come by all our *Ideas* whether *Simple* or *Complex*, it would not perhaps be improper to set before the Reader's view, what is my Tenet, the *Cartesians* and Mr. *Lockes*, and how we

*How the Doctrine of  
Cartesius, Mr.  
Locke, and J. S.  
differ, as to this  
point.*

differ.

differ. The *Cartesians* do not own themselves at all beholding to *outward Objects* for their *Ideas* ( as least, as some of them say, for the chiefest ones ) but they say they are *Innate*, or imprinted on the Soul by Gods immediate hand ; tho' some of them ( which makes the matter much worse ) chose rather to say they are *Elicited* or *produced* by the Soul it self, upon such a Motion from without ; as also, that they are *re-excited* by such *Motions* ; in which last Tenet Mr. *Locke* seems to agree with them. But this Learned Author denies all *Innate Ideas* ; and holds that the *Simple* ones ( at least ) are caused by the *Objects*, whether they be *Internal* or *External* ; but, that the *Complex Ideas* are framed by the Mind, which he conceives to have a virtue of Compounding them as she pleases. Whereas, my Principles force me to oppose them both, and to hold That all *Ideas*, whether *Simple*, or *Complex* ( provided that by *Ideas* be meant *Notions*, and not *Imaginations* ) are to be taken intirely from the *Objects* or Things in *Nature* ; as also that, when we excite them a *new*, something that is *in Act* it self must cause that Action ; because a meer *Power* to do any Thing, ( whether *in* the Soul or *out* of it ) cannot *determin it self* to any Action in *particular*. And, if I may freely and impartially pass my Verdict between them, I should frankly declare, that Mr. *Locke*'s way has far *more of Nature* in it, and consequently is *more Solid* than the *Cartesian* ; in regard he holds all our *Ideas* are originally taken from the *Outward Objects*, either *emmediately*, as to his *Simple Ideas* ; or *mediately*, as to those which are compounded of them by the Soul : Whereas the *Cartesians* cannot pretend to know any thing in *Nature*, unless they can

solidly

solidly prove these three Previous Points: *First*, That their *Ideas* are *Innate*, or else *produced* by the Soul; neither of which I am certain they can ever prove. *Secondly*, *What* those *Ideas* are, or that they are not *meer Fancies*. *Thirdly*, If they put them to be *meer Representations*, and not the *Thing*, or Object it self, how we can be certain that we must *by them* know the Things without us, notwithstanding all that I have alledg'd to demonstrate the contrary in my Second and Third *Preliminaries*. If these Points, which are the main Hinges that open us the way into Philosophy, or the *Knowledge of Things*, be not *first* firmly establish'd, all their Discourses, tho' they be never so ingenious, must be *hollow* and *superficial* for want of *Solid Ground*. These three Points, I say, they must either show to be *self-evident*, or they must *make* them Evident by *Demonstrating* them; or else, I am sure, 'tis *most Evident*, that all their Superstructures are *Ruinous* for want of a *Firm Foundation*. I would not misunderstand them, when they explain to us what their *Ideas* are; and yet they have such a peculiar Talent of speaking Ambiguous Sense in seemingly plain Words, that I cannot for my Heart comprehend their Meaning. They tell us sometimes they *hold* the *Idea*, consider'd *Objectively*, to be the *Res* or *Thing* itself; but when they add, that it is the *Res* or *Thing* [ *quatenus representata* ] they seem to deny it again; for the Words [ *quatenus representata* ] signifie, in true Logick, the bare *Representation* of the Thing; as [ *Paries quatenus Albus*, ] means [ *Albedo*; ] the restrictive Word [ *Quatenus* ] cutting off the precise Notion to which it is annex'd, from *all others*. And how odd a piece of Chiquanery it is to say,  
that

that the *Picture* or Resemblance of *Cæsar*, is *Cæsar* himself, *quatenus representatus*, I leave it to others to judge. Besides, if the thing it self be really *there*, or in the Knowing Power, it may be *known* without more ado, or without needing those little *Spiritual Epicycles*, (if I may so call them) those useless *Ideas*. Mr. *Locke*, I must confess, began at first to build Solidly on the *Things*; but, he is so very acutely and speculatively attentive to the *Ideas* in his own Thoughts, and so wholly taken up with Contemplation of them, that he seems sometimes to *over-run* his own Principles, (which only at first he intended to pursue) and quite to *lose Sight* of the *Things*. Whereas I bend my whole Endeavour to keep my Eye steadily upon them through the whole Course of my Doctrine, without intermingling any gratuitous Suppositions, or suffering my self to be led astray from the *Natures of the Things* by any ill-grounded *Fancies* of my own, which would court and debauch my Reason, tho' they seem never so Ingenious.

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REFLEXION *Seventh.*

O N

*The Thirteenth CHAPTER.*

1. **I**F, as Mr. Locke says, we get the Simple Idea of Space by our Sight and Touch, then Nature gives us *no Idea* of a Space, which is not *Visible* and *Tangible*; *Extension not well Explicated.* whence follows, that the Idea of such a Space as *Vacuum*, which is neither the Object of one of those Senses, nor of the other, is *Unnatural* and *Fantastical*. The Notion of *Distance* is well explain'd; but I cannot discern why Length, Breadth and Thickness should be called *Capacity*: For, these three Modes (as all Modes do) express the manner *how* they *Intrinsically* affect their Subject, *Body*; whereas, *Capacity* signifies the Respect to something *Extrinsic* to the Body thus affected, or a *Power to contain Another Thing*. Much less can Extension be character'd *A Capacity of Space, with something between the Extremities, which is Solid, Moveable and Tangible*; for, tho' Matter were suppos'd to have no Extremities at all, but to be *Infinite*, it would not be *less Extended*, but *more*: And were the Air suppos'd to be neither Solid, Moveable or Tangible, yet still it might be conceiv'd to be *Extended*. Again, What means it, that *Extension is a Capacity of Space*, whereas *Space is rather a Capacity of what is Extended*. I wish I knew from what Rule or Ground Mr. Locke takes the Pro-  
per

per Meaning of the Words he uses ; for it seems evident to me, that this Explication of Extension is meerly Voluntary and Preternatural ; and seems ( tho' perfectly Groundless it self ) to be laid as a Ground for *Vacuum* ; and, therefore, his Consequences drawn thence, want Premises. Nor need

we take such Pains by Repeating  
 Immensity worse. our *Ideas*, to gain the Notion of  
*Immensity* ; it is but putting a Negative to the plain Notion of [ *Measurable*, ] and the Deed is done. Rather, 'tis perfectly Demonstrable, that the *Adding* or *Repeating* our *Ideas*, cannot possibly give us the Notion of *Immensity* ; for, we have no *Ideas*, but of *Finite* Quantities ; and the *Number* of the Times we can repeat them, can be but *Finite* ; which the very Terms tell us, can never give us a Notion of an *Infinite Quantity*, or of *Immensity*. When he says, the *Mind* can repeat, double, or join *Ideas*, I must deny it, as impossible, unless, by the Word [ *Mind*, ] he means the *Man*. The *Mind* has no distinct Shop of her own, to work in a-part ; nor can she work without her Tools, or her Conjoin'd Instrument, the *Body*, as is prov'd above.

2. Nothing can be more solid, ingenious, or better express'd, than are his Discourses here about *Place* : In  
 Place well explained. which, he, in great part, observes the Sayings, and Common Language of the *Vulgar* ; which is the most Natural Way to explain those Notions which are *Vulgar* ones, and *Common* to all Mankind. Whence, when we will needs affix Significations, to the Words which are generally used to express those Notions, by our own Conceits, it will most certainly

tainly lead us into very great Errours. He only seems not to reflect upon the Common Saying of the Vulgar, that [ Things are *in* such or such a Place ; ] which shews, that their Notion of *Place* is to be a *Container*, and consequently, *Extended* ; the Body *Contain'd*, to which it is *adjusted*, being *such*.

3. He argues well *ad hominem*, against those who make *Body* and *Extension* the *same Thing* : I suppose, he and they both mean, the *same Idea* ; for, the latter is not a *Thing* distinct from the *Substance* in which it is ; and the *Ideas* do most evidently differ, *toto genere*. Those Men's Way of Arguing from *Ideas* including one another, is purely Fantastical, unless those *Ideas* be *Notions*, or the *Thing*, as *thus* or *thus conceiv'd* ; which, like a kind of *Parts*, are in the *whole Ens*, and so may be *said* to be in it, or *Predicated* of it.

Body and Extension not the same Notion.

4. I have already prov'd, that *Space* is ( materially ) nothing else but *Body*, consider'd according to its *Quantity* ; and those *Preliminary Discourses*, which pretend to demonstrate it, must either be confuted, or else it must follow, that ( whatever we may fancy ) the *Parts* of *Space* are both *Separable*, *Moveable*, and do resist *Motion*. Farther, to imagine *Space*, that is not *Extended*, is a perfect Contradiction, tho' not in the very *Terms*, yet by an *Easie* and *Immediate* Consequence. For, putting a *Body* to be in *such* a *Space*, it must be commensurate to such a *Part* of it ; otherwise, that *Body* might take up *all* *Space* ; and must do so, were it not *Commensurate* to some *part* of it only : And to fancy

Space cannot be without Extension.

fancy a Thing *Commensurate* to the Parts of what is *extended*, and it self not to be *Extended likewise*, is a most extravagant Conceit, and a plain Contradiction. Again, If a Body take up but *one part* of Space, and not *another part* of it, ( *v. g.* that part which is next it, or in which it is, ) Space must not only have *Parts*, but also *one Part without Another* ; which is the very Notion of *Extension*. Lastly, Since *Imaginary Space* is put to be *Vast*, and even *Infinite*, it cannot consist in an *Indivisible* ; wherefore, it must necessarily be *Divisible* and *Diffused*, that is, *Extended*: Whence follows, that, to fancy Body to be put in such a *Space*, or *Place*, ( for he grants here, §. 11. that these two *Ideas* differ but in a certain Respect, ) and yet not *shove* aside or *remove* those *Extended Parts out of* that *Space*, is to make the *Extended Parts of* that *Space*, and of the *Body in it*, to be *within one another*, or *penetrated* ; which implies a Contradiction. Now, if they be not *Penetrated*, one of them must necessarily *drive* the other out of the *Space* it occupies ; and therefore, the *Parts of* that *Space* must be *Separable*, *Moveable*, and *Resistent*, as those of *Body* are ; they being, in very deed, the *self-same*.

5. Hence is seen, that in all this Discourse about *Pure Space*, or *Vacuum*,

*Extension and Space differ only Formally, or in some nice respect.*

Mr. Locke consulted his Fancy, and not his good Reason attending to the *Things* as they are in Nature. That which misled him

seems to be this, because he finds not in his *Idea of Space*, *formally consider'd*, the Notion of *Divisibility*, *Separability*, nor *Resistance* ; but that it *abstracts* from them all, as to the *Formal Part* of its



its Conception, by which 'tis distinguish'd from those others. But, this is not peculiar to *Space*; nor bears it any Shew of being a solid Ground for the Existence of *Space* separately from *Body*. For, *Figure* has not, in its Formal Notion, *Quantity*; and yet 'tis nothing but *Quantity thus terminated*. How many Notions have we of *Quantity*, and several other Modes, formally Distinct, which yet are nothing else, *really* and *materially*, but *Quantity* it self. Take *Divisibility*, *Extension*, *Measurability*, *Proportionability*, *Impenetrability*, *Space*, *Place*, &c. They have, all of them, some nice Formality, or different *Respect*, which distinguishes them; and makes the *Ideas* or Notions of them, as *such*, to be *Formally Exclusive* of one another. *Divisibility* speaks the *Unity* of the Potential Parts of *Quantity*: *Measurability*, the *Respect* they have to some determinate *Quantity* stated by our Mind: *Proportionability*, such a Degree of Equality or Inequality to *another* Thing, or to their own Parts: *Impenetrability* and *Extension*, the *Order* or *Situation* of the same Potential Parts: *Space*, the same *Quantity*, precisely and formally, as it is a Capacity or Power to contain a Multitude of Things, without any Determination or Adjustment of the *Space*, to the Things contain'd in it; so that the Notion of *Space* is the self-same as that of *Room*: And *Place* signifies the same *Quantity*, as having a Power to contain them *Limitedly*, and *Determinately*: Yet, notwithstanding, none ever conceited, that, because they were apprehended as *formally* distinct, they could therefore exist separately, *without Quantity*, or without one another, (as he puts *Space* to exist **without Body** and *Extension*,) tho' all their *Ideas*

are thus *formally Distinct*: Nor, consequently, can *Space*, for the *same Reason*, exist without *Extension* and *Body*; which seems to be his Ground, built on the distinct Formal *Idea* he has of *Space*, why he thinks there may be a *Vacuum*: Or else, his Ground is only a roving Imagination of a *Vast Nothing* beyond the Universality of Things, fancy'd by him to be a *Thing* he knows not *what*, nor of what *Sort* or *Kind*. But, enough of this formerly.

6. The Notion of *Extension* stands in his way, and therefore he endeavours to make it Unintelligible, and Inexplicable. He objects, that, to say that to be *Extended* is to have *partes extra partes*, is the same as to say *Extension is Extension*. First, If it were the same in Sense, where's the Harm? so it be only meant, that it is the same *in re*; or in the *Formal Notion*, as long as the *Expression* is Different, and not formally Identical. At this rate we may ridicule all *Definitions*: For, to say, [*Homo est Animal Rationale*,] is the same in reality, as to say, *Homo est Homo*. Next, I deny they are *formally the same*: *Divisibility*, which is the Notion of *Quantity*, expresses only, that the Body it affects, *has Potential Parts*; and *Extension* expresses the Manner *how* it has those Parts; *viz.* not Penetrated, or one *within another*, but *without one another*; which adds a new Formality to the bare Notion of *Quantity*: And this is a fair Explanation for such a most Common and General Notion; which having no *Proper Genus*, but a *Transcendent*, can bear no exact *Definition*.

7. To our Objection, that if Pure Space or *Vacuum* be not really a *Body*, it not being pretended to be a *Spirit*, it must be a meer *Nothing*, and so cannot exist; he replies, (if I understand him,) that there may be a Thing that is *neither* Spirit, nor Body; and he asks *who* told us there may not be such a Third Thing? I answer, Our evident Reason told it us, by dividing *Ens* into *Divisible* and *Indivisible*; which dividing Members, being Contradictory, allow no *Third* Thing which is neither the one, nor the other. Since then he must not say, that such a vast Expansion as *Vacuum* beyond all Bodies is *Indivisible*, either *Mathematically*, as a *Point* is, or *Physically*, as those Things are which are insuperably *Hard*; it must be *Divisible*, and consequently *Extended*, *Separable*, &c. as a *Body* is. But this also he denies it to be; and therefore 'tis evidently concluded, that 'tis a meer *Nothing*.

*Ens adequately divided into Body and Spirit.*

8. Nor will he acquaint us with his Thoughts, whether *Vacuum* be a *Substance*, or *Accident*, till we shew him a distinct *Idea of Substance*: Which seems to me a witty avoiding the Question, rather than a Pertinent Answer. Indeed, we have no *Distinct* and *Compleat* Notion of a *Suppositum*, or *Individual Substance*, because it involves many distinct Notions or Considerabilities in it, as their Ground. But, of *Substance* it self, or, which is the same, of what is meant by the Word [*Thing*,] 'tis scarce possible to be Ignorant, or to want a *Distinct Idea* of it: For, there is nothing from which we need or can distinguish the Notion of *Substance*,

*Vacuum must either be Res, or Modus Rei; otherwise, we can have no Notion of it.*

or *Ens*, and so to gain a Distinct Conception of it, but either *Non-Ens*, or *Modus Entis*; from both which, honest Nature, if we attend to It, and not to Preter-natural Fancies, teaches us to distinguish it. I should put the Argument thus: *Vacuum*, if any Thing, must be either *Res*, or *Modus Rei*; for we have no other Notions: But *Vacuum* is neither; therefore it is pure *Nothing*. I believe Mr. Locke had the worst of the late School-men in his Eye, when he gave this Answer; who, talking Metaphorically of *Standing under*, and *Inhering*, left their Readers in the dark, as to what they meant *Literally*. How **GOD** is Metaphorically called a *Substance*; and how all our Notions and Words fall infinitely short of *conceiving* him as he is in himself, or of *expressing* him *Literally*, I have discourd \* above.

\* Preliminary 4.  
§. 39.

2. 'Tis almost insuperably hard for those who are more vers'd in Mathematicks than in Metaphysics, to get *above* *Fancy*, especially in this Particular of *Vacuum*, or *Imaginary Space*; because, tho' plain Reason tells them that all Created Things are *limited*, both in their own *Natures*, and consequently in their *Modes* or *Accidents*; yet, because they can *fancy* something beyond Bodies, they will needs *conceit* there is some *Ultra-mundane* kind of Thing *existent out of the World*, tho' it costs them that highest Absurdity of putting *Non-Ens* to be *Ens*, or *Nothing* to be *Something*. And the same *Fancy* furnishes them with plausible Apprehensions, which serve them for Arguments. So, Mr. Locke asks, *If God should place a Man at the Extremity of Corporeal Beings, whether he could not stretch*

*The Extravagant  
Argument for Va-  
cuum refuted.*



*stretch out his Hand beyond his Body?* I answer, that, in all Probability, he could neither *stretch* out his Hand, nor so much as *live* in a Region so remote from the Habitation of Mortals: Nor, did he live, how knows he but the Outmost Surface of the World is insuperably *Solid* and *Hard*; as 'tis likely it is, so to keep the World Compacted, Close and Tight? Next, to put **God**; at every turn, (with all Reverence to his Divine Majesty be it spoken,) to *shew Tricks*, meerly for the Interest of *Their* Tenet, (as our Moderns use,) is very Unphilosophical. He will say, it is only a Supposition; which, even, tho' impossible, is sometimes allowable to put, that we may clear a farther Point. Nor do I look upon it to be any other but a Supposition; only, I judge it to be a very Extravagant one, and Contrary to the Natures of Things. **God's** Infinite Wisdom has so contriv'd the World, ( \* *Omnia in sapientia fecisti Domine,* ) that *Created Things* should be the *Ground of Truth*; therefore, whatever Supposition or Position draws after it a Contradiction, is as Impossible, as that Two and Three should not make Five; or that a Thing can be and not be at once. And, as it has been demonstrated, that when the Sucker in a Pump is drawn up, the Water must needs follow; because, otherwise, it would violate the Natures or Essences of Things: And therefore, *Vacuum*, within the World, is impossible; so no Force in Nature can make any Protuberancy in the World's Surface, because it would induce a *firmal Effect*, viz. *Distance*, and yet Nothing to make that Distance *firmally*. A Position as contradictory, as 'tis to say a Thing is round, and yet no *Mode* or Accident of

*Roundness* is in it, which is the Formal Cause of it as 'tis Round. 'Tis his Opinion, that they who deny *Vacuum*, must hold *Body* to be Infinite: Whereas, I hold it demonstrable that there is no *Vacuum*, nor *Infinity* of the World *neither*; nor can I see any Dependence one of those Tenets has upon the other.

16. He conceives, that *no Man can, in his Thoughts, set any Bounds to Space, more than to Duration*. I ask, whether, by his *Thought*, he means his *Judgment*? For, 'tis evident, that he that can *demonstrate*, that the Mode or Accident cannot exist, where the Body or Thing, of which it is a Mode, *is not*; or, that both the Extent of the World *has*, and its Duration *will have* an end; can, and must, in his *Judgment*, set Bounds to both of them; however his *Fancy* rambles and roves *beyond* his Judgment. Or, if he means, he cannot have a Notion of any thing so great, but a greater may be still conceiv'd; then I answer, *First*, That our Conception cannot make or prove that *to be*, which *is not*. *Secondly*, That none can, indeed, possibly have such a Notion (by *his way*) of *either* of them; but by *our way* very easily; for, by adding a Negation to *Finite*, as 'tis manifest we may, we may have a Notion of *Infinite*, which sets Bounds to all Imaginable Quantities, since none can pretend to *imagine* any thing *beyond Infinity*. The same way gives us the plain Notion of *Immensity*, by joining a Negation to *Measurableness*. Indeed, the Notion of *Eternity* can be explicated neither way; neither by repeating or adding *Ideas*, nor by a Negation of *Finite Time*, compounding an Infinite Time, to which

it may be conceiv'd *Commensurable*: For, to *Endure*, is to *be*; and, tho' *our* Duration, which is accompany'd with perpetual Alterations and Changes, is therefore *subject to Time*, and *Commensurable* to such and such Portions of it; yet *God's* Duration is of a far more Sovereign Nature. Let us reflect, when we say, *God was from all Eternity*, what those Words can mean. *Infinite Time* neither *was*, nor *can be*; and therefore, to explicate Eternity by what neither *was*, nor *can be*, is to explicate it by an Impossibility, which is to make it *Inexplicable*. *Time was not* before the *World*, *in re*; nor in *our* Understanding, for *we were not* yet; nor in *God's*, for he, being Truth it self, cannot know any thing to *be actually*, when as yet it *was not*. Wherefore, since Eternity cannot be explicated by any Regard to *possible Time*, it is left that it must be explicated by what the Word [*Duration*] imports, *viz. by Being*; and so it must consist in the highest *Impossibility of Not Being*, which naturally follows from the Notion of *Self-Existence*. Tho' I doubt not but those who are not got above Fancy, are as hard put to it, not to imagine a long Flux of *Time before the World*; as they are, not to imagine a vast Expansion of Empty Space *beyond the World*. And so it must happen, till *Connexion of Terms* (in which only, and not in the *Fancy*, *Truth* is to be found) comes to govern Men's Thoughts, and establish their Judgments.

II. But, to leave these little Saltes and Inroads into Metaphysicks, and return to our Business: The next Argument is drawn from *God's Power to Annihilate* a Part of Matter, and keep the next Bodies from clo-

*Annihilation implies a Contradiction, and is not an Act of Omnipotency, but of Impotency.*

sing; in which Case, a *Vacuum* between them is unavoidable. In Answer; *First*, I ask how he knows **God** would keep the next Bodies, in that Case, from *Closing*? If it be against the Nature of Things, he *will not* do it: And if it be a plain Contradiction, as we contend it is, Mr. L. himself will not say he *can* do it. *Secondly*, I fear it would look like a wild Paradox, and little less than Blasphemy, if I should deny that **God** *can annihilate*; and yet, out of the profound and dutiful Reverence I bear to his Wisdom, Goodness and Power, I must declare, it is my Tenet, that he cannot; any more than he can witness a Falshood, or be liable to any other Imperfection. It will be thought this limits, and consequently takes away his *Omnipotency*: And I, on the contrary, think I have far more Reason to judge, that the *other* Opinion argues *Impotency*, and *ours* settles his *Omnipotency*. Common Sense seems to tell us, that *Omnipotency* is a *Power of doing all things*, and not of *doing Nothing*. To *Act*, is to do *something*; and therefore, to *do Nothing*, or *make a Nothing*, (which the Sense of Annihilation,) is, *not to do*: And, 'tis a strange Notion of *Omnipotency*, which puts it to consist (in such an Occasion) in *not doing*. I wonder what Conceit such Discourfers make of the *Divinity*. What I am forc'd to conceive of him, as *Essential* to him, is, that he is a *Pure AÆnality of Being*, (as far as is on his part,) *actually, and ever exercised*; that he has no Power in him *Undetermin'd to act*, as we have; which argues some *Potentiality*, or *Imperfection* in us. That, *Actual Existence* being *Essential* to him, his Peculiar Effect is, to *give Existence*, or to *Create* Things; and to *Conserve* them in Being, which

is



is a *perpetual Creation*, or *Creation continued*; and, therefore, that 'tis more Diametrically opposite to his Nature, to cause *Not being*, than it is for Light to cause Darknels. Whence follows, that whatever his Creatures are naturally *disposed* for, he is *actually bestowing* it upon them. Since then the Essences of all Creatures are *Capacities of Being*, the same Goodness that makes the *Sun shine on the Just and Unjust*, must give them continually to be *actually*. The Place is not proper to prove this Point at large; but, were I writing *Metaphysicks*, and were oblig'd to handle it throughly, I should not doubt, but to demonstrate from the Natures of Action, Effect, Causality, the Specification of Action, from the Natures of Creatures, and almost each of *God's* Infinite Attributes, that *Annihilation* is both Impossible, and also most unworthy the Divine Nature. Some Witty Men think that Annihilation does best sute with *God's Justice*; and thence conceit, that Eternal Damnation is nothing else but to be *Annihilated*. Whereas, indeed, this Tenet violates that Attribute in the highest Degree: For, to *punish* a Sinner without inflicting something upon him that is *penal*, is *Nonsense*: And, what *Pain* can a Sinner feel when he is *Nothing*, or is *not*?

12. Indeed, Mr. *Locke*, §. 22. argues strongly, and (as far as I can judge) unanswerably, against the *Cartesians*; who make the innumerable Particles of their *Aether*, tho' jumbled together confusedly, still light so exactly, as to fill every little Interstice. Did they put them to be *Fluid*, and of a very *Rare* Nature, and

*The Cartesians can hardly avoid Vacuum.*

and so, easily *Pliable*, they might make some Sense of it: But they make them Solid, Dry, and of a Firm Consistency; for, otherwise, the Particles of their Elements could not be made by *Attrition* of other Parts of their Matter; of which, one of them is (as it were) the *Dust*. Nor can it avail them to say, those Particles are less and less *indeterminately*; for, every *Thing* (and *Mode* too) in Nature (especially if Consistent) is *determin'd* to be particularly *what it is*, and *as it is*. Nor can there be any *Thing* of an *Indeterminate* Quantity, any more than there can be a Man in *Common*, who is Indeterminate and Indifferent to be *This* or *That* Man.

13. As for his alledging that Men have an *Idea*, of *Vacuum*, distinct from the *Idea* of *Plenum*, 'tis true, indeed; and it means the same as *Non Corpus*, and consequently *Non Quantum*, *Non Quale*, &c. and is of the same Nature as is *Chimæra*, which means *Non Ens*. But, how does it follow hence, that it does or can *exist*, or that (as he phrases it) there is an *Incomprehensible Inane*; unless, with the Vulgar Schools, we will make every Distinct nice *Conception* of ours to be a particular *Entity*, and *capable of Existing* a-part; which I do not think Mr. *Locke's* good Judgment will allow of.

REFLEXION *Eighth,*

O N

*The Fourteenth CHAPTER.*

**T**HIS Chapter affords much Matter for Reflexion, which to do as briefly as I can, I will put my respective Negatives to Mr. *Locke's* Affirmatives, giving my Reasons for them, and invalidating his.

I deny, that the Notion of *Time* is so abstruse as he conceives it. The *Word* is used commonly by the Vulgar to express what they *mean* by it, and their usual Meaning is the *Notion* or *Nature* of it. No Clown can be ignorant of it, if he ever read an Almanack, or saw a Sun-dial ; unless some witty Man comes to puzzle him with Doubts and Questions ; which he may even in things the Vulgar, and all Men living, know very *perfectly*. He knows, tho' not to a Mathematical Exactness, ( which is not requisite to our Time, or our Use of it ) that the Year begins on New-years Day, and that the Sun's *Diurnal* Motion, till he returns to the same Line or Point, makes what we call a *Day*, and that a Day is divided into 24 Hours. He knows how many Days make a Month, how many Months a Year, &c. He esteems all these, however he *divides* them into *lesser*, or by Addition *augments* them into *greater*, to be *Parts of Time* ; and, consequently, Parts of the *Sun's Motion*, as well as  
he

*The plain Sense of the Vulgar gives us the true Notion of Time.*

he knew that a *Day* was such. If then they know that all *particular Parts* of the Sun's Motion are *particular Parts* of *Time*, let us abstract from all these *Particulars*, and the Motion of the Sun, in *Common*, is the Common Notion of *Time* it self in *reality*; however the *Formal* Notion of *Time* consists in this, that it be *Known* and *Regular*, (as the Sun's Motion is, as far as they can discern,) so that they can measure and adjust all their Actions by it, which 'tis evident they may. And this Formality of *Time* they do know *too*; as appears by using or applying Hours, Days, Months, &c. to measure and adjust all their Motions or Actions by them. So that this whole Discourse of mine, Answering the Niceties objected, which escap'd the Observation of the Vulgar, seems to be built on that Solid Maxim, that *The true Signification or Sense of the Words is to be taken from the Common Usage of them*. If Mr. Locke pleases (as I think he will not) to coin Another *Idea* of it, and call it *Time*, he may if he pleases; but it will not be the Notion of *Time* which Men have had hitherto; nor will his *new* Notion sute with the Sense of *Mankind*; nor is it possible the Signification he imposes upon that Word can ever obtain Acceptation in the World, unless some Supreme Authority, which commands all the World, should enjoin, under great Penalties, that such a Word be taken in that *new* Sense, and no other; and even that will never be; for all Mankind will never be under any such Authority.

2. I deny that *Duration* ought to be call'd *Succession*, unless restrain'd to *Corporeal Duration*, but *real Duration*, which is the *least* rather opposit to it. worthy that Name. For to en-  
dure



*Endure* is to *be*, which has *Steadiness* and *Permanency* in its Notion ; whereas *Succession* is essentially *Change*, and so rather *opposit* to Duration or *Being*. Nor is any thing said to *Endure* because it *succeeds*, but because it *is* all the while other things *succeed* ; or rather, while it self undergoes some *Accidental Change*. Whence our *Being* is not Commensurate to Succession as it is *Being*, but as it is *Changeable* one way or other ; which *Changes* being accompany'd with *Motion*, must consequently be *Successive* as it is. Angels and Pure Spirits have *Duration*, tho' they are *Unchangeable*, and therefore *Unsuccessive* ; having *no Parts* or Vicissitudes in their Natures or Operations, as *Material* and *Quantitative* Things, or *Bodies*, have. Moreover, the Notion of meer *Being* is *Indivisible*, whereas the Notion of *Succession* is essentially *Divisible* ; whence they can have no Commensuration to one another. For which Reason, *before* ( as we apprehend it ) *Motion* or *Succession* *begun*, or after it is *ended*, the things afford us no Ground to conceive any thing like *before* or *after*, but only one *Ever-standing* or *Unchangeable* and *Indivisible Instant* ; which better expresses our *Eternity*, or *constantly being ever*, than any Correspondence to *Succession* or *Motion* can ; whose Natures are *Finite* in Duration, and so can never reach *Infinite Duration*, or that *ever-constant Being* call'd **Eternity**.

3. I deny absolutely, That the Notion of *Succession* ought to be taken from the *Train of Ideas* running in our Heads, but from the *Things* in Nature ; and Mr. Locke, (*Chap. 5.*) makes *Motion*, which is the same with *Succession*, one of his *Simple*

'Tis a strange Paradox to say, the Notion of Succession or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Head.

*Ideas*

*Ideas* which comes into the Mind by *divers Senses* from *Outward Objects*. Which how to reconcile with his Doctrine here, I am at a Loss: Nor can I see why the Rowling of a Cart-wheel in the Street, or the Flying of a Bird in the Air, should not more naturally and more solidly give us the *Idea* of *Succession*, than our observing the Gliding of *Ideas* in our Fancy, or Mind.

4. I deny that his Argument, drawn from our not perceiv'g Duration when we sleep, does conclude that this Successive Train of *Ideas* gives us, or is the Notion of our Duration. For, none can think he *endures* not, whether he *perceives* it or no; or that our Duration *ceases*, or is interrupted, tho' he *thinks* not of it; or that its being *longer* or *shorter* depends on our having *Attention* to those *Ideas*, but on its Correspondence to *more* or *less* of the Sun's Motion: Nor, had we endur'd *more* or *less*, or been a Jot more or less *Old*, whether we had *wak'd* or *slept* all our Life-time. Nor, is this *peculiar* to the *Idea* of Duration, that we have no Perception of it in our Sleep; but common to Extension, and all other Modes whatever; which, nevertheless, *are*, or continue *in being*, after their manner, whether we *perceive* them or *not*. Wherefore his Notion of Duration taken from our Co-existence to such a *Train of Ideas*, is ill-grounded, as not having any the least Foundation in Solid Nature, but in Witty Fancy.

5. I deny also, that the *Idea* or Notion of *Succession* comes by *Reflexion* on our *Train of Ideas*: Because Experience tells us it comes naturally by a Direct

This Tenet is against Experience.

Direct Impression from Outward Objects, which we see move or succeed.

6. I deny absolutely, that, tho' all that's said be wav'd, a *Train of our Ideas* can either be a *proper Cause* of the Notion of Succession, or *represent* it: For Succession or Motion has, of it self, no *distinguishable*, much less

*And against the Nature of Things, and of Resemblances too.*

*Actually distinct* Parts, any more than *Permanent* Quantity, or Extension has any Nicks or Notches to butt, bound, determin or distinguish it here and there; but they both proceed in one Even, Confus'd and Undistinguishable Tenour; whereas in the *Train of Ideas*, each *Idea* is *actually Distinct* from the other. Whence the Notion of such a Succession ought to be *One continued Idea*, or the *Idea* of a *Continuance*, or else it resembles not the Thing as it is in Nature; nor consequently, is it a Similitude or *Idea* of the Thing, or outward Object; that is, 'tis no *Idea* at all, nor so much as a good *Phantasm*; much less is it a *Notion*, or the Thing *so* in the Understanding, as it is out of it. Whence I must utterly deny what he says here, §. 6. that *Motion produces in the Mind an Idea of Succession*, any otherwise, than as it produces there a *continued train of Distinguishable Ideas*. For, *Distinction* can never represent that which is essentially *Indistinct*, as Succession is: Or, if he means the *Interval's* between the Appearances of one *Idea*, and another — *Indistinct* and Confused, it will be ask't by what *Idea* this *Indistinct Interval* is made known to us; and why the same *Idea* may not as connaturally be imprinted by the *Motion* of Bodies in Nature; the Succession of which our Eyes, Ears, and Touch, do testify?

7. I must deny too that *Duration* ( as he takes it ) and *Succession* cannot one of them be a *Measure* to the other. For, all that can be conceiv'd of the Notion of *Duration* ( besides *Being* ) fitting it to be a *Measure*, is some *Designed Part of Motion*

or *Succession* : And, when two things *move*, that which moves *more regularly* ( provided it be *evidently knowable*, and its *Quantity* some way or other *Determin'd* ) is in all points fitted to be the *Measure* of the others Motion. Nor is it more difficult to measure the *less* Regular Motion by the *More* Regular one, if the other requisites be not wanting, than 'tis to measure the *Extended Quantity* of a *Permanent Body*, v. g. a *Yard of Cloth* ( which as found in the *Piece* is *Undetermin'd* ) by a *yard-wand*, whose *Quantity* is *Stated* and *determin'd*. For Example, when I write or walk *an hour*, the Motion of Sand in an *Hour-glass*, which is *more known* and *Determinate*, *measures* the Motions of my Pen or Legs, whose *Successive Quantity* or Motion is *less* certainly known or *Determinate* than the other is. And, as *that* *Determinate Motion* measures the *other*, so the Motion of the Sun, which is *knowable* to all mankind ( which the *Glass* was not ) and, to their apprehension, *Regular*, brought to *Proportionate* and *Determinate* parts by help of our Understanding, is apt to *measure all* our Motions whatever ; which Measure we call **Time**, as I think, Mr. L. grants. Whence I deny that *Time* is *measur'd by the Motion of the Sun* ( as Mr. L. objects, and justly wonders at ) for it is that *very Motion*, fitted, as is now said, to be a *Common Measure*



to all others. He mentions many other Signes or Marks of Periods supposed Equidistant, as the Returning of Birds at such Seasons, the Ripening of Fruit, or Fire *lighted up at the same distance of Time, increast in Heat, &c.* but what must measure the distance between those Periods? Or, what's this to *our Time as it is now*. St. *Austin* was puzzled to know, whether, if *Rota figuli moveretur*, and all things else stood still, there would in that Case be *Time or no*. But all these Extravagant Suppositions are frivolous. Mankind takes their Notions from things *as they are*, and as they work upon their *Senses*; which, in our case, is the Regular and Known Motion of the *Sun*; and they take the Notions of its *parts*, from the Designation, Division and Multiplication, made by our Understanding; and not from wild Suppositions, which neither come home to the Point, nor *are, ever were, or shall be*; nor *are, or could be* so Regular and Knowable to all Mankind, as this Motion of the Sun is.

8. I must absolutely deny, and moreover think it a most Extraordinary position, to affirm that we must not judge that the Periods of Duration are equal, by the Motion of the Sun, but by the Train of Ideas that passed in Men's minds in the intervals; which, I conceive, is the Sense of his §. 21. and §. 12. and of the Tenour of his Discourse in divers places. For, first, how does it appear that the Motion of the Train of those *Ideas* is it self *Equal, or near Equal*, in any one or the *same* Man at all times; without which we cannot know by *their Equal succession* that the Periods which

*There is no shew of Reason that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can possibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas.*

they are to *measure* are Equal, When a Man is in a *stupid* Humour, his Thoughts play very *little* and *slowly*; when he is found *a-sleep*, not at all; when Awake and Brisk, or *agitated* by some great Passion, they move *very swiftly*; when sedate and compos'd, more *moderately*; so that 'tis impossible to fix the succession of those Ideas in any *Regularity*. Next, how can we know that those Ideas move *regularly*, and not rather very differently, in *diverse* Men? Contemplative, Melancholly and Dull Men use to fix their Mind long upon one Thought; and, consequently, upon one Object of their Thought, or one Idea: Whereas those who are endow'd with Gayity of Wit, (which is defin'd *Celer motus Intellectus*) and those who are possess'd with Phrenzy or Madness have their Ideas succeeding one another *very Swiftly*: When we Judge, we fix our thought; when we Invent, we muster up whole Armies of them *en a Sudden*. 3<sup>ly</sup>, Let any Man consult his own Interiour, and examine with the most exact Reflexion, whether his Ideas have mov'd Swiftly, or Slowly, the last hour, he will find himself at a loss to give any good account of them; much more to assure himself, or ascertain others that they moved *regularly*: Wherefore the *Train of Ideas* (and the same may be said of his other Imaginary Measures, §. 19.) are quite destitute of that Chief Property of a Measure, *viz.* that it self be *Regular*; and, if it concerns all Mankind, *most Notorious* to all who need it. For want of which, and for the Reasons lately given, perhaps no two Men in the World could agree, or come to a right Understanding with one another, about the *Time* of their Actions, which would put all the World in Confusion about

about their Common affairs. Lastly, Mr. L. assigns no Reason to evince the *Regular* succession of his *Ideas* in his §. 9. which seems the proper place to assert that Principal Point upon which all his Discourse depends ; and he only says, that he *guesses that the Appearance of the Ideas vary not very much in a waking Man* ; and that they seem to have certain Bounds in their *Quickness* and *Slowness*. And the Reason he gives afterwards, §. 10. for this ( as he calls it ) *odd conjecture*, is easy to be solv'd by our Principles : For, there is no doubt but that some short time must be allow'd for the coming of Impressions from without, for the ferrying them over the *Medium*, and the Re-exciting them in the Fancy, by which Notions are bred in our Mind ; which a very quick Motion of the Outward Object may prevent, as in a Brand whirl'd round, &c. and there must be also some Marks to make us observe *too slow* Motions ; Yet, between those two Extremes, there are so many Degrees, and such Variety intervene, that the Succession of those *Ideas* may nevertheless be very Uneven and Irregular. Rather, I may with better Reason, affirm that it is impossible it should be any way Regular *at all* ; since their Succession depends on the *Fancy* ( the most Irregular and Unconstant Faculty we have ) applying the Material *Ideas* or Phantasms a-new to the Seat of Knowledge ; which Application thousands of Causes may *retard*, or *accelerate*. His Objections against the Regularity of the Sun's Motion not being Mathematically such, is of no force. 'Tis sufficient that it be so Regular as serves our use to measure, and adjust our Actions by it ; and the

same may be Objected against one measuring Cloth by a Yard-wand, whose length is never Mathematically Exact.

9. Wherefore, Notwithstanding the respect I have for Mr. L. I cannot but think that such quivering Grounds as these can never support his most unaccountable Opinion, §. 12.

*This odd Tenet not  
positively asserted  
by Mr. L.*

that *The Constant and Regular Succession of Ideas in a Waking Man, are, as it were, the Measure and Standard of all other Successions.* His own good Judgment saw well the weakness of his grounds; wherefore his clear Sincerity, and usual Modesty would not suffer him to deliver *assertively*, and *assuredly*, what he saw was *Uncertain*; and therefore he propos'd it rather as a *Paradox*, or (he calls it) an *odd Conjecture*, than maintain'd it as a *Position*; however, the Conception being so *New*, he was tempted not to pretermitt it wholly: In doing which too, I believe, he not so much gratify'd himself, as the Humor of most late Philosophers; who are far more addicted to value what's *Quaint* than what's *Solid*.



## REFLEXION Ninth,

## O N

*The Fifteenth CHAPTER, Of Duration and Expansion consider'd together.*

I. **I** Have already said enough of *Imaginary Space*, *Imaginary Time*, and of the true Notion of *Eternity*. Philosophers must speak of Things *as they are*, if they mean to speak *Truth*; and, therefore, the applying our *Idea* of Duration, which is a Mode of *Ens*, to *Imaginary Time before the Creation*, when as yet there was no such *Ens* as was *Capable* of such a Mode, is evidently against the First Principles of our Understanding; and the same Illusion of Fancy that induced Mr. L. to put *Space* (which is a Mode of that *Ens* called *Body*, and neither has, or ever had any Being but *its*, nor Power to beget any *Idea* at all in the Mind, but by being *It*) *beyond* the World, that is, beyond the Universality of *Things*; where there can only be pure *Nothing*. When we relinquish the *Things* on which only *Truths* are grounded, all the *Ideas* we pursue and substitute in their Rooms must necessarily be *meer Fancies*, and inevitably plunge us into Contradictions and Absurdities. Wherefore, I have no Occasion to make any further Reflexions upon the Grounds of this present Discourse, the Foundation of it being,

*Imaginary Time before the World, a meer Illusion of Fancy.*

I hope, overthrown in my Preliminaries, and divers other places ; yet, upon his Manner of his carrying it on, I must a little Reflect. As,

2. First, That they who endeavour to introduce Opinions Inconsistent with

*They who advance  
Tenets against Na-  
ture, must alter  
the Meaning of  
those Words that  
express our Natu-  
ral Notions.*

our Natural Notions, must be forced to change the Common Signification of Words, lest they cross them in their Discourses, and in the Explication of their Tenet. Hence (as I have noted above) Mr. L. alter'd the Signification of the Word [*Solidity*,] to make way for an *Unsolid Being*, or an *Empty Space*, as also, the meaning of the Word [*Extension*,] which he would confine to *Material Beings* ; and chose to make use of the Word [*Space*,] because it seem'd less to connote the Notion of *Body*, than *Extension* did. And, here, he rather chuses to make use of the Word [*Expansion*,] as if it were better, that is, *Different* from *Extension*. The Word is proper enough, for which I do not much blame him: Only, I must affirm, that no Wit, nor even *Fancy* of Man, can conceive or imagine any thing, existing any where but in the *Imagination*, (or, even scarcely there,) to be *Expanded*, but it must also be really *Extended* ; nor to be *Extended*, but it must be *Divisible* ; and, therefore, its Parts *Separable* by the intervening *Body*, (which he denies of his *Inane*,) unless we put them to be insuperably *Hard*, *Solid*, or *Indivisible*, as *Epicurus* did his *Atoms* ; or that, if they be thus *Extended*, and yet the Parts of the *Inane* do not *separate*, and give way to a new-come *Body*, there must not inevitably follow a *Penetration* of *Extended Parts* ; that is, those

Parts

Parts that must be *without one another*, must be at the same time *within one another*; which is a direct Contradiction.

3. *Secondly*, I cannot but specially remark, to what incredible Extravagancies

Fancy, if not check'd by Reason, transports Men, tho' otherwise of the greatest Parts; even so far as to conceit that **God's Immensity** consists in a kind of Quantitative

God's Immensity  
not Commensu-  
rate to an In-  
finitely Expanded  
Space.

*Diffusion* of his Essence, or in the *Commensuration* of it to an *Infinite Expansion*. For, what else can his Argument here, §. 2. for his Infinitely Expanded *Inane* mean, couch'd in these Words, [*Unless he (viz. the Denier of such a Vacuity) will confine God within the Limits of Matter.*] What, I say, can this mean, but that he apprehends God's *Unconfin'd* or *Infinite Being*, would be *Confin'd*, *Finite*, and consequently *Lost*, unless there were an Infinite Quantity of *Imaginary Space* answerable to it in *Extent* or *Expansion*. A Conceit certainly most unworthy the Divinity, whose Essence was *equally Immense* ere any Creatures were made: Nor can any of his Essential Attributes be taken in order to them; for, this would give his *Essence* some kind of *Dependence* on his Creatures. This is something like (but much worse than) the Opinion of those Ancients, who thought **God** to be the *Soul* of the World.

—————*Penitusque infusa per Artus*  
*Mens agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.*

Which Whimsy making **God** a kind of *Compart* with Matter, is long since exploded out of the

Schools by the solid Principles of Christian Faith. **God** is not in his Creatures by any *Co-extension* to them, or any other way than by giving them *Being*; and his *Immensity*, which is Essential to him, consists in this, that, did an Infinity of Creatures exist, he would be Intrinsically, and of himself, able to give, or rather, actually giving *Being* to them *all*. Or else, [*Existence*] being the least Improper Notion we can attribute to **God**, he is said to be *Immense*, because his Existence is *Illimited*, or *Infinite*.

4. *Thirdly*, I much wonder what those Words should mean, [*And he, I think, We can have no Notion of a Vacuum, but a Fancy only.* very much magnifies to himself the Capacity of his own Understanding, who persuades himself that he can extend his Thoughts farther than

*God exists, or imagine any Expansion where he is not.*] For, First, I deny any Understanding can conceive or have any Notion of a Vacuum, tho' he may have a Fancy of it; the Notion being the Thing it self in our Understanding, imprinted by Outward Objects, by means of the Senses; whereas, his *Inane* never made, nor can make any Impression upon the Senses at all. Next, For the same reason, I deny our Thoughts are extended to Imaginary Space, if by Thoughts he means Notions, or Judgments built on them. Lastly, I see not why our Fancy may not extend it self farther than **God** *Exists*; that is, (as is lately explained,) gives *Being* to Creatures; as well as Fancy can extend it self farther than *God's* Omnipotency can act. Splenetick or Maniacal Men can fancy they are made of Glass; that, if they make Water, they shall drown all the World; that,



that, tho' standing on the Ground, they touch the Moon ; that their Nose, tho' but an Inch and an half long, touches and feels the opposite Wall, tho' perhaps a Furlong distant : The Quaker fancy'd he was a Grain of Wheat ; and, when any Pidgeons flew over his Head, fell down in a marvellous Fright, lest they should peck him up, and fly away with him, &c. Now, none of these are a possible Object of the Divine Omnipotence, which is employ'd in making *Things*, which are the Ground of *Truth* ; and not in making *Nothings*, or *undoing* the Natures of Things, (as *Fancy* does,) and so laying a Ground for Fallshood and Contradiction.

5. *Fourthly*, I remark, that the Texts of Holy Writ, which speak *humano more*, or in Accommodation to our low Fancies and Conceptions, are the worst sort of Arguments imaginable, and most unfit to be alledg'd for such by a Philosopher ; being apt to lead us into a Thousand Enormous Errours.

*Scripture-Texts the worst sort of Arguments for Philosophers, unless they be most Plain, and Literally meant.*

For, if they be taken in a *Literal* Rigour, (as Philosophical Arguments ought,) they would make **GOD** no better than his poor Changeable Creatures. They would make him, at every turn, Angry, Sorry, Repentant, Subject to all, or most Passions ; Moving from this place to that ; and liable to Innumerable Imperfections. All which are opposite to the Unchangeable Nature of the Divinity ; and therefore ought to be remov'd from him, as far as our Thoughts can distance them.

6. The

6. The Divine nature is Essentially *Actual Being*; and he goes *below* his Sovereign Excellency who *conceives* any thing of it by any other Notion, or *Speaks* of it by any word that is in the least *Potential*, or comes not up to *Actual* and *Essential* Existence. All his Attributes, as Metaphysicks demonstrate, do flow or follow from that infinit Source of all Perfection, *Self-Existence*; or rather, are nothing but *It* diversly conceived by us; and, therefore, cannot, according to *Literal* Truth, be any other way rightly explicated but by *Being*. Much more then are all the *Modes* of *Ens*, founded in Creatures, especially those belonging to the basest of all other *Entities*, *Corporeal* Things, (such as are Diffusion, or Commensuration to Space or Quantity) most highly Derogatory to that most Simple and All-comprehending Mind, which eminently and actually contains them *all*, and centers in its self all *Possible Being*. Creatures are no more but [*Rags of Being, torn into thin Formalities*]; Whereas the Divinity is the *Inexhausted Source* of Existence or *Being it self* in the most Full, Compleat, and Intire Latitude its vast Notion can bear.

7. I should think my self very happy, if I could correct this Influence of *Fancy* over Men's Thoughts, when they speak of *Spiritual* Natures, without making long Excursions into Metaphysicks; and, perhaps, this plain Discourse may help much towards it; it being fetch'd from our most *Natural Notions*, and known to us (as it were) by a kind of Experience

Our Natural Notions assure us, that 'tis meer *Fancy* to explicate GOD's Attributes by respect to *Corporeal* Natures.

ence. Let us take then any *Spiritual* Mode or Accident, a *Virtue* for Example, and let it be that of *Temperance* ; which done, let us ask our Natural Thoughts, how *Long*, *Broad*, or *Thick* that *Virtue* is ? Is it as little as a Barly-corn, or as big as a House ? Is it a Yard in Length, or but an Inch ? Is it as Thick as a Wall, or as Thin as a Wafer ? &c. And, Honest Nature would answer for us, that 'tis *Nonsense* to ask such a Question ; its nature being perfectly of another kind, and utterly disagreeable to any of these Accidents. Again, Let us ask what *Colour* or *Figure* it is of ? Is it *Blew*, *Green*, or *Yellow* ? Is it *Round*, *Four-square*, or *Triangular* ? Is it *Rare* or *Dense*, *Hot*, *Cold*, *Moist*, or *Dry* ? And we shall discover that the Asker, if serious, would be look'd upon by all Mankind as a *Fool* or a *Mad-man* ; such Qualities as these being as much Disparate from the Subject we are Enquiring about, as Knowledge is to a Beetle, or Science to a Mushroom. And yet, it would not be wonder'd at, that such Questions as these should be ask'd of any *Body* whatever. And what does this amount to, but that Nature assures us, by her free and sober Acknowledgment of it, that this *Spiritual* Mode, call'd *Virtue* or *Temperance*, is quite different from the whole Nature of *Body*, and from any *Corporeal* Thing that by our Senses ever enter'd into our *Fancy*. Since then this *Spiritual* Mode or Accident has nothing at all to do with *Body* or its *Modes*, it is clearly evinced by the Ingenuous Confession of Unprejudiced Nature, that the *Subject* of it, which we call a *Spirit*, is so vastly removed from all we can say of *Body* (Being only excepted) that 'tis perfect Nonsense to attribute any thing to it which we find in *Corporeal* Natures.

Natures. Since then we can truly say of *Corporal Natures*, that they are Long, Short, Diffus'd, Extended, Commensurate to one another in their Bulk, Motion, Duration, &c. we must be forced to *deny* all those of *Spirits*; and to Judge that they have nothing to do with any of these, nor can bear the having such *Modes apply'd* to them, or said of them, under Penalty of forfeiting our plainest Reason, and contradicting Common Sense. And, if it be such an Absurdity to apply them to *Created Spirits*, how much more absurd must it be to explicate **God's** Eternity, Infinity, or Immenity by such *gross Resemblances*, or an Imaginary Order to the *Short and Fleeting* Natures of *Corporal Creatures*?

8. *Lastly*, to sum up all, I deny that the Notion of Motion is taken from the continu'd *Train of Distinguishable Ideas*; and I affirm that it is Imprinted by the Object *without* me, and is one continually successive and undistinguish'd *Mode* there as it is in the *Thing*. I deny too, that *Duration* is Motion or *Succession*, but only *Being*; tho' our *Being* (it being Unconstant and Fleeting) is accompany'd with *Succession*, and subject to Motion and Time; and *commensurate* to them, only (not as 'tis *Being*, but) as 'tis *Fleeting*, or perpetually *Changing* some way or other. I deny it also, as the most prodigious Enormity a Rational Soul could be liable to, thro' its giving up the Reins of *Reason* to *wild Fancy*, to say, that our *Measure of Time* is applicable to *Duration before Time*. For Mr. Locke makes Duration inconceivable without *Succession*, and there could be no *Succession before* the World, when there was only one Unchangeable **God**, in whom is *no Shadow of Vicissitude* or *Succession*. Does not the plainest



est Sense tell us, that we cannot *apply one thing to another*, but there must be *One and Another*; and where's that *Other* Duration or Succession *before Time*, or *before the World*, whenas 'tis confess'd there was none. Can any Man apply a Mode of *Thing* to *Nothing*, which yet must be avowed by this Author; for *before the World* there was nothing but **God**; to whom it *could not* be apply'd, and therefore there was nothing for Mr. L. to apply it to. But this is parallel to that seducing *Fancy* that inveigled his Reason to hold a *Vacuum*; he took the Notion of *Space* from *Body*, and then apply'd it to what was neither *Spirit* nor *Body*, but meer *Nothing*; and, *here*, he took his Notion of *Duration*, or Succession from *Bodies moving*; and when he has done, he would *apply* it to what's *not Body* (nor *Spirit* neither) nor *Motion*, nor like it, but contrary to it; that is, he would apply it to *meer Nothing*. I desire he would please to consider, that the *Thing to which Another is Apply'd* must exist *as well as* that which *is Apply'd* to it; and this *antecedently* to his Application of one to the other. Wherefore both *Space* and *Duration* being both *Modes* or *Accidents*, he must *first prove*, there is something beyond the *World* to which he can *apply* the Mode of *Space*; or something *before the World*, to which he can apply the Mode of *Successive Duration*, or it is perfect Nonsense even to *talk* of Applying *one* to the *other*. But this he has not done, and his way of attempting to do it seems to be this; first, he fancies he can apply those Modes to something *there*, and *then*; and thence concludes, there must be *Things* there to which they may be apply'd; as if his *Fancy* could create *Entities* at Pleasure, or to please  
her

her Humour. Nor matters it that we can apply *stated Measures of Duration*, and thence *imagin Duration* where nothing does really endure or exist, or by this means *imagin to morrow*, *next Year*, or *seven Years hence*; for we cannot apply them by our Reason, but only upon Supposition that they *will exist*, and then there *will be* also some *Thing* or *Subject* supposed fit for them to be apply'd to; whereas an imaginary Space *beyond the World*, or imaginary Time or Succession *before* or *after* the World, neither *is now*, nor can there ever be any possible Subject to which they *can be Apply'd*; and so the Application of them can bear no manner of Sense. I must confess the word [*imagin*] which Mr. L. uses, *cap. 14. § 32.* is very fit for his purpose, and gives the greatest Semblance of Truth to his Discourse. But, by his Leave, our *Imagination* cannot create *Entities*, nor make Things, to which he is to apply his Ideas, to *exist* when they *do not*, nor *ever will exist*; and, unless it can do this, his Application is *no Application*; for to apply a Thing, or Mode of Thing, to *Nothing*, is *no Application* at all. Both Space and Successive Duration are Modes Proper to *Body*, whence only we had them; and, a *Mode* without the Thing of which 'tis a Mode (Modes having no Entity of their own) is a *meer Nothing*. Let him prove then *first*, that there are *beyond* or *before* the World any Thing to which they can be apply'd; otherwise he will be convinced to ground all his Discourse on this Principle, [*Whatever we can imagin, is.*] Which Maxim being utterly deny'd, he must make it Evident by Proof. Which if he does, it will do his Book 'more Service, than any *Principles* taken from all the Sciences in the World; for all these are as much opposite to *Him*, as he is to *Them*.

REFLEXION *Tenth;*

ON

*The 16th and 17th CHAPTERS.*

1. **I** have little to except against his 16th Chapter, of *Number*. Nothing, certainly, could have been deliver'd more solidly, or more ingeniously. I only reflect on the last Words in it; *viz.* That the *Endless Addition of Numbers*, so apparent to the Mind, is that, I think, which gives us the clearest and most Distinct Idea of Infinity. For, since it is granted that all we do *actually conceive*, how much soever it be, is *Finite*; and all our *Ideas* are of what we do *actually conceive*; I cannot comprehend how that which is *Finite* can give us the Idea of *Infinite*. It may be said, that our Reflecting that we can still add more *Endlessly*, is that which gives us the Notion of *Infinity*. I reply, that, were this Addition of Numbers taken from the *Objects* side, so that we saw that by such an Addition, Number might at length arrive to be truly or *actually Infinite*; then, indeed, that Object (*viz.* *Number*) thus consider'd, or reflect-ed on, might beget in us the *Idea* or Notion of *Infinite*: But, 'tis taken only from *our* side, who are the Adders, or Multipliers; and so, means only that *we can* never come to take so much of it, but *more* may by us be still taken; whence, since all we can possibly take of it (our Term of Life, and

*Endless Addition of Numbers can never give us the Notion of Infinity.*

and consequently, our Additions being stinted and Limited) must still be *Finite*; this may, indeed, furnish us with an *Idea* or Notion of a *very great Number*, and *by us Incomputable*; which notwithstanding, for any thing we can thence gather, may be of it self *Finite*, tho' our Additions can never *de facto* reach its by-us-Innumerable *Total*. Now, how a *Finite Number*, a *finite Number of Times repeated*, tho' we called in Algebraical Multiplication to our Assistance, can give us the Notion of *Infinite*, which is contradictory to it, surpasses all Imagination. And, instead of shewing how it does so, Mr. Locke tells us here, that we must *Suppose an Inexhaustible Remainder beyond the Finite Idea*, and that *Infinity consists in a Supposed Endless Progression*; which is, in a manner, to *suppose* or beg the whole Question: For, if this *Inexhaustible Remainder* be still *actually Finite*, (especially, if held by us to be *such*,) it can never give us the *Idea of Infinite Actually*, which only is the *true Idea of Infinite*; a *Potential Infinity*, or a meer *Power to be Infinite*, rather signifying *not to be Infinite*; for, nothing is, what it is only a *Power to be*, especially *such a Power* as is never Reducible to *Act*: Wherefore, this *Inexhaustible Remainder* must be supposed *more than Potentially*, that is, *Actually Infinite*; which is the Thing in Question. Or, if he says, this *Remainder* is only a *Power to be still greater*, but is *Impossible ever to be actually Infinite*, then how can it ever, possibly, beget in us an *Idea of True or Actual Infinity*?



2. I have explicated above, by how plain and easie a Method we come to have our Notion of *Infinity*; which is, \* by joining the Sense of the Adverb [ *Non* ] to that of [ *Finis* : ] And Mr. *Locke*, Ch. 17. §. 8. seems to come over to my Thoughts; where he says, that *the Idea of Infinity seems to be pretty Clear, when we consider nothing in it but the Negation of an End.* Whereas, on the other side, he grants, that *the Idea of an Infinite Space or Duration is very Obscure and Confus'd.* Now, if the Clearness of an *Idea* be the greatest Perfection it can have, it follows, even from his own Concession, that the *Idea of Infinity* ought rather to be taken from the Negation of *Finiteness*, than from this Confus'd Way of *Adding* and *Repeating* more and more of Space or Duration. Add, that (as was said) this way can only give us the *Idea of a Potential Infinity*; nor that neither *well*, unless that Power to be Infinite could ever be reduc'd to *Act*, which is impossible it should: Now, the Negation of *Finiteness* fully reaches an *Actual* and *Absolute Infinity*; and is applicable, and truly to be Predicated of **God** himself, and all his Intrinsic Attributes, as Being, Duration, Power, Wisdom, &c. without needing any Recourse to the transitory and limited Natures or Modes of Creatures to explicate it. Whereas, Mr. *Locke's Idea of Infinite* cannot be predicated of **God**, or his Attributes, at all: Nor can we say that **God is Infinite**, in his Sense of that Word; in regard he says, that *our Idea of Infinity is (as he thinks) an Endless Growing Idea*; For, the Infinity of **God**, and of all that can be conceiv'd to belong

*How we come to have that Notion,*

\* Prelim. 4. § 31, 32.

to him, is incapable of *Growth*, *Degrees*, or *Additions*; but is one *Indivisible Being*, without any possibility of our conceiving *more* or *less* in it, if we conceive it as we ought.

3. On the other side; How facil and natural is my Way of our gaining an *Idea* or Notion of *Infinite*? We see most Things we converse with to be *Limited*, or *Finite*; wherefore, the Notion of the Thing *as 'tis limited*, or (which is the same) the Notion of *Limitation* or *End*, is very familiar and obvious to our Thoughts. Since then Experience teaches us that we can very easily join a *Negation* to *Finiteness* or *End* when-ever we please, as well as we can to any other Notion; and, thence, have a kind of Complex Notion of *Infinite*, as well as we can of *Immortal*, *Immenſe*, *Immaterial*, *Incorporeal*, *Indivisible*, &c. We have the Notion of *Infinity* given to our hands, without more ado; or without perplexing our selves with making use of those lame Helps of *Adding* or *Repeating* those *stinted Measures* of *Corporal Modes* or *Accidents*, whose very *Natures* (besides the *Finite* Number of Times we can only repeat them) do make them utterly Incapable ever to reach *Actual*, that is, *True Infinity*.

4. As for the Question he introduces here, *viz.* Whether the *Idea* of *Infinite* be *Positive*, or *Negative*, or includes something of *both*; my firm Opinion is, That, however the Grammatical way of expressing that Conception seems to be *Negative*, yet the *Notion* it self meant by that Word, is *altogether Positive*. My Reason is, because the *Idea* or Notion of *Finis* or

or *Limit* (in what kind forever it be) does formally signifie [*no farther in that kind,*] which is perfectly *Negative*: Wherefore, the Negation added to *Finite*, in the Word [*Infinite,*] quite taking off that *Negative* Sense which did before belong to the Word [*Finite,*] gives the Word [*Infinite,*] a Sense purely *Positive*. Again, we can have no *Direct Impression* from the Thing; nor, consequently, *Direct Notion* of [*Infinite,*] nor, consequently, any *Reflex Notion* of it; for, all *Reflex* Notions have for their proper Object, the *Direct* ones which are already in our Minds: Wherefore, if the Notion of [*Infinity*] can be had any other way than by adding [*Non*] to [*Finite,*] it must come from our *Reason* finding out by *Discourse*, that there is a First and Self-existent Being, whose Essence and Attributes are beyond all Limits, or actually *Infinite*. Whence follows, that, since clear Reason demonstrates, that all *Created* Entities, and consequently, all the *Modes* belonging to them, are *Finite*, and only **God** is *Infinite* in his Essence, and in all his *Intrinsic* Attributes: And Reason also tells us, that all which is in **God**, (to whom only the Notion of *Infinite* can belong,) is most highly *Positive*; the same Reason teaches us to correct in our Thoughts the Grammatical Negativeness of the Word [*Infinite,*] which can only be apply'd to *Him*; and to look upon it, and esteem it, as most perfectly *Positive*.

5. I cannot pass by, unreflected on, a Passage, §. 16. in which Mr. *Locke's* Fancy imposes strangely upon his Reason: He says, that Nothing is more unconceivable to him, than Duration, without Succession. What thinks he of

Duration easily conceivable, without Succession.

the *Duration* of **God**, in \* whom  
 \* James i. 17. is *no Vicissitude, or Shadow of Change*; (which Text, I believe, no Man, at least, no Christian, but holds to be *Plain, and Literally True*; ) whereas, *Succession* is essentially *perpetual Change*? Let him please to reflect, that [*To Endure so long,*] is nothing else but [*to be so long*; ] which done, by cutting off [*so long*] in both those Sayings, he will find, that [*To Endure,*] is neither more, nor less, but simply [*To be.*] Whence his Conceit is so far from being *True*, that Nothing more wrongs *Duration, or Being*, than does *Succession, or Motion*. And, therefore, our *Duration here*, which is *Unsteady, Unconstant, and Transitory*, is justly reputed to be the *worst* sort of *Duration, or Being*; and the next to *Not-Being, or Not-Enduring* at all. Again, *Common Sense* tells us, that nothing moves merely *for Motion's sake*; and, therefore, that all *Motion* is, to attain something which is *Not-Motion*, but the *End* of it, that is, *Rest*. Wherefore, *Eternal Rest*, or that *Duration* called *Eternity*, is the *End* of *all* the *Motion* of the *whole World*; conformably to what the Holy Scripture, speaking of the State of Eternity, tells us, that, \* *Tempus non erit amplius*; *Time* (nor, consequently, *Succession*) shall be *no more*.  
 \* Apocal. cap. i. v. 7.  
 Wherefore, since, taking away *Motion* and *Succession*, 'tis impossible to imagin any thing in *Duration*, but *only Being*; and *Eternity* is an infinitely better *Duration, or State of Being*, than this *Transitory* one, which is *Successive*; it follows, that *Eternal Rest*, in which we have all we can have, or could acquire by *Motion, at once*, is the

the



the *only true* Duration, and *our* Duration *here* only the *way* to it. So far is *Duration* from being *Unconceivable without Succession*, if we guide our Thoughts by *Principles*, and not by *meer Fancy*.

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## REFLEXION Eleventh.

ON

### *The Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth* CHAPTERS.

I. THE three next Chapters of *Simple Modes*, are very suitable to Mr. *Locke's* Doctrine delivered formerly, and almost all of them agreeable to Nature ; particularly the 20th, which gives us more genuin Definitions of the several Passions ; and more aptly, in my Judgment, expresses them than Mr. *Hobbes* has done ; tho' he is justly held to have a great Talent in delivering his Conceptions. But, I must deny that the *Perception* or *Thought*, made by *Impressions on the Body*, by *Outward Objects*, is to be called *Sensation*. For if *Thoughts* be *Sensations*, then the *Sense* can *Think* ; which being the proper Act of the *Mind*, I believe none will say if he reflects

*Thoughts are not  
to be call'd Sen-  
sations.*

that our Soul is of a *Spiritual* Nature. Nor are the Modes of *Thinking* at all proper to the Senses. The Truth is, that Man having two *Natures* in one *Suppositum*, all the Impressions upon him as he is an *Animal*, do also at the same time (I may say the same Instant) affect him also as he is *Spiritual*; whence they are to be called *Sensations*, as they are receiv'd in that *material* Part called the *Seat of Knowledge*; and the same Direct Impressions, as they proceed farther, and affect his Soul, are call'd *Notions*, or *Simple Apprehensions*. Wherefore, as the two *Natures* in Man are Distinct, and have their Distinct Properties and Modes; so the *Words*, that are to express what's peculiar to each of those Natures, are to be Distinguish'd too, and kept to their proper Signification; which cannot be, if *Thought*, which is peculiar to the *Mind*, be confounded with *Sensation*, which properly belongs to the *Corporeal* part. But I suspect the Printer may be *here* in the Fault, and not the Author; the Sense in this place being something imperfect.

2. To the Question proposed, ( *Cap. 19. § 9.* )

*Whether it be not probable, that Thinking is the Action, and not the Essence of the Soul?* I answer, That 'tis more than probable; for 'tis *Demonstrable*, that 'tis only the *Action*, and not the *Essence* of it. For, in such Natures as are *potential*, or apt to receive Impressions from other things, ( as the Soul is in this State ; ) and therefore their Essence does not consist in being *Pure Acts* ( as Angels are, ) *Being* must necessarily be presuppos'd to *Operating*; especially, when their first Operation ( as *Thinking* is

to the Soul) is a meer *Passion*, caus'd by Impressions from another thing; which are therefore purely Accidental to the Subject that receives them. And I wonder Mr. *Locke* would even propose this as a Question to be yet decided, or think it but Probable; since he has formerly maintain'd assertively, That *Men do not always think*: For if it be not certain that *Thinking is not the Essence of the Soul*, it follows necessarily, that *Men must always think*; since the Soul can never be without her *Essence*, or what's *Essential* to her.

3. His Position, that *Things are Good or Evil only in reference to Pleasure or Pain*, however it may hap to be misunderstood by some well-meaning Bigots, is a most solid Truth; and is exceedingly useful to explicate Christian Principles, and to shew **God's** Wisdom and Goodness in governing Mankind Connaturally. He proposes to him *Fulness of Joy, and Pleasures for evermore*; and such as, being Spiritual and most Agreeable to the Nature of the Soul, are *Pure, Durable*, and filling the whole Capacity of its boundless Desire; not *Transitory, Mean, and Base*; which, tho' they cloy, never satisfy. Heaven would not be Heaven, if it were not infinitely *Pleasant* and *Delightful*; nor would Hell be Hell, if it were not *Penal*. And in case that Explication of *Epicurus* his Tenet, which is given it by some of his Followers, be truly *his*, which makes Man's *Summum Bonum* consist in *Pleasure* at large, and chiefly in the *best* Pleasures of the *Mind*, it would not misbecome a Christian Philosopher. Whence results this Corollary, that *The whole Bo-*

Mr. L's Position,  
that Things are  
Good or Evil only  
in reference to  
Pleasure or Pain,  
is True and Solid.

dy of Christian Morality depends, as on its Practical Principle, upon our making a wise Choice of the Pleasures we pursue here. For, the Object of our Will, and consequently, of its Acts of Love, is an *Appearing Good*, and the *Lively Appearance* of that Good is that which makes the Will prompt to act effectually ; whence, since that which breeds *Pleasure* in us, must needs appear *Lively* to be a *Good to us*, there needs no more but to chuse wisely what is *most Pleasant*, or *most Agreeable* to our True Nature, **Reason** ; ( such as the best *Spiritual Goods* are ; ) and we may be sure by such a well-made Choice to arrive at that Best, Greatest, and Purest Pleasure, *Eternal Glory*.

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REFLEXION *Twelfth.*

O N

*The 21th. CHAPTER.*

1. **I**N this Chapter of *Power*, I find more to admire than confute. The Author always Ingenious, even when he errs, has here much out done his former self. Particularly, his Explication of *Freewill*, is (generally speaking) both Solid and Acute; and his Doctrine that *Liberty* is consistent with a perfect *Determination* to Goodness, and Virtue is both *Learned* and *Pious*. Yet I am forced to disagree with him in some particulars: In giving my Thoughts of which I will imitate Mr. *Locke's* laudable Method; in making my Discourses *Subservient*, and in shewing them to be **Agreeable**, to Christian Principles.

*The due Commendation of Mr. L's Doctrine in this Chapter of Power.*

2. 'Tis an excellent Thought, that *The Clearest Idea of Active Power* is had from *Spirit*. For *Bodies* can act no otherwise, than as they are acted on themselves; nor can the first mov'd Body that moves the rest, push others forwards farther than it self is moved by something that is *not Body*, or by some *Spiritual Agent*; which therefore has the truest Notion of *Agency* in it, without any Mixture of *Patiency*; because the Body mov'd cannot react upon it. Tho' therefore we may have by our Senses the

*That some Spiritual Agent is the First Mover of Bodies.*

*Idea*

*Idea* of Action and Passion, from the Effects we see daily wrought by *Natural Causes* on fit Subjects; yet the *Clearest Idea* of *Action*, is given us by our *Reason*, finding out that the *Beginner* of Corporeal Action is a *Separated Spirit*, or *pure Act*; and therefore not at all *Passive* from any other Creature, nor from the Body it operates on, by *Reaction*, as is found in *Corporeal Agents*. And, our Reason gives us this *Idea*, (as it does many other Reflex ones) by seeing clearly that neither can there possibly be *Processus in infinitum* amongst Corporeal Agents; nor can they, of themselves alone, *begin* to move themselves, nor move one another *Circularly*; and therefore the *First* Corporeal Motion must necessarily be Originiz'd from some *Pure Spirit* or *Angel*. Now, Mr. Locke conceives that the Soul, according

*The Will cannot  
move our Bodies.*

*Idea of Active Power*;

\* Preliminary 4.  
§. 25. 26. Refl.  
5. §. 1.

which Tenet I have in diverse places disprov'd \* formerly; and shown that the *Soul*, by reason of her *Potential State* here, cannot principiate any Bodily Action; nor the *Man* neither, unless wrought upon by some External or Internal Agent, which is *in act* it self.

3. He Judges with good reason, that the Vulgar mistake of Philosophers, in mak-

*The Understand-  
ing and Will,  
not Distinct  
Powers.*

ing every *Faculty* or Power a *Distinct Entity*, has caus'd much Obscurity and Uncertainty in Philosophy; which humour of Multiplying Entities, I am so far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand,

hand, in making the *Understanding* and *Will* to be *one* and the *same Power*, and affirming that they only differ, formally, in *Degree*. He shows clearly how, in proper Speech, the *Will* is *not Free* but the *Man*; unless it be signified with a Reduplication, that by the Word [*Will*] is meant *Man*, according to that Power in him call'd the *Will*. For *Powers* (as he discourses well) belong only to *Agents*, and are Attributes *only* of *Substances*, and not of the *Powers themselves*. Perhaps this reason of his will abet my position, that the *Understanding* and *Will* are the *same Power*. Those who make them *two*, do this because they find in the Notion of [*Will*] only a Power of *Acting*, and not of *knowing*; and in the Notion of [*Understanding*] only a Power of *knowing*, and not of *Acting*: But the same Men make the *Understanding direct* the *Will*, which they call a *Blind Power*; by which they make *one* of those Powers, formally *as such*, to work upon the *other*, as if the former were an *Agent*, and the latter a *Patient*. I add, moreover, that they do this with the worst Grace that is possible; for what avails it the *Will*, to be *directed* by the *Understanding*, if it does not *know* how the *Understanding directs* it? And to make the *Will* to *know*, is to make it a *knowing Power*, which is to make the *Will* (tho' they never meant it) to be the *Understanding*. Not reflecting in the mean time when our *Understanding* is *full* of any Apparent Good, the *Man* pursues it, and so becomes, or has in him a Principle or Power of *Acting*; which is what we call *Will*.

4. Perhaps a Philosophical Discourse, beginning from the Principles in this affair, if exprest Literally, and pursu'd home by Immediate Consequences, may set this whole business in a Clearer Light; and show us very evidently how Man *determins himself to Action*; and therefore is *Free*; as also how he is *Predetermin'd* to determin himself, than any particular Reflexions on our own Interiour: Which, tho' they may oftentimes have some Truth in them, yet, not beginning from the bottom-Truths that concern the point in hand, they can never be *steady*, but are now and then liable to some Errors.

5. Beginning then with the *Animal* part in Man, and considering him barely as an *Animal*, and wrought upon as other Animals are, I discourse thus. Particles, agreeable to the Nature of the *Animal*, being by the Senses convey'd into the Brain, do, if they be but *Few*, lightly affect it; and work no other effect but a kind of small *Liking* of it; If *more*, they make it (as we say) begin to *Fancy* it: But, if they be *very many*, and sent from an Object *very Agreeable* or *Good* to such a Nature; they will in proportion to their Multitude and Strength, cause naturally a *Tendency* towards it, and powerfully excite the Spirits, so as to make the *Animal* pursue it; that is, they will become such a *Principle of Action*; which in *meer Animals* we call *Appetite*. To which Action that *meer Animal* is not carry'd thro' Choice, or *Freely*, but is *naturally* and necessarily *Determin'd* to *Act* for the Attainment of



of that Good, in the same manner as Iron follows the Load-stone. But, if we consider this Animal, as having now a *Rational* and *Knowing* *Compart* join'd to it, things will be order'd after another manner: For, those Impressions are carry'd farther than the Region of the Brain, even into the *Soul* it self, which is endow'd with a Faculty of *Reflecting* upon those her Notions, whence she gains *exacter* Knowledge of those Bodies that imprinted them. Nor only so, but she can *reflect* upon *her own* Operations too, and *know that she knows* them; by which means she comes acquainted with her *own* Nature, and comes to *see* that *Knowledge* and *Reason* is that Nature of hers; which she finds is a *Nobler* part of the Man, than is the *Body*; because by it she excels and governs Beasts; and, in great part, under **God**, manages Corporeal Nature. Moreover, she can *discourse* her Thoughts, *compare* the Objects, or the Goods they propose, and *gather* the Preference some ought to have above others.

6. Things standing thus with the *Man*, it is evident that he has *now* not only that Nature called the *Body*, to provide for; but *another*, and that a *Spiritual*, and much *better* Nature, to look to, and to procure for it all the *Good* he can, and such Goods as are *Agreeable* to it. He finds evidently, that no Corporeal Things can be its *Proper Good*, taking it as 'tis Distinct from the *Body*. He may easily discern, that its Distinct Nature being *Knowing*, or *Rational*, nothing can perfect it but what is *according to Reason*, or improves *Knowledge*; and that the Acquisition of *Science* does

*Man naturally pursues what is according to Reason, or Virtuous.*

does perfect it in the latter Regard, and *Virtue* in the *Former* ; *Virtue* being nothing but a *Disposition to act according to Right Reason* in such and such Matters, or in such and such Occasions. *Reason* therefore is the Ground of all true Morality ; and, to act *according to Reason*, is to act *Virtuously* : Wherefore, to act *Virtuously* would be *most Natural* to Man, if his True Nature be not depraved ; which it cannot, without Impiety, be thought to be, if we consider it as it came *immediately* from **God's** Hand. Wherefore, if it be not so *now*, but be blinded and mis-led from *Reason* and *Virtue*, by *Passion* and *Vice*, (as we experience it is,) it is demonstrable

*Therefore his Nature has been perverted since his Creation.*

hence, *a posteriori*, that it has been some way or other *perverted* since its Creation ; which Christianity tells us, has happen'd thro' *Original Sin*, transfus'd from *Adam*. Moreover, as the Sense of Corporeal or Sensible Pleasure or Pain invites the Man to pursue what is for the Good of the *Body*, and makes him tend towards what's Agreeable, and eschew what's Harmful to it ; so, in Man, as he is *Rational*, there is, or ought to be, answerable to those, a *Spiritual* Pleasure and Pain, *viz.* the Satisfaction and Dis-satisfaction of *Mind*, which we call *Conscience*, or the *Law of Nature*, annex'd to all our Actions ; *our Thoughts* (as *St. Paul* says) *accusing or excusing one another* ; so to keep us from *Unreasonableness*, or *Vice*, and make us more pliable to follow *Reason* or *Virtue*. For, as Grief or Pain is caus'd in us by our Knowing that our Bodies, for which we have a great Concern, is Disorder'd ; so the *Stings of Conscience* (as far as they proceed from Nature) come from  
our

our Knowing that our *better* part, our *Soul*, for which we ought to have an incomparably higher Concern, is wounded or disorder'd in her *Rationality*, which is her *Essence*.

7. Hence is seen, that Man is apt to be wrought upon by two several sorts of *Motives*, *viz.* those which are *sutable* to the Good of the *Body*, and those which are agreeable to the Good of the *Soul*. Now, were not Humane Nature (as was said) *perverted*, these two could not

*Therefore Supernatural Motives are added, to strengthen Man's weaken'd Nature, or Reason.*

*clash*; nor would there be any Inclination in the Man to do any thing which could prejudice his Superior Part, *Reason*; to which the Inferior, the Body, is *naturally Subservient*. But, Man's Nature being poison'd in the Spring-head, the Motives of the First Kind did hazard quite to over-bear the Motives of the Second Sort; and so Mankind became liable to act, in a manner, perpetually *against Reason*, or, (to express it in Christian Language,) all his Actions might have been Sinful, and himself *a Slave to Sin*. Wherefore, to obviate the violent Impulses of Passion, and to strengthen our Reason against its Assaults, *God's* Wisdom, Goodness and Mercy took care to give us a Doctrine full of *Supernatural* Motives, and those the most powerful ones that could be conceiv'd; taught us by a *Divine Master*, and ascertain'd after the *best Manner*; so to make the *Appearance* of the *Eternal Goods* it proposed (if reflected on) *Lively*; which might keep us upright, and move us effectually to follow our true Nature, *Reason*; and so pursue our true Last End, by the Practice of *Virtue*.

8. Now, there can be no Question but that, both in the State of *Pure* and *Uncorrupted* Nature, as also in the *Corrupted* State of it, thus powerfully assisted, the *Innate Propension* of the Will tending strongly to *Good* or *Happiness*; and [*Good*] and [*Motive*] being in our Case the *same*, *Eternal* Goods would most strongly carry the Will, and prevail over *Temporal* ones; as certainly as *Heat ut octo* would prevail over *Heat ut duo*, were there the *same Application* of one as of the other to the *same Object* equally well *Dispos'd*; in case the *Proposal* or *Appearance* of both these Goods were but *Equal*.

9. Both these *Motives*, *Natural* and *Supernatural*, have their several *Species* or *Phantasms* beating upon the *Seat of Knowledge*; with this difference, that the *Natural* *Phantasms*, being directly imprinted, are *Proper* ones; but those *Reflex* ones, being of *Spiritual* Natures (as the *Words* and *Language* they are express'd in do testify) are *Metaphorical* and *Improper*. As then, when in a *meer Animal* a *Sensation* is made by a small Number of *Agreeable Effluvia* they make only a slight *Fancy*, *Imagination* or *Representation* of it; but when an *Impression* is made by a great *Multitude* of them, the *Animal* is *Naturally ripe for Action*, and is *Enabled*, or has a *Power to act*, which *Power*, thus prompt to act, we call *Appetite*: So (as was said above) in a *Rational* or *Knowing Animal*, a small *Quantity* of *Reflex* *Notions*



tions may serve to give it a *speculative* Knowledge of the Object proposed: But, when those *Reflex* Impressions are *many*, and of such Objects as, being *very Agreeable* or Good to our true Nature, are therefore *highly concerning* us to have them; the *Appearance* of them is so *Lively*, and the *Strength* of their Motive Force is so *great*, that the Man becomes fit to *act for them*; which Principle of Action we call **Will**. So that *Knowledge* and *Will* differ but in *Degree*, as did *Fancy* and *Appetite* in a meer *Animal*. By which Explication are avoided all the Incoherent Positions about this Subject; such as are, that the Understanding *directs* the Will; that the Will *knows*; that one Power works upon another, &c. Whence is seen,

10. *First*, That the way to conquer in our Spiritual Warfare, is, to strive to *Multiply* and *Strengthen* those Reflex Thoughts, especially those given us by *Supernatural* Motives; and to make their Appearance *Lively* in the Soul; that so it may be able to beat down and overcome the opposite Band of Impressions from *Corporeal* Objects which assault it: Which I conceive to be what is Literally meant by a *Lively Faith* working in us that best Virtue, *Charity*. Next, in order to the *same* End, we must endeavour, by a cautious and prudent Avoidance, to *lessen* and *weaken* the Impressions from *Corporeal* Objects; which is done by that Virtue which we call *Temperance*, or (when 'tis to some high degree) *Mortification*; and, by that means to *dim* the *Appearance* those Objects would otherwise make; lest, if it be *too Lively*, they should over-

*How to conquer  
in our spiritual  
Warfare.*

come the Motive Force of those Objects which are *Spiritual*. But, it is to be noted, that the *multiplying*, or *frequently repeating* those Reflex Impressions, are not so necessary to *every* Person, nor always the best. For, a Wise, Judicious Christian, who, out of a *Clear Sight* of Spiritual Motives, has (by a thorow-Penetration of their Excellency and Preferribleness) his Speculative Thoughts so Lively, that they *fix* his Interior Practical Judgment to *work steadily* for the Attainment of Eternal Happiness, is a far more *Manly* and *Strong* Christian, than those who arrive at a high Pitch by the frequent Dints of Praying, or other good Exercises, almost hourly continued: For, those *Well-knit Thoughts*, and *Rational Judgments*, are (as it were) an Impenetrable *Phalanx*; and being Connatural to our Reason, no Assault can shock or break their Ranks. Yet, even in those firmest Souls, *Christian Discipline* and *Vigilance* must be observ'd; lest, not having those strong Thoughts or Judgments *still in readiness*, they be *surprized* by their Ghostly Enemy; which I take to have been King David's Case, when he first sinn'd.

11. *Secondly*, It is seen hence, that Man *determines himself to Action*, or is **Free**.

'Tis evident, that  
Man determines  
himself to Action,

For, 'tis evident, both to Reason and Experience, that all those Thoughts, Discourses, Judgments and Affections, he had in him *before*, naturally, or supernaturally, are the *Causes* of the *Determination* of his *Will*. Wherefore, all these being *Modes* or *Accidents* belonging to him, and Modes not being *Distinct Entities* from the *Thing* to which they belong, but *the Thing it self*, (or, the *Man* thus modify'd;) it follows, that

**Man**

**Man** determines himself to Action ; or, is a Free Agent.

12. *Thirdly*, Since Man has neither his Being, his Powers, his Actions, nor consequently, the Circumstances by which he came to be imbu'd with his good Thoughts (from whence he has the Proposals of his true Good, and of those incomparable Motives to pursue it) *from Himself*; but had all these from the *Maker* and *Orderer* of the World: And, since *this Series* of Internal and External Causes (called, in Christian Language, *God's Grace*) did produce this *Determination of himself*, 'tis manifest, that he was *Predetermin'd* by **GOD**, the *First Cause*, thus to Determine himself, as far as there was *Entity* or *Goodness* in his Action.

*Not, as Predetermin'd by GOD.*

13. *Fourthly*, Since all our *Powers* are, by the Intent of Nature, ordain'd to *perfect* us, and that Power, called *Freedom*, does not *perfect* any Man while he determines himself to that which will bring him to *Eternal Misery*; it follows, that the *more* he is *Determin'd* to *Virtue* and *true Goodness*, the *more Free* he is. Again, Since a Man is *Free* when he acts according to the *true Inclination* of his *Nature*; and the true natural Inclination of a Man is to act according to *Right Reason*, that is, *Virtuously*; it follows, that *Freedom* is then *most truly* such, and the Man *most truly Free*, when he is *Determin'd* to *Virtuous Actions*. Whence *Irrationality*, or *Sin*, is by the Holy Ghost called *Slavery*, which is opposite to *Freedom*. From which *Slavery*, the Mercy of **GOD**,

*Determination to Virtuous Action does perfect, and not destroy Freedom.*

meerly and solely through the Merits of his Son, our Redeemer, has freed us.

14. *Fifthly*, We Experience, that the Lively Proposal of Temporal and Eternal Goods, when it arrives to that pitch, that there is *hic & nunc*, such a *Plenitude* (*ex parte Subjecti*) of such Objects or Motives, that it hinders the Co-appearance, Co-existence, and much more the Competition of the *Contrary* Motives, does *always* carry the *Will*, or the *Man*, along with it. For, the Object of the Will being an *Appearing Good*, and no other Good, in that Juncture, (at least, Considerably,) *appearing*, because the Mind is full of the *other*; it follows, that the Inclination of the Will to Good in Common, which Man is naturally determin'd to, must needs carry the Soul; no other (as was said) *then Appearing*. Whence, Mr. Locke's Position, that *Uneasiness alone is present*; and his Deduction thence, that therefore nothing but *Uneasiness* determines the Will to act, is shewn to be Groundless: For, an *Appearing Good* cannot but be always *Present* to the Soul; otherwise, it could not *appear*, or be an *Appearing Good*.

15. *Sixthly*, Hence wrong Judgments arise, either thro' Want of *Information*, as, when Men are not imbu'd with sufficient *Knowledge* of Eternal Goods; or else, thro' Want of *Consideration*; whence, by not perfectly *weighing* and *comparing* both, they come to prefer Temporal Goods before Eternal ones.

16. *Lastly*,



16. *Lastly*, 'tis to be noted, that Sin does not always spring from *False Speculative* Judgments, but from their being *Disproportionate*. For, 'tis a Truth that Temporal Goods are in some sort Agreeable to us; nor would they hurt us for loving them as far as they merit to be lov'd, provided we did but love Eternal Goods as much as *they* deserve to be loved too. Sin therefore is hence occasion'd, that thro' too close and frequent a Converse with *them*, we too much *conceit*, and make *vast* Judgments of these Temporal Goods in proportion of what we make of *Eternal* ones. And, were not this so, no Sin would remain in a bad Soul when separate, or in a Devil; nor, consequently, the proper Punishment of Sin, Damnation, because they know all Truths *Speculatively*. Wherefore, their *Inordinate* Practical Judgments (in which Sin consists) springs hence, that they do not *conceit*, or (as we say) *lay to heart* the Goodness of True Felicity, because they *over-conceit* or make *too-great* Judgments of the Goodness found in some *False Last End*, which they had chosen. Yet these Disproportionate Judgments, tho' *Speculatively True*, are apt to beget *wrong Practical Judgments*, and *wrong* Discourses or *Paralegisms* in the Soul of a Sinner, to the prejudice of his Reason; as has been shown in my METHOD, Book 3, *Leff. 10. §. 18.*

Sin generally  
springs from True  
but Disproportion-  
ate Judgments.

17. Mr. Locke's Discourse about *Uneasiness*, lies so cross to some part of this Doctrine, that it obliges me to examine it. He endeavours to shew that *Uneasiness alone* and not Good or

of Uneasiness,  
and Mr. L's dis-  
course concerning  
it.

the Greater Good, determines the Will to Act. His Position, tho' new, and Paradoxical, is very plausible; and, taking it in *one* Sense, (*viz.* that there is always *some* Uneasiness when the Will is Alter'd in order to Action,) has much Truth in it; and it seems to have much Weight also, by his pursuing it so ingeniously: Yet there is something wanting to render his Discourse Conclusive. For,

18. *First*, If we look into Grounds and Principles, they will tell us, that 'tis the Object of any Power, which actuates, or determines it; and the Object of the Will cannot be Uneasiness: All Uneasiness being evidently a Consequence, following either from the not yet attaining the Good we desire, and hope for; or from the Fear of Losing it. And, if we should ask whether Uneasiness does affect the Will, otherwise than *sub ratione mali*, or, because it is a Harm to the Man; and Ease otherwise affect it, than *sub ratione Boni*, (that is, because it is Good to him;) I believe it is impossible, with any Shew of Reason, to deny it. Now, if this be so, it will follow, that 'tis Good only which is the Formal Motive of the Will; and Ease, no otherwise than as it is Good.

19. *Secondly*, All that we naturally affect being only to be Happy, or to be well; it follows, that Good only is that which our Rational Appetite, the Will, strives to attain; or pursues, and acts for.

Prov'd from our  
Natural Desire of  
Happiness.

20. *Thirdly*,

20. *Thirdly, Appearing Good* being held by all, to be the Object of the Will, (for none hold, that *Good* will move it, unless it *appears such*;) and the *Greater Appearance* of it having a *greater*, and sometimes the *Greatest Power* to move it, I observe, that tho' Mr. *Locke* does

*The Appearance of the Good is of greatest weight, but, in a manner, disregarded by Mr. Locke.*

now and then touch slightly at the *Appearance* of the Good proposed to the Understanding; yet, he no where gives the *full Weight* to the Influence the several *Degrees* of this *Appearance* have over the Understanding, to make the Man *will it*; but only denies that *Good*, or the *Greater Good*, in it self, determines the Will. Whereas, even the *Greatest Good*, dimly appearing such, may not, perhaps, out-weigh the *least Good*, if it be *very Lively* represented, or Apply'd close to our view, by a *Full Appearance* of it. Hence, his Argument, that [*Everlasting Unfpeakable Goods do not hold the Will*; whereas, *very great Uneasiness does*,] has not the least Force; because he still leaves out the *Degree* of their *Appearing* such to us. For, since (especially in our Case) *eadem est ratio non entium, & non apparentium*; and no Cause works its Effect, but as it is *Apply'd*; he should either have put an *Equal Appearance* of the two Contesting Motives, or nothing will follow.

21. *Fourthly, This Equal Appearance* put, his Argument is not Conclusive, but opposes himself. For, the prodigious Torments inflicted by the Heathen Persecuters, upon the Primitive Martyrs, were,

*Putting this Appearance, his Reasons do not conclude.*

doubtless, the Greatest *present* Uneasiness Flesh and Blood could undergo ; yet the *Lively Appearance* of their Eternal Happiness, (tho' *Distant*, and *Absent*,) which their Well-grounded Faith, and Erected Hope assur'd them of, after those Short, tho' most Penal Sufferings ; *overcame* all that Inconceivable *Uneasiness* they suffer'd at *present*.

22. *Lastly*, How can it be thought, that the getting rid of *Uneasiness*, or (which is the same) the Obtaining of *Ease*, can be the Formal and Proper Object of the Will. Powers are ordain'd to *perfect* the Subject to which they belong ; and, the *better* the Object is which they are employ'd about, *so much*, in proportion, the Man is the *Perfector*, who applies that Power to attain it. It cannot then be doubted, but *True Happiness* being the Ultimate Perfection Man can aim or arrive at, which is only attainable by Acts of his *Will* ; that Power was naturally ordain'd to bring Man to his highest State of Perfection by *such* an Acquisition ; or, by loving above all Things, and pursuing that Object ; and, consequently, since this consists in obtaining his *Summum Bonum*, 'tis the *Goodness* of the Object, apprehended and *conceited* such, which determines the Will ; and, therefore, the Straining after *Greater*, and even the *Greatest* Goods, and being *Determin'd* to *them*, is what, by the Design of Nature, his Will was given him for. Now, who can think, that merely to *be at Ease*, is this *Greatest Good* ; or the Motive, Object, End, or Determiner of the Will ? *Ease*, without any farther Prospect, seems



seems rather to be the Object of an Idle Drone, who cares not for *perfecting* himself at all; but sits still, satisfy'd with his Dull and Stupid Indolency. It seems to destroy the Acquisition of all *Virtue*; which is *Arduous*, and not perform'd but by *Contrasting* with *Ease*, and *present* Satisfaction. It quite takes away the very Notion of the Heroick Virtue of *Fortitude*; whose very Object is the Overcoming *Ease*, and attempting such Things as are *Difficult*, and Inconsistent with it. I expect, Mr. *Locke* will say, that all these Candidates of Virtue had not acted, had they not, according to their present Thoughts, found it *Uneasie* not to act as they did. But I reply, that Uneasiness was not their *Sole Motive* of Acting, nor the *only*, or Formal Determiner of their Will: For, in that case, if meerly to be rid of *Uneasiness* had mov'd them to act, meer *Ease* had satisfy'd them. Whereas, 'tis Evident, they aim'd at a *Greater Good* than meerly to be at *Ease*. In a Word; *Ease* bears in its Notion, a Sluggish, Unactive, and most Imperfect Disposition: It seems to suite only with the *ἀναιμία*, or Insensibility of a Stoick. *Pleasure* and *Joy* have some Briskness in their Signification: *Desire* is *Active*, and implies a *Tendency* to some Good we affect: But the meer *being at Ease* denotes no more but a *Stupid Indisturbance*; which Noble Souls hate, as *mean*, and are weary of it: And, if *Ease* be the proper Motive and Determiner of the *Will*; and the Greatest Good the Will can have, or wish, is *Eternal Glory*, it would follow, that the Glory of the Saints and Angels in Heaven is nothing but being in the best manner at *Ease*; which is far from Elevating

ring the Soul to the *highest* Degree of Perfection, as *Glory*, or the *Beatifying Sight of God* does; and only signifies, she is, when in Heaven, securely *out of Harm's way*, or free from being *disturb'd* ever after: By which, no great *Good* accrues to her, but only a kind of *Neutral State*, in which she shall receive *no Hurt*.

23. The true Point then seems to me to stand thus; The Object of the Will, *The Truth of this Point stated.* an *Appearing Good*, works many Effects immediately consequent to one another. First, When the Appearance is but *slight*, it begets a *Liking* of it; when *Lively*, a *Love* of it, which determines the Will to it; to which, if *Great*, follows an *Effectual Tendency* towards it, called *Desire* of it. *Desire* not satisfy'd, *troubles* us, or makes us *Uneasie*: *Uneasiness* makes us strive to change our Condition, to get *Ease*. This makes us to cast about, and Consider how to *find Means* to do it: Means found, we make *use* of them, and *actually go about* to rid our selves of what was *Uneasie* to us. Now, tho' some of these are *nearer* to our Outward Action than others, yet the *Appearing Good* in the Object is the *Common Cause* which produces all those Orderly Dispositions; in virtue of which, as the *First Motive*, they do *all Act*, Assist and Concurr to determine our Will to go about the Outward Action with Vigour.

24. Ere I part with this Chapter of *Power*, I am to observe, that Mr. Locke has not any where so much as touch'd at the *Power to be a Thing*; tho' Nature gives us as  
*Mr. L omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing, tho' Nature suggests it*  
 Clear

Clear a Notion of it, as of any other *Power* whatever. For, as oft as we see *one* Thing made of *Another*, which we know is not *Created a-new*, so often our Natural Reason forces us to acknowledge that *some* *what* of the former Thing *could be made another Thing*; and this, as evidently as when we see a Thing *Act*, which did *not Act* before, we must acknowledge it had antecedently a *Power to Act*; and thence we frame an *Idea* or Notion of *such a Power* accordingly. But of this *Power*, called *Matter*, and of its Metaphysical Compart, the *Form* or *Act*, I have treated largely already in my Appendix to my *Method*, to which I refer my Reader; as also here, *Preliminary* 5. §. 6, 7. I note, by this Omission of the Notion of Metaphysical *Power*, or *Matter*, that Mr. L. holds so rigorously to his First Ground, that all our Notions are got by *Sensation* and *Reflexion*, that he seems to make account, that, by working upon *these*, we do not gain *other* Notions by using our *Reason*; in which Sense, I must deny that Ground of his. Or else, he omits *this*, and *other* Notions, (especially *Metaphysical* ones,) because he finds no *Proper* or *Formal* Similitudes for them in his *Fancy*; which makes it still more Evident that he too much consults his *Imaginative Faculty*, to the Prejudice of his *Reason*; and, too frequently, means by his *Ideas*, meer *Fancies*. Which also is the reason why he blunders so about the Notion of *Substance*.

REFLEXION *Thirteenth,*

## O N

*The Twenty Second and Twenty Third*  
CHAPTERS.

1. **I** Find nothing in *Chap. 22th*, [*Of Mixed Modes*] to reflect on, but what has been

Our Mixture of  
our Notions is Re-  
gular, Mr. L.'s  
Irregular and  
Disorderly.

spoke to already. The Author pursues with much Accuracy his own Method of shewing how his *Ideas* of *Mixt Modes* are made up of *Simple* ones. Which, in a manner, falls into the same, as does our way of *ranging* all our Notions into the *Common Head* of Substance and its *Modes*, and then compounding them as Use and Occasion invites us, or rather as Nature forces us. Nor do I see how the Name *ties* (as Mr. *Locke* fancies) the several *Ideas* together, more than barely by *signifying* the Combination of them made beforehand in our *Minds*. The different Method in this Point, taken by Mr. *Locke* and us, seems to be this: That *We*, by distributing our *Ideas* or *Notions* into *Ten Common Heads*, do know at first view in which Box to look for them; and, this discover'd, we find also all our Particular Notions, that are within the Precincts of each Head, by Dividing the Head itself by *Intrinsic Differences*, or more and less of it, which done, the Mixture of that Compounded Notion is *Close* and *Compacted*; each



each Part of it, if in the same Branch of that Division, being *Essential* to the other. And, if some Part of the Compound Notion be taken from *other* Heads, we, by looking into their Notions, and Comparing them by our Reason, know *how much*, and what Share of that Notion is borrow'd from others, and *belongs* or *not* belongs to it; and in what *manner* it belongs to it: Which teaches us how to *predicate* diversily; and instructs us *how* the Terms of our Propositions are *connected*, and whether they be connected *at all*. Which exceedingly conduces to *Science*, and (as we conceive) is hardly performable by *his* way, but rather is Inconsistent with it. Again, while we *Divide* those Common Heads, in case our Division be rightly made, we, with the same labour, frame Genuin and Proper *Definitions* of each Notion under each respective Head. Whereas, we conceive, his way of Mixing his *Ideas* wants the Beauty of placing their Parts *orderly*, which the Process from Superiour to Inferiour Notions *has*; and his Mixt *Ideas*, if he goes about to explain and compound them, have so Ragged, Shatter'd, and Dishevell'd an Appearance, that 'tis hard to determin which of his *Simple Ideas* that makes this Mixture, (much more which of his Compounded ones) is to be the First, Second, Third, &c. So that the Definitions of his *Ideas* do more resemble a *Confused Heap* than a *Regular Building*; as will be observ'd by any Man who reflects on those Definitions and Explications of his *Ideas* he now and then gives us. In which, however it may be pretended, that his Materials are oft-times *proper*, and the same with ours, yet it will be impossible to shew, that his *way* of laying those Materials together

gether is *Regular*, Artificial, or Handsome. He speaks of the Combinations, Compositions, and Mixtures of his *Ideas*; but I do not remember he ever tells us, much less maintains, their *Regularity*, or the *Order* in which his several *Ideas*, or the *Words* which express them, are to be placed; which must necessarily leave his Reader's Thoughts in much Confusion. Indeed, it seems not to have been his Intention in this Treatise to observe the *Rules of Art*, but only to give us our *Materials*; wherefore, as I do not object, or much impute this Deficiency, so I thought it not amiss to note it.

2. While I perused Mr. *Locke's* 23th Chapter, of the *Idea of Substance*, I was heartily grieved to see the greatest Wits, for want of True Logic, and thro' their not lighting on the right way of Philosophizing, lay Grounds for Scepticism, to the utter Subversion of all *Science*; and this, not *designedly*, but with a *good Intention*, and out of their Sincerity and Care not to *affirm* more than they *know*. He fancies that the Knowledge of *Substance* and *Extension* are absolutely Unattainable. Now, if we be altogether Ignorant what *Substance* or *Thing* means, we must bid Adieu to all Philosophy, which is the *Knowledge of Things*, and confess that we talk all the while of *we know not what*: And, if we be invincibly Ignorant of what *Extension* is, farewell to all the Mathematical Sciences; which, (those that treat of *Number*, or Arithmetick, excepted) do all of them presuppose our Knowledge of *Extension*, and are wholly grounded on that Knowledge.

Where-

Wherefore, that I may perform the Duty I owe to *Science* and *Truth*, I judge my self obliged first to establish the *Literal Truth* in this Point ; and, next, to satisfy his *Scruples* and *Difficulties*. In order to which I discourse thus.

3. We can have no Knowledge of a *Nothing*, formally as such ; therefore all our Knowledge must be of *Things* one way or other ; that is, all our Knowledge must either be of the *Res* or the *Modus rei* ; or, (as the Schools express it) of *Substance* or

*All our Notions, and, amongst them, that of Substance or Res is taken from the Thing.*

*Accidents* ; for, other Notions we cannot have. Again, Since Mr. *Locke* grants the *Accidents* or *Modes* are not *distinct Entities* from the *Thing* ; they can only differ from it *Notionally* ; or, as divers Notions, Considerations, Respects, or Abstracted Conceptions, which our limited Understanding (not able to comprehend at once the *whole Thing*, and all that belongs to it, in the Bulk) has of the *Thing*, which grounds them all. Hence, all our Knowledge of *Quantity*, (under what Name, or in whatever Formality we take it) is of the *Thing* as 'tis Big, Divisible, or Extended : Our Knowledge of *Quality*, is of the *Thing* consider'd according to what renders its particular Nature Perfect or imperfect. *Relation* is still the *Thing*, according to that in it which grounds our comparing it to others. Now, as we can consider the *Thing* according to its *Modes* or *Accidents*, so we can have another Notion or Consideration of the *Thing* as to its own self, abstracting from all these former Considerations ; or a Notion of the *Thing*, (not according to any Mode it has, but) precisely according to its *Itselfship* (as we may

may say ) or Reality ; that is, in order to *Being* ; or ( which is the same ) we can consider it precisely and formally as an *Ens*, *Res*, *Substance* or *Thing* ; and all we can say of it, *thus consider'd*, is, that 'tis capable to be actually. For, since we see Created Things have *Actual Being*, yet so that they can *cease to be* ; all that we can say of them, (thus consider'd) is, that they are *Capable to be*. Besides, since we see they *have Being*, were this *Actual Being* or Existence *Essential* to them, they would *be of themselves*, and so *could not but be* ; and, consequently, must *always be* ; which our common Reason and Experience contradicts ; in regard we know them to have been *made* ; and we see many of them daily *Produced*, and others *Corrupted*. This Discourse is built on this Principle, that all our *Ideas* or *Notions* ( and amongst them the *Notion* of *Substance* or *Thing* ) are but so many *Conceptions* of the *Thing* ; or which ( taking the Word [ *Conception* ] *objectively* ) is the same, the *Thing thus* or *thus conceiv'd* ; which, besides what's said here, is prov'd at large in my Second and Third Preliminaries.

4. Now, according to this Explication, which when we are distinguishing the *Notion* of *Thing* or *Substance* from its *Modes* ( as both of us are here ) is evidently true ; it is so far from being Impossible to *know*, even *distinctly*, what the Word [ *Substance* ] or, which is the same [ *Thing* ] means, or what *Substance* is, that it is impossible to be *ignorant* of it. For, every one must needs know what it is *to be* ; since without knowing *this*, we could not understand any thing another *says*, nor what our selves

*We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance or Thing.*



selves *think*; for all this is perform'd by *Affirming* or *Denying*, express'd by [*is*] or [*is not*], which speak *Actual Being*, or *not Being*. And 'tis in a manner *Equally Impossible* not to *know* what [*Capacity*] or [*Power*] means; which are the only Ingredients of [*Capable to be*], which is the very formal Conception of *Ens*, as 'tis precisely *Ens*; or, of the *Thing* according to the meer Notion of *Substance*, taking that Word in a Logical Sense, as 'tis distinguish'd from *Accidents*; and not in a Grammatical one (as it were) for a *Supporter* of the *Accidents*; for, this is a *Secondary* Sense of [*Thing*], and does not signifie what *it is in it self*, or according to its *Primary* and precise Notion, as is noted above; but, according to what Respect or Consideration it bears to *others*, or *other* Notions.

5. Thus far concerning the *Idea* or Notion of *Substance* in *Common*, or taken as abstracted from its *Modes* or *Accidents*. Descending thence to such and such *sorts* of *Substances*, and keeping still in that Line, 'tis plain that there goes *more* to *their* Composition, than there did to constitute the bare Notion of *Substance* it self; and therefore the *Modes* or *Accidents* must be taken in (for there is nothing *else* in Nature imaginable) to constitute them *such* and *such*: Wherefore, the *Complexion* of *these Accidents* which *constitutes* them of *such* or *such* a Nature, and nothing else, is (as the Schools phrase it) their *Substantial* or *Essential Form*. And, if we go yet lower, there will need still a *greater* Complexion, or a *Decomposition* of *Accidents* for the same Reason; and so still *more*, till we come to an

*We know the more  
Inferiour Notions  
of Things less  
perfectly;*

*Individual Thing*; or, as they call it, the *Substantia Prima*; which, only, is in proper Speech, *A Thing*, because It only is *Capable of Existing*. But, when we are got to this lowest Step in the *Climax of Substance*, I mean to the *Individuum* or *Suppositum*, which includes in it *all* the Modes that constituted the Superiour and Inferiour Natures above it, and those innumerable Accidents over and above, which distinguish it from all other *Individuums* of its own kind, and by which it is perfectly determin'd to be *This* in particular, and *no other*; then, 'tis no wonder our bewilder'd Thoughts are lost in a Wood; it being impossible for us to conceive, find out, much less to know *distinctly* the confused Medley of those Numberless Accidents or Modifications found in the *Suppositum*, which do *completely* constitute its *Individual Essence*.

6. And hence arises Mr. Locke's first Difficulty, and his Apprehension that we can make nothing of the *Idea of Substance*. But, he may please to reflect, that we ought to distinguish between the Notion of a *Thing* or *Substance* taken as *Involving* all the Modes aforesaid; and the Notion of *Thing*, as *Excluding*, *Abstracting* from, and *Contradistinguish'd* to to them all; in which *later* Sense I take it here, and himself too, as appears by his Considering it as a *Supporter to the Accidents*. Which done, I am confident his Difficulty will be at an End: For this is as ealie to be done, as 'tis to see the Difference between the meer Notion of *Thing*, (or  
what's

To gain a Distinct  
Notion of Sub-  
stance or Thing,  
we must consider  
it abstractedly  
from its Modes,  
singly consider'd.

what's *Capable to be* ) and *such a Thing*, or *Capable to be of such or such a Nature*. Next, he thinks that all we can make of the *Idea of Substance* is, that it is a *Substratum*, or *Supporter of the Accidents*. To which I Answer, that if we consider *Substance* in reference to its *Modes*, we do indeed make such a Metaphorical Conception of it ; but *not*, if we do ( as we ought when we consider it *singly* ) conceive it as 'tis *in its self*, or as to its *own* precise *Notion*, or *Idea*. 'Tis partly the Impropriety and Unfitness of the Word [*Substance*] ( as I have noted Preliminary 5. § 10, 11. ) and partly the Blundering Explication of the Common School-men, which breeds all this perplexity. And, indeed, 'tis no wonder, if, when we take *Metaphorical Words Literally*, we find our selves at a loss, and that our Thoughts ramble into Extravagancies. The Literal Truth of the whole business is this in short, which who ever does not well reflect on, and carry along with him, ( the Distinction of our Notions depending on it, ) I dare confidently affirm must necessarily discourse *Confusedly*, and *Incoherently*.

7. The *Thing*, or *Individuum*, as it stands in Nature, does ( as was said ) contain in its self what grounds, corresponds to, and verifies thousands of Different Notions or Conceptions which we may make of it. We cannot, as Experience teaches us, wield or manage *all or more* of those Notions at once ; and, therefore, our Knowledge of it ( taken as it is in Nature, or in the *Bulk* ) is so *Confused*, that we know not *distinctly* what it is, more than to see

*The Literal Truth how Substance and its Accidents, or the Thing and its Modes are distinctly known.*

and experience that it *is*, and is *Distinguish'd* from all others. The only way then to gain a *Clear* and *Distinct* Knowledge of it, is to *take it in pieces* (as it were) by our various Considerations of it, and frame *many* Partial, Inadequate or Abstracted Notions of it. All these Notions, how many soever they be, are either of *Res*, or of *Modus rei*; that is, either they must be the Notions or Natures of *Thing*, or of *such a Thing*; and both the *first* of them, and also all the *rest*, are nothing but the *Thing* diversly Consider'd. The Conceptions, or Notions of the *Modes* or Accidents are innumerable; but there is only *One* which is the Conception of *Thing* it self, which we find to be this, that 'tis *Capable to be* or *exist*; and, this Notion, or (which is the same) the *Object* thus consider'd, we call *Ens*, *Res*, *Substance* or *Thing*. The other Notions we have of it, such as are *Big*, *Qualify'd*, *Related*, &c. have neither *Being*, nor any *Order to Being* in their signification, or peculiar Notion, as had the *other*. Wherefore, since Nature tells us that we must *first* conceive the *Thing to be*, ere we can conceive it *to be after such and such a manner*; nor can the *Mode* or *Manner* be apprehended *to be* of its single self *capable to be*, otherwile than as it is *annext* to what's *Capable to be* by its self, or by its own peculiar Nature, that is, as it is *identifi'd* with it; therefore no *Mode* or *Accident* can *exist* by *Virtue* of its own *Idea* or *Notion*, but in *Virtue* of the *Notion* of *Thing* or *Substance*; with which, therefore, tho' *formally Different*, they are all *materially Identifi'd*. Or thus, more briefly: Had not the *Thing* somewhat in it which grounds this true Conception of it, that 'tis *Capable to be*; none of



of the Accidents ( they *all* wanting in their Notion any Order to *Being* ) could be conceiv'd to be at all. And this, in Literal Truth, is the great Mystery of those Positions, about which Disputants in the Schools, blinded with their own ill-understood Metaphors, have so long, like *Andabatae*, fought in the dark about such Questions as these, *viz.* Whether the *Essence* of the Accidents is their *Inexistence*, or *Inherence* in the *Substance*; Whether the *Substance* *supports* them in *Being*: Is their *Substratum*, or the *Subject*, in which, those Accidental Forms, do *Inhere*? Then, in pursuance of their Fanciful Metaphor, some of them begin to cast about how those *Forms* are *United* to the *Subject* or *Substance*, or come to be *received* in it; in order to which, and that nothing may be wanting to do the work thorowly, they coyn a new connecting little Entity, call'd an *Union*, to soder them together, and so, instead of making it *One* Entity, they very wisely make *Three*. All which Conceits, if we look narrowly into them, have at the bottom this mistake, that all our several *Conceptions* have so many distinct *Entities* in the Thing corresponding to them. Which vast Errour both perverts all true Philosophy, and is against a First Principle in Metaphysics, by making *Unum* to be *Divisum* in se, or *One* Entity to be *Many*. Now, if these Modes be *Things*, or ( to speak more properly ) if the Notion of every *manner* of a Thing be the formal Notion of the *Thing* it self, or of *what's* *Capable of Existing*; first, the Nature of *Modes* is destroy'd; for they will be no longer the [ *How*, ] but the [ *What*; ] and the Nature or Notion of *Substance*, or *Ens*, is lost too; for, if all the Modes

are Distinct Entities, or *Capable of Existing*, they must all be *Substances*; which blends all the Notions Mankind has, or can have, (on the perfect *Distinction* of which, all Science is grounded,) in a perfect Confusion; and, consequently, reduces all our *Knowledge* to a *Chaos of Ignorance*.

8 But I wonder most, how this Learned Man can think none knows what *Extension* is. We cannot open our Eyes, but they inform us, that the Air, and other Bodies which which we see, are not cramp'd into an Indivisible, but are vastly *Expanded*, or (which is the same) *Extended*. May we not as well say we may see Light, and yet have no *Notion* of it? And, does not himself make *Extension* to be one of his Simple *Ideas*, the Knowledge of which goes along with all the Knowledges we have of Bodies; and, withall, *resembles* the *Thing*; For what, thinks he, serves an *Idea*, but to make Men *Know* by it what it represents; or, consequently, an *Idea* of *Extension*, but to make us *know Extension*? Perhaps he may think we cannot know it, because we cannot *define* or *explicate* it, but in Words *Equivalent* to it. But, first, this Objection has no Ground; because all Definitions and Explications in the World are the *same Sense* with the Notion they Define and Explicate; and, were it not so, they would be no Definitions nor Explications of *that* Notion; for they do no more but give us *all the Parts* of the Entire Notion, and *all the Parts* are the same as the *Whole*. Next, how does it follow, that, because we cannot *explicate* it, we do not *know* it? Whereas, the *direct contrary* follows in

in our present Case: For, the *commonest* Notions can the *worst* be defin'd. because they *least* need it, being *Self-known*, or Self-evident. Not all the Wit of Man can Define and Explicate what it is to be; and, yet, all Mankind knows it *perfectly*, or else it is impossible they, not knowing what the *Copula* means, should know the Truth or Falseness of any Proposition whatever. Thirdly, He seems to think that (as some of the School-men do imagin) Contradictory Positions may follow out of the Notion of *Extension*; else, why should he imagin the Difficulties concerning it are *Inextricable*: Which I must declare against, as the *worst* piece of *Scepticism*, next to the denying all First Principles. For, if Contradictory Positions may follow out of any Notion taken from the *Thing*, then that Notion, and consequently the Thing it self, would not have any *Metaphysical Verity* in it, but be purely *Chimerical*. Add, that the learned *Thomas Albius*, in his Excellent Preface before the Latin Edition of Sir *Kenelm Digby's Treatise of Bodies*, has clearly solv'd those Imaginary Contradictions.

9. To shew the Difficulty of Knowing *Extension*, he objects, that no Reason can be given for the *Cohesion* of the Parts of Extended Matter. If he means, that we can give no *Physical* Reason for it, or such an one as fetch'd from the Qualities or Operations of Bodies, I grant it; for all those Qualities and Operations are *subsequent* to the Notion of *Extension*, and Grounded on it: But, if he thinks there cannot be a far *Better* and *Clearer* Reason given from the Su-

The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs, and can only be known by Metaphysics.

pream Science, *Metaphysicks*, I deny it. I explain my self; All Positions that concern the *Essences* of *Things*, or *Modes* either, do belong to the Object of *Metaphysicks*; so that, whoever makes the *Natures* or *Essences* of any of these [*not to be what they are,*] is most clearly convinced, by his violating that *Metaphysical First Principle*, [*A Thing is what it is,*] to maintain a clear Contradiction. If then *Divisibility* be the *Essence* of *Quantity*, and *Divisibility* signifies *Unity* of the Potential Parts of *Quantity*; and *Continuity* (as making those Parts formally *Indivisas in se*) be evidently the *Unity* proper to those Parts; it follows, that *Quantity* being the Common Affection of *Body*, does *formally*, and as *necessarily*, make its *whole* Subject, that is, *all its parts*, *Continu'd*, or *Coherent*; as *Duality* does make a *Stone* and a *Tree* formally *Two*; or *Rotundity* in a *Body* makes it *Round*; or any other *Formal Cause* is engag'd by its very *Essence* to put its *Formal Effect*, which would induce a Clear Contradiction if it should not.

10. 'Tis not in this Occasion only, but in many others too, that Great Scholars puzzle their Wits to find out *Natural Causes* for divers Effects, the true Reason for which is only owing to *Trans-natural* ones, or from these *Altissimæ Causæ*, which only *Metaphysicks* give us; and it happens also, not seldom, that Men beat their Brains to find out *Efficients* for that which depends only on *Formal Causes*; whose *most certain* Causality depends on no *Second Causes*, but only on the *First Cause*,  
 God's

Whence 'tis in vain  
 to seek for *Natural*  
*Efficient Causes*  
 for those Effects  
 that depend  
 on *Formal Causes*.



God's Creative Wisdom, which establish'd their Essences *to be what they are*. Let any one ask a Naturalist, why Rotundity does formally make a Thing *Round*, and you will see what a Plunge he will be put to, not finding in all Nature a Proper Reason for it. The same, in other Terms, is the Ground of Mr. *Locke's* Perplexity how Extended Parts do *cohere*; to which, the properest and most Satisfactory Answer is, because there is *Quantity* in them, which is Essentially *Continued*; and, so does Formally give *Coherence* of Parts to *Body*, its Subject. By the same means we have a Clear Reason afforded us, why Bodies *impell* one another; which Mr. *Locke* thinks is Inexplicable. For, putting one Body to be thrust against another, the Body that is *Passive* must either be shov'd forwards, or there must necessarily be Penetration of Parts; unless, perhaps, at first, the Impulsive Force be so slight and leisurely, that it is able to cause only some Degree of Condensation. Every thing therefore *acting as it is*, if the Body, or the Quantity of it, be *Extended*, or have one Part *without* the other, and, therefore it be impossible its Parts should be *penetrated*, or be one *within* the other, the Motion of the Passive Body must necessarily ensue.

II. To proceed: Mr. *Locke* makes account we have as clear a Knowledge of Spirits, as we have of Bodies; and then argues, that we ought no more to deny the Existence of *Those*, than of *These*. Which I should like well, did he maintain and prove first, that the Nature of Bodily Substances is *clearly Intelligible*: But, to make these Notions which are most

*We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion.*

most Essential and Proper to Bodies, and most Obvious of all others, *viz.* their *Entity* or *Substance*, and their *Extension*, to be *Unintelligible*; and then to tell us, that *The Idea of Spiritual Natures are as Clear as that of Bodily Substance*, which he takes such pains to shew is *not Clear at all*, is, as I conceive, no great Argument for their *Clearness*, nor their *Existence* neither; but rather, a strong Argument against both: The Parallel amounting to this, that we know not what to make either of the one, or of the other.

12. As for the Knowledge we have of *Spiritual* Natures, my Principles oblige me to discourse it thus: We can have no Proper or Direct Notions of Spiritual Natures, because they can make no Impressions on our Senses; yet, (as was shewn \* above,) our Reflexion on the Operations, and Modes which are in our Soul,

\* Reflex. 9. § 7. make us acknowledge those *Modes* are not *Corporeal*; and therefore, that the Immediate Subject of those *Modes* (our Soul) is not a *Body*, but of another nature, vastly different, which we call *Spiritual*. Our Reason assures us also, \* by demonstrating that the first Motion of Bodies could neither proceed immediately from

\* See Method to Science, B. 4. C. 6. §. 18.

God, nor from our *Soul*, (which *presupposes* both that, and many other Motions, to her Being,) that there must be *another* sort of *Spiritual Nature*, distinct from our Soul, from which that Motion proceeds; which therefore being Active, and so *in Act* it self, is not a *Compart*, but a *Whole*, and *Subsistent alone*; which we call *Angels*: Their Opera-

Operations prove they have *Actual Being*, and therefore a *fortiori* they are *capable to be*, or *Things*. Whence we must correct our **Negative** Expressions of them by our Reason; and hold, they are *Positive Things*; all Notions of *Thing* being *Positive*. Farther, we can as evidently discourse of those Beings, or *Things*, tho' *Negatively* express'd, as we can of any Body: *v. g.* if an Angel be *Non-quantus*, we can demonstrate it is *Non-extensus*, *Non-locabilis*, &c. and, from its having no *Matter*, or *Power*, which is the Ground of all *Potentiality* and *Change*, 'tis hence collected, that 'tis a *Pure Act*; and, therefore, that *once Determin'd*, it is *Immutable*, at least *Naturally*. Lastly, I affirm, that, this presuppos'd, we can discourse *far more clearly* of *Spirit*, than of *Bodies*: For, there are thousands of *Accidents* belonging, *intrinsically* or *extrinsically*, to every *Individual Body*, whence all our *Confusion*, and *Ignorance* of it comes; whereas, in a *Pure Spirit*, there are only three or four *Notions*, *viz.* *Being*, *Knowledge*, *Will* and *Operation*, for us to *Reflect* on, and *Manage*; and, therefore, the *Knowledge* of them is (as far as this *Consideration* carries) *more Clearly attainable*, than is the *Knowledge* of *Bodies*.

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REFLEXION *Fourteenth,*

## ON

*The 24th, 25th, 26th, and 27th*  
CHAPTERS.

1. **T**HE 24th Chapter [*Of the Collective Ideas of Substance*] gives me no Occasion to reflect. Only when he lays (as it were) for his Ground, that *the Mind* has a Power to compare, or collect many Ideas into one, I am to suppose he means, that the Mind does not this of her self *alone*, without the Joint-acting of the Body, as has been often prov'd above; for, otherwise, the *whole*, or the *Man*, cannot be said to be the Author of that Action.

2. The 25th Chapter gives us the true Notion of *Relation*, and very clearly express'd; which he seconds with divers other Solid Truths, *viz.* That *some Terms which seem Absolute are Relatives*; that *Relation can be only betwixt two Things*; and that *All things are capable of Relation*. What I reflect on is, that he gives us not the true Difference between *Real* and meerly *Verbal Relations*; nor the true Reason why some *Relative Terms have*, and others *have not Correlates*. He thinks the Reasons why we call some of them *Extrinfecal Denominations* (which is the same

*Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language, but for want of a Real Ground.*



same with *Verbal Relations* ) proceed from *Defect* in our Language, or because we want a Word to signify them: Whereas, this matters not a Jot; since we can have the *Idea* or *Notion* of Relation in our Minds, if we have *good Ground* for it, whether we have a Word to signify it or no; or rather, if we have a *Real Ground* for it, we shall quickly invent either some one Word, or else some Circumlocution to express it. Let us see then what our Principles in this Affair say to us.

3. *Relation* is not here taken for our *Act* of Relating, (for then it would belong to another common Head of Notions, call'd *Action* ) but for the *Thing* as it is referred by our Comparative Power to another; Wherefore, there must be some *Ground* in the Thing for our thus referring in; and, consequently, if the Relation be *new*, or such a one as before *was not*, there must be some *Novelty* in the Thing it self to *ground* it. Whence follows that, if there be such a *Real Ground* on the one side only, and *no Real Ground* on the other, there will be a *Real Relation* on the one side, and *no Real Relation* on the other, but only a *Verbal* one, or an *Extrinfecal Denomination*; Answering, or (as it were) Chiming Grammatically to the Term which is *really* Relative, v. g. Our Powers of *Seeing* or *Understanding* any thing, have a *Real Relation* to their proper Objects; both because such Objects *Specify* the Power, or make it *such* a Power, that is, give it its peculiar or distinct *Essence*; as also, because the Power is by the Object *actuated* and *determin'd* to act; that is, the Power is *intrinsically Chang'd*, or *otherwise* than it was, by means of the Object; but the Object suffers *no* kind of *Change*, nor is it at all *Alter'd*, or *otherwise*

wife than it was by being *known* or *seen*. Whence the Intellectual or Vivive Powers are really Related to the Object ; but the Objects, for want of a *Real Ground*, are *not* really Related back to the Powers ; however the Words [ *Understood* ] or [ *seen*, ] do Verbally answer to the Acts of *Understanding* and *Seeing* ; which is, therefore, call'd by the Schools in their barbarous Language [ *Relatio dedici* ] or an Extrinsic Denomination. For farther Light in this very necessary Particular, I refer my Reader to my *Method*, Book 1. Less. 7. where, if I flatter not my self, he will find the Notion of *Relation* treated of very fully and clearly. Especially I recommend to his Perusal the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th Section, where I discourse of that *Unmutual Relation of the Measure to the Thing measured* ; the exact Knowledge of which is far more useful than any other piece of this Subject ; however it lay out of Mr. *Locke's* Road to take notice of such Speculations as regard, or not regard, the *Thing* as their Ground.

3. Reviewing his 26th Chapter, ( *of Cause and Effect, &c.* ) I found that he acquaints us very exactly, how we gain the *Ideas* of them by our Senses ; but he proceeds not to show us, ( which yet he often does in other occasions ) in what the nature of *Causality* consists, which is of the Chiefest use in Philosophy. For, what is the Learned part of the World the better, for having those *rudest Draughts*, or ( as Mr. *L.* well calls them ) *materials* of Knowledge, *Ideas* or *Notions*, or for knowing how we *come by them*, ( in which he very frequently terminates his Enquiries, ) if we do not by

Re-

Reflexion and Reason, *polish and refine* them, and thence attain to true Knowledge of the Things, from which we glean'd them ; or by what virtue they come to be *Causes* of such *Effects* ? What I conceive of *Causality* is, that 'tis the Power of Participating or Communicating some *Thing*, or some *mode* of Thing, to the Patient, which was before some way or other, in the Thing that *caus'd* it : On which point I have no occasion to dilate here particularly. Only, which concerns our present purpose, I am to note, that that which is thus *communicated* is the *Real Ground* on which the *Real Relation* of the *Effect* to its *Cause* is founded. Whence follows, that the *Cause* also, when it has some *Real Change*, by being reduced from the *Imperfecter* State of meer *Power*, to the *Perfecter* one of *Act*, or ( as we say ) *gets something* by producing such an *Effect*, will have a *Real Ground*, and Consequently a *Real Relation* to the *Effect*, and *not otherwise*. And hence it is that **God**, our *Creatour*, has no *Real Relation* to his *Creatures*, tho' they have *many* to him ; because he is no *otherwise*, nor better, in the least, by Creating them, than he had been in Case he had not Created any thing at all ; and therefore there is no Ground in *Him* of a *Real Correlation* to *them*.

4. The 27th Chapter ( of *Identity and Diversity* ) requires a deeper Consideration.

In order to which, I know no more Compendious way to clear the Point in dispute between us, than to fetch my Discourse from those Principles that concern it. The Subject does, indeed, pro-

*The Knowing the Principle of Individuation, must antecede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity.*

perly

perly belong to Metaphysicks; but I will endeavour to do what I can, to avoid those Abstracted *Mediums*, which are made use of in that Supreme Science. And, first, as the Ground work of my Discourse, I am to settle the *Principle of Individuation*, or how a particular *Thing* or *Substance*, comes to be what it is; for, this done, it will be easily seen whence we are to take our Measures, to judge when it continues the same, and when it is to be another, or a Different Thing from its former self. I discourse thus; nor will it be Tedi-ous I hope to repeat often, what is so Useful to be remember'd, as being the sure Ground of all our Knowledge.

5. All our Conceptions, by which only we can discourse of Things, are either of *Res* or *Modus rei*; that is, they are either the Notions of *Substance* or *Thing* precisely; or else, the Notions of *Accidents*. Of these the Word [*Thing*] has a very Abstracted Notion, and is perfectly Indifferent and Indeterminate to all Particulars: Wherefore the Notion of such a *Species* or sort of Thing, being (as was said above) more Determinate, must have something superadded to it to determin it, and compound or constitute it of such a *Species*; which can be nothing but such a Complexion of *Accidents* or *Modes*; there being (as was said) nothing else imaginable that can be added to the Notion of *Thing*. Now, Philosophers agreeing to call that which determines the common Notion of *thing*; and so, constitutes such and such *Species* or *Kinds* of Things [*A Substantial* or *Essential Form*;] hence, the *Substantial Form* of all the *Sorts*, *Kinds*, or *Species* of Natural Bodies can be nothing

What gives the  
Ground to Spec-  
ify all Notions.



nothing else but such a Complexion of Accidents, as fit the Thing for *such a kind* of Operation in Nature. And, hitherto, if I mistake not, Mr. Locke and I may agree in the main, however we may differ in the manner of Explicating our selves.

6. Descending then to the *Individuals*, it is evident, that a Greater Complexion of Accidents is necessary to determine and constitute the several *Individuums*, than would serve to constitute the *Species*;

*What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum.*

for, the *Species* or *Kinds* of Things are but *few*, but the *Individuums* under those *Kinds* are *Innumerable*; and, therefore, *more* goes to distinguish *these* from one another, than was needful to distinguish or determine the *other*: Whence it comes, that we can never comprehend or reach all that belongs to the *Suppositum*, or *Individuum*. Wherefore, it being a certain Maxim, that [*what distinguishes, does constitute,*] this Medley of Innumerable Accidents, which *differences* or *distinguishes* each Individuum from all the rest, does also intrinsically *constitute* those *Individuums*; or, is the Intrinsical or Formal Principle of *Individuation*. Moreover, since nothing in *Common*, or not ultimately determin'd to be *This* or *That*, is capable of *Existing*; nor, consequently, in proper Speech, a *Thing*; it follows again, that that Complexion of Accidents, which gave the Thing its Primigenial Constitution in the very first Instant it was thus ultimately *Determin'd* to be *This*, (or Different from *all others* of the same Kind,) did truly and properly *Individuate* it. Note, that this Discourse holds equally in Elementary, Mix'd,

Living, Vegetable and Animal *Individuums*; allowing only for the smaller or greater Number of Accidents, which goes to the constituting each of them respectively. Why Mr. *Locke*, who allows the Complexion of Accidents to constitute the *Specifick* Nature, should not follow the same Principle, in making a *greater* Complexion of the Modes *Intrinsically* distinguish the *Individuum* from all others, and so constitute *It*, I cannot imagin; it being so perfectly Consonant, and necessarily Consequent to his own Doctrine, and agreeable to Evident Principles.

7. Applying then this Discourse to *Man*: Since

How Individual  
Men are consti-  
tuted.

it is the constant Method of God's Wisdom, as he is the Author of Nature, to carry on the Course of it by *Dispositions* on the Matter's side; and, therefore, to adjust and fit that which *Supervenes* to what *Pre-exists*; and, especially, to sute the *Form* to the *Matter*; and, since 'tis evident that the *Embrio* *pre-exists* to the Infusion of the Soul, as the peculiar *Matter* to its *Form*; it follows, that the Soul is *adjusted* to the Bodily or *Animal* Part; and, according to the Degree, that part of it, call'd the *Fancy*, is better or worse fitted (as far as is on its side) to perform such Actions, when it is ripe; or, *more* or *less* fit to work *comparatively*, (in which all Judging and Discourſing \* consists,) there will be infused a Soul apt to *judge* and *discourse* *more* perfectly, or *less* perfectly, according as the *Matter* requires. And, were it otherwise, so that the Soul were apt to work *more* perfectly than the Body were able to go along with it; first, that

\* Method to Science, B. 2. L. 1.  
§. 10.

greater

greater Degree of Rationality in the Soul would be *lost*, and *in vain*; and next, the *Man*, God's Workmanship, would be *disproportion'd*, and, in a manner, *Monstrous* in his most Essential Parts. Putting then those Parts orderly fitted to one another, which can only be done (as was shewn) by futing the *Supervening* Part to that which *pre-existed*, it follows necessarily, that as the Bodily or (meerly) Animal *Matter* of Man, the *Embryo*, was, in the Instant before the Soul was infused, (and the *Man* made,) *individually* different from all of the same Kind, or from all other *Embryo's*; and so, was, consequently, just to *such a Degree*, fit, by the peculiar Disposition of its Brain, (as its conjoin'd Instrument,) to act with the Soul *comparatively*; so, it is impossible (the *Soul* being proportion'd to *that Matter*, as its *Form*) that any *two* Souls should be perfectly *Alike*, or *Equal* in Rationality; or rather, that any *Two Men* should have a Capacity of Knowing, or Reasoning, to the *self-same Degree*: For, were they *equally Rational*, those *two Men* would be but *one* and the *same Man Essentially*, or under the Notion of such a *Species*; in regard that, tho' they might have many Accidental Differences, yet they would have nothing in the Line of *such a Rational Ens*, or *Man*, to distinguish them *Essentially*, or make and constitute them formally *Two* such Entities, or *Things*, as we call *Men*, or *Rational Animals*.

8. This premis'd, I come to examin Mr. L's Discourses upon this Subject.

He imagins *Existence is the Principle of Individuation*; which can consist with no shew of

*Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation.*

Reason. For, since *Thing in Common* cannot exist, and therefore what's Ultimately determin'd to be *this* Thing, or an *Individuum*, can only be capable of *Actual Being*; 'tis evident that the Individual Thing must, ( in priority of Nature or Reason ) be *first* constituted such, ere it can be capable of *Existence*. Wherefore 'tis impossible that Existence, consider it how we will, can be in any manner the *Principle* of *Individuation*, the constitution of the *Individuum* being presupposed to it. Again, since, as has been shown above, the Notion of a *Thing*, or an *Individuum*, ( speaking of Creatures ) is [ *Capable to be* ] 'tis impossible that *Actual Being*, or *Existence*, should constitute the *Potentiality* or *Capacity* of *Being*, any more then the *meer Power* of walking, can constitute or denominate a Man *Actually walking*. Besides, both Logick and Metaphysicks demonstrate that, *Existence*, it being the immediate Effect of the first Cause, who is Essentially an *Infinitely-Pure Actuality of Being*, is therefore the *most Actual* of any Notion we have, or can have. Wherefore, since whatever does *difference* or distinguish Another, must necessarily be *more Actual* than the Notion Distinguish'd; it follows, that *Existence* is of its own Nature a most perfectly uniform and *Undistinguishable* Effect, that is *one* and the *same* in all Creatures whatsoever, as far as concerns its *own* precise Nature or Notion: For Reflexion will inform us clearly, that whatever Notion is *Distinguishable* is *Potential*; and that the *Distinguishing* Notion is *more Actual* than it. Since then no Notion can be *more Actual* than is that of *Existence*; it follows, it cannot possibly be *Distinguish'd* at all. Whence follows this



this Unexpected, tho' Clear, Consequence, that, if Existence does *constitute* the Individuality, all the Individuums in the world, as having *one* and the *Self-same* Constituter, would be but *one Individuum*.

9. Next, Mr. L. fancies, that the Existing of a Thing in the same *Time* and *Place*, constitutes the *Identity* of a Thing; and the being in *several Times* and *Places* constitutes its *Diversity*. By which 'tis easy to discern, that he distinguishes not between the *Extrinfecal Marks* and *Signes* by which we may *know* the Distinction of *Individuals*, and what *Intrinfecally* and *Essentially* constitutes or *makes* them *different* Things. Who sees not that *Time* and *Place* are merely *Extrinfecal* to the Notion of *Substance*, or rather *toto genere* different from it, as belonging to other Common Heads? And therefore they are too *Superficial* Considerations for their *Identity* and *Diversity* ( which are Relations grounded on their *Essence* ) to consist in them. Besides *Time* and *Place* are evidently no more, but *Circumstances* of the Thing; wherefore, that very word ( *Circumstance* ) shows plainly that they cannot be *Intrinfecal*, much less *Essential* to it; and it evidences moreover that they *suppose* the Thing already constituted, to which they are annexed. Tho' then *Practical* men may have light thence to distinguish *Individuums*; yet, it is very Improper for Philosophers, or Speculative Reflecters, to make the *Entity* of Things, which grounds the Relations of *Identity* and *Diversity*, to consist in these *Outward Signs* and *Circumstantial Tokens*.

The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essences.

10. This Learned Gentleman conceives there must be a Different Reason for the Individual Identity of *Man*. To make way to which he premises, and would persuade us *gratis*, that it is one thing to be the same *Substance*, another the same *Man*, and a third to be the same *Person*. But, I must fore-

*An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind, and an Individual Person too.*

stall all his Subsequent Discourses by denying this Preliminary to them. For, speaking of one and the same Individual Man, as he does, I must affirm that 'tis all one, nay, the same Formal Conception of him, to be the same *Substance*, *Man* and *Person*. For Example, 'tis evident that *Socrates* is one Thing under the Common Head of *Substance*, or *Ens*, descending by the *Genus* of *Animal*, and *Species* of *Homo*; whence this One Thing or *Substance* is not only Necessarily, but Formally one *Man*, because he is formally a Thing, or *Substance*, under the Kind or *Species* of *Man*; and 'tis impossible he can be under any other. Again [ *Man* ] bearing in its Essential Notion that he is an *Intelligent Being*, he is *Essentially* and Formally one *Person* too. Nor can we separate, even by our thought, one of those Considerations from another, unless we take the word [ *Substance* ] or [ *Man* ] in a Generical, or Specific Meaning for *Substance*, and *Man* in common, which we are forbid to do by our very Subject in hand, which is about the Principle of *Individuation*; or else, unless he takes *Substance* for Parts of *Matter*, with their Quantity and Figure acceding and deceding to the *Individuum*; which Things are not Essential to *Man*, nor fit him

him for his Primary Operation ; which Position follow'd home, would, perhaps, make the Individuality of *Man*, and of all Things else, alter every Moment. So that Mr. *Locke*, led by the different Sound of Words, makes Three Notions of One; and then racks his Wits to shew how this One Notion, made into Three, is distinguish'd; which we may easily foretell must render his Discourse very Extravagant, as will be seen shortly.

II. Perusing his 8th Section, I much fear that his Tenet, that Brutes are *know-*  
*ing* and *rational*, does influence his Thoughts strangely on this Occasion, and makes him dislike the Definition of *Man*, [*viz.* a *Rational Animal* ; ] and he seems here not only to take the *Idea* of

*The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar, nor from Extravagant Suppositions.*

*Individuation*, but of his very *Nature* and *Kind* too from his *Make* and *Shape* ; and then he discants on what People would think of a Thing in the Shape of a *Man*, which never used Reason any more than a Cat or Parrot ; or, of a Cat or Parrot that could *Discourse* or *Philosophize* ? I answer, I will tell him my Mind when it shall please *God* to do Miracles to help out our want of Principles ; and, in the mean time, that I think such Extravagant Suppositions, perverting the Course of Nature, should not be heard amongst Philosophers ; much less be brought *instead* of, or to *Abett*, Arguments. It would be more to purpose, if he could convince Men of Sense by Conclusive Reasons, that it is possible that *Knowledge* should be made by Artificial laying together Particles of *Matter* ; or else, if it

cannot, to prove that Brutes have *Spiritual* Natures in them: For, one of these two must necessarily be first made good, ere we can with Reason affirm, that Beasts have, or can have *Knowledge*. 'Tis *Principles* and not *Fancies* which must guide our Thoughts in such concerning Points. What I conceive Sober Men, and even the Generality, would think of such *Irrational Men* and *Rational Brutes* is this: They would think the former, if they could never be made to understand, or answer pertinently in their whole Lives, ( notwithstanding their *Make*, ) to be *no Men*; and the Later, I mean those *Philosophizing Brutes* to be either *Dewils*, or Engins acted and animated by them: So far are such wild Suppositions from giving us the Notions of Things. But the main Point ( in which Mr. *Locke* frequently mistakes ) is, that it matters not at all what People *think* or *judge*. We are indeed to take the Meanings of Words which express our Natural Notions, or Simple Apprehensions, from the Users of them, the *Populace*; but, the Applying, or Joining those Words or Notions to one another, in order to the framing *Thoughts* or *Judgments* of such Connexions, we are to take only from the *Learned*, or from the *Principles* belonging to the Sciences that treat of such Subjects, and *not at all* from the *Vulgar*; which if we did, we must judge, as many of them doubtless do, that the Moon is no bigger than a great *Cheshire Cheese*; nor one of the *Fixed Stars* so big as a Brands-end, or a Beacon on Fire.



12. The former Distinction forelaid, he proceeds to make *Personal Identity* in Man to consist in the *Consciousness* that *we are the same thinking Thing in different Times and Places*. He proves it, because *Consciousness is*

Consciousness  
cannot constitute  
Personal Identity.

*Inséparable from Thinking*, and as it seems to him, *Essential* to it. Perhaps he may have had Second Thoughts since he writ his 19th Chapter, where, § 4. he thought it probable that *Thinking is but the Action and not the Essence of the Soul*. His Reason here is, *Because 'tis impossible for any to perceive, without perceiving that he does perceive*. Which I have shewn \* above to be so far

from Impossible, that the Con- \* Reflex. 2. § 2,  
trary is such. But, to speak to 3, 4, 5.  
the Point: *Consciousness* of any

*Action* or other Accident we have now, or have had, is nothing but our *Knowledge* that it belong'd to us; and, since we both agree that we have no *Innate Knowledges*, it follows, that all both Actual and Habitual Knowledges which we have, are *Acquir'd* or *Accidental* to the Subject or *Knower*. Wherefore the Man, or that Thing which is to be the *Knower*, must have had Individuality or Personality from other Principles, antecedently to this Knowledge call'd *Consciousness*; and consequently, he will retain his Identity, or continue the same Man, or (which is equivalent) the same Person, as long as he has those Individuating Principles. What those Principles are which constituted this Man, or This Knowing Individuum, I have shewn above, §§ 6, 7. It being then most evident, that a Man must be the same, ere he can know or be Conscious that he is the same; all his laborious

Laborious Descants, and Extravagant Consequences, which are built upon this Suppositions, that *Consciousness individuates the Person*, can need no farther Reflexion.

13. Yet it is a great Truth, that Consciousness of its own Actions is *Inseparable*

*That Consciousness is Inseparable from every Individual Man.*

from a *Knowing Individual Substance*, or *Person*, and remains with it *eternally*; and (which will justify the Forensic Consideration he mentions) will *Acquit* or *Condemn*

him when he appears before God's Dread Tribunal; not because it *constitutes* its Personality, but because nothing we once *knew*, or knowing, *did*, is possible to be ever blotted out of the Soul. Whence it comes, that a Soul not only knows her self as soon as separated, (or rather, *is* then her own *First*, and most *Immediate*, and *Ever-most-present* Object,) but also, because, *then* knowing all the Course of the World, and, consequently, all the Actions of her past Life, both Good and Bad, is disposed, by the Knowledge of the *former*, and by the Consequences of them, laid by ~~God~~'s Mercy or Justice, to erect her self by *Hope* to an Ardent and Over-powering *Love* of her true Last End, which will *save* her; or, by her Knowledge, or the Consciousness of the *Latter*, to sink into *Despair*, which will plunge her into a Hell of Endless Misery. It is also true, that we are Conscious *here* of any perceptible Good or Harm that happens to our Person; because we cannot but *Reflect* on what concerns any part of our *Individuum*, which is our *Self*; which, yet, is so far from proving that our Personality *consists* in this Consciousness, that

it proves the direct contrary : For, it shews that our Person, or Individual *Self*, affected thus agreeably, or disagreeably, is the *Object* of that *Consciousness* ; and *Objects* must be *antecedent* and *presupposed* to the *Acts* which are employ'd about them, because the *Objects* are the *Cause* of those *Acts*. Nor is there any farther Mystery in the Word [*Self* ; ] for it means no more but *our own same Intelligent Individuum*, with which we are well acquainted, partly by *Direct*, partly by *Reflex* Knowledges.

14. It looks so very odly to say, that one of our own *Acts* should constitute our own particular *Essence*, ( which it must do, if our *Personal Identity* consists in our *Consciousness*, ) that I am apt to think that Mr. *Locke's* great Wit aim'd at some other Truth, tho' he hap'd to mis-apply it. I can but guess at it ; and perhaps 'tis this : 'Tis, without doubt, true, that the *Essence* of *Subsistent* Spiritual Natures, which ( as having no *manner* of *Potentiality* in them ) are *Pure Acts*, ( I mean *Angels*, ) consists in *Actual Knowledge* ; which *Act* is first of *themselves*. And, if so, why may not *this Act* of the Soul, call'd *Consciousness*, employ'd about *herself*, or her own *Actions* constitute the *Soul*, or the *Man's Personality*. But, the difference lies here, that those *Pure Spirits* having no *Matter* or *Potentiality* in them, *Annex'd* to, much less *Identify'd* with their Natures, their *Essence* is formally constituted by their being in *Act* according to their Natures ; that is, by being *Actually Knowing* : Whereas, the Soul, in this State, be-  
ing

Not Angels, who are Pure Acts, are constituted, in part, by the Act of Knowing themselves.

ing immers'd in Matter, and *Identify'd*, or making *One Thing* with her Bodily Compartment, and needing to use it as her Conjoin'd Instrument (as it were) to attain Knowledge, is therefore in a State of *Potentiality*; whence she has no *Innate Notions*, (much less *Principles*,) but is merely *Passive* in acquiring those First Rudiments of Knowledge: However, after she is thus pre-inform'd, *she* (or rather, the *Man*, according to his Spiritual Part) is, *in part*, *Active*, when he improves those Knowledges, or ripens them to Perfection, by his Reflexion and Reason, as both of us hold.

15. I see no Necessity of making any farther Remarks upon this Chapter, after I have noted some other ill-laid, and wrongly supposed Grounds, which occasion'd his Mistakes. As, First, That *the Soul of a Man is indifferently alike to all Matter*. Whereas, each Soul not being an *Assistant*, but an *Informing Form*; and, withall, being but the Form of *one Particular*, and therefore fitted (as was lately proved) to the Disposition of the particular *Pre-existent Embryo*; it can be receiv'd in *no Matter*, but *that* which is individually determin'd in it self, as to its Animality; and therefore it requires a Form distinct from *all others*, or as the Individual Constitution of the *Embryo* was. Secondly, §. 28. he makes account, *the Specifick Idea, if held to, will make clear the Distinction of any Thing into the same, and Diverse*: Whereas, our Subject (as I suppose) being about *Individual Identity, and Diversity*; how the holding to the *Specifick Idea*, in which all the *Individuums* under



under it do agree, and which makes them *one* in Nature, should clear the Distinction of *Individuals*, is altogether inexplicable. It must then be only the *Individual Idea*, or Notion, as far as we can reach it, (to which there go *more* Modes, than to the *Specific*,) and its *Intrinsic* Composition, which can *diversifie* Things Really, or make them to be Really the *same*, or *Divers*: However, some Outward Circumstances can do it, *quoad nos*. I am not much surpriz'd, that Mr. Locke, led by the Common Doctrine, does think there are no Essential Notions under that which Logicians call the *Species*: Where-

The Notion of the Individuum is Essential.

as, all *Individuals* being most properly *Distinct Things*, must have also (*Essence* being the Formal Constitutive of *Ens*) *Distinct Essences*, and so be *Essentially Distinct*. But of this, enough in my *Method*, Book I. Less. 3. §. 11. &c. His Proof of it is very plausible: But the Reader may observe, that while, §. 29. he uses the Word [*that Rational Spirit, that Vital Union,*] he supposes it *That*; that is, *Individually the same*; instead of telling us what makes it *That*. Besides, that he throughout supposes *Existence* to individuate; which is already confuted. Lastly, I observe, that, to make good his Distinction of [*Person,*] from the *Individual Substance*, and *Individual Man*, he alledges, that a Hand cut off, the *Substance* is vanish'd. By which 'tis manifest, that he takes [*Substance,*] not for the *Thing*, called *Man*, constituted by a *Soul*, as its *Form*; but, for the *Quantity* of the *Matter*, or the *Figura-*

The Substance is the same, tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go.

ration

ration of some Organiz'd Part: Whereas, taking the Word [ *Substance,* ] as he ought, for *Ens*, or *Thing*, no Alteration or Defalcation of *Matter*, Quantity, or Figure, &c. makes it *Another Substance*, or *Another Thing*; but such a Complexion of Accidents, or such a *New Form*, as makes it *unfit* for its *Primary Operation*, to which it is ordain'd, as it is a Distinct Part in Nature. Nor can this argue in the least, that *Consciousness constitutes Personality*; because this happens not only in *Men*, or *Persons*, but also in *Trees* and *Dogs*; which, if they lose a Branch, or a Leg, are still the same *Substance*, or *Thing*; that is, the same *Tree*, and the same *Dog*, as all the World acknowledges.

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REFLEXION *Fifteenth,*

## O N

*The 28th, 29th, 30th, 31th, and 32th*  
CHAPTERS.

1. **T**HE 28th Chapter [*Of other Relations*] is very Ingenious, and consonant to his his own Principles. It might; indeed, shock a less attentive Reader to see *Virtue* and *Vice* rated, or even so much as *named* so, from the Respect they have to the *Lesbian* Rule of Reputation or Fashion, call'd in Scripture *Consuetudo Sæculi*, which the more Libertine Part of the World would set up and establish as a kind of *Law*. And this, I suppose, was the Occasion that made that very Learned and Worthy Person, Mr. *Lowde*, except against it. But the Author has clear'd that Point so perfectly in his Preface, that none can now remain dissatisfy'd: For who can hinder Men from *fancying* and *naming* things as they list.

*That is only true  
Virtue, which is  
according to  
Right Reason.*

2. I take leave to discourse it thus: The word [*Virtue*] both from its Etymology and true Use, signifies *Manly*, or *becoming a Man*, taking him according to his Genuin and Undeprav'd Nature given him by **God**; that is, *Right Reason*. This *Reason*, if we use it and attend to it, will give us the Knowledge of a *Deity*: In Speculative Men,  
by

by way of *Demonstration* ; in others, by a kind of *Practical Evidence*, from their observing the Regular and Constant Order of the World, especially of the Celestial Bodies ; as likewise by their Scanning, according to their different Pitch, the Solid Grounds of the Christian Religion Reveal'd to us by **God**, viz. The certain Testimony of the Miracles, and other Supernatural ways by which it was introduced and recommended. *This* Right Reason convinces us we are to *Adore* this Supreme Being and Great Governour of the World, and to *Obey* him in those things he has manifested to us to be his Will. *This* assures us that he governs his Creatures according to the Natures he has given him ; and, therefore, that he governs Mankind according to his True Nature, *Right Reason* ; and consequently, that the *Rule of Living*, or the *Law* he has given us, is absolutely the *Best* for the Universal Good of the World, which Right Reason teaches us is to be observ'd and preferr'd before the Satisfaction of our own private Humour or Appetite ; and therefore this Rule, call'd the *Decalogue*, or *Ten Commandments*, is *most Rational*. Whence, from its being most Agreeable to Man's true Nature, *Reason*, 'tis hence styl'd *Jus Divinum Naturale*, or the *Law writ in Men's Hearts*. *This* shews how compleat a Summary of our Comportment with all others of our own kind, that Incomparable Precept is, [ *Do the same to others as you would they should do to you* ] and that a Rule so short and plain in *Words*, and so comprehensive and universally Beneficial in *Sense*, could only be dictated by a Divine Master. *This* assures us that, if this Infinitely Great and Good Governour does, to elevate and perfect Souls, oblige them to *believe* any



any other and higher Points, especially such as are Uncouth to the Course of the World, or to Natural Reason, he will, out of his Wisdom and Goodness, give us such Convincing *Grounds* for our Belief of them, as shall *overpower* the Repugnance of our *Fancies*, and *oblige* us according to Principles of Right Reason to assent to them as *Truths*. *This* tells us also, thro' our Reflexion on the Goodness, Piety and Peaceableness of Christian Doctrine, that the Principles of it (that is, the Doctrine it self) are *True* and *Sacred*; and lets us see how infinitely we are bound to his Favour, and Merciful Kindness, for enlightning us with so Sacred a Law, and so every way conformable to Right Reason. And, if any Company or Sort of Men have, out of the Depravedness of their Nature, fram'd to themselves, and introduced any *other* Rules of Manners, grounded upon Vain-Glory, False Reputation, or any other new-fangl'd Conceits of their own Invention; *v. g.* if they would strive to Legitimate, and make pass for Current and Unblameable Morality, Duelling, Excessive Drinking, Swearing, Whoring, Cheating, &c. *This* tells us how *Unmanly*, and far from Right Reason, those Actions are; and how the World could not long subsist, did Men take their private Revenge, beset their Brains continually with Excess; Blaspheme, or needlessly and carelessly (that is, irreverently) flubber over *God's* Holy Name, which alone gives Majesty and Authority to all those Sacred Laws; or, did they live promiscuously with Women, or take away all they could get from other Men. *This* Right Reason, abetted by Costly Experience, shews us what pernicious Consequences, and Inconveniencies of

many kinds, do amend the Breach of those Laws, instituted for the Universal Good of the World; and, how all the Course of our Life is disjointed, and out of Frame, when we once yield the Conduct of it to Passion and Vice. Lastly, 'Tis this Light of True Reason, which makes those who are conscious to themselves that they have deviated enormously from this Rule, look upon themselves as Debauchers and Deserters of their Reason, which is their *Nature*; as Breakers and Contemners of the Law (not of the Land, but) of the *World*, and Disregarders of the Law-giver himself; as Base, Mean, Corrupted, and Rotten at the Heart, Degenerate from their own true Nature; and, therefore, (unless they reform themselves,) utterly incapable of being promoted to that Perfection and Happiness, to which the ever ready Generosity of their Infinitely-Bountiful **God** and Maker, would otherwise advance them; and, moreover, as Liable to all those most Dreadful Punishments, which the Anger of so great a Majesty, justly provok'd, will certainly inflict on them. Whence ensues Interior Heart-gnawing Sorrow, and Stings of Conscience; and, if they persist, Despair and Damnation. These Things consider'd, and *Virtue* being Nothing but *Right Reason* (Man's true Nature) employ'd about Fitting Objects, in Fitting Occasions, I do not think we are to attend to what Irrational Men, Libertines, or Humourists call *Virtue* or *Vice*, and esteem *Laudable* or *Blameable*; but to what *Right Reason*, the only *Establish'd* and *Impartial Standard* in this Case, teaches us to be *truly such*: And, I think it had been better, and more unexceptionable, to have called such good and bad Dispositions [Re-

puted

puted Virtues and Vices,] than to join those Qualities in an Univocal Appellation with those Rational or Irrational Habits, which only, in proper Speech, are truly such.

12. As to the 29th Chapter, [of Distinct and Confused Ideas,] I cannot think that *the Confusion of Ideas, is in reference to their Names*; but springs mostly from the Reasons assign'd

*How we come to have Confused Ideas, or Notions.*

by himself, §. 3. For, what are Names, but the Words which *signifie* those Ideas? The Idea, then, is in my Mind, *what it is*, and *such as it is*, independently of those Names; as being there *before* I named it. And the same Reason holds, for keeping up the Distinction of those Ideas; for the Notions will be still what they were, whether *one* Name or *Another* be imposed on them: And, I think Mr. Locke agrees with me, that they are like Figures, which, the least detracted, or added, makes the Idea be quite *another*. If one talks to me of a *Mufti*, and I take that Word to signifie a *Rat-catcher*, my Idea of a *Rat-catcher* is the same as if the Word [*Rat-catcher*] had been us'd, tho' the Reference of the Idea to that Name be as wrong as may be. Or, if I speak of an *Individuum*, call'd *Longinus*, and another takes that Word to signifie a *Yerd*; my Idea is *confused*, being of an *Individuum*; and his *Distinct*, tho' the Word be the same. So, if the same Person, rectify'd as to the Meaning of any Word, takes it *now* in a different Sense than he did *formerly*, then he has another Idea by it than he had; but yet, both his *former*, and his *New-got* Idea are still unalterably and perfectly distinct. But, I observe, that Mr. Locke attributes many Things to Words and Names; which, whe-

ther it be his Over-acuteness, or my Dulness, I can make nothing of. What I conceive of *Confus'd Ideas*, is this: In two Cases chiefly they are *Confus'd*, *viz.* when there is a Confusion in the Things themselves from which they are taken, and to which they Correspond; as, when too many Considerabilities are blended together (as it were) in the same *Suppositum*, or *Individuum*; or, that the Object it self consists of *Many* Things; as, a Heap, an Army, a Sack of Wheat, &c. Or else, when the Object is not well represented, either by Defect of the Organ, the Distance of the Object, or the ill Disposition of the *Medium*. To this latter sort belongs the Imperfection of our Understanding; which, not able to comprehend the whole *Thing*, is forced to make many Inadequate *Ideas* or Notions of it; which, not reaching to *particularize* the Thing, must therefore be *Common*, or *General*, as containing more under them *Indeterminately*, that is, *Confusedly*. In two Cases also, *Names* seem to cause in us *Confused Ideas*: One, when the Word is *perfectly Equivocal*, and signifies neither Sense *determinately*. The other, when a Multitude of Words are huddled together *inartificially*, or stammer'd out *unintelligibly*; to which we may add, our not understanding the Language thorowly. In which Cases, we have either no Notion at all, or, if any, a very *Confused* one. And these seem to me the only solid Ways to breed *Confused Ideas*, as being taken from the Nature of the *Things*, and of their Circumstances; and from the Nature of the *Words*, as *Words*; that is, from their *Significativeness*. As for the *Secret and Unobserved References*, the Author speaks of, *which the Mind makes of its Ideas* to such

Names,



Names, I must confess, I know not what it means, more than that the Understanding knows perfectly, or imperfectly, what the Word stands for, or ( which is the same ) what is its *true* and proper *Meaning*. Concerning *Infinity*, of all sorts whatever, I have said enough formerly, on divers Occasions.

3. The 3<sup>rd</sup> Chapter needs no *New* Reflexion.

The 3<sup>rd</sup>, [ *Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas*, ] has in it much of true Philosophy ; especially, where he makes the *Essences* of Things consist in the Complexion

*The whole Thing, as it needs not, so it cannot be known clearly.*

of the Modes or *Accidents*. I grant, that *whole* Complexion is not knowable by us in this State : But, why have not we as much Knowledge of them as is necessary for us ? Or, why must we think we know *Nothing* of them, unless we have ( over and above our Use ) all those superfluous Degrees of the Knowledge of Things, as may satisfy also our Curiosity, or Humour ? By those Accidents of *Gold*, which we know, we can discern Gold, *Ordinarily*, from other Metals : Or, if any Cunning Fellow would impose upon Nature and us, and undermine that slighter Knowledge of the Generality, to cheat them ; **God** has furnish'd us ( especially those whose peculiar Concern it is ) with Means to countermine their Sophisticating Arts. I grant too, that our *Idea* of Individual Substances is not *Adequate* ; but, if an Imperfect Notion of them be sufficient for our purpose, and withall, most suitable to our Imperfect Understanding, why should we desire more.

4. Moreover, there is another Reason, of a higher Nature, and most Supreamly Wise, grounded on what the Metaphysicians term *Altissima Cause*, which we call *First Principles*, why this Complexion of Accidents should be so Numerous, and Millions of Ways variable.

*The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents which constitutes Individuums, should be almost infinitely various.*

It becomes the **God** of Truth, so to order his World, that Things should be a *Gr. und for Truth*. Now, had there not been almost as Infinite Variety of those Modes which constitute, and, consequently, distinguish, every *Individuum*; it might happen, there being such an innumerable Multitude of those Individual Things, that some *Two* of them, which, by being *Two*, must be *Different*, would yet differ in nothing, or in no respect, or Mode; and so, they would be *One*, and not *One*; which is a Contradiction. Nay, not only divers Things, but each discernable and Divisible Part of the same Thing, however seemingly Uniform, must have a *various* Complexion of those Modes, to distinguish them. For Example; Let a 20s. Piece of Gold be divided into Forty Parts; each Part, after Division, being now a *Whole*, and a *Distinct Thing* from all the rest, must either have some *Distinct Modes* in it, to distinguish it from all the others, or it would be *Distinct*, and yet *Not distinct*, (having nothing to distinguish it;) that is, it would be *One Thing*, and yet *Not one Thing*; or rather, the *same Part*, and yet *Not the same Part*; and this in the same respect, (*viz.* under the Notion of *Substance, Thing, or Part*;) which is a perfect Contradiction. Wherefore, the **God** of Nature, who is always *Essential Truth*, has so order'd

der'd it, that Things, and each part of Things, how minute soever, should have a Ground in them of *differing from one another*, as whoever is us'd to Microscopes, will easily discover. As for what concerns *us*, this Inconceivable Variety tasks our Industry, employs our Speculation, and raises our Contemplation, by making us see that **God's** Wisdom is infinitely exalted in the *least* of his Creatures; and by obliging us to break out into Transports of Admiration, \* *Ecce,*

*Deus magnus vincens Scientiam nostram.* \* Job 36. 26.

5. Since then we see and experience that Things *do* exist, and therefore (nothing being Able to do what 'tis *not* Capable to do) are Capable of Being *Actually*, or Existing; since we know they existed not of themselves, or by virtue of their *Own Essence*; and therefore, that to be *meerly* or purely Capable of Existing, is the very Nature or Notion of Created Things, considering them precisely according to the Notion of *Toing or Substance*. Since we know the Last Distinction, or Individuation, of Things thus consider'd, consists intrinsically in the Complexions of Modes or Accidents, which ultimately determins them to be *this*; and since, withall, we have such *Outward Marks* and Signs of their Individuality, from their Existing in the same Time and Place, and other such like Circumstances, (in which Sense, and not in making them *intrinsically* constitute the *Individuum*, Mr. Locke's Doctrin in this Point is admitted.) Lastly, Since there are the highest Reasons imaginable, that this Individual Complexion

*We can sufficiently know Things without comprehending fully this Complexion.*

of Accidents should be impossible to be comprehended by us in this State; let us content ourselves with this sufficient Knowledge which we have of them, without grasping foolishly at more than we are able to fathom.

6. In my Judgment this Acute Author might have excused this 32th Chapter, [Of True and False Ideas.] He grants they cannot properly be True or False *in themselves*; and *Ideas or Notions*, being nothing but the Nature of the Thing (as thus or thus conceiv'd) in our Minds, can have no Consideration belonging to them, but what they *are in themselves*, or that they *are what they are*, which is called their *Metaphysical Verity*; and therefore (as he says well) *they can no more be True or False, than a single Name can be said to be such.* The Improper Truth or Falshood which he seems willing to attribute to them, belongs (as he also intimates) to *Judgments*; that is, to the *Connexions* of his *Ideas*, and not to the *Ideas* or Notions themselves, which are the *Parts* that are capable to be connected. But, if *This* Truth or Falshood (which Mr. Locke would force his Reason to shew,) can *any way* belong to them, it will not be *Improperly* but *Properly* such; for Truth and Falshood are *most properly* found in *Judgments*, and *only* in them. Wherefore, either *no* Formal Truth or Falshood *at all* can belong to *Ideas*, or it must be *Proper* Truth or Falshood; which is what the Author denies, as contrary to his Intention.



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# REFLEXIONS

ON THE

THIRD BOOK.

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REFLEXION *Sixteenth,*

ON

*The Subject of this whole Book.*

I. IN the 5th Section of the First Chapter, the Grounds are well laid to shew how *Metaphorical* and Improper Conceptions and Names come; and how they are *Translated* from those Notions which arise from Impression on the Senses. For, to have *Senses* being common to all Mankind; and, withall, they being, (with a very small difference) apt to be affected by Objects after the *same manner*, the Notions thus imprinted are *Natural* and *Common*; and, therefore, the Words that Men agree on, or by Use establish, to signify such Notions, are *Proper*; the Universal Use

*Whence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and Words have their Origin.*

Use of them, and the General Consent that they should signifie those Natural Notions, making them current, and giving them this Propriety. Whereas, the Notions we have of Spiritual Natures, and of the Operations of our Mind produced by it, not being *imprinted Naturally*, but got by *Reflexion*, have no Words or Names which Mankind agrees to call them by. Whence we are forced to make use of our Natural Notions and Expressions, ( with some Additions annex'd, to shew their Difference ) to signifie our *Reflex Ideas*; and, therefore, the Conceptions we have of *such Natures*, and consequently the *Names* by which we signifie them, being *Transferr'd* from the *Natural* ones to them, are called *Metaphorical*.

2. As for Rules to know the right Sense of Words, as far as relates to Philosophy, there can be but Two in General, *viz.* that the *Sense of Those Words or Names which express our Natural Notions, which are common to all Mankind, is to be taken from the Vulgar*; and, the *Sense of Artificial Words from the Masters in those respective Arts*; these Two sorts of Men being the *Framers and Authors*, as it were, of those two sorts of *Language*; and who, by their Imposing, Accepting, or Using of them in such a Sense, have stamp'd upon them their *Proper Signification*, and given it to be *Sterling and Current*; in which, and not in Etymologies or Criticisms only, consists the *Propriety of Words*. Nor can I see (Care being taken to avoid Equivocalness) what further inspection into the Nature of Words can be needful for a Philosopher. I say, in *this* Designation, Agreement, and Usage of the Word, and

*The General Rules  
to know the right  
Sense of Words.*

and *only* in *this*, consists all the *Connexion* or *Tying* the *Ideas* to the Words, and those *Secret References* of the former to the other, of which Mr. *Locke* speaks so often in his Second Chapter, and other places; nor can it consist in any thing else.

3. Indeed those Words which express *Artificial* Notions are most liable to be mistaken; because Artists have the Prerogative of Coining their own Words, and of Affixing to them what Signification they please. Whence, if their *Thoughts* differ, the Words that express them must needs be Equivocal or Double-sensed. For all *Art* being nothing but *Reflexion on Nature*, polishing and perfecting those rude Draughts given us by our Mother-wit to an Exactness, and Reflexions being *Various* in divers Men, according to their Degree of Skill, and their Talent of Penetrating the Nature of the Object they are employ'd about; the same Univocalness of Signification is not to be expected in those Words that express our *Reflex* Thoughts, as in those by which we notify our *Direct* ones, in which all Mankind (as was shewn) do agree. This chiefly happens in many *Logical* Words; for the Notions that Art makes use of, being wholly built on the manner of Existing the Thing has in our Understanding, which none but Steady, Solid and Acute Reflecters can perfectly discern; hence, those Reflex Notions, and consequently the Names which are to signify them, become liable to Ambiguity; which has, doubtless, been the Occasion of many fruitless Contests; which end (if they ever end at all) in *Word-Skirmishes*.

*Words of Art most  
liable to be mistaken.*

4. Yet, it will not be hard to prevent, or avoid, all Mistake even in *these*, if we do but attend heedfully to the *Manners* by which those things exist in our *Minds*, and take the Sense of those Words from the

The way how to avoid being mistaken in Words of Art.

ablest Artists, or best Reflecters. For Nature ( if we do not relinquish it ) and familiar Explications, will make them easy to be understood. For example, let it be told us by a Logician, that the *Species* is the *lowest* and *Narrowest* sort of Common Notions, that have none under them but *Individuals*; and it will be presently seen that the Conception we call [ *Man* ] ( thus apprehended and exprest ) is a *Specific* Notion. Let it be told us again, that a *Genus* is a Larger Notion which has divers *Species* or *Sorts* under it ; and, it will quickly appear that [ *Animal* ] is a *General* Notion ; Or, if a Logician acquaints us, that a *Proposition* is a Speech which *affirms* or *denies* ; and that that part of it *which is affirm'd* ( or *Deny'd* ) is call'd by Men of Art the *Predicate*, and that part of *which* 'tis affirm'd or deny'd, is the *Subject* ; and that *which expresses* the Affirmation or Negation is the *Copula* ; and there can be no difficulty to know that this Speech ( *A Stone is hard* ) is a *Proposition* ; that [ *Stone* ] is the *Subject*, [ *Hard* ] the *Predicate*, and [ *is* ] the *Copula* ; and so in all the rest, if a Right Reflector have the management of them. But, care is to be taken that we do not pin our belief upon Authors, who frame Artificial Notions out of their *Imagination*, without regard to the *Thing* as 'tis conceived by our Understanding, or according to the Manner *it is there* ; for, then, we shall quite lose



lose the solid Grounds of *Nature*, and let our Wits loose to follow their Butterfly *Fancies*; For, that *Thing* call'd [ *Men*, ] as thus conceived, is *as truly* a *Species*, and [ *Animal* ] a *Genus*, considering it *as it is in our Understanding* with such a degree of Abstraction, as an *Individual* Man, as existing *in re*, or *out of the Understanding*, is Two-legg'd, or a Horse four-footed. And, for the same Reason, 'tis as evident to true Logicians, or right Reflectors, that in the Proposition now mentioned, there are as truly, really, necessarily and essentially those *Three* parts lately spoken of, as 'tis to a Mathematician, that there are three Corners in a Triangle: The same Reason, I say, holds for both; for the Soul is as really a *Thing*, as the Bodies in *Nature*; and *her* Modes, or Accidents, and their Manners of Existing, are as *Real*, as those of any Bodies are, or can be, perhaps more. Whence 'tis Evident also that, in the Proposition now mentioned, the *Thing* diversly conceiv'd, or its *Modes*, are *truly* and really Subject, Predicate and Copula in the Mind; and that, tho' they be express in *Logical* Terms, they do not put off their Natures, or Notions, which were *directly* and *Naturally* imprinted on the Understanding; but are only super-vested with an Artificial Dress, thrown over them by our Reflexion: For, otherwise, we could not say the Thing call'd [ *A Stone* ] is *hard*, but we must withal mean and say [ *the Subject is the Predicate* ] in case not the *Natural* Notion of the Thing, but only the *Logical* Notion were predicared; Nor could the former of these two Propositions be *True*, the Later, *False*, if the *Thing* it self, or its *Modes* were not the Materials that Compound it.

5. Where-

5. Wherefore, this is to be establish'd as a certain Maxim, and a necessary Preliminary to all Philosophy whatever, that 'tis the *Thing in our mind* that gives Solidity and Steadiness to all our Judgments and Discourses; for all these are made up of *Notions*, that is, of the very *Thing* it self in our Mind, inadequately and Diversely conceiv'd: Wherefore *That* is still the *Ground-work*, however it be wrought upon, order'd and postur'd by Reflexion and Art. From default of this Consideration springs all the Wordishness, and empty Disputes among trivial Philosophers; of which Mr. L. does, with good Reason, so often Complain. I wish he could as well give us an account, that the *Ideas* he and others speak of are the *Thing it self*, inadequately conceiv'd by us, and not meer *Representations* of it; for, this done, we might hope for true *Philosophy* from the Principles of the *Ideists*. Which they cannot pretend to show, or to give us this Hope, till a solid Answer be given to what's alledg'd against them in my Second and Third Preliminaries; where I undertake to demonstrate that 'tis impossible.

6. I am not of Mr. L's mind, that Metaphysical Words (however Logical ones may be ambiguous) are so unintelligible, or in fault. For those words that signify *Being*, or what nearly relates to it (which are the Chief Objects of that Queen of Sciences) are absolutely the *Clearest* that Mankind ever uses, or can use; so that, whoever abuses or misaccepts them, must needs be a Deforter of *Common Sense*.

Not-

Notwithstanding, in regard some pretended Schollers have on divers occasions us'd *Philosophical*, and even *Common* Words variously, I have thought fit to add a Fifth Preliminary, to show what Sense the Chief Words us'd in Philosophy must have; and that they *can* signify no other. Lastly, I have shown at large in my *Method*, B. 1. *Less. 10th.* how Equivocalness springs, and how it may be detected and avoided.

7. This Learned Authour having most elaborately, largely and acutely profecuted in his former Book the Distinction of his *Ideas*, and the whole Duty of *Words* being to *signify* our Thoughts to others, I

*This Third Book concerning Words seems Unnecessary.*

cannot discern what need there could be to take such pains about those Outward Signes. Many curious Remarks do indeed embellish his Discourses, which show that his Exuberant Wit, can make good work of the dryest Subject, and raise elegant Structures out of the Sleightest Materials: Yet, notwithstanding, I see not how they conduce to promote the Solid *Knowledge* of *Things*. The very *Essence*, I say, and the Nature of *Words* being to *Signify* our Notions, or to impart the Knowledge of the *Things in our Mind* to others; their Sense must either be *suppos'd* to be Agreed on, and Foreknown to the Speakers and Hearers, or they will scarce be allow'd worthy to be call'd *Words* but rather *Empty* and *Insignificant* articulate *Sounds*. Wherefore, if the *Idea* or Notion of the Speakers be Clear, or Obscure; Distinct, or Confus'd; Adequate or Inadequate, &c. The *Word* must either express it *accordingly*, or it is not the *Name* of such an *Idea* or Notion, nor a *Word* fit

for

for it, and much less for any thing *else*; and therefore 'tis good for nothing at all. This makes me with Mr. L. had rather thought fit to take particular Notice of those Words, which have been Abus'd or Misaccepted by Trivial Philosophers; and had clear'd their Ambiguity, rectify'd their Impropriety, and Substituted (if need were) others more Proper in their stead; which must certainly have had great Influence upon the Advancement of Science. Nor need he much wonder that Dull or Hasty Men, who either are not *capable* of much Sense, or will not take pains to *reflect* on their *Natural Notions*, or (which is the same) on the *meanings* of their Words, do make use of them, and yet talk *by rote* all the while; following the Track of others whom they have heard speak them, or the Jargon of their Masters; who breed their Schollers to stick to their Words, as unalterably as if they were Principles; tho' perhaps neither of them were so Wise as to know, or so Prudent as to regard much their determinate Meaning.

8. Things standing thus, and my Intention, in this whole Treatise, being only to carry on my *Method* to Science, and to reduce to *Solidity*, those Discourses which I conceive have too much of *Fancy* in them, I have no more to do, as to this Third Book, but to note by the way some particulars that occur, and which, as I judge, do byass from true Philosophy.

*Nature teaches us to define by a Genus and a Difference.*

9. The Author seems to dislike our way of Defining by a *Genus* and its *Difference*, and to think it may be better perform'd by enumerating



enumerating some certain *Ideas*, which, put together, do make up the Sense of the Notion defin'd. To abert which Doctrine, he gives us this Definition of a *Man*, viz. *A Solid Extended Substance, having Life, Sense, Spontaneous Motion, and the Faculties of Reasoning*. I discourse thus: What best futes with the *Vulgar* is one thing, what becomes *Men of Art*, another. It will serve the Common People well enough to declare their Thoughts by *buddling together* many particular Considerations; nay, they will define even *Individuums* (if such as these may be call'd Definitions) by this Method, as *Homer* did *Thersites*. But the Point is, how *Art*, which is to *perfect* and *polish* the Rudeness of raw Undisciplin'd Nature, ought to behave it self. *Reflexion*, the Parent of all Arts, teaches even Housewives and Lawyers, that 'tis very convenient for the one to put such and such Linnen into distinct Drawers; and, for the other to distribute all those Writings that concern different Businesses into distinct Boxes: And the same Faculty teaches Logicians also to range all their Notions (the Materials they are employ'd about) into distinct *Common Heads*, so to gain a *Distinct* Knowledge of each; which, they being innumerable, would otherwise lie mingled confusedly. This perform'd, what are they to do next? Must they hover still in these few common Heads of Notions? No, certainly; for, then, they would not have enow of such *more-particular* Notions as are needful for Discourse. They must descend therefore from those Common Notions to more-particular ones under each of them; and this, as Plain Reason tells us, *gradually*: that is, they must *divide* those Common Heads by Immediate Distinctive No-

tions, call'd *Differences*: for, were they not *Different*, the Product of that Division could not be *more* Notions; whereas Division must (at least) make *Two* of *One*. And, whence must we take those Differences? From *other* Common Heads? No surely; for this would *confound* all our Notions again, which we had taken such Care to *distinguish* into those Heads, in case the *more particular* ones, or the respective *Species*, were made up of one Notion found in *one* Line, and of another found in another. Those Differences then that *divide* each Common Head, must be found within the *same* Head, or (as we use to call them) must be *Intrinsic*; which (\* as

\* *B. I. L. 3. § 2.* is demonstrated in my *Method*) can be no other but *more* and *less* of the immediate Superiour Notions. The First two Differences (of *Ens*, for Example) join'd with the Common Head it self, gives us the *Definitions* of the two first Subaltern *Genera*; and each of those two (and of the inferiour) *Genus's* being for the same Reason *divided* after the same manner, do still give us naturally (as it were) the *Definitions* of the *next* two Members immediately under *them*; and so still endways, till we come at the *Individuums*; each of which being constituted by an innumerable Multitude of Accidents, we are, when we come there, lost in a pathless Wood; and can no longer *Define* or give a clear and *entire* Account of the *Intrinsic* Distinction of those Particulars, but are forced to content our selves with some *few* Notions belonging to them, which distinguish them from others; or to describe them by *Outward Signs* and Circumstances for our *Use* and *Practice*; our *Speculation* being here Nonplust.

10. When Mr. *Locke* shall have leisurely consider'd each Step of this short Discourse, he will find that *Nature* forces us upon this Method of Defining by a *Genus* and a *Difference*; that *Art*, (which is nothing but Nature well reflected on) shews us it *must* be so; and that his own Definition of *Man* will oblige him, even while he opposes this Method, to have recourse to it for Refuge. For, when he puts Man to be a *Solid Extended Substance*, should it be deny'd, because there is but *one* part of Man (his *Body*) that is *Solid* and *Extended*, and not his *Spiritual* part, the *Soul*; his only Defence can be this, that those Words were meant only for the *General* Notion, or what was *Common* to Man and *all* other Bodies, (for which Reason, *Substance* there is the Highest *Genus*;) and that which follows is meant to *difference* or distinguish *him* from *them*. Next, it will be unanswerably objected, that Man being a *Thing*, or (which is the same) a *Substance*, which signifies merely *what's capable to be*, and a Definition telling us the *Essence* of the Notion design'd, he deviates manifestly from the Fundamental Laws of *Art*, by taking in such Differences to distinguish *Substance*, viz. *Solidity* and *Extension*, which are *Foreign* to this Common Head of *Being* or *Thing*, and belong to other Common Heads, which are only *Modes* of *Thing*, viz. those of *Quantity* and *Quality*. Add, That this seems also to contradict his own Doctrine, (*B. 2. Chap. 13. § 11, 12. and B. 3. Chap. 6. § 21.*) where he makes *Extension* and *Body* not to be the same. I suppose he means *in part*; which, were *Extension* a Proper and Intrinsic Difference of *Substance*,

*stance*, constituting the Essence of *Body*, could not be said. Now, as was lately shewn, all these Rubs are avoided if we separate our Notions into Common Heads; and, by dividing those Heads by Intrinsical Differences, at the same time make our Definitions of each Inferior Notion. Nor can it be objected, that *we* also use Extrinsical Differences, while we divide Substance by *Divisible* and *Indivisible*, and yet make Divisibility the Notion of *Quantity*; for, all such Exceptions are fore-stall'd in my *Method*, B. 1. *Less.* 3. and particularly, §§. 5. and 6.

11. The like Errour, and no less Fundamental, is his Assertion, *Chap.* 3. *L.* 11. that *Generals and Universals belong not to the Real Existence of Things, but are the Inventions and Creatures of the Understanding, made by it, for its own Use, and concern only Signs, whether Words, or Ideas.*

Had he said, that *Universals* belong not to the Existence of Things, *as they are in Nature*; or, that *Universals*, as such, are not *capable of Existing there*, I could understand him: But, if he means, they do not belong to the Existence of Things *in the Understanding*, or, that they are *designedly invented*, or fram'd, or made use of by it, for its own Convenience, I must utterly deny it. For, it is as evident that Nature makes them in our Mind, as it is that because we cannot *here* comprehend Individuals, therefore Nature, by imprinting Objects diversly in us, and by different Senses, *forces* the Mind to have Partial or *Inadequate* Notions of it. Now, every *Inadequate* Notion, in what Line soever, is an *Universal* Notion;



tion ; as will appear to any Man who reflects upon the *Ideas* or Notions of *Ens*, *Corpus*, *Vivens*, *Animal*, *Homo* ; all which are *Inadequate* ( and withall, *Universal* ) Notions, in respect of the *Individuum*. When I see a Thing a-far off, so that I can yet make nothing of it, but that 'tis *something*, or *some Body*, 'tis evident that I have only an *Universal* Notion of it, since I know not yet what it is in *particular* ; and, that this General Notion is not *Invented* or *Created* by my *Mind*, but *given* me by *Nature*. The like happens when I hear one knock at the Door, without knowing who it is in particular ; and in a Hundred such like Occasions. So that the *Mind*, and *it only*, is indeed *Capable* of Universal Notions ; but, 'tis only *Nature*, and not *her self*, which begets in her those Notions. Her only Work is, to *Compare*, or *Discern* the Identity or Diversity of those Notions ; but *Nature* gives her those Objects, or Materials, on which she thus works. Thus, when we see two or many Things agree, 'tis those Natural Objects, that have in them something Agreeing to *both*, which causes in me a *Common* Notion, called *Animal*, or *Homo* ; and the mind lends nothing but her *Comparing* Nature, to make those Common Notions ; which Artificial Reflecters, designedly re-viewing, call them *Genus* and *Species*. Let us hold to the Things *in Nature*. Our *Mind* ( as was often said ) is not here in an *Actual* State, but in a *Potential* one ; and, therefore, when we ascribe to her singly any *Activity*, we make her *do* what she *cannot* do ; and, so, missing the true Causes of such Effects, we fall into great Errours.

12. As for that *Catachresis* of *Nominal Essences*, which answer to those few Abstract Notions we have *Actually* of the Things, when we name them, making a *Complex Idea*, I deny we have any such Intention as he speaks of, in naming any Thing: For, tho' at that time we do actually know but *Few* of those Accidents, whose Complexion does, indeed, go to the *whole Essence*; yet, being pre-assur'd the Thing has *more* Modes in it than we know or think of, we do not nominate them *precisely* according to what we do then *actually* know, *exclusively* of all others, but *including* them *confusedly*. Rather, otherwise, we cannot know the Thing at all, because it involves *confusedly* all the Modes that are in it, Known or Unknown, as their *Subject*: For, tho' we should afterwards discover *more* particular Accidents in Gold than we did formerly, yet, we should not alter the *Name* which signifies its *Substance*, or *Essence*; nor would call it any thing but *Gold* still; however the newly discover'd Mode gave us a new *Idea* of it self, Annex'd to that of Substance. The Essences are no otherwise *Ingenerable*, but as they are from Eternity in the Divine *Ideas*; nor *Incrruptible*, but as they are either *there*, or else in some *Humane* or *Angelicall* Understanding, out of which they can never be effaced. Lastly, What have *Names* or *Words*, which are nothing but Articulate Air, or Figur'd Ink, (excepting what is Annexed to them by our Minds,) to do with the *Intrinsic* Natures of Things, that they should be one *Sort* or *Kind* of *Essences*.

13. This Learned Author justly complains that we have so few Definitions; and my self have both resent'd it in my Preface to my *Method*, and have also excited and encourag'd Learned Men to make good that Defect. But, till the Best, and *only* Proper Way (which I mention'd lately) to make Definitions be allow'd and taken, I am sure there will be no *new* ones made that will deserve that Name; and those *few* that are already made, will still be expos'd to the baffling Attacks of Fancy. *Aristotle* was, certainly, the best Definer of any Philosopher yet extant; yet, his Definitions are excepted against by Witty Men; and (which is worse) for no other Reason, but because they are *too Learned*, that is, *too Good*. Mr. *Locke* expresses here great Dissatisfaction at *two* of them; which, to my best Judgment, not all the Wit of Man can mend. The First is. of *Motion*; which *Aristotle* defines to be *Actus Entis in potentia, quatenus in potentia*. Now, I wonder not that Mr. *Locke*, who, in his large Chapter of *Power*, never so much as mention'd the *Idea* of *Power* to be a Thing, nor the *Power* to have such an *Accident*, or *Mode*; nor, consequently, the *Idea* of an *Act* answering to such a *Power*, should conceit this Definition to be Gibberish. However he came to pretermitt them, it is most manifest that we have Natural *Ideas* or Notions of both these. We cannot see a Thing made actually of Another, or Alter'd to be any way otherwise than it was; but Nature obliges us to see, and say, that that Thing, of which the new one was made, could, or had a *Power* to be, It, or have Another made of it. Or, when we see 'tis anew made Hot,

*Aristotle's Definition of Motion defended.*

Cold, Round, White, Moved, Placed, &c. but that it *could*, or had a *Power* to become such, ere it was *Actually* such. These *Ideas* then of *Act* and *Power* are so Natural, that Common Sense *forces* us to acknowledge them, and Common Language *must* use them: And 'tis a strange Fastidiousness, not to allow those Transcendent (that is, most Common, and most Clear) Words in *Definitions*, whose Notions or Meanings Nature gives us; and which Words, or Equivalent Expressions, Common Discourse forces us to use. Yet, in the Uncouthness of *these* Words to some Men's Fancies, consists all the Difficulty which they so boggle at in this Definition. The *Ens*, or Body, was only *Capable*, or had a *Power* to be moved ere Motion came; and, now, by *Motion* it is *Actually* moved. It is evident then that Motion is the *Act*, or (which is the same) the *Formal Cause*, which reduced that *Power* into *Act*, or *formally* denominated it *moved Actually*. *Act* then, was a Proper *Genus*, as far as those *most Common* Notions can have one. Now comes the Difference [*in potentia*,] which is, to determine what *kind* of *Act* Motion is. To understand which, we may reflect, that a Body has many *other Acts* or (as we conceive and call them) *Forms* in it, such as are Quantity, Figure, and all Qualities whatever; as, Roundness, Length, Breadth, Health, &c. But they are not *Acts* of that Body, as 'tis *in power* to be otherwise than it is, but as 'tis *actually* such or such: For, they truly denominate it to be *actually* Round, Long, Healthful, &c. Whereas, *Motion*, being formally a meer *Tendency* to an Effect *not yet produced*, constitutes and denominates a Body to be only in

power



power to be what by that Motion it is to be afterwards. For, reflecting on all Motions whatever, *v. g.* Generation, Alteration, Augmentation, Sanation, &c. none of them affect the Subject, or Body, in order to what it has *already* fixedly; but in order to a *newly* generated, or rather, *producible* Thing, Quality, Quantity, Disposition, Health, &c. which the Matter or Subject has only a *Power* to have or acquire by means of those respective *Motions*. The last Words, [*quatenus in potentia,*] signifie, that the Thing, as affected with Motion, is formally and precisely consider'd to be *in power* to be such or such, and not at all as *actually* so. *Matter* has the Notion of *Power to be another* Thing; but in regard it is a kind of *Compart*, constituting actually the stable and entire *Ens*, the Thing, or Body, which has Matter in it, cannot be said to be meerly in *power to have* Matter which it *has Already*. Whereas, by having *Motion* in it, which is only the *Way* or *Means* to attain what Nature *aims to produce*, it must be thus *meerly* and formally in *Power* to that to which it is *Tending*. Wherefore, this Definition most appositely fits the Notion of *Motion*, by distinguishing it most perfectly from all other Sorts of *Acts* whatever; without a Tittle conceivable in it that is Defective, Superfluous, or Disparate. Yet, this is here character'd to be *Exquisite Fargon*, and a *Famous Absurdity*. I should be glad to see how one of our new Philosophers would define *Motion*: I doubt he would find it a puzzling Task to explicate its *Formal* and *Proper* Nature; in regard that, besides its being *very General*, it is the  
Blindest,

\* See Method to  
Science, B. I.  
L. 8. §. 2.

Blindest and \* *most Imperfect* Notion we have, and most approaching to *Non-Entity*; being neither the Thing as it is *in it self*, nor as it is yet *another*, but hovering (as it were) between both. And I am certain, it is impossible to perform it, without varying the Words used by *Aristotle*, to others of the same Sense; or, even to give some tolerable Explanation of it, which can sute with its Formal Notion.

14. The other Definition which Mr. *Locke* mis-

*Aristotle's* Defini-  
tion of Light,  
*most Proper.*

likes, is, that of *Light*; which he says *Aristotle* defines, *The Act of a Perspicuous Thing, as it is Perspicuous*. Now, tho' *Light* be *Fire*, were the Particles of it contracted into one closer Body, as it is by a Burning-Glass; yet, the Rays of it, thinly scatter'd, have, like all other *Effluvioms*, the Notion of a *Quality* or *Mode* of the Body they are receiv'd in; and *Modes* or *Accidents* have their Analogical Essences from the manner they affect their *Subjects*. The Question then is, What is the Proper *Subject* of *Light*? Mr. *Locke's* Principles deny the *Sun* is the *Subject*; and put it to be only the *Cause* of it: Nor can an *Opacons* Body be the *Subject* of it; for it affects not that Body it self, but the *Surface* which reflects it; and then it has the Notion of *Colour*. 'Tis left then, that the Proper *Subject* of *Light* must be a *Medium*, which is *Perspicuous*, or which has a *Power* in it to let it pass through it, to our Eyes; and, therefore, only *Light* is, properly and formally, the *Act* which *informs* or *actuates* that *Power*; which

which cannot possibly be express'd better than by these Words, *The Act of a Perspicuous Body, as it is Perspicuous*. For, putting the Air, or the Water, to be that *Medium*, those Bodies may have many other *Acts* or Accidental Forms in them; as, Rarity, Fluidity, Humidity, Coldness, &c. yet, according to none of these, is Light the proper *Act* of either of them; but as they are Pellucid, or *Perspicuous*; because, whatever other Qualities or Powers they may have, if they had not that called *Perspicuousness*, it could not affect those Bodies at all. I observe by Mr. *Locke's* Discourse here, that he makes account Definitions are made for the Vulgar: Whereas, they are only fram'd by *Art*, for Men of Art, or Philosophers. But, surely he is pleasant, and cannot mean seriously, when he finds fault with this Definition, as *Useless*, and *Insignificant*, because it will not make a *Blind Man understand what the Word [Light] means*. The *Meaning* of the Word, is the *Notion* of it in our *Mind*; and our *Notions*, or *Ideas*, (as both of us hold,) come in by Impressions from the Object upon our *Senses*. If, then, Blind Men could have no *sensible* Impression of Light, 'tis impossible they should have any *Idea* or *Notion* of it, let the Definition be never so good. Definitions are the Work of Reflexion, and are to *suppose* our Natural *Notions*, which are the Rough Draughts of Knowledge, Common to us, and to the Vulgar: *Art* is to polish our *Notions*, and bring them to Exactness and Concinnity, by *Defining* them; and not to *imbue* us with them, when Nature never gave them: And 'tis a hard Case, if *Aristotle's* Definitions must be Useless and Insignificant, unless they work Miracles.

15. I agree with him that the Definition of Motion, which he says is that of the *Cartesians*, [*viz.* That 'tis the *Successive Application of the Parts of the Superficies of one Body to those of another*] is Faulty. Whether it be theirs or no I know not, I think they give another: Yet, I doubt not but Mr. *Locke* has his Reasons why he dislikes it. Mine is this; because *Successive Quantity* and *Motion* are the *self-same* Formal Notion; and, so, the *Definitum* is as plain as the *Definition* which should explain it. Besides that, [*Applicacion*] is one sort of *Motion*, and therefore is harder to be understood than *Motion* it self, which is the *Genus* to it. All which Absurdities, and others such, *Aristotle* wisely avoids, by using the *Transcendent*, or more Common Notions of *Act* and *Power*.

16. I pardon Mr. *Locke's* Opinion, That nothing is Essential to *Individuums*; because this Error is Common, or rather Epidemical, amongst the Modern Schools; and springs hence, that those Authors do not distinguish between what serves for *Logical Speculations*, and what is the *Real Constitution* of Things in Nature: For, what can the word [*Essentia*] of which *Essential* is the Denominative, possibly mean, but that formal Notion *quâ Ens est Ens*. Since then the Notion of *Ens* or *Thing* is only Proper to the *Individual Substance*, as being its *First Analogate*; it follows that, if they bedivers *Entia* or *Things*, they must have divers *Formal Constituents*, or *divers Essences*. Nay more, it follows that [*Ens*] being only properly spoken of  
Substantia



*Substantia Prima* or the *Individuums*, and Improperly of *Substantiæ Secundæ*, and much more of the *Modes* or *Accidents*; therefore, *Essence* (the Formal Constituent of *Ens*) can only be properly said of the *Essences* of Individuals, and improperly of any other *Essences*: So that only divers *Individuals*, in proper Speech, do differ *Essentially*, or have *Essential* Differences belonging to them. But, of this enough in my \* *Method*.

I only remark how odd it is to \* *B. I. L. 3. § 11.* say, that *Two Men* are *Two Things*, and yet do not differ under the Notion of *Thing*, but only *Accidentally*; or, according to the Notion of some *Mode* or *Accident*; which is perhaps as much as my self *now* do differ from my self a *Year ago*, and yet I am the *same Thing now* I was *then*. But, I have said enough above of what *Intrinsically* Constitutes divers *Entities* or *Individuums*; and how we sufficiently *know* them, tho' we comprehend not the *whole* Complexion of *Accidents* that constitutes their *Individual Essences*, on which a good part of this 6th Chapter proceeds.

17. The two last Chapters contain many various Observations in them; and such as may both *delight*, and in some sort *profit* inquisitive Wits: Yet they touch upon some difficult Points, which are contrary to my Sentiments, and cannot well be solv'd without first laying my Grounds; especially that about the Unknowableness of *Real Essences*. To clear which farther, and withall to meet with other Difficulties that may occur, it will be necessary to lay, or repeat, for the Foundation of my future Discourses, some few Principles.

*Whence we must take our Measure of Simple and Compound Notions.*

I have, I hope, demonstrated in my Preliminaries, that all our *Ideas*, or *Notions*, which are Solid, and not Fantastick, are nothing but several Conceptions of the *Thing*; or, which is the same (taking the Word [Conception] for the *Object*, and not for the *Act* of Conceiving) *the Thing diversly conceiv'd*. Hence all our Conceptions, or *Notions*, are *Inadequate*, especially if they be *Distinct*, and not *Confused*. Hence the most abstracted *Notion* we have, or can have, let it be Figure, Colour, Existence, or what other we please, even tho' signify'd by the most Abstract Term, is still the *Thing* consider'd precisely as having those Modes in it; in regard that, as those Modes, or Accidents, have no *Entity* of their *own*, but meerly that of the *Thing* which they affect, so they can have no *Intelligibility*, or Knowableness, (which is the Property of *Entity*) but as they are conceiv'd to belong to the *Thing*, or to be *It*: So that, (Hardness being that by which a Thing is *formally* Hard) neither would Hardness be Hardness, nor would Existence be Existence, if they were the Hardness or Existence, of *Nothing*; for Nothing can neither be *hard*, nor *exist*, nor have any other Affections belonging to it. Again, 'tis evident we can have no *distinct* *Notion* of the *whole Ens*, or *Individuum*; nor consequently of the *Essence*, (properly such) which is the Form that Constitutes the *whole Ens*: For this contains in it what grounds or Corresponds to great multitudes of Inadequate, or Partial *Notions*, and contains them *blended* (as it were) in the *Thing* as in their *Root*; and this so *Confusedly* and inseparably, that only that most acute Divider, call'd *Acies Intellectus*, can take them a sunder, or separate

rate them. Moreover, there are not only *Confus'd* and *Distinct* Ideas, as Mr. L. acknowledges, but also ( which I remember not he takes notice of, ) Notions or *Ideas* which are *more* and *less* Confused or Distinct ; or *partly* one, *partly* the other, and this with very great variety ; as is seen in his Example of *Gold*, of which ( and the same may be said of all other Bodies, ) some Men gain by Degrees more distinct Knowledges than others do. To proceed, 'tis evident that, of all other Notions, that of *Existence* has the least Composition in it that can be. Whence all *Clearness* of our Notions coming from their *Distinctness*, and their Distinctness Springing from their *Simplicity*, the formal Notion of *Existence* is the most *Clear* ; that is, *self-evident*, and therefore *Inexplicable* ; all Explications being of those Notions that can need it. The Notion of *Ens*, which signifies *Capable to Exist*, has but a very little *Composition*, and Consequently, *Confusion* in it, as consisting of *Actual Being*, and the *Power* to it, For the same Reason *Corpus* has *more* of Composition or Confusion in it, than *Ens* ; *Vivens* than *Corpus* ; *Animal* than *Vivens* ; *Homo* than *Animal* ; and *Socrates*, or the *Individuum*, most of all ; There going still ( as was shown above ) more Notions to constitute and Compound each *inferiour* Notion than there does to constitute those *above* it ; whence, still as they are *more* Compounded, they are proportionably *more* *Confus'd*, that is, *less* *Distinct*, or *less* *Clear*. The *Ideas*, or Notions, of *Individuals* therefore, or of *particular* Things, are for the reason now given the most *Unintelligible* ; meaning by that Word, the most *impossible* to be comprehended all at once. This reflected on, and it being shown above, that  
both

both Nature and Art instruct us to divide our Notions into Common Heads, and to proceed thus gradually to Inferiour ones; 'tis most evident that the *only Proper and Natural* way of distinguishing our Notions into *Simple and Compounded*, is to be taken (not from our *Fancy*, what *Ideas* seem most Clear to us) but from this *Gradual Progression* from Superiour to Inferiour Notions; in regard there goes still *more* to compound the *Inferiour* Notions, than there does to compound the *Superiour*. Whence follows out of the very Terms that *those* must be *more Compounded*, or less Clear, these *more Simple*, and *more Clear*.

18. The same Rule holds, and for the same Reason, in all the Common Heads of the *Modes or Accidents*. The Notion or *Idea* of the Supreme Genus has no Composition but that noted above, which is common to them all, of *Connotating the Subject*. Whence, it is the *Simplest* or least Compounded, as involving both that of the *Common Head* and that of the *Difference*, superadded to it. Hence neither the *Ideas* of *Motion* nor *Extension*, if by this Latter be meant (as by distinguishing it from Motion it should seem) *Permanent Quantity*, are *Simple Ideas*; but the *Idea* of *Quantity* is the *Simple* one; and they, being evidently *such Kinds of Quantity*, viz. *Permanent*, and *Successive*, are clearly Compounded of *Quantity* and of the two *Different Ideas* which make them those two several sorts of it. Much less is the *Idea* or Notion of *Number* or *Figure* *Simple* ones; for the former is compounded of the *Idea* of *Meer Quantity* and of [*Discrete*;] and the later of the *Idea* of *Quantity*, and of *such or such*



such a manner of *Terminating* it. And, the same may be easily shown of all the rest of his Simple *Ideas* whatever, excepting only that of *Existence*. From these Principles I make the following Reflexions.

19. *First*, That the *Ideas* can never be in fault when we *name* things wrong, but our own heedfulness or Disagreement about the *Meanings*, for which such Words stand. For, our Common Notions are wrought by Natural Causes upon the same-natur'd Patients, the Senses, and thence upon the Soul. Whence *Notions* are *what they are invariably*, without their meddling or being concern'd with our Signifying them, or *applying* them to these or these Words. We have them from *Nature*; the *Signifying* them by such and such Words, comes from our *Voluntary Designation*; and that is all can be said of them; as Mr. L. has shown *B. 2. Ch. 32. § 2.*

*The Idea or Notion can never be in Fault when we Name things wrong.*

20. *Secondly*, *Confused Ideas*, they being all *Compounded*, may have fewer or more *Distinct Ideas* annex to their Subject, according as we gain a farther *Distinct Know'edge* of the Object, as is exemplified in Mr.

*Confused Notions may have more Distinct ones Annex to their Subject.*

*L's* frequent Instance of *Gold*. In which case, it is not a new *Specificall Notion*, nor so much as a new *Nominal Essence*, as Mr. L. calls it: (for, let us discover never so many *New Qualities* in *Gold*, every Man will call that Thing *Gold* still) but the Additions or Appendages of New *Distinct Notions*, tack't as it were to the *Confused* one; or new *Inadequate* Notions, approaching so many

little steps nearer to the making it an *Adequate* One.

21. *Thirdly*, Since we know before-hand, that every Thing has a *Distinct Nature* or *Real Essence* peculiar to its self, we take those *most Remarkable* Accidents intrinsically belonging to it, to be that Essence; especially if they do *sufficiently distinguish* it from all other Natures; and, when we find they do not, we acknowledge our Judgment may be false, we strive to correct it, and suspend till we gain better Light; yet still our *Notions* are inerrably *what they are*, and faultless, however it fares with our *Judgment*. Nor does our Judgment *exclude* the *yet-undiscover'd* Modes from the Notion of the Thing; but, we *include* them all in the Lump or *Confusedly*. Whence 'tis the *Real Essence* of the Thing which is known, tho' Imperfectly and Inadequately. Thus we know a Man and a Horse to be two Things of different *Species* by divers manifest *Qualities* which never agree to *both* of them, and therefore distinguish them; and, tho' 'tis the *whole*, or rather a *Greater Complexion* of Accidents which does constitute the *Specifick Difference*; yet even *that* is known *truly*, (tho' imperfectly) when we know it but *in part*, especially (as was said) when it is sufficient to distinguish one from the other: In the same manner as when I see but a Man's *Hand* or *Face*, I am truly said to see the *Man*, tho' [*Man*] signifies the *whole*, which I see but *in part*. The solid Reason of which is this Great Truth, that [*There are no Actual Parts in any Compound whatever.*] Whence follows, that every *Part* is the *Whole*

*Whole in Part*, or according to such a *Part* ; which is one of the Chiefest Principles that gives Grounds to the Science of Physicks, and therefore is Demonstrable by the Superiour Science, Metaphysicks.

22. *Fourthly*, Our former Discourse being well reflected on, which shews that the most solid and certain way of Knowing which Notions are *Simple*, which *Compounded* or *Complex*, is not to be taken from the Easie Apperances to our Fancy, or from seeming Experience, but from their being more General or more Particular ; we may farther learn what Notions are *Clear* and which *Obscure*, and *how* or *why* they are so. For, 'tis manifest that all *Confusion* and *Obscurity* springs from Composition, or the Involving *many* Notions, as is evidently seen in *Particular* or *Individual Bodies* ; and all *Distinctness* or *Clearness* in our Notions from their involving *few* or *none*, as is found in the most General Notions. Add, that, if this Rule be observ'd, the Order in our Complex Notions will be *more Regular*. Whereas the *other* unmethodical way of making so many *Simple Ideas*, places those *Ideas* at random, or hap-hazard. Lastly, If our Method be observ'd, *Complex Ideas* cannot be taken for *Simple* ones, as has been shewn Mr. Locke does in most of his.

*We must not judge which Notions are Simple, which Compounded, from the Clear or Obscure Apperances they make to our Fancy, but from the Rule given above, § 18, 19.*

23. *Fifthly*, That the Distinction of Simple and Complex, Clear and Obscure Notions, is not to be taken from *Appearances* to our Fancy, but from the solid Grounds now spoken of, is seen farther by this Instance, that many Men are much distasted at the Notions belonging to Metaphysics, such as are *Being, Ens, Essence, Act, Power*, and such like. The Reason of which is, that we do customarily *reflect* upon our Notions, and endeavour to *define* or *explain* them. Whence, in Metaphysical ones, finding this to be very Difficult, and in many of them Impossible, hence Men fancy them to be Inconceivable and Incomprehensible; and thence they take a Toy at Metaphysics, and pretend it insuperably *hard* and *mysterious*. Now it passes with these Reflecters, as it does with those that would look stedfastly on the Sun at Noon-day; they find a kind of Cloud hovering before their Eyes, and seem bedarken'd with too much Light. The Test to stick to in such Cases is, to set themselves to *define* or explicate their Notions; which done, if they find they can invent no Notions *more Clear* than those Notions themselves are, they may be sure they are *self-evident*, and may safely look upon them as such; and, if they find they *can* be *defin'd* or *explain'd*, they may be sure there will be found in their Definition or Explication more Notions equivalent to that one; and thence they may be assur'd also that, the Notion Defin'd or Explicated, has *more Parts*, or *Composition* in it; and, therefore, is not *Simple* nor perfectly *Clear*, since



it needs to be made Clear by others, which therefore must be *more Simple* and *Clearer* than It.

24. *Sixthly*, It appears from what is said, that 'tis not to avoid different Significations of Words, that Men suppose a Real Essence belonging to each Species; but because 'tis impossible there should be any Individual Thing, but it must have Superior Notions, or (which is the same) it must be of some sort or other in Nature; and, the Notion of this Sort, or Species, must be an Essential and main Part of the Individual Essence. For, 'tis evident, that Nature forces us to have both the one, and the other Notion, without any form'd Design of ours; and Words have nothing to do but to signify them.

Not the Design of avoiding different Signification of Words, but plain Nature, forces us to put Real Essences.

25. *Lastly*, Hence it appears, that Words do not therefore become *Ambiguous*, because they have no Settled Standards in Nature; as Mr. Locke apprehends in Mix'd Modes, especially in Moral ones. For, all

Words are not Ambiguous for want of settled Standards in Nature.

*Virtues* and *Vices* being nothing but Dispositions to act according to Right Reason, or contrary to it, have as fixed Standards in Nature, as Reason it self has; taking [Nature] for the Reflexions we naturally have upon the Operations of our Soul, and for what is Agreeable or Disagreeable to its true Nature; as also, on the Subjects and Circumstances, about which, and in which it is employ'd. Hence, the Words which he instances in, *viz. Sham, Wheedle, Banter*, are evidently Deviations

from Right Reason in our Just and Civil Comportments with other Men; and all the Notions that go to their Definitions, are as much *Connected* as any other *Genus* and *Difference* are in any other Definition whatever. So likewise, his Mixed Modes, *Murder* and *Sacrilege*, are *defin'd*; *The Killing a Man lawlessly*, and the *Taking to our selves lawlessly, or Abusing Holy Things*; and have the same Solid Connexion, as any other Notions; which consists in this, that the *one* of them is Common or Determinable properly by the *other*, and the *other* is Particular or Determinative of it, which makes them *Cohere* together in good Sense. As for our Soul's Connecting them at *pleasure*, it is quite otherwise: She has Notions of each Common Head *naturally*; and Nature and Art do both of them conspire to oblige us to divide those Heads by Intrinsical Notions, called *Differences*; and, it is not at her Pleasure and Choice, what Differences shall be *Proper*, what *Disparate*. Nature has settled the Agreeableness of one of these Notions to the other; so that, should we put a *Difference* to a *Generical* Notion, which is Inconsistent with it, the Notion thus defin'd would be *Nonsense*, and *Chimerical*; and no Wiser than *Green Scarlet*, or a *Four-square Triangle*.

26. Let the Obscurity and Ambiguity of Words spring from what Causes Mr. L. pleases, concerning which he is very Acute in his 10th Chapter, it is to me very evident, that the *Thing signify'd* is not to be blam'd for the *Abuse of Words*, and, that this Abuse of them must spring from one of these three heads, *viz. Ambiguity of*  
*The Thing signify'd*  
*is not to be blam'd*  
*for the Abuse of*  
*Words, but only*  
*Ambiguity, or*  
*Contexture, or*  
*Mis-application.*  
 Single

Single Words, the *ill* Contexture of them, and their *Mis-application*. *Artificial* Words are, indeed, (as was said,) more liable to Obscurity; and, perhaps, *Logical* ones most of all. But, since the Users of those Words do pretend to Learning, let them *define* their Terms of Art, and it will quickly appear whether they agree in the Notion of those Terms, or no; and, by declaring what the Notion meant by that Term is *useful* for, it will appear which of the Definitions agrees *truly* to that Notion, and which does *not*.

27. Tho' then some Men have the Knowledge of *more* Accidents in the same Thing, or in the same Essence, than another Man has, yet it does not follow they agree in nothing but the *Name*, or that they substitute the *Name* for the

*Imperfect Knowers agree in the Thing, and not in the Name only.*

*Thing*; for they do both of them acknowledge and agree that they speak of the *same Thing*, or of the *same Essence*, notwithstanding this *more particular* Knowledge which one of them has of it above the other. In the same manner as divers Persons may know, or discourse of the same Individual Man, *Socrates*, (tho' the Complexion of Accidents which constitute the Individuum be far greater than that which constitutes the Specific Notion;) notwithstanding that, one of them *better* knows his Humour, Temper, Constitution, Science, Virtue, and his Degree of Rationality, (which is most Essential to him, as he is *This Man*,) than the *other* does. Whence this Position does not only make all Philosophy, or Knowledge of *Things* (which are not such, but



by their *Real Essence* which formally makes them such ) to be impossible ; but, it makes even our Ordinary Communication amongst Men unintelligible, because we should still speak of *Divers Things*, and not of the *same* : For, *Divers* they must be, if they have *Divers Essences*, which formally *constitutes* them such. Yet, I must declare, that I verily judge this Learned Author delivers this Doctrine out of his Sincerity, without intending to do any Favour to the Scepticks ; and that he is not aware how much this leans to that Maxim of the *Pyrrhonians*, viz. that [ *Nothing can be known, unless it be known perfectly* ; ] which is sufficiently confuted by this Evident Reflexion, that our Soul works by Inadequate Notions, and builds her Knowledge on those *Partial* Notions ; that is, we can *truly* know that *Thing*, though we know it but *imperfectly*, or in *part*.

28. And, where's the Harm to this Acquir'd

*The Knowing Things  
by Abstract No-  
tions promotes,  
and not hinders  
Science.*

Knowledge, called *Science*, tho' we know the Thing, or its Essence, only *imperfectly*, by those *Partial* Notions ; since Science has not for its Object the *whole* Thing *in the Bulk*, nor its *whole*

*Essence* neither, but only *Abstracted* Conceptions of it ? Cannot a Mathematician discourse Scientifically of Wood, as 'tis *Long*, *Broad*, or *Solid* ; or a Carpenter or Carver know it to be Wood *really*, or to have the *real Essence* of Wood, and such a *Sort* of Wood, by its Colour, its Degree of Hardness, its Aptness to be Cut, or its being more easie to do so if one goes according to the Grain, and such like ; unless he knows all those



those Innumerable Accidents found in its Entire and Exact Composition? Or, cannot (I may say, do not) we all agree to call its *Real Essence* [ *Lignea*, or *Woodish*, ] without *abusing* the Word; because one of us penetrates the Nature, or *Real Essence* of it, more than the other does? I suppose, Mr. *Locke's* laudable Zeal against some pretended Philosophers, did, on this occasion, something byass his good Reason, that he might better oppose them. And, certainly, it must be acknowledg'd, that, never were Words more *abusively* used, to the prejudice of good Sense, than those by which they express their *Essences*, and their *Specifick* and *Essential Forms*; so that, for want of some Determinate and Literal Intelligible Meaning, which could give a Philosopher any Light what to make of them, they seem'd nothing but *meer Words*, obtruded upon us for the only Truths; and so tended to reduce *Science* to Mysterious Nonsense, and Unintelligible Cant. But, I could wish, notwithstanding, that Mr. *Locke* had not over-strain'd some Points, to baffle their Insignificant Talk. I hope his discerning Judgment will distinguish me, and all true *Aristotelians*, from the Abettors of their Folly; and let them answer, if they can, for themselves.

20. His last Chapter is, about *Remedying the Abuses of Words*. Wherefore, since divers of those *Abuses* are conceiv'd by him to spring from our *Names* given to *Real Essences*, and 'tis impossible, he says, to know fully what those Real Es-

By Mr. *Locke's* Principles, there is no Way to remedy the Abuse of Words.

sences

sences are ; I should be glad he would put us into a Way to do an *Impossibility*, and *Comprehend* them fully ; otherwise, since name them we *must*, we shall, according to his Discourse, be necessarily inforc'd to the *Abuses of Words*, without any *possible* Remedy ; which is something too hard a Case.

31. I am a little apprehensive, that I do not perfectly hit Mr. Locke's true Meaning in some Passages here, and elsewhere ; finding his Discourse in other Places *Sub-con-  
trary* to what I took to be his Thoughts. For example ; Speaking here, §. 19. of *Shewing and D-fining Substances* ; all which being *Entities*, must have *Real Essences* in them ; he has these Words : [ *For, there being ordinarily in each Sort some Leading Qualities, to which we suppose the other, which make up the Complex Idea of that Species, annex'd ; we give the Name to that Quality or Idea which is the most observable, and we take to be the most Distinguishing Idea of that Species.* ] Where, if, in stead of the Words [ *to that Quality,* ] be put [ *the Subject of that Quality,* ] to which Subject we suppose the rest of its proper Complexion of Accidents *annex'd* ; it will be perfectly Co-incident with my Thoughts as to this Point. Only, I wonder why he pitches upon some *one Quality* ; as also, why he says not a Word of the *Matter*, which, (in all Bodily Substances,) determin'd by this Complexion of Accidents, makes up the Thing. This manner of Expression makes him seem to discourse all along as if this Complexion of Accidents, *abstractedly* consider'd, without any  
Regard

Mr. Locke's Ser-  
viments, after all,  
Ambiguous.

Regard to the Matter, did make the *Essence*; whereas, they cannot do this at all, unless by their Determining the Potentiality of the *Matter* to be *This*, and as including that *Determination* of it; that is, as including the *Matter thus Determin'd*.

Of the *Equivocalness* in Words, the several *Sorts* of it, *how* it comes, and of the *Way* how to *detect* it; as also, of the *Means* how we may arrive at their True and Proper Signification in several Subjects, I have treated in my *Method to Science, Book I. Less. 11.*

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# REFLEXIONS

## ON THE

### FOURTH BOOK.

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#### REFLEXION *Seventeenth,*

#### ON

#### *The First Three Chapters,*

1. **T**HIS Learned Author having, with much Exactness, treated of all that can belong to his *Ideas*, the being affected with which is called the *First Operation of our Understanding*, or *Simple Apprehension*; he advances to the *Second* [*Judgment*,] which is express'd by a *Proposition*. 'Tis by this that we have *Compleat Knowledge or Cognition*; which (as the Word it self imports) is the *putting together* of Notions in the Understanding *after its manner*; that is, in order to the *seeing* them connected, or *knowing* they are so. The *First* Chapter is both comprehensive of his Subject, and has much Truth in it. Whether



ther it goes to the bottom, and does not require some Deeper Truths to explicate the Point fully, is now to be examined.

2. He defines Knowledge to be *The Perception of the Connexion and Agreement, or of the Disagreement and Repugnancy of any of our Ideas.* My Exceptions against this Definition are:

Mr. L.'s Definition of Knowledge in many respects Faulty.

1. That [ *Perception* ] being the Act of a Knowing Power, can mean nothing but *Knowledge*; and, therefore, to define *Knowledge* by *Knowledge* seems Inartificial and Preternatural: For, it will still be ask'd, what this *Knowledge* he calls *Perception* is? 2. Mr. *Locke* granting *Perception* to *Brutes*, he must necessarily allow them *Ideas*, and that they can connect them too. Wherefore his Book being Entitled, *An Essay concerning Humane Understanding*, it is needful we know what kind of *Ideas* *We* have, what *Brutes* have; and, (not to speak of *our* or *their Perception*) whether *they* do connect them as *we* Men do. For, this Concession makes *Perception* to be the *Genus* in this Definition; and, therefore, to appropriate it to *Humane Knowledge*, the large Signification of it ought to be restrain'd to such a *Perception* as is peculiar to *Man*. But, what I most dislike is the word [ *Ideas*, ] in our perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of which he puts *Knowledge* to consist. Philosophy is the *Knowledge of Things*; wherefore, unless those *Ideas* be the *Thing it self* in our Understanding; or, if they be not, but *Similitudes* only (as the Word imports) unless it be well made out that those *Similitudes* do give us the *Knowledge of the Thing it self*, (which I have demonstrated in my Preliminaries they cannot)

'tis

'tis impossible we should ever arrive at true Philosophy, tho' we did perceive the Connexion of all the *Ideas* in the World. Nay, unless they be the Thing it self (in part,) no Predication we make can be *True*.

3. To shew this more fully, I intreat Mr. *Locke*

*Knowledge cannot  
consist in the Con-  
nexion or Disa-  
greement of I-  
deas.*

to consider, that this *Connexion* of *Ideas* he speaks as necessary to Knowledge, is that which is signify'd by the Word [*Est*;) which being so, in this Proposition, [*Sugar is sweet,*] the Word [*Est*] must

according to him, if only *Ideas* must be connected, naturally and genuinely affirm, that *one* of those *Ideas* is the other *Idea*, or that the *Idea* of *Sugar* is the *Idea* of *Sweet*; which is evidently False. For those *Ideas* differ *toto genere*; the former belonging to the Common Head of *Substance*, the other of *Quality*; and besides, 'tis perfectly contradictory to Mr. *Locke's* avowed Doctrine, that each *Idea* has its peculiar Metaphysical Verity, or *is what it self is*, and is *distinct* from any other *Idea*, and therefore is to be *Deny'd* of it. Whence follows, that it is not in seeing the Connexion or Disagreement of the *Ideas* themselves that Knowledge can consist; for they are, as to themselves, always *Distinct*, and therefore *Unconnected*; so that we can never say one of them *is* the other, which yet we do in all our Affirmative Propositions; whence follows, that all our *Affirmative* Propositions would be false. It follows then, that it is the *Subject* or *Thing* inadequately conceiv'd by our Understanding, which is said by the Copula [*Est*] to be Identity'd really and Materially with it self as conceiv'd by another Inadequate Notion; and

and, that [*Est*] speaks their being united in the same *Ens*, or ingrafted on the same *Stock of Being*. And, certainly, it appears, at first Sight, to be an odd Explication of Knowledge and Philosophy, to maintain, that they consist in seeing the Connexion or Disagreement of *Similitudes*.

4. Wherefore, I should rather think, that, as *Notions* are defin'd, *The Thing in the Understanding inadequately conceiving it, (which has been abundantly prov'd,)* so Knowledge ought to be Defin'd, *The Inadequate Notions of the Thing, existing in the Understanding, so connected there, as they are in the Thing in Nature.* To make good my Definition, I discourse thus: *First*, It has been prov'd by many Arguments, that all our Notions are *Partial Conceptions* of the *Thing*; or, which is the same, (if we take the Word [*Conception*] for the *Object*, and not for the *Act* of *Conceiving*,) they are the *Thing* inadequately conceived. And, I dare be confident, those Arguments are unanswerable; and that no true *Reason*, or *Connexion of Terms*, can ever shock them: However, I may expect much Repugnance of *Fancy*, ere that Point be admitted. *Secondly*, All our *Distinct* Notions being *Inadequate*, and consequently, (as it were,) *Parts* of the *Thing*, as 'tis Knowable by us; it follows, that (according to our Doctrine) the Immediate *Object* of all our Knowledge, being *somewhat* of the *Thing*, is wholly built on *the Thing it self*, and therefore *Solid*. *Thirdly*, Those several Notions, however *Inadequate* taking them *Abstractedly*, yet they do connote the *whole Thing*; since no Part can be

*The true Definition of Knowledge.*



conceiv'd, but in reference to the *whole*, or as in *it*, it being impossible the *former* can be apprehended to be a *Distinct Thing* from the *latter*; because, if it were of it self a *Distinct Thing*, it would be of it self a *Whole*, and not a *Part*. *Fourthly*, The Copula [*Est*] speaks the *Identity* of those *Parts* with the *Whole*; for, they can onely be *Identify'd*, as they are *One* with the *whole Thing* *materially*; since *formally*, as *Parts*, they are contradistinguish'd from one another. And, were it not so, few Propositions (as was lately prov'd) could be True. Whence, let us take any Proposition, *v. g.* [*Socrates is wise*;] the true Sense of it is, that the Individual Substance, called *Socrates*, is the *same Thing*, *Materially*, or *Really*, with that which is *Wise*; or, that, what answers to *Socrates*, and to *Wise*, are found in the *same Thing*. *Fifthly*, In regard *Parts*, as *such*, are distinguish'd *formally* from one another; therefore, we cannot say that any Partial Notion, express'd *formally as a Part*, is *Another*. Whence we cannot say [*Petreitas est sapientia*,] tho' we can say [*Petrus est sapiens*;] in regard those Abstract Words do *formally* signify such a *Partial* Notion of the whole Thing, or a kind of *Part* of it. And, tho' each of them does *connotate* the *whole* Thing, yet, with a *Quatenus*, (to which that *Abstract* manner of Expression is Equivalent,) they cut off such a precise Considerability, or Notion of it, from *all others*; and therefore, such Words can onely signify that precise *Notion*, or (as it were) *Part*, and *no other*. *Lastly*, Hence it is, that we cannot predicate a *Concrete* of an *Abstract*, nor an *Abstract* of a *Concrete*; because the Abstract signifies, distinctly and formally, only a *Part*, and  
the



the *Concrete* the *whole*, (tho' confusedly,) and *not* any *distinct Part* of it. But I expatiate too much into the Subject of Predication, and shall pursue it no farther at present.

5. To come closer to the Business in hand ; It appears by what is here said, that it is not enough for *Knowledge*, nor answers the true Notion of *Philosophy*, that *Ideas* be *predicated* of other *Ideas*, or *Similitudes* of *Similitudes* ; nor (which is the same) that we see they *agree* or *disagree* with *one another* ; but it is necessary, that the Ground of our Knowledge, and of our Predications, be taken from the *Thing it self*, as is express'd in *our* Definition. I produce not here the Definition of *Knowing* which I gave in my Preliminaries, because it is not yet granted by those with whom I am discoursing, that our *Notions* are the *Things* in our Understanding ; tho' (one Consideration, which is brought there, being added) these two Definitions are Co-incident : But I accommodate my self to Mr. *Locke's* Words, as far as they will bear, that the Difference between us may be made more apparent.

Our Definition of Knowledge *farther maintains.*

6. Hence, whereas Mr. *Locke* makes *Four* Sorts of Connexions of our *Ideas*, in which Knowledge is found, *viz.* 1. Of *Identity*, or *Diversity* : 2. Of *Relation* : 3. *Co-existence* : 4. *Real Existence* ; I must, in pursuance to the Grounds now laid, affirm, and maintain, that there is but *one* Sort of Intellectual Connexion of our *Notions*, *viz.* that of the *Co-existence* of what is meant by the two Terms in the *same Thing* ; and, that (there

Hence, there is but One Sort of Connexion, in which Knowledge consists ; *viz.* that of Co-existence.

being but *one* Copula [*Est,*] all the other Sorts of Connexion are co-incident with this one. For, the First consisting in this, that each *Idea*, or *No-*  
*tion, is its Self*, and *not Another*, signifies no more but what we express by this Identical Proposition, [*The Thing as thus conceiv'd, is the Thing as thus conceiv'd*; or, *not as otherwise conceiv'd.*] Whence it is *Self-evident*, because the Terms being every way the self-same Notion, are as closely connected as perfect Identity can express them; whence they can admit no Middle Term to come between them, and *make* the Proposition Evident, or *prove* it: But their Evidence is entirely grounded on this first Metaphysical Principle, [*Every Thing (whether Substance or Accident) is what it is*; or, *is Indivisum in se, and Divisum a quolibet alio*;] that is, in plain terms, *One*. The *Second*, [*Relation*;] taking it not for the *Act* of our Mind, comparing or connecting it to another; but for the Ground of it in the Thing, which obliges our Comparing Power, when it is in it, to refer it *actually*; is still the *Thing* it self, inadequately conceiv'd to be Connected with, or agreeing to the same Thing *in part*, as is explicated above. *V. g.* *Master* and *Scholar* are grounded on the Actions and Passions of *Teaching*, and *being Taught*, which are Inadequate Conceptions, Co-existing in those two Persons, and Identify'd materially with those Subjects: And the same is found in all others, which are *thus Connected*. And the *Last*, Of *Real Existence*; As, when we say, [*Peter is,*] clearly imports, that what is meant by *Peter*, the Subject, and by *Existent*, which is the Predicate, (imply'd there in the Word [*is,*]) are *Co-existent*; or, are found in the same *Thing*. But, more of  
this,

this when we come to consider his 4th Chapter, *Of the Reality of our Knowledge.*

7. His Second Chapter, *Of the Degrees of our Knowledge*, distinguishing it into *Intuitive, Demonstrative, and Sensitive*, is admirably Solid, Clear, and Rational throughout. The First of these is proper to *Principles*, the Second to *Proofs*, the Last to the Knowledge of Particular Things or Modes by the way of *Experiments*. Indeed, *Intuitive Knowledge* is proper to *Pure Spirits*, call'd *Intelligences* or *Angels*; which, because they do not *glean* their Knowledge from various Impressions on the Senses, consequently they do not *divide* the thing into *Parts*, by Inadequate Notions, when they come to know it; nor *compound* those Notions again into Propositions, as we do; but, at one *direct* and *full* View, call'd *Intuition*, they comprehend the whole Thing, and all that belongs to it, *at once*. Whence it seems not so proper to attribute *Intuition* to us Mortals, who are but poor Retailers of our Imperfect and short Notions; which we *spell* (as it were) and put together as Children do Letters, when they are, otherwise, not able to *read* whole Words currently. But this is very pardonable in Mr. *Locke*; for, to say true, 'tis very hard to find another Word which fits our Knowledge of First Principles much better; tho' I think [*Self-evidence*] might serve. My self have long ago had such a Thought, tho' I express'd it warily in these words: ["There is nothing in all our Knowledges, that, in the manner of it, comes so near the *Angelical Intuition* as does our Knowledge of Self-evident Principles, express'd by *Identical Propositions*."] The Degrees of our Knowledge assign'd by Mr. L. very Solid.

“ It divides as little as is possible for us in this State ;  
 “ for it predicates the same of the same ; nay, the  
 “ whole of the whole ; and, for the same Reason, it  
 “ as little compounds again. Whence, it resembles  
 “ it not a little in its *Absolute Evidence* and *Immo-*  
 “ *vable Firmness* ; and is the nearest Approach pos-  
 “ sible to Simple Intuition. That so, as the Or-  
 “ der of the World requires, the *Supremum infimi*  
 “ may immediately confine upon the *Infimum Su-*  
 “ *premi*.

8. I was much pleas'd to see Mr. Locke declare,  
 that upon this Intuition depends all  
 Every Step we take the Certainty and Evidence we have  
 in Demonstrative of our Knowledge, and particularly,  
 Knowledge, or eve- that, in every Step Reason makes in  
 ry Consequence, Demonstrative Knowledge, (that is,  
 must be ground'd in every Consequence we deduce)  
 on Self-evidence there is an Intuitive Knowledge of  
 the Agreement or Disagreement of the next intermedi-  
 ate Idea. I add, Upon which Agreement all the  
 Force of Consequence, that is, all our Reasonings are  
 ground'd. The Evident Proof he gives for it here,  
 is worthy the attentive Consideration of his Learn-  
 ed Readers. 'Tis not in this occasion only, but in  
 divers others, tho' I have not always noted them,  
 that Mr. Locke and my self have, without design'd  
 Confederacy, agreed in Positions of great Mo-  
 ment ; which, I know not how, have escap'd the  
 Thoughts of all other Authors I have seen. The  
 Reader may please to review my *Method to Sci-*  
*ence*, B. 3. *Less.* 1. § 3. where I discourse thus :  
 “ Wherefore, since, if the Consequence, in which  
 “ consists the Essence, and all the Force and Nerves  
 “ of Discourse, be not Clear and Evident, there  
 “ could be no Certainty or Evidence of any thing  
 “ that



“ that needs to be *made known* or *Concluded* ; and  
 “ so our Faculty of Exact Reasoning would have  
 “ been given us to no purpose ; hence, ’tis ma-  
 “ nifest, that however one *Proposition* may be *made*  
 “ *known* by other *Propositions* that are connected  
 “ and *consequential* to one another ; yet the *Conse-*  
 “ *quence* it self cannot be proved by Another *Conse-*  
 “ *quence*. For, the Question would still return  
 “ *how*, and in virtue of *what*, that *Consequence*  
 “ which made the other Evident, is Evident *is*  
 “ *self*, and so *in infinitum*. Whence it follows, that  
 “ the *Evidence* of all *Consequences* whatever, must  
 “ be built on something in a higher manner Evi-  
 “ dent than any *Consequence* or *Proof* can *otherwise*  
 “ make it ; that is, on a Self-evident Proposition.]  
 The certain Knowledge of which kind of Pro-  
 positions, as Mr. *Locke* holds, is to be had by *In-*  
*tuition*.

9. I have been larger upon this Point, and do  
 most especially recommend it to  
 the best Reflexion of our Readers ;  
 because it is not only the Deepest  
 and Firmest Ground, but also the  
 very *best* Test of all Argumentation ; and there-  
 fore the main Hinge on which all *Science* turns. I  
 must confess, for all that, I cannot see why, since  
 all Self-evident Truths can only be express’d by  
*Identical Propositions*, this Learned Gentleman is so  
 shy to use those *Words*, since the *Sense* he brings on  
 this Occasion, is clearly Equivalent to those *Iden-*  
*tical* Forms of Speech ; nor, if put into Proposi-  
 tions, can be express’d by any other. I think we  
 should not be asham’d of them, or think them  
*Trifling*, because some Men of Fancy, who never  
 set their Thoughts to trace Evidence and Truth to  
 their

*The great Usefulness of this last Position.*

their Originals, are pleased to make themselves Sport with them; nor because their Terms are too closely connected; For, they *must* be so; and, were they *not* so, they would be unworthy the Name of *First Principles*, nor do us *any Good* when we come to *reduce* other Truths into them; which is the best Way of *Demonstrating*.

10. *The Extent of Humane Knowledge*, of which he treats in his 3d Chapter, is a very Excellent Subject. *Science* has two Capital Enemies, *Scepticism*, and *Dogmatism*: The one will allow very little, or *Nothing* at all, to be known; the other pretends to know *too much*. The former, by breeding a perfect *Despair* of Knowledge, discourages the Industry of the best Wits; and makes them, since Truth cannot be found, to addict themselves only to *Wordish Talk* and *Declamation*: To which contributes not a little, that many who have *incomparable Fancies*, have oftentimes the *worst Judgments*; especially, if they have let their Wits loose to Raillery, and Drollery: For, such Persons, proud of their Joking Talent, do think they *answer* a Demonstration, if they can but *break a Jest* upon it. And, besides, they have the Faculty of cutting Capers beyond the Moon, and raising Objections at *random*. The Latter does, perhaps, as much Harm, by *Presuming* to demonstrate *every Thing*: And the Over-weening of *these Men* is the more pernicious, because they make a Shew of a great Friendship and Zeal for *Science*; and yet, by falling short of their Extravagant Pretensions, they throw a Scandal upon her; and make weak Distinguishers apprehend there is *no Science*

*Science at all.* The One deviates from Zeal for Truth, in Excess; the Other, in Defect: And the Judicious Decision of this Point, [ *Of the Extent of our Knowledge,* ] settles the *Golden Mean* between both. I have endeavour'd, in my *Method*, B. 1. *Less.* 2. to §. 12. to establish from Clear Grounds, the *Just Pitch* of our Knowledge in this State: Mr. *Locke* does, with his usual Candour, attempt to do the same in *his* Way; Concerning which, I am to give him my Thoughts; which are these.

11. There is no doubt but we have less Knowledge than we might have had, through our Want of some Notions; as also, for want of discerning the Agreement or Disagreement of them in the *same Thing*.

*We have Sensitive Knowledge of other Notions, besides Existence.*

No doubt too, but Intuitive Knowledge, which is only of *Self-evident* Truths, cannot reach to *all* that *belongs* to our Notions, or *Ideas*; and, that we too often want proper *Mediums* to connect those Notions, in order to Demonstration: As also, that our Sensitive Knowledge (I suppose he means that which is had by *Experiments*) does not reach very far; otherwise, our Senses giving us (as we do both of us hold) all the First *Natural Notions* we have, I believe it cannot be deny'd, but that they give us withall the *Ground* of *all* our Knowledge. Whence I cannot see, why he limits *Sensitive* Knowledge to the Notion of *Existence* onely; or, that our Senses do make us know onely that a Thing *is*: For, certainly, our Senses do as well tell us the *Wall is white*, as that the *Wall is*; tho', in proper Speech, it does *neither*, but by means of our *Mind*, comparing the

Notions of the two Terms, given us by the Object, in order to the seeing their *Co-existence in the Thing*. All they do, is, to give us our *Notions*; which the Soul (that is, the *Man*, according to his *Spiritual Part*) compounds into a Proposition; and so frames a Judgment of the said Co-existence (or Inconsistency) of those Terms, or (which is the same) of what is signify'd by them, in the same Thing. Nor do I think Mr. *Locke* will much deny any of this, however we may express our selves diversly.

12. 'Tis very true that our Experience gives us some Light to know what Qualities do belong to such Substances; yet, I cannot think it impossible to know this *very often a priori*, by *Demonstrative Reason*, tho' we do not know the *Constitution of the Minute Parts*, on which those Qualities do depend; much less do I judge, that, *tho' we did not know them*, yet we could not discover any necessary Connexion between them and any of the *Secondary Qualities*; he means, those Qualities which are the *Objects of our Senses*. Nor do I wonder Mr. *Locke* thinks thus, because he does, all along, pitch his Thoughts on the *Corpuscularian Hypothesis*, as on that which, in some Men's Opinion, goes farthest in an *Intelligible Explication of the Qualities of Body*. Now, my Judgment is, that 'tis demonstrable, that the Principles of the *Corpuscularians* cannot possibly give Account of the *Constitution* either of the *Minute Parts*, or of the least Atom, nor, consequently, of any Body in Nature; or (which is the Proper Work of a Philosopher) refund any Quality into its



*its Proper Causes* ; I mean, such Causes as they can *prove* to be such, or *must* be such ; however, they may *fancy* them to be such, by allowing to themselves *Voluntary Suppositions* for Principles. I have shewn in my *Appendix* to my *Method*, that the most Celebrated of the *Corpuscularian* Philosophers, the *Cartesians*, cannot *know the Constitution* of the *most minute Part* of any of their *Elements*, since they can never tell us by *their Grounds*, the *Primary Qualities* of their *First Matter*, of which their three Elements, and, consequently, all Natural Bodies are made. To shew *we* can, I will give a short Summary of the *Aristotelian Doctrine* in this particular, truly represented, and cleared from the Mis-conceits of some late Schoolmen.

13. 'Tis confess'd, and Evident, that *Quantity* is the Primary Affection of Body ; of which, re-modify'd, (as I may say,) all Qualities are made.

*Short Hints of the true Aristotelian Grounds.*

We can shew, that *by it* Body is *Divisible* ; and, therefore, *Quantity* (for that, and and many other Reasons) is *Divisibility*, especially, taking it as consider'd *Physically* : however, taking it as capable to be Measur'd, Proportion'd, and Figur'd, (as Mathematicians do,) it may not very unfitly be called *Extension*. But, take it, (as I said,) as affecting Bodies, in order to *Natural Action* and *Passion*, in which the Course of Nature consists, (as a Natural Philosopher ought to consider it ; ) and 'tis *Divisibility*, or a Capacity to be divided by those Causes. Nor can the Greatest *Cartesian* deny this, since he grants, that the *First Operation* in Nature, is, the making their three Elements, by *Grinding* (as it were) or  
*dividing*

dividing their First Matter. Proceeding by immediate Steps, we are to seek out the *first Sorts* of this *Divisibility*; and this must be done by finding the *most Simple Intrinfecal* Differences of that, or any other Notion, which can only be *more* and *less* of the *Common Notion*. Now, *more* and *less* of *Divisibility* Consider'd, in order to Natural A-

gents, is the same as to be \* *more easily*, and *less easily* Divisible by those Agents, which we call to be *Rare*, and *Dense*. *Rarity* therefore, and *Density* do constitute the *Simplest* Sorts or Kinds of Bodies. And, since it is inconceivable that Matter should be divided at all by Second Causes, but the Divider must be *more Dense*, or *more able* to divide, than the Matter that is to be divided by it; it follows, that *Rare* and *Dense* Bodies were *originally* such; or, that there were *Created* at first some sorts of Bodies that are *more*, and others that were *less* divisible; as is clearly express'd in the two first Verses of *Genesis*. And Reason abets it; for, otherwise, the Course of Nature, consisting in *Motion*, could never have been *Connaturally* made; because, had all the Parts of Matter been *equally* Divisible, there could be no Reason why *one* part of the Matter should be the *Divider*, rather than the *other*; and so there could have been no *Motion*, nor, consequently, any Course of Nature at all.

14. By the Division of *Rare* Bodies by *Dense* ones, and the Division of their first Compounds, the Number of Parts increasing, there naturally follow'd the various *Size*, and the *Grossness* and *Minuteness* of those Parts; as also, their

\* See Method to Science, B. I. L. 3. §§. 1, 2.

How all Secondary Qualities come to be made.

their various *Figures, Situations, &c.* All which contribute to compound the *Species* and *Individuums*. Of these, variously mingled and remingled, all the rest are made. From Simple Division, *two* Things are made of *one*; whence follows the Individual Diversity of Bodies, according to the Notion of Substance, or *Ens*. *More* Accidents are (as was said before) still taken in, to make the Subaltern *Genera* and *Species*, even to the lowest Sort, or Kind; and innumerable more of them, to distinguish and constitute *Individual Bodies*.

15. To come a little nearer our main Point: unless those Qualities, *Rarity* and *Density*, which are the *Primary* ones, be admitted, the World could *never* have been *form'd* con-naturally; nor the Course of Na-ture carried on; because, (as was now shewn,) in that Suppo-sition, there would have been no *Motion*. For, Motion of Material Entities is perform'd by the Intervening of the Parts of the *one* between the Parts of the *other*, and, so, Dividing it; which is impossible, unless the one had been *Rarer*, or *more yielding*; the other *Denser*, or *less yielding*. But, this once settled, 'tis evident from the very Terms, that there *are* Proper Causes, both on the Agent's and Patient's Side, for the one's *Dividing*, and the other's being *Divided*. For, the Rare being *more* Divisible than the Dense, 'tis demonstrable, that the Dense being *impell'd* against the Rare by Mo-tion, (which comes from a Superior Agent,) the Rare being *more* Divisible, will give way, and be divided by the Dense; which is clearly impossible  
in

*The Course of Na-ture is fundamen-tally built on the Admission of Ra-rity and Den-sity.*

in the *Corpuscularian Hypothesis*; which puts all Parts of their Matter to be *equally* Rare, or Dense; or rather, (as the *Cartesians* do,) *neither* Rare, *nor* Dense; all Qualities, according to them, being made by mingling their three Elements; which Elements are themselves made by, and presuppose, the Motion of their First Matter. Whereas, yet, it is impossible to conceive, but those Parts of that Matter must be *either* Rare, or *else* Dense, at least to some Degree. And, as denying the Rarity and Density in the *First Bodies* does, by making Motion impossible, put the Course of Nature out of Frame, both in its Beginning and Progress; so it utterly destroys all Demonstration in Physicks, which is grounded on *Mediums* from Proper Causes, and Proper Effects.

16. Passing over many Immediate Steps, which shew how those Four Principal Qualities, Heat, Cold, Moisture, and Driness, are made of Rarity and Density, acted upon by the common Causes in Nature; we come to shew how these two *Primary* Qualities do constitute many *Secondary* ones; and how these last are refunded into the other, as their *Proper Causes*; and, therefore, are Demonstrable by them, as by their *Proper Mediums*. A few Instances may serve, as Hints, to explicate others. That great *Pellucidity* in the Air is necessarily, and properly refunded into its extream Divisibility, or *Rarity*; by which it becomes easily penetrable in all its Parts, by those *Spicula Ignea*, the Rays of the Sun; and *Opacity*, for the same Reason, is the Proper Effect of *Density*; which hinders  
its



its Subject from being penetrated, or *Divided* by them ; whence also it is a Proper Cause of Repelling, or Reflecting them. Again ; Who sees not that *Liquidity*, which makes its Subject easily yielding to be flatted evenly, as we see in Ponds ; or driven to run into Cavities, by the common Motion of Gravitation, is a proper Effect of Rarity, as *Consistency* is of Density ? Spissitude is a Constipation of Dense Parts, or the Want of Pores to admit the Ingress of other Bodies. *Grossitude* is clearly nothing but Density, in a *bigger* Quantity of its Parts. *Friability* is refunded into great Dense Parts, and very large Rare ones : Whence, those Rare Parts, which, were they less, would better cement those Parts together, being now very large, and, withal, very Divisible, are *easily divided* ; and, consequently, the Body is soon shatter'd : As we find in Dry Clods, out of which, ( while they were yet *Wet Dirt*, ) those Parts which were Watry, being drawn by Heat, large Cavities are left, which the Air now possesses. On the other side, *Ductility* and *Malleability* are the Effects of the very smallest Rare Parts, finely compacted with the minutest *Dense* ones. Those *Small* Dense Parts, so closely woven, and, in a manner, Contiguous, keep the Rare from evaporating ; and the *Rare*, by being such, and interwoven with the Dense all over, make the Compound yield to Expansion, without Breaking ; being *very small*, are not easily separable ; and yet, tho' rarify'd farther by the subtillest Agent, Fire, they render it *Fusible*.

17. Were these Principles which I rawly and briefly touch on here, pursu'd by Learned Men with Immediate Consequences, which, true Logick assisting, is far from impossible ; the Nature of those *first-*

*The true Reason why some Men think them Inexplicable.*

*-mixt* Qualities, and by their means of many others, would not be very hard to explicate. But, if Men are resolv'd to neglect all *Natural* Principles, and the *Intrinsical* Constitution of the *First* Bodies in Nature, and will needs run upon nothing but *Mathematical* Notions, which presuppose those Principles ; nor could be found in Nature, unless the other be first admitted, or Division made Possible ; ( for neither *Parts*, nor consequently *Figures* of Parts, could be made without *Division*, nor Division unless some Bodies were naturally *apt to divide*, others to be divided, that is, unless some were *Rare*, others *Dense* ) or, if, instead of demonstrating their Natural Principles by the *Superiour* Science, they will needs have recourse to *Voluntary Suppositions* ; and violate the Nature of Causality, and of the Deity it self, by making him whose *Proper Effect* ( he being Essentially Self-existence ) is to *give Existence*, or *create*, to be the Proper and *Immediate Cause* of *Motion* ; and go about to prove *Ignotum per Ignottissimum*, by supposing ( as they sometimes do ) that *God wills* this or that, which is for the Interest of their Tenet, and too hard to prove : If, I say, Men are resolv'd to follow such *Untoward Methods*, 'tis no Wonder Science does not advance, but the World is detain'd in Ignorance of many things, which otherwise it might know. Did Learned Men set themselves to carry forwards the

the Grounds of Nature in *Euclides Physicus* (where they will find Demonstrations enow) to farther Conclusions, with the same Zeal as they do the Mathematicks; I doubt not but the Evident Truths, which would by Degrees disclose themselves, would both encourage, and enable them, to make a farther Progress in Knowledge; nor would the Science of *Second Qualities*, (about which Physical Demonstrations ought in great part be employ'd) be held so Desperate. But to leave these Discourses, and apply my self to Mr. L. I cannot but wonder, that amongst all his *Ideas* of Qualities, he not so much as once mentions (as far as I remember) those two *Chiefest* ones of *Rarity* and *Density*; tho' nothing is more obvious in the whole Course of Nature than these are. Which, with many other Reasons, makes me think he had not seen, or at least well weigh'd the true *Aristotelian* System, (which he might have seen in Sir *Kenelm Digby's Treatise of Bodies*, and its Latin Preface; as also in *Institutiones Peripateticæ*;) but took it as represented by the Modern Schools. For my self, I must declare I verily judge, that the Grounds I here insist on, are the *only true* ones that a Natural Philosopher *can have*; that they are *Demonstrable*; and I do offer my self to *maintain* them to be *such*, if it shall please any Learned Objector to attempt to show these Principles Faulty; or that we build on any *Supposition* at all, and not on what's either *Self-evident*, or easily and immediately *Reducible* to Self-evidence. Which, I believe, no other Sect of Philosophers did ever so much as pretend to.

18. To come to those Qualities, which are the Formal Object of our Senses, called by Mr. Locke *Secondary Qualities*, I have shewn already that divers of them are *Intelligible* and Explicable by *Rarity* and *Density*; only certain little Respects are added to them, which too lie in our Ken: Nor do I doubt but most of the others may be clearly and distinctly known by the same Grounds. Indeed, divers of them depend on the *Figure* and *Texture* of Parts; which, tho' we can never know with a Mathematical Exactness, yet I see not why we may not demonstrate the *Natures* or *Kinds* of each Quality, so far as to *distinguish* them from *others*, and refund them into their *Proper Causes*; which is enough for our purpose, and most proportionable to our State. For Example, *Light* brings from the Wall into the Eye, and so into our Knowing Power, the Notion of *Whiteness*, and of other Colours from other Objects. It cannot be doubted then, (since *Light* of its self is *Uniform*) but that there is some Disposition in the Surface of the Object, or the Figure of its outmost Parts, which reflects *Light* after a different manner, and affects the Seer accordingly. Nor is it hard to conceive, but very Evident, that a very smooth Surface, as having *fewest Pores* in it, will reflect *more Light*, and so make it *more Visible*; especially if those Outmost Parts be *Roundish*, which reflect *Light* every way, or towards all sides. It is manifest then that, that Quality which is *most Visible* of all others being that which we call *Whiteness*, the *Proper Causes* of that Quality may be found out. Which will further appear hence,



hence, that if, on the contrary, the Surface have Small-pointed Parts and Large Pores, much of the Light will be lost in those shady Grotts, and scarce any Beam of it reflected ; which therefore is the Proper Cause of that Lightless Appearance call'd *Blackness* ; which is the Reason why, when there is no Light at all to be reflected, all things seem Black. If we hold a Thousand Needles Points towards our Eye, they appear Black, because of the vastness of the Interstices or Cavities in proportion to the extant Parts which should have reflected the Light : Whereas, were the Object a polish'd Plate of Steel, the Interstices or Pores being less, it appears more luminous and whitish ; which may give us some faint, but sure, Light, how this Colour is made. The Intermediate Colours are made by the Mixture and Demixture of those Extreams ; whence, out of the Degrees of their partaking those, Contrary or Subcontrary Qualities are framed, as Blue, Green, Yellow, and all other Colours. Nor is this *Degree*, constituting each of those *Species*, Unknowable. A Picture-drawer can tell us what Proportion of his Paint of *such* a Colour he adds to that of *another* Colour, to make what *Third* Colour he pleases. We see then, that the *Secondary Quality* of Colour, may come within the Compass of our Knowledge. Nor do I see why the *rest* of them may not become *equally* Intelligible, did we seriously set our Reflex Thoughts on work to study them ; especially Experimental Knowledge assisting, by hinting to us such Matters of Fact as give Light to our Reason, ( when furnish'd with, and attentive to, true Natural Principles ) how it may *reduce* those Qualities unto their *Proper Causes*, which is the *only* Work of **Science**.

REFLEXION *Eighteenth,*

## ON

*The 4th and 5th CHAPTERS.*

1. **I** Come now to a nearer view of the 4th Chapter, *Of the Reality of Knowledge*, the main point in which the whole Doctrine of the *Ideists* is concern'd. To State it rightly, I do not doubt (as I have express'd my self formerly) but that the *Ideists* have many true Notions of the *Things*; that is, the Things themselves in their Minds, after a Natural Manner, as well as their Opposers have, notwithstanding their ill Speculation; and thence oftentimes discourse right; for the same Reason that, tho' some Philosophers held that the Eye sees *per Emissionem*, others *per Receptionem Radiorum*, yet they naturally saw *both a like*, however their Speculative thoughts, differ'd about the *manner* how *Seeing* was made. Wherefore the true State of the Question is, whether they can have any *Real Knowledge* of the things in Nature, according to the Principles of the *Ideists*; or, by their putting our Notions, which are the Ground and Materials of our Knowledge, to be onely *Likenesses, Appearances, Similitudes, Resemblances, Pourtraitures, or Pictures* of the Things, (which are the names they give them) and not the *Things themselves* in our minds: For, if they can have *no Real Knowledge*, or *Knowledge of the Thing*, by such meerly represent-

representing *Ideas*, then it must be said that those *Ideas*, being confessedly the *First* and *only* Materials of their Knowledge, the *Ideists* will become oftentimes liable to deviate from Nature, and fall into Errour by adhering to such Groundless Principles, as is the Substituting very often *Empty Resemblances*, or *Fancies*, for the *Things themselves*; nor can they ever be able to give a Solid Account by *their* Principles, that they know *any thing*.

2. Now, it seems to me (tho' I should wave those many pregnant Arguments brought against them, in my three first Preliminaries) that the very Position of the *Ideists*, does decide the Question, and confute themselves. For, if we may trust their words, they agree that we know the *Things* as well as the *Ideas*, and onely differ in the manner *how*: Of which Mr. L. tell us here § 3. 'Tis Evident the mind knows not *Things* immediately, but onely by the Intervention of the *Ideas* it has of them. Whence I much fear that by *Ideas* he means *Phantasms*, or Material Pictures in the *Imagination*; by whose Intervention 'tis indeed confest we know. For, otherwise, it is far from *Evident*, that we know them by *means* of those *Spiritual* Conceptions, we call *Notions*; since we bring many close Arguments, fetcht from the Nature of the Thing, to prove that there is perfect Evidence of the *Contrary*: For, those *Ideas* or *Notions* being held and shown by us, to be the *Things* in our Mind, their very *being there*, or in a *Knowing Power*, is to be *known*: Nor can they be held by us to be the *means* to know *themselves*; for, so the same

How we know the  
Things by means  
of Ideas, Inexpli-  
cable.

would be the *Means* and *End* both, which is a Contradiction. But, let us consider his words. *The mind*, he says, *knows the Things by the Intervention of Ideas*. The Question then is what the *Idea* does, and what the word [ *Intervention* ] means. Does the Mind see the Thing *without*, by sending out her Rayes of Knowledge to it? This cannot be said, in regard all the Acts of Knowledge which the Mind has, are *Immanent* ones, and are receiv'd in that which produced them, as in their *only* Subject. Does then the Thing that is *without*, send its beams by the *Ideas*, as by a kind of Spiritual Optick-glass, to which the mind lays her Intellectual Eye? Neither can this be said, for the Mind could see or know the Thing *it self* were it *in it*, else how could it know the *Ideas*? Rather, were the Thing in the Understanding, it could not but be *known*, whether there were any Similitude, besides, in it, or no. It may be said that the Mind knows the Thing by the *Idea* because it is a Picture or Similitude that represents it. But I way walk in a Gallery, and see a Hundred Pictures in it of Men, and many other Things in Nature; and yet not know one jot the better, any one of the Things represented, unless I had know them formerly, tho' *Apelles* himself had drawn them. I may remember them again, indeed, if I had known them *before*; which cannot be said in our case, because those *Ideas* of theirs are to give them the *First* Knowledge of the Thing.

*The Ideists must be forced to grant that the Thing known is in the Mind.*

3. Being thus at a loss to explicate [ *Intervention* ] or to know what It, or the *Idea* or Representation serves for, we will reflect  
next



next upon the Word [ *know* ] which Mr. Locke applies ( tho' not so *immediately*, yet ) *indifferently*, to the *Thing* and to the *Idea*. Now, if this be so, and that to *to be known* agrees to them both ; then, as the *Idea* is in the Mind when it is *known*, so the *Thing*, when *known*, should be *in* the Mind too, which is our very Position, thought by the *Ideists* so Paradoxical, and yet here forcibly admitted by themselves. And, if neither the *Idea* brings the Thing *into* the Knowing Power, or ( which is the same ) into the *Mind* ; nor the Mind, or Knowing Power goes *out of* the Soul *to it*, I know not how they can pretend to show how the *Knowing Power*, and the Thing *known*, can ever come to *meet*, as they must when ever an *Act of Knowledge* is made. 'Tis to no purpose then, to alledge that the Thing *comes into* the mind, or is *brought thither* by means of the *Idea* ; for, if it *comes* or is *brought thither*, let it be by what *means* it will, 'tis most incontestably Evident that, *after* it is come or brought *thither*, it is *there*. Nor can all the Wit of Man avoid this Consequence, unless plain words must lose their Signification. Wherefore Mr. L. in pursuance of his own Principles should not have said *that the Mind does not know Things immediately, but by means of the Ideas* ; but, that it does not know them at *all*, neither *mediately* nor *immediately* ; for if the Thing be *in the Knowledge* at all, they must be *in the Mind*, where *only* the *Knowledge* is ; which comes over ( thus far ) to our Position.

4. It must be confess'd, that Mr. *Locke* has here, §. 3. put the Objection against the *Ideists* as strongly, and home, as it is possible: But I must still persist, and avow, that neither his own excellent Wit, (which, had he light on right Principles, could reach to any thing that is within the Compass of Possibility,) nor all the World joining in his Assistance, can clear that Objection, so as to satisfy any Intelligent Man, who is true to his Reason guiding itself (as it ought) by *Connexion of Terms*, and not by *Fancy*; nor shew, that by his *Ideas* any Knowledge at all of the Thing can be possibly had. First, He alledges the *Agreement or Conformity of the Things with his Simple Ideas*. And I reply, that he cannot, by the Principles of the *Ideists*, shew that the Things do agree or disagree with his *Simple Ideas* at all. To demonstrate which, I argue thus: Ere he can know that the *Representation* and the *Thing represented* do agree, Common Sense tells us, he must have both the *Idea* and the *Thing* in his *Comparing Power*, that is, in his Mind; that so he may take a View of both of them, and consider them *in order to one another*; and, by doing this, see whether the one does truly resemble the other, or no. But, this is directly against the Principles of the *Ideists*, who do not allow that the *Thing* can be in the Mind, but the *Idea* only. Next, he alledges, that his *Complex Ideas* are *Archetypes*; and not *Conformable to the Things*, as the others were, but to *themselves* only; and, therefore, he says, they cannot lead us into Error, because they cannot but represent *themselves*. I pass by the Oddness of the Position, that

that the *Idea*, which is a *Picture*, should be a *Picture of it self*, or *represent it self*: I only note, that this Allegation which should *clear the Point*, quite *loses it*, and *gives it up*. For, the Question is, whether his *Ideas* do give us the Knowledge of the Things in Nature; and 'tis evident, and confess'd they cannot give us this Knowledge of them, but by *representing them*: Now, he tells us, that his *Complex Ideas are not Copies of the Things*, nor *represent them*, but *themselves only*. Whence is evidently concluded, that we are never the nearer to the Knowing of *Things* by *them*; no, not obliquely, and *at Second hand*, or by the *Intervention* of those *Ideas*, or Similitudes representing them, as was pretended formerly. Whence, for any thing he has produced, we may justly doubt whether such *Ideas* are not *Whimsical Fancies*, without *any Reality at all*; since he will not allow them even that *slightest Relation* to the *Things*, of so much as *representing them*. But, which is much worse, he affirms, §. 5. that *those Ideas themselves are consider'd as the Archetypes*; and the *Things* no otherwise regarded, but as they are *conformable to them*. Now, this seems to me a strange way of proving the *Reality of our Knowledge*, by *Ideas*, to affirm, that we are not to regard the *Things*, but as *conformable to our Ideas*. Is not this to make Philosophy not the *Knowledge of Things*, but of *Ideas only*; and to pretend, that the *Thing* must only be held *True*, if it be *Conformable to our Ideas*? He might as well have said *Fancies*; for, he expressly says, these *Complex Ideas* are *made by the Mind*, and *not taken from the Thing*, nor *like it*: And, whatever is neither the *Res*, nor so much as *like it*, can neither have *Reality*, nor

Shew of Reality ; and therefore, must be a *meer* Fancy. Now, these *Complex* Ideas reach much farther than all the *others* do ; viz. to *Modes*, *Substances* and *Relations* ; as is seen, *Book 1. Chap. 12.* So that this Discourse of his destroys the *Reality* of our Knowledge in almost all the Things we are to know. He will, perhaps, say, those *Complex* Ideas are the *Effects* of certain *Powers* to Cause them, found in the Thing ; and, by this Means they bring the Things, as being their *Causes*, into their Mind. But the Argument returns still with the same Force ; for, if they bring the Thing into the Mind, then the Thing is in the Mind when it is brought thither. Add, that this makes them *Resemblances* of the Thing, which he denies ; for, the *Effect*, being a *Participation* of the Cause, must necessarily resemble it ; especially, if it be a Natural Effect. Nor can he say they make us know the Thing, because they are made up of *Simple* ones : For, as the *Simple* Ideas only made us know the Thing by representing it, so these other not representing It, have lost the Power of making us know it at all. So that, let them turn which way they will, either the Thing is never brought into the Knowledge, or the Mind ; and then it can never be known : Or, it is brought thither, and then it must be there ; which is our Position, and deny'd by the *Ideists*.

5. I have shewn above, that all Mathematical Knowledges, tho' they are never so abstractedly express'd, are grounded on the Thing, or on Body ; and *Moral* ones, ( which two he here mentions, ) on the Nature of *Man*, or *Reason* ; which,

I sup-

*Mathematical and Moral Knowledges are grounded on the Thing in the Mind.*



I suppose, none will say are *Nothings* ; and, therefore, they are, both of them, *true Knowledge of the Thing*, consider'd in part, or inadequately.

6. In his 8th Section, he defends himself for *having so little regard* (as it may seem) *to the Real Existence of Things*. I discourse thus : We have more Real Notions of the *Thing*, than barely *Existence* ; for, every Notion that belongs to the Line of *Thing* or *Substance*, whether Inferior or Superior ; nay, every Mode or Accident that *does* belong, or ever *did* belong to the *Thing*, either Intrinsically or Extrinsically, are *all* of them *Real* ; so that he needs not be solicitous any should object, that his *Ideas* have no *Reality* in them, because he regards not their *Existence* onely. And, were such an Objection made, or had it any force, he might also reply, that in every part of his Discourse, he *does* regard *Existence*, and cannot do otherwise ; unless any Objecter should be so weak as to alledge, that *what exists in the Mind, does not exist at all*. For, if he had once his Notions from the *Thing*, they would be still the *Thing in the Mind*, and *Real*, tho' the Individual Objects, whence they were taken, be perish'd. Nay, more ; *those Things* would have a Better, a more Durable, and more Noble Existence *in the Mind*, than they had in Nature. I say, [*those Things* ; ] not fearing that any should object, that *Thing* signifies the *whole* ; which may seem contrary to my former Doctrine, that the *Thing* is only in the Mind by *Inadequate* Notions, or *in part*. For, tho' the

*All Essential Predicates, and Accidental ones too, are truly the Thing, and the whole Thing, implicitly confusely.*

*Formal*

*Formal Conception* be onely of some *Quality* of it, *expresly* and *distinctly*, yet it *implies* or *connotes* the *Knowledge* of the *whole Thing confusedly*; it being most clearly demonstrable in *Metaphylicks*, that *there are no Actual Parts in any Compound whatever*: So that 'tis still the *whole Thing* that is known, tho' onely a *Part* (as it were) of it be known *distinctly*. Upon this *Evident Principle*, that *there are no Actual Parts*, is grounded that *Solid* and most approved *Maxim*, that *Actions and Passions are of the Suppositum*, or *Individual Thing*. Thus, when the *Hand* strikes or wounds a *Man*, 'tis truly said, that the *Man* (which signifies the *whole Thing*) did it, and is answerable for it; and, if he kills the *Person* he struck, the *whole Man* will be hang'd for it, tho' the *Hand* onely, and not the *Legs*, *Head*, *Neck*, &c. gave the *Blow*. Now, this could neither be said with *Truth*, nor that *Punishment* be inflicted by *Justice*, if the Word [*Hand*] did not *signifie*, and truly were the *whole Man*, according to his *Faculty of Handling* or *Striking*, or according to *that Part* which immediately did that *Action*. The self-same is to be said, and for the self-same *Reason*, of our *Inadequate Notions*; and, that each of them implies, or connotes (that is, materially and entitatively *is*) the *whole Thing*, tho' *formally* or *precisely* but a *Part* of it, as it were; or the *Thing* according to *such a particular Considerability*, found in it, or *Identify'd* with it. Whoever shall weigh attentively the *Force* and *Coherence* of this *Discourse*, will clearly discern how *entirely* all our *Philosophy* is built on the *Things*, and is the *Knowledge of them*; and how far the *Idejs* fall short of having that *Solid Ground* for the

the *Basis* of their Discourses: But, especially, this Tenet, which puts their *Complex Ideas* not onely *not to be the Thing*, (which it must be some Way, or to some degree or other, if it be not a meer *Fancy*,) but, not to be so much as a *Copy* or *Resemblance* of it, which (as was said) is the slightest and least Relation it can possibly have to it.

7. I would have none think, that, by this Discourse I *deny* Complex Notions, or *Ideas*. The Ten Common Heads are the Simpler ones; which when we divide by *Differences*, each Inferior *Genus* and *Species*, (they being made up of the Superior Notions, and those Differences,) are *Complex Notions*, as their very Definitions tell us. Whence Mr. *Locke's* Complex *Idea* of *Murder*, *Sacrilege*, or whatever else they be, are given us by the *same* Method. And, the difference between him and me in this Point, is this; that we complicate our Ideas *regularly*, and according to the exact Rules of *Art*; and he seems to make his *voluntarily*, or else by Reflexion on his own *Interiour*, and what he experiences in himself; which I take to be a very fallacious way, because very few can distinguish well between a *Phantasm* in the *Imagination*, which is a *Material* Faculty in us; and a *Notion*, which is *Spiritual*, tho' they be both of them *Interiour*, or *within us*. To shew the Difference between which, I have given a short Hint in my *Method*, Book 1. *Less.* 2. §. 24. and much more here, in my *Preface*.

That our Complex Notions are Regular, and well grounded; Mr. L's, not so.

8. It is very hard, when two Writers go upon different Principles, not to mistake now and then one the others Meaning ; and I would be loath to wrong so Ingenuous an Author. Sometimes he seems to mean no more by his *Complex Ideas*, but either those Compound Notions which are made up of the Simpler Notions of the *Genus* and *Difference*, as we descend downwards in the *same Line* ; or else, of those in divers Lines ; and, I am sure, let him discourse them as he will, they can be compounded of nothing else ; those Common Heads comprizing all the Natural Notions we can have. It is no less certain too, that we can put together (as he says) Simple Notions as we please, which we have not observ'd thus put together in things that actually exist. But then we must be wary, while we do this, that our *Reason* joins them by seeing them *Consistent* and *Compossible* : For, our *Fancy* will put together *Ideas* which are utterly *Repugnant* to one another, and are altogether Chimerical. Now, if the Notions, thus join'd by us, be Consistent, the Nature or Thing suppos'd to be the Ground of those Notions is *possible to be* ; which being the Notion of *Ens*, hence they are conceiv'd as a kind of *Intellectual Entity*, created (as it were) by the Mind, and thence have an *Intelligibility*, which is a Property of *Ens* (Non-Entities and Chimæras being Unintelligible) and we can have a kind of *Counterfeit*, or Artificial, Notion of them as *Entities*, tho' such a thing *never existed* in the World that we know of ; tho', I believe, 'tis hard to conceive, that we can frame a Complex Notion of a Nature that is *Capable to be*, but it exists somewhere



where in the Universality of Creatures, here, or elsewhere. How the Mind, using the Fancy, can do this, cannot, I think, be better elucidated, than by reflecting on what those, who write of the Excellency of *Poesie* and *Poets*, use to say in Commendation of those *Dædalean* Artists. They tell us that a *Poet* has that Name from the Greek Noun ποιήτης, which signifies *A Maker*. The Reason they give for this Appellation is, that whereas *other* Artists have their *Materials* given to their Hands to work upon, by shaping it into an Artificial Form; the *Poet* alone is the *Maker* as well of his *Matter*, as the Contriver of its *Form*. So that the *Ideas* he has in his Head of his Heroes, his Lovers, his Ladies, and of Vir-  
tuous Persons, are indeed (as Mr. *Locke* calls his) *Archetypes*, and regard not whether such Incomparable Patterns he has invented did ever exist in Nature, or no; nor is it to his purpose. Yet still (as Mr. *Locke* says well) that his *Complex Ideas* are made of *Simple* ones, so (by the leave of those Self-magnifiers) the *Poet* could never have had those Excellent *Ideas* of his *Heroes*, or their great Actions, had he not been pre-imbu'd with *Natural Notions*; which he joins together ingeniously, and exalts them to a high Pitch, so to make them *Exemplars* for others to imitate. Rather, he only adds *Superlative* or *Extraordinary Degrees* to what he finds in Nature. Whence 'tis manifest, he regards not *what is*, but *what should be*; quite contrary to the Duty of a *Philosopher*, who is to take his *Complex Notions* from Things, just as he finds them complicated in Nature, and then discourse upon them by his Reason; and not to stand coining new *Complex Ideas* which Nature  
never

never gave him. What therefore I most dislike here in Mr. *Locke* is, that he seems not to reflect on what it is which makes some *Ideas* or *Notions* more Simple than others, viz. Their being more Abstracted or Universal; for this frees them from the Partnership of more-compounded Differences, and the Complexion of Multitudes of Accidents; (which, still, as they descend lower, are requisite to distinguish the *Kinds* of Things;) by which means they become more Simple or less compounded; whence, the Supreme Heads of the Ten Predicaments are the *Simplest* Notions of all others, except that of *Existence*. Did Mr. *Locke* rate the Simplicity and Complexion of his *Ideas* from this certain and well-grounded Rule, there might an easie Accomodation be made between his Doctrin and mine as to this Particular. But his Zeal against the Cobweb Schemes some Modern Schoolmen had woven, transported him to ravel that Excellent Frame of Notions, which both Nature and Art had given us; and, (as *Cartesius* and others have done) to model all Philosophy upon a new, tho' less Solid, or rather far from Solid, Foundation.

2. That I may say as much as I can in behalf of the *Ideists*, it may be alledg'd,

*All Pleas fail the Ideists, unless they perfectly distinguish Phantasms from Notions.*

that they find by *Experience* Things are as their *Ideas* do represent them, and that they Succeed as we by means of our *Ideas* do Forecast them: Therefore *Real Knowledge* may be had by means of *Ideas*. I answer, First, That this Agreement they have between what's in the Mind and out of it, would equally, nay better, be explicated, were the Things themselves in  
the

*the Mind*, and not the *Ideas*; and, therefore, it can be no Argument for the Reality of their Knowledge by *Ideas only*. Besides, I deny that when their *Ideas* are not true Natural Notions but *Fancies*, they experience them, or any Effect of them; as in *Vacuum*, or Duration before or after the World. Secondly, I answer, That Experience only helps them by giving them *Knowledge*; and *Knowledge*, according to them, can only be had by means of *Ideas*; wherefore they must either prove, by *other* Grounds, that *Similitudes* can give us Knowledge of the Things, or they do *petere Principium*, beg the Question, and prove *idem per idem*. For, if meer *Representations* can give us no true Knowledge, *Experience*, which only assists us by giving us *Ideas*, is quite thrown out of doors, and may all be *Fantastical*. All is wrong and falls short, if the *First Ground* of our Knowledge be Incompetent and Insignificant. Besides, *Experience* gives us both *Phantasms*, which are *Material* Representations; and our *Notions* too, which are *Spiritual*; but Experience is not duely qualify'd to tell us which is the *one*, and which is the *other*; tho' this be of the highest Concern in our Case: All it can do is to inform us, that we are affected by some Agent working on our Senses. Nay, of the two, it more inclines us to embrace *Phantasms* for Notions; for those do make upon us the more *Sensible* Impression, and cause a *more lively Representation*. To distinguish perfectly between this False and True Ground of Knowledge, is of the most weighty Importance of all other Points of Philosophy whatsoever; and yet I must complain, that not the least Care (as far as I have observ'd) is taken any where in this

Treatise to *distinguish* them ; and particularly, not in this Chapter, which had been the proper Place to treat of that Subject : But, on the contrary, (as I have shewn above) they are carelessly *Confounded*. And I must declare, that without settling this Point *well*, we can never have any Certainty what Knowledge is *Real*, what *Fantastick* : Or, when we do *truly know*, when onely *seem to know* : But, there is not a Word here to that purpose.

10. As for the *Monsters* and *Changelings* here spoken of, I think Philosophers should have nothing to do with *Lusus Naturæ*, or *αὐαρηματα τῆς φύσεως*, which are besides the ordinary Course of Nature ; but with the *Common* Course of Causes, or *Nature it self*. My Judgment is, too, that People should be very wary in *Killing* any Monsters that approach to Humane shape ; and, that it were fitter there should be Hospitalls to breed them, till perfect Observations were made concerning them. The Novelty of the sight, would invite Spectators, and bear their Charges : Unless perhaps there may be danger, lest the Imaginations of the Apprehensive Sex, who see such Uncouth Shapes, or hear frequent Talk of them, should, by that occasion, breed more of them. What concerns us is to look to our Principles, and not to be misled from them, by reflecting on such odd preternatural Productions ; as I must think Mr. *Locke* is, when he thinks *Changelings* to be *something between a Man and a Beast*. The Division of *Animal* into *Rational* and *Irrational* is made by such Differences as are perfectly *Contradictory* to one another ; between



tween which there can no more be any *Third* or *Middle*, than there can be a *Medium* between *is* and *is not*. If then that odd Birth be *Rational*, let the shape be as Distorted as it will, it is truly a *Man*; if it be *not*, let it look never so *like* a *Man*, 'tis a *Brute*. When 'tis the one, when the other, may hap in some odd cases to be Doubtful; and then it belongs to the Prudence of Intelligent Men to decide it; or, if they cannot, it becomes us in Christian Prudence to act warily. Indeed, if the Definition of *Man*, viz. *Rational Animal*, be questionable, we shall (as I said above) be at a great Loss to know *our own Kind*; which would be but a melancholy Business. And, if we forego our Principles, distinguishing between *Corporeal* and *Spiritual* Natures, we may perhaps grow in time no wiser than the Common People amongst the *Portugueses* in *Brazil*, who conceit the Apes and Monkies there have as much Wit as themselves have, and could *speak* well enough too if they would; but that, out of a deep Reach of Policy, they *counterfeit* themselves dumb, and not to understand the Language, lest they should be forced to work.

Corollary I. From this Discourse, and the Evident Grounds of it, all possibility of *Vacuum* is clearly confuted. Hence, no *Vacuum*. For, if the *Idea* or Notion of *Space* be only an Inadequate Conception of *Body*, whence 'tis evidently taken, or *Body* conceived according to such a *Mode* of it; then to put *Space without Body*, or where there is *no Body*, is a perfect Contradiction.

Corallery II. Hence also, tho' the *Cartesians* could demonstrate there are *Innate Ideas*, (which I judge impossible) yet, unless they declare and prove, *by their Principles*, that those *Ideas* are the *things themselves* in our Understanding, and not *Resemblances* onely, the same Arguments I have used against others will have equal, or rather a far greater Force against them; and conclude, that they cannot, by their Principles, have Knowledge of any Thing, but that they *know Nothing*. And, how they should pretend they are the *Things* themselves, if they do not so much as allow them to be *taken from the Things*, is altogether Inconceivable.

11. Concerning *Truth in General*, of which Mr. *Locke* treats in his 5th Chapter, no more can be said (speaking of *Natural Truths*) but that it is, the *Things Existing such in our Minds as they exist in themselves*. For, this put, our Minds will be conformable to the Things, whose *Metaphysical Verity* fixes them to be what they are, or (if we speak of them as affected with any *Mode*) as they are: Whence our *Judgments* concerning them, being thus grounded, cannot but be *True*. What Mr. L.'s *Joining or Separating of Signs, &c.* has to do with *Truth*, is beyond my Skill to comprehend; for *Signs* are no more *Truth*, than the *Bush* at the Door is the *Wine* in the Cellar. I have demonstrated over and over

ever, that *Ideas*, which he makes here one sort of *Signs*, and are meer *Similitudes*, can never give us Knowledge of *Things*; much less can *Truths*, which is the *Object* of Knowledge, consist in conjoining or separating *them*; and, least of all, can *Truth* consist in the Joining or Separating the other sorts of *Signs*, *viz.* of *Words* without the *Ideas* or *Notions*; for, thus consider'd, they are no more but Sounds or Characters. To discourse this Point from its Fundamental Ground, and declare it Literally: The *Metaphysical Verity* of the Thing, which, put into a Proposition, predicates the *whole Thing* (or *Mode*) of *it self*, and affirms that the Thing *is what it is*, gives us our *First Truths*, or *First Principles*. And all other *Truths* consists in this, that *Inadequate*, or *Partial Notions* or *Conceptions* of the Thing, either as to what is *Intrinsical* or *Extrinsical* to it, are predicated either of the Thing as *in it self*, that is, according to the Line of *Substance*, which are call'd *Essential Predicates*; as, when we say, *Petrus est Animal*; or, as it is affected with some *Mode* consistent in the same Subject; as when we say, *Petrus est Albus, Pater, Locatus, Galeatus, Album est Dulce, &c.* and it is impossible there can be any more sorts of *Formal Truths* but these *two*: For all Predication is made by some kind of *Identification*, as is plainly signify'd by the *Copula* [*is,*] and there cannot possibly be any other sorts of *Identification*, but either *in the whole*, or *not in the whole*; that is, *in part*, or according to *Partial Conceptions* of the same Thing; nor can there be any *Identification* at all of *Ideas*; Mr. *Locke* confessing, that each of them is *what it self is*, and *no other*.



12. I take it to be a strange kind of *Catechresis* to make two sorts of *Truth*, *Mental* and *Verbal*, and we may with as good Sense say, that a Tavern has two sorts of *Wine*; one in the Cellar, the other in the Bush at the Door; for Words are good for nothing in the World but meerly and purely to *Signifie*: So that when we say a *Man speaks True*, the Sense of those Words can be only This, that the Proposition he speaks does *signifie* such a Thought or Judgment in his Mind as is really *Conformable to the Thing* he thought or spoke of: And I wonder this Great Man can imagin that, in our more *Complex* Ideas, we put the *Name* for the *Idea* it self; for then that Name would *signifie Nothing at all*, if neither the *Thing* nor the *Idea* be signified by it, as he seems to hold. Again, Words differ from meer *Sounds* in this, that they have some *Sense* or *Meaning* in them, and *Meanings* are the very *Notions* we have in our Minds: Wherefore the Parts of this Distinction of his would be *coincident*, because all *Verbal* Truths (were the Expression proper) would necessarily be *Mental* ones; and Mr. *Locke* seems to say the same, § 8. where he makes those Truths which are *barely Nominal* to be *Chimerical*. I grant too, that Truths may be distinguish'd, according to their several Subjects, into *Moral*, *Physical*, *Metaphysical*, &c. But I must severely reflect on his describing *Moral* Truths, § 11. to be the *Speaking Things* according to the *Persuasion* of our own Minds, tho' the Proposition we speak does not agree to the Reality of Things: For, since it is most Evidently known,

that



that the *Persuasions of Men's Minds* not onely may, but do frequently contradict one another; by this Definition of *Moral Truth* both Sides of the Contradiction may be *True*; which destroys *Truth* by confounding it with *Falshood*; and makes the Art of Distinguishing ridiculous, by making *Truth* a *Genus* to some sort of *Falshood*, or *not-Truth* to be one kind of *Truth*. 'Tis a very dangerous thing in Philosophy to bring Distinctions, unless each Member of the Notion divided includes the Notion of the *Genus*. They were invented for clearing *Truth*; but, if ill made, or ill-manag'd, nothing in the World breeds greater *Error* and *Confusion*. *Corruptio optimi pessima*.

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# REFLEXION *Nineteenth,*

## ON

### *The 6th, 7th, and 8th CHAPTERS,*

i. **B**Y what has been deliver'd in my foregoing Reflexion, my Notes upon his 6th Chapter [*Of Universal Propositions, their Truth and Certainty*] will be easily understood. But, I am to premise, *First*, That the Question is not here, what *proves* the Truth of such Propositions, which is

*Universal Propositions in the Mind are easily Knowable Antecedently to Words.*

the work of *Logick*; but, whether there can be any *Truth* in them, or *Certainty* of them at all, or *no*. *Secondly*, That the *Formal Truth* of Propositions can onely be in the *Mind*; or, that *Mental Propositions* onely are capable of *Truth* or *Falseness*; tho' *Words* be needful to signify them: And, therefore, I must deny that *The Consideration of Words* is a necessary part of the *Treatise of Knowledge*; meaning by that word, *Philosophical Knowledge*, as our Circumstance determin us. Let *Logicians* but take care that the *Words* be *Univocal*, and not *Equivocal*, or double sens'd, and all else that can be consider'd to belong to *Truth*, is to be look'd for in the *Mind*, and can be no where else. Hence, I cannot admit his *Distinction of Certainty of Truth*, and *Certainty of Knowledge* in any other sense than that *Knowledge* is the *Act*, and *Truth* the onely *Object* of that *Act*; since nothing can be known to be what is not; nor  
known

*known to be True, which is not True.* The Generical Notion[*Certainty,*] should first have been explicated, ere those *two sorts* of it had been defin'd; otherwise both those Definitions must necessarily remain Unintelligible. I shall presume that I have in my METHOD shown from its Grounds what *Certainty* is, *viz. The Determination of our Understanding, or Judging Power by the Object's actuating it, or being actually in it as it is in its self.* With which, what his putting together of Words in Verbal Propositions has to do, surpasses my understanding. And, 'tis as hard to conceive, that *General Truths can never be well made known, and are very Seldom apprehended, but as conceiv'd and express'd in Words.* That General Truths cannot be made known to others without Words, is in a manner, as Evident as 'tis that we cannot see one anothers *Thoughts*; nor is this peculiar to *General Truths*, for scarcely can *Particular* ones be made known any other way: But, that they cannot be known or apprehended by our selves ( which seems here to be his meaning ) but as *conceiv'd and express'd in Words*, is so far from Evident, that the Contrary is such; for, it is impossible to express them in Words, unless we do first apprehend and conceive them in our *Thoughts*; and were not this so, all the while we use Words in speaking of *General Truths*, we should do nothing but talk of we know not what: For, our *Thoughts* and *Apprehensions* are *ex Natura rei*, presupposed to the Words by which we express them; and, to do otherwise is to let our Tongue run before our Wit. Whence we account them silly and Senseless people, and Perverters of Nature, who make use of Words before they know their *Meaning*.

2. I have shown above, that it is not necessary to our being Certain of any Proposition that we know the precise bounds and Extent of the Species it stands for; but that 'tis sufficient to know it in part Distinctly; and the rest of it, or the whole, Confusedly;

'Tis not necessary to know the precise Bounds and Extent of the Species.

provided that part of it, which we know is sufficient to distinguish it from all other Species: And, were not this so, it would follow that we never could know the Truth of any Universal Proposition whatever; especially when we discourse of the *Species Infima*, which requires a Complexion of very many Accidents, whose precise Number and Bounds are utterly unknowable by us. A Position which makes Logick useless; scarce any Conclusion being deducible from Premisses, unless one of them be an *Universal*; and quite destroys all Science which is employ'd about *Universal* or *General Truths*. He instances in *Man* and *Gold*, and judges that, for want of knowing the Extent of their Species, it is impossible with any Certainty to affirm that all Men are Rational, or all Gold yellow. We cannot indeed know this by considering every Individual Man by the poll: But, if by the word [*Man*] we mean no more but a *Rational Animal*, it is so far from Impossible to know, and affirm that All Men are Rational, that 'tis Impossible not to know it. And, were it a proper place to make good that Definition here, I could demonstrate that it does agree to *Man*, and can agree to nothing else; and therefore that Definition is *True* and *Adequate*: Nor can the contrary be sustain'd any other way, but by unacquainting us with our selves and our own



own Kind ; and by jumbling together these *Species*, which are distinguish'd by *Contradictory* Differences, and *Confounding* the vastly-Distinct Natures and Properties, of *Corporeal* and *Spiritual* Beings. As for the *Species* of Gold, *Yellowness* (which he instances in) is not *Essential* to it, as *Rationality* is to *Man* ; as being but *one* of those Accidents, by which we distinguish it from *other Species* of Minerals ; and I have hinted some other formerly, which are more *Intrinsic* and *Essential* to it than its *Colour*. Again, we are more-over *Certain* by manifest and daily experience, and by the constant and Common Practice of the World, that Mankind is acquainted with *enow* of those Accidents to distinguish it. One bespeaks a Golden Cup, and the Goldsmith makes it for him : Nor was it ever heard that any of this Trade, did hope to Cozen a Sensible Man, by obtruding upon the Buyer Brass, or any other Mettal, for Gold ; or, if he did, that Goldsmith's-Hall could not *distinguish* it : Nay, if it be but a little *alloyd*, there are ways to find it out ; which shows that Mankind is furnish'd with means *enow*, to distinguish *Gold* from other Mettals, and for the same reason *other* things also ; tho' the *Extent* of all the *Species*, and their *precise bounds*, be not exactly known to those Speculators, who will needs forgo their Natural Knowledge of *Things* to pursue *Scrupulous Fancies* : which, let loose to fly at rovers, are too hard for their *Reason* Unestablish'd by Principles.

3. Hence

3. Hence an Answer is given to Mr. *Locke's* Acute Difficulty, *viz. That 'tis impossible for us to know that this or that Quality, or Idea, has a necessary Connexion with a Real Essence, of which we have no Idea at all; that is, (according to his Principles,) no Knowledge.* For, since a *Real Essence* is that which constitutes such a kind of *Ens*, or *Species*; and what *distinguishes* an *Entity* or *Species* from all others, does also make it *this*, or *that Species*; that is, does *constitute* it; it follows, that, since, by my Discourse here, we have such a Degree of Knowledge of that kind of *Ens* called *Gold*, as to *distinguish* it from all others, we have a *Sufficient* and *True* (tho' not an *Adequate* and *Distinct*) Knowledge of its *Essence* too, that constitutes it such a kind of *Ens*. Indeed, if nothing will content us but *Superfluous* Knowledge, for Curiosity sake, of each particular Mode that *belongs* to that *Essence*, 'tis no wonder if we labour in vain; and, by over-straining to go *beyond ourselves* in this State, fall short of our Aim. I must confess, that it would concern us much, as we are, to know whether there be any *Quality*, which we *do not yet know* in the Thing, *inconsistent* with those we *do know*; for, this would blunder our Notion of it, and make it Chimerical. But, as it is impossible Creative Wisdom should lay Grounds for Contradiction; so, in case those *Qualities* be all *Consistent*, where is the harm not to know them? And, since *Consistency* implies some kind of Agreement or Connectedness of the one with the others, who knows how far their Connexion and Dependence may be

be known in time, if right Principles were taken, and pursu'd? 'Tis a strange dis-satisfy'd Humour in us, to complain *we know not all*, when we know *enough*: I know no Man is more free from this Fault than Mr. Locke, or declares more against it *formerly*. What I dislike in him in this Point is, that, by his too much Introversion, he *forsakes Nature*; and, by his too nice Speculation of his *Ideas*, hazards to breed a Conceit in his Readers, that they know *less* than they really *do*; and, that we *are not able* to attain half that Knowledge we, in reality, *may* arrive to; which, tho' contrary to his Intention, must needs incline Men to be *Scepticks* as to *Essences* and *Substances*.

4. The 7th Chapter, [*of Maxims*,] is admirably Clear, and, in the greatest part of it, very Solid; abating his Proceeding upon *Ideas*, and applying his Discourses to his former Hypothesis; to which Mr. Locke was oblig'd, that all the Parts of his Work might be woven of the same Piece, and Consonant to one another. He explicates very well, how they are *Self-evident*: Yet, tho' they be such, he has three Exceptions against them; 1. As not being *First known*; 2. As, in a manner, *Useless*; and 3. *Dangerous*. He proves the First, because *Particulars are known before Universals*. I understand him not. Knowledge may be either consider'd, as *instill'd* by insensible Degrees, into *Infants*, or the *Ruder Sort*; or, as *Reducible* to the clearest Grounds, *by Men of Art*. Now, I cannot think that Mr. Locke imagins, that we, or any Man, hold that *Maxims* were meant for *Infants*, or the *Vulgar*; or, that either of them ought to be taught

*The Nature and Use  
of General Maxims,  
mistaken by  
Mr. Locke.*



taught *General Principles at first*, and by them attain to Particular Knowledges; or, that the *Users* of Maxims ever intended them for that end. Wherefore, all his Discourses to prove them not to be *First-known*, may be allow'd to have their full Force, and yet hurt no body, being wrong-levell'd. The Point then is, how they may avail Artists, or Speculators: And this leads to his Second Exception, their pretended *Usefulness*; which he endeavours to shew, by alledging, that 'tis as Evident as any Maxim whatever, that *the same Idea, is the same Idea, and no other*; v. g. that *the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow, and not of Blue*; and, therefore, that *Maxims serve to little purpose*, and are also *Innumerable*. Now, I grant, indeed, that all such *particular Propositions* may be *Self-evident*, and *Truths*; as also, that *Truths of this kind*, which express the Metaphysical Verity and Unity of every *Thing*, and of every *Mode* of Thing, are *Innumerable*. But, I do not think that any Man living thought those to have the Usefulness of **Maxims** or **Principles**, which are always *General*, or *Universal*: For, the Notion of [*Principles*] super-adds to their being *Truths*, and *Self-evident*, that they influence many other Truths that are (as it were) *under them*; which cannot be said, or thought, of those *particular Propositions*. For example; Should any one go about to refund the Verity of this Truth, *Yellow is Yellow, and not Blue*, into this, because *White is White, and not Black*, it would look more like a *Similitude*, than a *Reason*; and be ridiculous to alledge the *one* to be the Cause of the *other*; because *Yellow* is not *White*; nor has the Notion of the *one* any Influence upon, nor any thing to do with the

Notion



Notion of the *other*; in regard both of them stand upon the same Bottom, or on the same Level. But, should any Sceptick ask *why the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow?* tho' 'tis foolish to ask it, yet, it would not look so extravagant to answer, because *Every thing is what it is*: And, I believe, Nature would force Mr. Locke, or any other to give this for his Reason. In like manner, should he ask why a Man is a Man? It would look preter-natural to answer, because *a Tree is a Tree*, Whereas, it would look very natural to answer, because *Every Thing is it Self, or, is what it is*. Which shews to an Acute Reflector, that this *Universal* has some kind of *Influence* upon the *Others*, which their *Fellow-Particulars* had not. And, the Reason is, because *Universals* do *engage* for all the *Particulars* under them; whereas, one *Particular* owes not this *Duty* to another *Particular*, to which it has no such *Real Relation* as the *Notion* of an *Universal* has in the *Mind* to its *Particulars*. And, Who sees not, that, from this Proposition, *Every Man is Rational*, it follows, that *Peter, John, and each particular Man, is Rational?* But, from this, that *Peter, and a few other Particulars, are Rational*, it does not follow, that *Every Man is Rational*: Which shews, that (as was now said) the *Truth* of the *Universal engages* for the *Truth* of *all Particulars*, and not *vice-versa*; nor one of them for another.

5. Another Reason for the *Usefulness* of *Universal Maxims*, and, why *Artists* use to reduce the *Truth* of *Particulars* to them, is, because they are *more Self-Evident* than the *Particular Identicals* are. This

The Terms of General Maxims Clearer than those of Particular Propositions.

Position

Position looks something odd; for, since *Self-Evidence* is the *highest* Evidence that can be, to put *Degrees* of Self-evidence, is to say, there can be something *Higher* than the *Highest*; which looks like a Bull. To clear this Point, I discourse thus: In all Self-evident Propositions whatever, the Terms are so *closely Connected*, (being, indeed, *the same*,) that no Middle Term can come between them, so to *prove* them Connected, or *make* them Evident; wherefore, they must either not be *Evident at all*, (which were shameless to say,) or they must be *Evident of themselves*; that is, *Self-evident*. And, in *this* regard, or in the *Closest Connexion* or *Identity* of their Terms, all Self-evident Propositions are *Equally* such. But, there is another kind of Evidence arising out of the *Greater Clearness* of the *Terms* themselves. Now, it has been shewn formerly, that all Clearness of our Notions springs out of their *Simplicity*, and *Uncompoundedness*; and all *Obscurity* out of their *Composition*, which breeds Confusion: As also, that all *General* Notions are *more Simple*, and consequently, *more clear* than the Particulars are. Whence follows, that the Proposition, which has *more-general* Terms in it, (such as all General Maxims are,) do gain hence a *greater Degree* of Evidence, and are *more Undeniable*. For example; Let Mr. Locke tell a Sceptick, that *Yellow is Yellow, and not Blue*; he may answer, that he will yield to neither Proposition; because, *Yellow* and *Blue* are *Species* of Colour, and (according to Mr. Locke's Grounds) he knows not the *distinct Bounds*, or *precise Extent* of neither of them; and therefore, should he grant it, he must assent to *he knows not what*. Tell him, Mr. Locke speaks of the *Ideas* of those

those Colours; he will ask what an *Idea* is, and, doubtless, pick new Quarrels at the Definition; especially, these being the *Ideas* of *Secondary Qualities*, which himself says, have nothing *Like* them in the *Thing*. But, tell him, it cannot be deny'd, but that they are *Something*, and not meerly *No-thing*, in regard we *experience* we have them; and, that *Every Thing must necessarily be what it is*, (which is one of the *Maxims* excepted against;) he will be put to a Stand, and Nonpluss'd: For, what can he say? The Identity of the *Thing* with it self, whether it be a Substance, or an Accident, cannot be deny'd; nor can he deny, that *the same is the same with it self*, (which is another Maxim;) for, the Word *Thing*, signifies, a *Supream* Generical Notion; and, the Word *Same*, is a Transcendent; which are both of them *Clear*, because the Latter has no kind of Composition in it, the Other as little as is possible. So that he cannot begin to shuffle here, or press to know the meaning of the Terms, as he did when they were Particulars; the *Universal Terms* being far *Clearer* than those Particulars are.

6. Hence another Usefulness of *Self-evident Maxims* is discover'd; which is, not to deduce Conclusions from them, as from Premisses, as Mr. L. seems to apprehend; but, to reduce Inferior Truths, which are less Clear to them. That this can be done, and how it is done, I have shewn in my \* *Method*. And, Mr. Locke's Concession here, § 11.

*Such General Maxims are never used to deduce Conclusions from them, but to reduce Inferiour Truths to them.*

\* Book 3. Less. 4.

that *They are of great Use in Disputes, to stop the Mouths of Wranglers*, abets and confirms my late Discourses:



Discourses: For, Whence could they have this strange Virtue to *stop the Mouths* of such Unreasonable Men, but because their Evidence is *Greater* than any *others*, or than Particular Self-evident Propositions are? Otherwise, why could not *these* do it as well as *General Maxims*? Now, if this be so, why cannot they *satisfie* and *instruct* Rational Men, and conduce to quiet and *fix* their Judgment, as well as to *Nonplus* Wranglers? 'Tis the Nature of *Evidence*, to *enlighten* and *instruct* Men of Sense; and more Proper to it, than to *amuse* and *surprize* Sophisters. Let any Learned Man reflect on all the Maxims in *Euclid's Elements*, in *Euclides Physicus* and *Metaphysicus*, or any other Author who pretends to Reasoning with *Exact Closeness*; and he will easily see for *what* they are Useful, and *How*. Nay, even Mr. L.'s Identicals, [*Yellow is Yellow, and not Blue,*] are useful in their Kind. tho' Mr. Locke does omit to shew they are so: And this Identical *Yellow is Yellow*, tho' it do not *influence* other Particulars, as *General Maxims* do; (for which Reason, it does not absolutely deserve the Name of a *Principle*;) yet, both It, (and such other Particular Identicals,) is a kind of Principle to all that is, or can be, discoursed about that Particular Colour: For, if any part of that Discourse makes *Yellow not to be Yellow*, or (which is all one) violates that Proposition, [*Yellow is Yellow,*] 'tis concluded to be most evidently *False*; or, if it agrees with it, to be *True*. He seems to dislike the Procedure by *Præcognita* and *Præconcessa*; whereas, his Acute Wit will find, upon Reflexion, that it is impossible we can make an Ordinary, much less any Speculative, Discourse, but the Discourfers must agree in something that is  
either



either *Foreknown*, or (at least) *Forgranted*; for, if the two Disputants disagree in *all* their Principles and Grounds, and one of them still *denies* **all** the other *affirms*, 'tis impossible they should Discourse together *at all*.

7. But, passing by all that is said, I alledge farther, that (not to speak of others) these two Maxims so much excepted against, [*What it is*] and [*'Tis impossible the same Thing should be and not be at once*,

*The Absolute Necessity of First Principles Asserted.*

are of such most Necessary and Universal Usefulness, that, without them, we could neither *judge, discourse, nor act*. Indeed, these Maxims lie *retruse* in the most Inmost Recesses of our Judging or Intellectual Power, and make not their Appearance in Formal Propositions, but only when we have occasion to produce them; tho' they are still *there* all the while, and guide all our Thoughts steadily, nay, all our Actions too. In the same manner as when a Musician plays a careless Voluntary upon a Harpsichord, he guides himself all along by the Rules of Musick lodg'd in his Mind; tho', they being now *familiar* to him, he is not so Sensible of those Rules as he was when he first learn'd them. To apprehend more clearly the Usefulness of these two Principles, let us suppose a Man *quite Devested* of them, and to have neither of them in his Judgment, and then reflect what he is good for. All our Judgments being made by the *Copula* [*is,*] in case he have not this First Principle in his Understanding, he might take [*is*] for [*is not*]; or else indifferently for one, and the other too: which, besides the perverting his Judgment quite, would make him

utterly unfit for the Conversation of Mankind. Again, 'tis impossible such a Man should have *any Truth* at all in his Mind, which is the Natural Perfection of Human Understanding; but, wanting a steady Ground to *fix* his Judgment, he might think all things to be *Chimerical*, embrace every *Fancy*, and adhere to any *Contradiction*.

8. To come to the Usefulness of *other General* Maxims, we may reflect how Mankind do naturally guide their Actions by them. A Country Butcher loses his Knife, and looks all about for it; in which case 'tis usual for such Fellows to say, as the Motive of his continuing to seek it, [*I am sure it must be somewhere or other.*] By which rude Saying 'tis evident, that he guides himself all the while by this foreknown General Maxim, [*Every particular Body in the World must be in some place.*] For, had he not had the Knowledge of this Maxim beforehand, that is, did he think it were possible it should be *no where*, or *in no place*, he would never have taken such Pains to look for it. We may observe Hundreds of such Natural Maxims as this in the Vulgar, guiding their Actions and Sayings; and perhaps, it would not be unworthy Speculators to observe their Behaviour and Words which proceed from Uncorrupted Nature, and retrieve the Genuin Principles and Maxims that naturally produced them. To apply this: The same we may gather from our Speculative Thoughts; and that the same passes in us naturally as does in the Vulgar. Our *First Principles* lie habitually laid up in the Closet of our Minds, and govern all our Thoughts as occasion presents

*How other General  
Maxims do govern  
all our Actions  
and Sayings.*

presents ; and, tho' we do not put them into Formal Propositions, till the Circumstance invites ; yet they *influence* all we *do*, or *say*, or *think* ; as was instanced lately in the unshaken and unalterable Sense of the Copula [*is*,] which verifies all our Propositions.

9. In a Word, it were easie to shew, that this unadvised Degrading of *General*

*Maxims*, making them in a manner *Useless* for Knowledge, does destroy all *Grounds* ; which ei-

*The Discarding General Maxims destroys all Science.*

ther *are* such *Maxims*, or, at least, have no force but by virtue of those *Maxims*, *express'd* or *imply'd* ; unless we will pretend those are *Grounds* in any Science that *want Proof* there ; which makes them *Conclusions*, and no *Grounds*. Whence, it does also destroy all *Science* it self, which consists in *Universal* Knowledges, as *Experience* does in *particular* ones ; for such *Universal Truths* cannot be had, if *General Maxims*

be disallow'd, as Logick demonstrates. This Ingenious Author thinks the need of such *Maxims* might be supply'd by having *Clear* and *Distinct Ideas*. Which, rightly understood, comes over

*This Error springs from Men's taking wrong Measures in judging what Notions are Clear, what Confused.*

to us ; for Art and Nature both inform us, that the *Clearness* of our *Notions* consists in their being more *General* ; and as they approach nearer to the *Highest Genus*, they are still *Clearer*. Now, the *Metaphysical Verity* of a *General Idea* or *Notion*, if put into a Proposition, is perfectly *Identical*, and a *General Maxim*. Hence appears, that it is a most Fundamental Errour in the *Ideists*, that they rate the *Clearness* of their *Ideas* from the

fresh, fair and lively Appearances they make to the *Fancy*. Whereas only the Definition, by explicating the true Essence of a Thing, shews us Distinctly the true *Spiritual Notion* of it. The former of these is *obvious* and *sensible*. and ( as I may say ) lies and appears *uppermost* ; and, therefore, is *Superficial*, and a *Material Representation* made in the *Fancy*. The Later is more *Retruse*, it requires more Reflexion and Labour to attain it, it is *Intelligible* not *Sensible* ; but, once gain'd, it is *Solid*, *Durable*, and ( being indeed the very Nature of the Thing,) it is the *Ground* of all our Discourses about it, and of those several Knowledges concerning it. Hence the Followers of *Fancy* become liable to take *Similitudes* for *Notions*, and *Representations* for *Things* ; which makes their Productions very Plausible to other Men's Fancies, ( for as they were the Productions of *Fancy*, so they suite best with Men of *Fancy* ) but they fall short of instructing their *Judgments*. To give an Instance of this Distinction of Notions from Phantasms : They think that the *Idea* of a *Quadrate* ( for Example ) or *Circle*, is very *Clear* and *Distinct* ; and that the *Idea* of *Quantity* is very *Obscure* and *Confused* : Whereas, to the Notion of the two former, there goes the Notion both of *Quantity*, of the *Termination of Quantity*, ( or *Figure* ; ) and, moreover, of *such* a Figure ; all which being Essentially involv'd in the Notion of a *Quadrate* or *Circle*, must needs make their Notions *less Intelligible* and *less Clear* than is that of *Quantity only* : However, the fair Pictures of the former, on Paper, or in the *Fancy*, enveigles them to think otherwise. Let us but reflect how many Truths are deduced by Geometricians out of the

Notions



Notions of a *Quadrate* or a *Circle*, and what large *Treatises* of *Trigonometry* are drawn out of the *Notion* or *Nature* of a *Triangle*; and we shall discover how *Compound*ed and *Confus*ed those *No*tions are *in reality*, however we seem, while we mind only the *Pictures* of them, to have very clear *Conceptions* of them, and to comprehend them *distinctly* and *fully*. Now, all these *Truths* are *involved* confusedly in the *Notion* or *Nature* of these *Figures*: For all *Discourses* concerning any *No*tion whatever, are nothing but *running Division* (as we may say) upon the *Nature* of that *Object* as their *Ground*; and all *Descants* upon it are meerly that very *Notion Unfolded* and *Explicated* at large, and consider'd on all *sides*, and *thoroughly*: Which, comprising them all in its *Bowels*, is therefore not so *Clear* and *Distinct* as *Fancy* makes us imagin. Whence is seen evidently, that *Fancy*, and the *first* and obvious *Appearance*, is not to be the *Judge* or *Test* of the *Clearness* or *Confusedness* of our *No*tions; but *Reason*, reflecting well on the *Simplicity* or *Compound*edness of those *No*tions themselves, and on the *Reasons why* they are so.

10. Lastly, 'tis objected, That such *Maxims* are *Dangerous*; because, if our *No*tions be *wrong*, *loose*, or *unsteady*, *General Maxims* will serve to confirm us in our *Mistakes*, and to prove *Contradictions*. Now, tho' our *Judgments* may be such, yet I cannot conceive how our *No*tions can be *Wrong*, *Loose*, or *Unsteady*. They are *what they are*; and being the *Things* in our *Understanding*, their *Existence* is *fix'd there*, and as *unalterable* as our

That not *General Maxims*, but their *Abuse*, breeds *Danger* to *Science*.

Soul it self, their Subject, is, *Notions* are the same as our *Meanings* of the Words ; and, tho' we may mistake what the Word signifies to *others*, or to the Generality ; yet, if I, mistaking, or not mistaking, have such a *Meaning* of it in my *Mind*, (which only can *mean* or *apprehend*,) that *Meaning* is truly *in me* : Nor, tho' I be rectify'd as to the Common Use of that Word, and put another Name to it ; yet my *Meaning*, whether properly or improperly signify'd, is still indivisibly and unalterably the same. But, suppose this so ; why must *General Maxims* be held *Dangerous* and *Faulty*, when the Fault Confessedly lies in *other Things* ? Mr. *Locke* grants *General Maxims* to be *True*, and *Self-evident* ; and 'tis extravagantly odd, to think, that Propositions *so qualify'd*, can be Guilty of leading Men into Errour. If, then, he only means, that the *Mis-application* or *Abuse* of them does great Harm, he *magnifies* *General Maxims*, while he intended to *disparage* them : For, it is generally noted, that those are the *Best Things*, that, *Mis-us'd*, do the *Greatest Harm*. By this Argument, we must lay aside all *Religion*, as well as *General Maxims* ; since, not all the Things in the World, put together, have done so great Mischief, as *Mis-us'd Religion* :

*Tantum Religio potuit suadere malorum.*

II. To show *General Maxims*, or *self-evident Propositions*, may demonstrate *Contradictory Positions*, he instan-

*His Instance that General Maxims are fit to prove Contradictions, shows he quite mistakes the Notion of Body.*

ces in *Cartesius's* making *Body* to be nothing but *Extension* ; and in his own *Tenet* making *Body* to be *Extension* and *Solidity* together : Whence, by this Maxim [ *what*

is, is] the former *may demonstrate there can be no Vacuum*, the latter that *there may*. And, I must, in behalf of Truth, take leave to tell them both, that neither *Extension* alone, nor *Extension and Solidity together*, are any more the Notion of *Body*, than a Horse-shoe is a Pancake. For, *Body* signifies a *Thing*, and their *Extension* and *Solidity* are onely *Modes* or *Accidents* of that *Thing*; and, therefore, the Notions of them do differ *toto genere*; which is a greater and wider mistake, than to say a *Man is a Horse*, or an *Apple is an Oyster*; these being all comprehended under the *same Common Genus*. If, out of Aversion to Metaphysicks, and Disregard to true Logick, which teaches us to distinguish our Notions exactly, Learned Men will not be brought to Consider what the Word [ *Thing*, ] and [ *Body* ] which is *such a Thing*, mean, they must necessarily fall into Fundamental Errours; and, so, stumble every step they take. The Notion of [ *Thing* ] evidently relates to *Being*, one way or other: But, it does not formally signify *Actual Being*, as *Existence* does; therefore it can onely consist in this, that is, a *Power to be*, or is *Capable of Being actually*. And this *Thing* call'd *Body*, since we experience it is *alterable* and *Changeable Substantially*, or into *another Thing*, must necessarily have a *Power* in it to be *Alter'd*, or become *another Thing*; which *Power* we call [ *Matter*; ] our Common Speech and Common Sense telling us, that when a New *Thing* is made, 'tis not *Created* or made of *Nothing*, but of the *Matter* that pre-existed in the former Compound. But, this *Matter* alone, since it is a meer *Power* to be another *Thing*, being, of its own Notion, *utterly Indeter-*

minate, (which is the true Sense of *Aristotle's* Description of it,) is not *capable of Existing*, or a *Thing*; for, nothing in *Common* can exist, but what is determinately *This*: Therefore, this *Matter*, or *Power*, needs another *Compact*, conceiv'd to *determin* it, (which the Schools call the *Form*;) by which it is made *capable to be*, or a *Thing*; and without which, it cannot be such. It being evident then, that every single *Mode* or *Accident* does something distinguish *Bodies*, therefore such a *Complexion* of them as so distinguishes *Matter*, that it makes it differ from all other *Bodies*, it does consequently *determin* it to be *This*, and *no other*; and therefore constitutes it such a *Thing*, or constitutes it *Capable to Exist*; which is, to make it *this Thing*, or an *Individuum*. Now, if we leave all Consideration of *Matter* out of the Notion of *Body*, and make it consist of *Modes*, or *Accidents only*, as he seems to tell us that himself and *Cartesius* do, we must put those *Modes* to have no possible *Subject*, but to hover in the Air, none knows how; and, therefore, we must needs discourse incoherently, and be too hard for our selves, by raising, at every turn, puzzling Difficulties we cannot solve. All our Grounds must fail us, when we do not distinguish between the *Mode* or *Manner how* a *Thing* is, and the *Thing it self*. Nor do I think *Cartesius* holds *Body* to be *Extension*, but *Extended Matter*. How *Mr. Locke* comes not to treat of *Matter* in his whole Book, I know not; but I fear it is, because his *Fancy* cannot frame an *Idea* or *Similitude* of it: By which it seems to me Evident, that very many of his *Ideas* are meer *Fancies*, coin'd by his Imagination: For, 'tis evident he must have a *Notion* of it, since he

very



very well knows the *meaning* of those *Words*, [ *A Power to be a Thing, or Matter* ; ] which *Meaning* is the same with our *Notion* of it. As for *Vacuum*, which he again mentions here, my *Demonstration* against it, is, in short, this ; waving many others mention'd above : All our *Natural Notions* are taken from *Body* ; and, amongst them, that of *Space* ; therefore they are nothing but *Body* inadequately consider'd ; and either *Body*, or some *Mode* of *Body* : Therefore, whatever our *Fancy* may suggest, it is impossible there should be *Space*, where there is *no Body* ; since the *Mode*, having no distinct *Entity* of *its own*, cannot be where the *Thing*, which gives it *Being*, is *not* : Therefore, to put *Space* where there is *no Body*, or a *Vacuum*, is a direct *Contradiction*. Each *Part* of which *Discourse* has been made good in its proper place.

12. In his *Second Instance* of *Man*, he seems again, not to distinguish between the *Fancy* and the *Notion* of a *Man* ; which I have shewn in my *Method, Book 1. Less. 2. §. 24.*

Ideism is the Genuine Parent of Enthusiasm in Philosophy.

Next, he seems not to reflect, that an *Imperfect Conception* of the *Thing*, is of the *whole Thing* confusely. Thirdly, 'tis evident, that *Men* do only *err*, or *discourse wrong*, by imperfectly conceiving, thro' this *Reason* ; because they are not so wise as to consider that there may be *more Modes* wrap'd up in the *Thing*, than we yet *distinctly discover* : In which case, they may *err* by *mis-applying* their *General Maxims* ; for which they must blame themselves, and not the *Maxim* it self. But, I absolutely deny that any *Man* can possibly have the true and distinct *Notion*

Notion of *Man*, unless he conceives him to be *Rational*. As for what he tells us, *he has discours'd with very Rational Men, who have actually deny'd they are Men*; I can only say, I wonder how they escap'd *Bedlam*; where, I dare say, there are many Men, who are *more Rational* than *they*: And, my Opinion is, that those *very Rational Men* were very high-flown *Ideists*: For, such Men, by deserting their Natural Notions taken from the *Things*, and the Conduct of true Logick, and *poring* perpetually on their *own Intericur*; and being withall unable to see the Difference between those *Ideas* they find there, or to distinguish betwixt *Fancies* and *Spiritual Conceptions*; are (unless they be otherwise Masters of an Excellent *Genius*) con-naturally disposed by their Principles to be *Fanatics in Philosophy*; and to entertain as wild *Fancies*, as the Deepest *Enthusiasts*. Witness *Cartesius* his mad Fit of Enthusiasm, which lasted some Days, when he was laying his Principles, (as is writ in his Life;) and those *Self-strangers*, now spoken of, *who actually deny'd they were Men*: Whom, (to requite Mr. *Locke* with a parallel Story) I cannot liken so well to any thing, as to a famous Humourist, one *John Band*, who serv'd my Lady *Wootton*, in *Kent*: This Fellow, in the Heat of Summer, going out in a Cart, drawn by two Horses, fell asleep in the Cart: The Horses not hearing any cry *Gee, ho*, to urge them forwards, took their Opportunity to rest themselves, and stood still: A Companion of his coming by, and seeing how matters stood, under-propp'd the Cart, took out the Horses; and, having set them up, return'd, and lay behind the Hedge, to observe how *John* would behave himself when he

miss'd

miss'd his Horses: Who awaking, got up, rub'd his Eyes, and, in the Dawning of his Reason, broke out, (to himself,) in these Words, *Either now I am John Band, or I am not John Band: If I am John Band, I have e'en lost two Horses; But, if I am not John Band, I have found a Cart.* So that all *John's* Hopes were, that he was *not himself*; for then he had been on the better hand. I much doubt, that both he, and Mr. *Locke's Rational Men*, wanted the help of an *Identical Proposition*; which (tho' Mr. *Locke* holds, they are not in the least Instructive) would have made them all so wise, as to know that *Every Thing is what it is.*

13. But, to be serious; I cannot but admire that this Ingenious Author should, in his 8th Chapter, so ridicule *Identical Propositions*, or esteem them *Trifling*. He told us in his 2d Chapter, that that Knowledge he calls *Intuitive*, is of *Self-evident Propositions*; and *Identical* ones are such. He assures us, that in every Step Reason makes in *Demonstrative Knowledge*, there is an *Intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas*; Consonantly to which, I have demonstrated in my *Method, Book 3. Liss. 1. §. 3.* that all the Force of *Consequence*, which gives the Nerves to all our Discourse, must be an *Identical Proposition*. Moreover, he says, *Chap. 4.* that we know each Idea to be it self, and not another; and, that no *Abstract Idea* can be the same with any other, but with it self; which are perfectly *Identical Speeches*, and equivalent to these, *The same is the same with it self*, or, *Every Thing is what it is*; nay, and *General Maxims* too, against which he

shows



shew'd himself much offended in that Chapter. Nor, do I doubt, but that he judges, his Knowledge by *Ideas* is refunded into those *Identicals*, as its Ground; as will be shewn shortly. Now, after all this, to rally *Identical Propositions* after such a rate, is to me *Unintelligible*. But, I shall be briefer here upon this Subject, having demonstrated in my *Method*, *Book 2. Less. 2.* and *3.* by many Arguments, which, I am very confident, are Unanswerable, that all *First Principles* must be *Identical Propositions*: Whence, either those Arguments must be shewn Invalid, or it must be forcibly deny'd by him that there are any *First Principles at all*; which all Mankind, unless they be perfect Scepticks, do grant, and Common Sense forces us to acknowledge. For, if there be no *Supream* or *First Principles*, 'tis impossible there should be any *Inferior* or *Subordinate* ones; and so, Mankind must talk ramblingly, and *at random*, all their Lives, without any Principles or Grounds *at all*. But, waving all the other aforesaid Proofs, I would beg of him to consider this one Argument: We may speak of, or (which is the same) put into Propositions, all other Considerations or Notions of the Thing, whether they be in the *same* Line, or be the divers *Modes* of it; we can say, without danger of being reproach'd, that *Socrates* is a *Man*, an *Animal*, a *Yard high*, *White*, a *Father*, *writing*, &c. and 'tis a hard Case if we may not be allow'd to say something of the *Metaphysical Verity* of the Thing, this being that on which *all Truth* is built; and without which, all we could say would be *False*; and all the World, a *Chaos* of *Chimæra's*. And, if we may say any thing of it, I desire all Mankind to shew me, that

that



that Saying can be any other but an *Identical Proposition*. This being so, I alledge farther, that as all Truths are *fundamentally* built on the Metaphysical Verity of Things; so all *Formal Truths*, or *True Propositions*, must be grounded on *such Propositions* as *express* or *signifie* that Metaphysical Verity, or, say that a *Thing is what it is*; and, consequently, *such Propositions*, and *onely such*, can be *First Principles*. Now, if *First Principles*, and that which grounds all the Force of *Consequence*, may be called *Trifling*, I desire to be inform'd what can be called *Solid*, *Serious* and *Useful*.

14. I perceive, by Mr. Locke's managing his Discourse here, that his Dillike of Identical Propositions springs from his Mistake of our *Manner of Using them*. He seems to imagine that we would place them in *Capite Libri*, (as it were,) and thence deduce Conclusions from

*The right Way how to use them, and that Mr. Locke himself does and must rely upon them.*

them; or else, that we consider them in their bare selves, without Relation to any thing else: Whence he, with good Reason, affirms, they *do not instruct us, or teach us any thing*, that there is *no Real Knowledge* got by them, &c. But the Business is quite otherwise: They are the First, and most evident Truths, fix'd and rivetted by Rational Nature, in our Understanding; at the Bottom of which they lie, perhaps Unseen, and and Unreflected on; yet so, that they give the perfect Light to guide all our Thoughts and Discourses. Whence it comes, that Speculators do by Art, what the  
\* Vulgar do by Nature; and

*See Meth. to Science, B. 2. L. 2. § 18*

make

make them the *Ultimate Ressort* of all their Persuasions, and endeavour to *Reduce* and *Resolve* all their other Knowledges into *them*. This will appear evident to any Man who reflects, that, if those be *False*, or we be not *pre-imbud* with them, we could have *no Truth*, nor any *Knowledge* at all. They are such deep-laid Foundations, that all Science is rais'd upon them, tho' they make no Formal Appearance in the Symmetry or Beauty of that Structure: Nay, even those who rally them as *Dry*, and *Useless*, must be forc'd, for their own Interest, to have recourse to them: For, unless Mr. *Locke* does first know, that each *Idea* he has, *is it self*, and not *another*, which is an Identical Proposition, he must confess he could have no *Distinct Ideas*; at least, no Knowledge that they are *Distinct*; whence, the Fabrick of his whole Book would fall to the Ground. After which Kindness and Support from them, in requital, to call them *Trifling*, is not so gentile a Return. Hence is seen, that we make no other Use of them, than himself *does*, and *must* do, or neither of us can possibly speak one Word of Sense; for, neither could he, without them, (*suppos'd* and *held*, at least, in his Mind, if not *express'd*,) be certain of any *Idea*; nor we, of any *Notion* we have; nor, consequently, could either of us build any Discourse upon them. Mr. *Locke* acknowledges, *Book 2. Chap. 32.* that the *Metaphysical Truth* of his *Ideas* do contain a *Tacit Proposition*: Which being so, what Blame can we deserve for *Speaking out*, or *Writing* what is *tacitly* in our Minds? The chief Reason why we put those *Tacit Propositions* into *Formal*

mal ones, is for the Scepticks sakes; who, having an utter Aversion against Metaphysicks, would not heed the Metaphysical Verity of Things, unless it were produced, and forced upon them, by putting it into such an undeniable Form of Speech as all Mankind uses, and *must grant*. Whence, as Mr. Locke confesses that they are *very useful to stop the Mouths of Wranglers*; so, Experience teaches us, they are of no less Use to convert or confute Scepticks: Nay, absolutely *Necessary* for that End; because Scepticks will not admit any thing to be True, but *Identical Propositions* onely. For which reason, I have attempted, in my *Method*, to give some Hints how to *reduce* all others to them. I once thought to have written a particular Treatise on that Subject; but, I hope those short Hints I gave there, may excite some other Speculators to perfect what, having a large Field of Matter to pass thorow, I did there but briefly touch upon. All this while, I am well aware that Mr. Locke, *Book 4. Chap. 8.* mentions other *Self-evident Propositions*, which are not Identical; but then, he acknowledges withall, that unless those *Ideas*, which make the two Terms of those Propositions, be fix'd in their own Natures to be *such*, or to be *themselves* onely, and therefore *not to be Another*, none of those Propositions could be evident at all. So that Nothing can be known to be True, or be Evident, but by having recourse, *finally*, to *Identical Propositions*.

15. Another sort of *Trifling* Propositions, he says, is *when a part of the Complex Idea is Predicated of the Name of the whole*; that is, the *Genus* or *Difference* of the *Species*. I answer; What have we to do with *Ideas* when we *Predicate*? For *Predicating* is the *Saying* something of Another which we call

the *Subject*: If then the *Thing* it self be not *Predicated*, then (to *Predicate* being to *Say*) we do not *talk* or *speak* of It, but perhaps of our own *Fancies*; especially since Mr. *Locke* has declared, *B. 1. Chap. 2. § 8.* that he takes *Idea* indifferently for *what is meant* by *Phantasm* or by *Notion*. Secondly, What means [ *Predicated of the Name of the whole.* ] For, if the *Name* of the *Subject* have not some *Idea*, or *Notion*, or some *Thing* for its *Signification*, 'tis *insignificant*, and a *meer useless Sound*: and, if it have, then the *Notion* of the *Species* or *Genus* is that which is *Predicated*, and not the *Name* onely. If *Things*, ( of which *onely*, as Philosophers, we ought to *speak* ) are turn'd into *Ideas*, *Realities* into *Spiritual Resemblances*, and those *Empty Resemblances* into *Emptier Names*, Philosophy will be brought to a strange pass. Thirdly, None ever intended to *instruct* Men by this Proposition [ *Homo est Animal* ; ] because every Man knows it already, who knows what the Word [ *Man* ] means; without knowing which, 'tis impossible to know any thing by any Word whatever; nor are such Propositions as that, which frequently occur in Logicians, meant for any thing but meerly for *Examples* of such and such *Predications*: But yet, Nature tells us how *Instructive*



structive it is on all occasions, to know what *sort* or *kind* (whether General or Specific) every thing is, and how it *differs* from others of the *same* kind. Now, Mr. Locke, contrary to his Equity in other occasions, will neither allow us to predicate the *whole* Definition of the Thing defin'd (as was seen above in the Definition of *Extension*) because 'tis the *same* Notion with that which is Defin'd; nor *Part* of the Definition, because 'tis *Part* of the *same*; and yet Common Reason assures us no Predication is True, unless the Subject and Predicate be, *in part* or *wholly* the *same*; as the Sense of the Copula [*est*] tells us. I wish Mr. Locke would put Mankind into a *wiser* Method; for they have, it seems, done nothing, but perpetually *trifled* hitherto.

16. Upon the main, he would have nothing that is *Essential* predicated of *Man*, or any other *Species*, (because the Word signifies *that* already) but only what's *Accidental* to him; and he thinks that then a Proposition is *Instructive*, when it tells us something not contain'd in the *Idea* of *Man*. He instances in this; [*In whatever Thing, Sense, Motion, Reason, and Laughter are united, that Thing has actually a Notion of God.*] Now this he conceives, does tell us *more* than barely what the Word [*Man*] means; and therefore has *some what* of *Instruction* in it. I much approve his Design of bringing Disparate Notions to *close* and connect: But yet I must say, that all he can say of *Man*, or any other thing, must either be taken from the *Intrinsic* Nature of the *Thing* it self, or it can never be *Instructive*, *Solid*, or capable of

Mr. L.'s new Instructive Way is utterly Insignificant.

Demonstration. *V. g.* It is Essential to Man to *have* Natural Notions, and to *connect* those Notions orderly by his Reason, and by doing this he *may attain* to the Knowledge there is a **God**. Now, all this is contain'd in the Notion of *Man* ; only it requires a deeper Inspection into that Nature, and a more particular Reflexion upon what the Word [*Man*] signifies. For (quite contrary to his Sentiment) 'tis the *Nature* of the *Thing*, signified by its *Name*, which only can *Instruct* us *Solidly* ; and it instructs us by our Attention to it, and our frequent and penetrative Reflexion on it. Whence I cannot commend his Instance, nor see how the Predicate [*has the Notion of God*] can ever be connected with the Subject he puts, by virtue of any thing found in the Subject it self as he exhibits it. *Sense* belongs to Man as he is an *Animal*, *Motion* as he is a *Living* thing ; from neither of which Considerations such a Connexion of the Terms are likely to follow. *Reason* is the most likely ; but since Mr. *Locke* holds, that *Brutes* too have *some* Reason, and yet can have *no Notion of God*, it cannot be deduced out of the Common Word [*Reason*,] that Man has any such Notion. *Laughter* there should seem, according to him, to be the *most peculiar* to Mankind ; for *Brutes* do *not laugh at all* ; but this is less likely than the others to be that precise Consideration, by virtue of which Man comes to *have the Notion of God*. Again, in his Discourse against *Innate Principles*, he declar'd his Opinion, that there were some Men who had *actually no Notion of a God* at all ; tho', no doubt, they had *Sense*, *Motion*, *Reason*, and *Laughter* too. So that if this Proposition be *Instructive*, it can (even according

cording to himself) instruct us in nothing but an *Errour*. Lastly, What needs this Circumlocation? If *Sense*, *Motion*, &c. huddled together, be signified by the Word [*Man*,] why could it not as well be said, [*Every Man has a Notion of God*] without more ado? Since by his Discourse to predicate what the Word [*Man*] signifies, is not *Instructive*. Or, if they be not signify'd by the Word [*Man*,] how is the Proposition *True*? Or what means it to say, he intends [*Man*] by those many Words, and yet would not have it thought so? Or that no Intrinsic Predicate *instructs*, but only what is Extrinsic to any Nature? Or, if this be meant for an Instructive Definition, as it must, (for the Subject in that Proposition agrees to nothing but to *Man*) why are the Parts of it so disparate, and *so many*? Or rather if *so many*, why *no more*? If we may gain the Knowledge of more Accidents in every *Species* by degrees, as 'tis granted we may; and that we ought to define those *Species*, not by the old beaten way of *Genus* and *Difference*, but by this new one, of cluttering together confusedly the Multitudes of Accidents we find in them, we may come in time, by finding still more and more, to have Definitions so large, that the whole side of a Leaf cannot hold them, nor Man's Memory retain them; and then what do they serve for?

17. Indeed, when Words are taken in divers Significations, if Men contentiously adhere to the different Senses themselves give them, it is, as Mr. *Locke* says well, meer *Trifling*. But I cannot grant that all Predications of

*That the Signification of Words is the Meaning of them; their Meaning is our Notion; and our Notion is the Thing.*

Abstract Words are only *Verbal* and *Trifling*. He says, they amount to nothing but *Significations of Terms*. And is not this enough? I wish he would consider his *own Words*. By [*Signification of Terms*] he means, I suppose, the *Sense* or *Meaning* of them: Now the *Meanings* of Words being the same with our *Notions*, which as has been demonstrated, are the *Things themselves*, how can those Abstract Terms be merely *Verbal*? Since they as much signify the *Thing* as any other Terms whatever; only they signify it with a *Restriction* to such a *precise* Respect or Considerability found in that whole *Ens* or *Substance*.

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## REFLEXION *Twentieth,*

### ON

#### *The 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th* CHAPTERS.

I. **T**HIS Excellent Author discourses very Solidly, when he says, that *Universal Propositions, of which we can have certain Knowledge, do not concern Existence*. I add, nor our *Notions* neither, of which those Propositions do consist, (and much less Propositions that are Uncertain.) For, taking the Notion alone, or according to the direct Signification

*Universal's must relate to the Existence they have in the Mind.*



cation of the Terms, obj ectively consider'd, they *abstract from* (that is, are indifferent to) all *kinds* of Existence, whether in the Mind or in Nature. But, when he says that such Propositions do not *concern* Existence, he means ( I suppose ) Existence *in Nature, or out of the Mind* ; ( or else *not at all* ; ) and the Copula [*est*] must necessarily *signifie* some kind of *Existence*, as well as *Identifie* the two Terms in every Proposition ; or otherwise it would be a *Sound or no Word*. But this Discourse is perhaps needless, being, as I think, in great part granted here. All I intend by it, is to clear the Notion of Existence in the Title, and that it means Existence *out of the Mind*, by which Things or *Individuums* are in themselves, whether we *think* of them or no. I grant too, that we have so certain a Knowledge of our *own Existence*, that it *can need no Proof* ; but I deny we have it by *Intuition* ; and I affirm we *get it, and have it*, by plain *Sensation or Experience*, in the same manner as we know the Existence of *other Bodies* ; as will be shewn, when we come to reflect on the 11th Chapter.

2. His Demonstration of a Deity, Chap. 10th, is very acute, nor does he here affect Recourse to his *Ideas*, or build on *them* expressly, or ( as he too often does in other places ) take *Phantasms* for *Notions* ; which takes off the force of his Reasons.

*To put any Knowledge in Brutes is against the Nature of the Thing, and Implicatory.*

Particularly, he argues so strongly that a *Cogitative Being* can never be made of *meer-Matter*, that I do judge it Unanswerable : And, withall, that it necessarily concludes that Brutes can have no Knowledge, without having something in them that is *Spiritual* ; which I am sure he will not

say. I could wish Mr. L. had been steady to this Distinction of those two Natures, of *Spiritual* and *Corporeal*, which adequately divide *Ens*: Which, I think he was not, when he said *B. 4. Ch. 3. § 6.* that he sees no contradiction in it that *God* should, if he pleas'd, give to certain Systems of Created Sensible Matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of Sense, Perception and Thought. For, if the Nature of meer Matter, by being Commodiously put together, can bear the having Thoughtfulness; it is but compounding it more artificially, and it may be as Cogitative as the *Wiseſt Man* living; and so farewell to all Spirituality of our Soul, nay, to all *Spiritual Nature* whatever: For, to what end should *God* create the Distinct Nature of *Spirits*, if Matter wisely orderd could perform all their Operations? if once we yield that Matter, conveniently contriv'd, can be capable of any degree of Knowledge, it is but contriving it better and better, (and who can stint *Gods* Omnipotency in this, more than in other things?) and it may be capable of the *highest Degree* of Science; and, consequently, to create *Spiritual Nature* at all, would be needless, and to no purpose. Besides, if Men and Brutes differ onely in the *Degrees* of Knowledge, they ought to be of the same *Species*; since *Magis et minus non variant speciem*: For, otherwise, every single Man would make a Distinct *Species*, which is a plain Contradiction.. Against this Position of the possibility of Matters being Cogitative, he argues here very Vigorously § 10. and shows clearly that *Incogitative Matter*, and *Motion*, whatever changes it might produce of *Figure and Bulk*, could never produce Thought. He will say that, tho' it

could

could not do this *of it self*, yet **God** could make it do it. But if **God** cannot *contradict himself*, or do *Unwisely*, then, since his Creative Wisdom has Establish'd each kind of Nature *to be it self* and *no other*; then, to put in **God** a Power to *confound* those Natures again, ( which he does if he should confound the Primary and proper Operation of Spirits, which is *Thought, Knowledge or Reason* by giving it to Bodies, ) is to put a Power in **God** to do *Contradictions*, that is, to do *Impossibilities*; for whatever is *against* the *Essence* or Nature of any thing, makes that thing *not to be it self*; which is against an Identical and self evident Proposition, and a *Direct Contradiction*.

3. The Clear Distinction of Corporal and Spiritual Natures, is of that vast importance; that (tho' it may seem a little unseasonable) I cannot but take this occasion to reflect, once more upon Mr. L's doctrine in this point, apprehending I may not meet with a fitter opportunity hereafter. I have reason to think, that he does not exclude Materiality out of the Idea of *Spirit*, or at least of the *Soul*, which all Christian Philosophers and most Heathens too, hold to be of a *Spiritual* Nature. On the other side he attributes *Reason* and *Knowledge* ( in some degree at least ) to *Brutes*. Now, out of these two positions it follows demonstratively. 1. That the *Corporal* and *Spiritual* Natures are not *clearly distinguished*, which utterly destroys all possibility of Truth in Philosophy, and seems to do no small prejudice to Truths of a Higher Concern; which are left Inexplicable to Men of Sense, if those inferior Truths, which relate to the Clear Dis-

Mr. L. confounds  
Material and Spi-  
ritual Natures.

distinction of those two Natures, be violated and render'd Uncertain. For, *Corporeal* and *Spiritual* Natures, comprizing, or dividing between themselves, the *Objects* of all the Sciences a Philosopher can treat of, whether they be *Physicks*, *Ethicks* or *Metaphysicks*, all which must necessarily build their Discourses, and draw their Conclusions from such Notions as are taken from, and do of right belong to those two Distinct Natures; it follows that, if these two Natures be *confounded* and jumbled together, and be not *clearly Distinct*, it is impossible any Clear Conclusion can be drawn from either of them, or any Rational Discourse made concerning them. 2. That Mr. *L.*'s way of Philosophizing by *Ideas*, which leads him into such strange Errours, or at least affords him no certain Light to Distinguish those Natures, is good for nothing at all. For, if it cannot furnish him with means, to put a Clear Distinction between Natures *so widely Distant*, and Different from one another; much less can it assist him to show clearly what Modes, Accidents or Properties belong to *one* Nature, what to the *other*; or to Distinguish those Natures, which are *Inferiour* to those two *General* ones; and therefore differ far *less* from one another than *They* did. It remains then to show that Mr. *L.*'s Doctrine by way of *Ideas*, does not put a *Clear Distinction* between the aforesaid Natures, but *confounds* them together. He holds it not to be Certain that Immateriality, is not included in the Notion of our *Spiritual* part the *Soul*; it may, therefore, be *Material*, or have *Matter* in it, for any thing his Way of *Ideas* tells him; and therefore since Matter cannot be cramp't into an Indivisible, it may be



be *Divisible* or *Extended*; and, so, may be *Divided* or *Shatter'd*, that is ( its *Unity* being thus lost, and, consequently, its *Entity*, ) it *may cease to bee*, or be *Corrupted*. Again, if it be *Divisible*, it must be to *some degree*, or either *more* or *less*, *Divisible*; that is, *Rare*, or else *Dense*. If *Rare*, then ( since *Passiveness* is *Essential* to the *Notion* of *Matter* ) it may by the operation of other *Material Causes*, which never wants, be *Condens'd*; and consequently, become *Opacous* or *Visible*; or, it *may* by the same *Causes* become *Rarer*, and be turn'd into *Fire*. Also being *Divisible*, it may have *parts* of which one must be *without* the other, that is, it must be *Impenetrable* as to its own parts, and thence be able to protrude another *Material being*, and be *Solid* too ( in his *Sense* of that *Word* ) which is the same with *Impenetrable*. Moreover, since it must be *Divisible*, it must be *Quantitative* or *Extended*, and this not *Ininitely* but *Finitely*; that is, it must be *Terminated*; wherefore, *Termination* of *Quantity*, being the *Notion* of *Figure*, it may have *Figure* too. In a *Word*, if it may possibly be *Material*, there is no *Property* of *Body*, but *may agree* to the *Soul*; and therefore, the *Soul*, tho' *Spiritual*, may be *Corporeal*; and so the *Nature* of *Body* and *Spirit* may be *one* and the *same*. But what needs more than merely his ascribing *Materiality* to it, at least, permitting it to belong to it? Our *Notion* of [ *Matter* ] is taken from *Body*, and from nothing else, and therefore can be nothing but *Body*, consider'd as ( not what it *actually* is, but ) as 'tis *Alterable*, *Changeable*, or *apt to be another Thing*, that is, as 'tis *Corruptible*; which, I am sure, *Mr. L.* will not say or think of our *Soul*. Perhaps he  
may

may say, that he only means that it may have Matter annex'd to its Spirituality. But then he must grant, that since this Materiality did not, as an *Accident*, accrue to the Soul *afterwards*, she had it from *her Nature*; and therefore it must be *Intrinsic* to her, and help to *constitute* her peculiar Nature; and, if this be so, then, when this Material kind of Compartment is dissolv'd or corrupted (for if *Material*, it may be Alter'd, wrought upon, and Corrupted as other Material Compounds may) the Complex or Compound it self is dissolv'd, and so no longer the *same*, but *perish'd*. Besides, what should the Soul do with *two* Material Compartments; one, Organical; the other, Inorganical? Especially, since there are as subtil Parts in this Visible Body of ours, with which, as the Form of the Body, she is *united*, (*viz.* the *Spirits*) as any, perhaps, Mr. Locke can conceive to be annex'd to her.

4. To proceed, He does but *think it possible*, for any thing he knows, that the Soul may have some Materiality; but he positively judges, that *Brutes* have Reason; nay, that 'tis as *Evident to him as that they have Sense*. Now, if they have Reason, they must know how to *draw Consequences*, this being Essential to the Notion of Reason, or rather the same Thing in other Words. Again, If they can Reason, they can *compare* what's meant by our *Terms*, and have the Sense of those Sayings we call *Propositions* in their Knowing Power. And, since that Reason is not given them for nothing, but for their Preservation, they can *compare* Agreeable and Disagreeable Objects, and *pursue, out of that Reason*, that which is most Agreeable; that is,

is, they can *Will*, *Chuse*, and *Act freely*, which are naturally consequent to their gathering by their Reason what is *better* or *worse* for them, and *thence* Determining themselves to it accordingly : I say, *themselves* ; for, if they *have* Reason, then Reason is part of *Themselves*, and not a *Distinct* Thing from them. Out of which Two Things follow : One, That the Nature of *Man* and *Brute* are Confounded ; since all those Chief Operations Proper to Man, are Communicable to *Brutes*. *Secondly*, That Mr. *Locke* will be at a loss to get an *Idea* of the *Spirituality* of his Soul, or of other *Spiritual* Beings, by reflecting on the *Operations* of his *Mind* ; since the same may possibly be found in such Beings as are *meerly Corporeal*. Wherefore, to conclude this Discourse, all our Natural Notions of *Body* and *Spirit*, and of all their *Operations*, must be *jumbled together* in a kind of Indifferency to either ; and therefore those two Natures must be *Confounded*, if either the *Soul*, which is *Spiritual*, may have *Materiality* Annex'd to *her* ; or *Brutes*, which are *material* Entities, may have Thought, Knowledge, and Reason Annex'd to *them*. And since Mr. *Locke* affirms very rationally, that *one of his Ideas is not Another*, I cannot but think he becomes the more oblig'd to shew out of the Natures of those two *Things*, liquidly and precisely, how those two Natures are distinguish'd ; or else his way of *Ideas* will be conceiv'd to be *meerly Phantastick* and *Unphilosophical* ; being most unlike the *Ideas* in the Divine Understanding, the Original Ground of all Truth, which do not *confound* Natures, but *establish* them in a most perfect *Distinction* to be *what they are*, and *no other*. I press not here how no Discourse at all in Philo-

sophy

sophy can be *Conclusive*, unless the Nature of Body and Spirit be perfectly and clearly *contradistiguish'd*; nor repeat what I have shewn, *Reflex. 9. §. 7.* that our Natural Notions teach us to distinguish perfectly between *Body* and *Spirit*, which his Ideas do not, but *confound* them, and thence *deprave* our Natural Knowledge of Things. I know he *says*, but *proves not*, that the *having General Ideas*, puts a perfect Difference between Brutes and us; to which I have spoken formerly. I add, that 'tis a thousand times easier to have General Ideas, they being but *Imperfect Perceptions* of the Thing, than to have *Reason*; as is easie to be demonstrated, and has been manifested above.

5. As for making *something out of Nothing*, or *Creating*; after we have prov'd  
 To create is the  
*Peculiar Effect of*  
 Self-existence.  
 that Existence is *Essential* to God, and not *Accidental* to him, which Mr. L. clearly demonstrates; it follows thence, and out of the Commonest Notion of *Causality*, that it is not a matter of Wonderment, or hard to believe that he should *Create*, but that if he pleases to operate *ad extra*, this is his Peculiar Action; since nothing is more Evident than that *Every Thing acts as it is*. Whence, if **God's** Essence, and his very Nature be *Existence* or *Actual Being*, 'tis demonstrable that it is not onely as peculiar to him to cause *Actual Being* or *Create*, as it is for Fire to heat, or Light to enlighten; but, moreover, that this is the *only Effect* that can *immediately* or without the intervention of *Second Causes*, proceed from him.



6. I much fear that it may seem something to weaken the true Argument for the Possibility of Creation, to bring the Instance of *our Thought moving our Body*; whence he concludes that Gods Power to do a Thing is not to be deny'd *because we cannot comprehend its Operation*. For, 1. Mr. Locke thinks he experiences this, *viz.* that the Soul moves the Body; whereas we do not experience that **God** Created any thing. 2. As Mr. Locke has shown very ingeniously, that onely the *Man* is *Free*: So I affirm 'tis the *Man* that, wrought upon himself, *moves his Body*, and not his *Thought* onely. And, that, as when we gain'd our *First* Notions, the *Man* was acted upon, both according to his Corporeal and Spiritual Part; so, every *New* Act he had *afterwards*, that proceeded from him as he was *Man*, is perform'd by the Concurrence of *both* those Parts. Whence, in every Act of his Soul, he must be re-excited by some Object that is out of the Soul, either striking on his Senses; or else, by the repeated Strokes of the Material Phantasms, lodg'd *within*, upon the Seat of Knowledge. These propose a-fresh the Motives, and continue those Impressions all the while he deliberates, compares, discourses, and determines; and, when the *Man*, according to that part call'd the *Fancy*, is *full* (as it were) of those Agreeable Phantasms; and, consequently, the *Soul* (*hic est nunc*) is *full* too of those Notions or Apprehensions of their Agreeableness, the *Whole Man* acts for them, and moves to attain them. In which Case, what is purely *Material* in those Actions, or belonging meerly to Corporeal Motion, is refunded into the *Stupendious*

*The Thought cannot move the Body, and why.*

pendious Contrivance of the *Body*, whose Motions follow connaturally from the Phantasms, in the same way as it does in Brutes ; which is equally wonderful, *we* knowing no more than *they*, ( that is, *not at all* ) *how* it is done : But, the *Manner* of the Action, as to its Design, Direction, wise Ordering of it, and its Proceeding from Knowledge, Freedom and Reason, ( all which we know it does, ) springs peculiarly from the *Soul*, or from *Man*, according to his *Spiritual* Part. Now, the Fundamental Ground of my Position is this, *Man* is not *Two* Things ; nor ( which is the same ) made up of Soul and Body, as two *Actual* Parts ; but *One* Thing, of which, consequently, those two are *Potential* Parts onely. Wherefore, neither of those Parts is *Actually*, but the *Whole* ; and therefore, neither of them *alone* can *Act*, because neither of them *exists alone* ; \* the Existence

See Method to  
Science, Book I.  
Less. 5. §. 7.

of the Thing being that in which its Virtue of *Operating* consists.

But, in truth, his Argument proceeds as well from *this* Topick, as it does from *that* of meer *Thought* moving the *Body* ; for, we can comprehend as little, how *Man*, tho' acting with his Phantasms and Thoughts too, does move the *Body*, and all its Distinct Parts, so variously, as how the *Thought alone* can do it. Nor, were there some Flaw in this Particular, does it prejudice his main Demonstration of a Deity, they being Distinct Questions. Add, that if we may conjecture from some Expressions of his in other places, he may perhaps be of my Opinion in this Point, and, by the Word [ *Mind*, ] mean the *Man* ; tho' in many places he speaks very Ambiguously ; or rather, seems too plainly to maintain the contrary Position.

7. I take leave on this Occasion, to recommend it to Speculative Men, to endeavour to draw all their Demonstrations from *the Nature of the Thing*, (this being the only solid way,) and not from *Foreign Topicks*. After we have prov'd a Deity, let us next demonstrate that *God is Self-existent*; or, that his Essence, or Nature, is *Existence*; and then, all that concerns the Deity, or his Immediate Operations, nay, even the Rational Explication of the *Trinity* it self, will (if Right Logick and Reflexion be not wanting) follow more solidly, and more clearly, than the clearest Mathematical Conclusions; if we rate Clearness and Evidence, (as we ought,) not from the Figures on Paper, which make it easie to our Fancy; but from the greater Simplicity and Clearness of the Notions, and their Terms, and of their equally-evident Connexion; which, coming nearest to First, and Self-evident Principles, do most firmly establish the Judgment.

*The Notion or Nature of the Deity being once settled to be Self-existence, all that can be said of it follows Demonstratively.*

8. The 11th Chapter treats Of *our Knowledge of the Existence of other Things*; by which words he means, *other Things than our selves*. He seems to ground his Discourse on this Position, that *no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when, by Actually operating upon him, it makes it self perceiv'd by him*; which he calls the Way of Sensation, or Experience. Now, if, by the Words, [*any other Being,*] he means *Bodies*, nothing can be more Solid, or worthy a Philosopher. But, why we may not gather by our Reason, the Existence

*We can know there are Angels, tho' they do not operate on us.*

ence of *Spiritual Beings*, or Angels, ( tho' they do not operate upon *us* actually, ) from some Operation on *other* Things in Nature that can *only* proceed from *them*, I cannot discern: Rather, I hope I have demonstrated we can, in my *Method*, Book 3. Less. 6. Thesis 4. Indeed, the Notions of Angelical Natures are not *proper* ones, as our *Natural* Notions, which are imprinted by Sensation, are; which makes our Conceptions, and consequently, the Words which we use when we discourse of them *Metaphorical*. Nor matters it, that our Expressions concerning them are oft-times *Negative*, or signify that they *are not* such Beings as Bodies are, but *Immaterial*, *Unextended*, *Indivisible*, and, consequently, their Operations *Unsuccessive*; in regard we *intend* all the while to signify by those Words, a *Positive Being*, tho' our low Natural Conceptions cannot reach its particular Nature, as in it self: And, if we *intend* this, then *this* is the *meaning* of those Words, or our *Notion* of them; *Meaning* and *Intention* being all one. Yet, these Predicates, tho' *Negative*, or *Metaphorical*, are, notwithstanding, *truly* said of them; and, therefore, we can Argue and Discourse as consequently from *them*, as we can from the most *Positive* or *Proper* Notions we have. Indeed, as Mr. *Locke* says well, §. 12. we cannot know they exist, by the *Ideas* we have of them in our *Minds*; and the Reason is, because those *Ideas*, or Notions, taking them as *distinct*, are but *Inadequate* Conceptions of the Thing; and, considered *distinctly*, are formally but a *part* of that Complexion of Accidents that constitute the *Individuum*, which only is capable of Existing, or the *Whole*; because *Parts* cannot exist *out of the Whole*.

But



But he is much mistaken if he thinks we can no more know they are *Capable of Existing* by the Notions we have of them, than we can that *Centaurs* are: For, the Idea or Fancy of *Centaurs* involves *Inconsistent* Notions in its very Nature, (or rather, *No-Nature*;) which the Notion of a *Subsistent Spirit*, called an *Angel*, does not. Add, that *Knowing*, *Willing*, and *Operating*, which we attribute to such *Beings*, are all *Positive* Notions; and *Consistent*, or capable to meet in a *Spiritual Thing*.

9. Whereas Mr. *Locke* says we can onely know the *Existence* of any *Other Thing* when it *operates* upon us, and therefore we know it is *actually* by *Sensation*, I cannot see the least reason why we should not know our *own Being* by *Sensation* too, as well as that of *other Bodies*, without having recourse to *Intuition*; which, apply'd to that Case, 'tis hard to understand; or, to know how it differs from the direct Knowledge had by *Sensation* or *Experience*. We can hear, see, feel and smell some parts of *our own Body*, as well as we can those of *Others*. Indeed, *now*, when we are ripe for more express Knowledges, those Impressions made by one of our own Parts upon others, do not *cause* in us the Notion of *Existence*, (tho', perhaps, they may tacitly repeat it,) because we know *already*, and *before-hand*, that we *do* exist: But, put case we *did not*, would not these Impressions make us know by *Sensation* *our own Existence*, as well as that of any *other Body* whatever? I doubt not but Mr. *Locke* will grant they *would*. Since then the

We know at first our own Existence, in the same manner as we know the Existence of other Things; i. e. by Sensation, and not by Intuition.

*Embryo* in the Womb lies in a Roundish Posture, why may not *one part* of it, by touching another, or operating upon it, cause in us, as soon as the *Soul* (which has a Capacity of Receiving Notions) is in it, a Notion of our *own* Existence, by way of *Sensation*? Especially, since *Operation* is nothing

\* See Method to  
Science, Book 1.  
Less. 8. §. 7.

but the \* Existence of the Agent *Body*, press'd or imprinted (as it were) upon another, by *Motion*. Certainly, it becomes us who deny *Innate Ideas*, to shew how all our *First* Notions do come into us by Impressions on the *Senses*; and, not to say rawly, that some of them come by *Intuition*; which is the Way of Knowing Proper to *Angels*, whose Knowledges are all *Innate*, and none of them *Acquir'd*, either by Sense, or Discourse, for they have *neither*. This, I say, is certainly best for the Interest of our Tenet; of which, *Intuition* gives but a slender Account. I believe Mr. *Locke* proceeds upon this, that he finds he not only *does*, but *must* as firmly assent to the Proposition *Ego sum*, as he does to the most Evident Proposition whatever; nor can he at all *doubt* of it, nor can it *need Proof*. But, my Judgment is, that this Introversion, and Studying our own Interiour, is a very Fallacious Guide, and will often lead us astray, if we keep not a steady Eye, attentively bent to our Principles; which he seems here to neglect. For, many Positions *need no Proof*, and *force* our Assent, and yet their Certainty may depend on *Different Causes*.

10. The 12th Chapter treats of *the Improvement of our Knowledge*, which Mr. Locke says, *does not depend on Maxims*. But, First, he mistakes the Use of General *Maxims*: They are not made for the Vulgar, or Beginners, to gather Knowledge by them; tho' it may be observ'd, that Men of all sorts do naturally use them when they *suete* their purpose; nay, sometimes make Proverbs of them. Nor was this Maxim, [*a Whole is bigger than a Part,*] ever intended for Boys, or to teach them that *their Hand is bigger than their Little Finger*, or such like; but, being premised to the ensuing Proofs, they are *occasionally* made use of by Learned Men, in the Process of their Discourse, to *clinch* the Truth of the Point, when it needs it, by their *Self-Evidence*. In the same manner as my self have very frequently had recourse to Metaphysical Principles, and made use of them, in my Preliminaries and Reflexions, as Occasion presented, to make my Discourses Evident; and, to *rivet* the Truths I advance, in the Minds of my Readers; as any Attentive Peruser of them may easily observe. He speaks against our *Receiving Principles without Examination*, and of Principles that are not Certain; that is, against such Sayings, as are *no Principles*; for, if they can either *need*, or *admit* of Examination, or, if *they be not Certain*, none but meer Fops will let them *pass for Principles*. Yet, tho' Mr. Locke does thus oppose Maxims and Principles, 'tis, notwithstanding, very evident, that himself must make use of some Maxims and Principles all the while he disputes against their Usefulness; otherwise, he cannot dis-

No Improvement of Science, without some General Principle.



course at all ; or, his Discourse can have no Force : In the same manner as he that wrestles with another, must either fix his Foot on some Firm Ground, or he will fall himself, instead of overthrowing his Adversary. Let us then examin *his*

Principles. He alledges, that *the Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles depends only upon the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our Ideas.*

Mr. Locke's Principles examin'd.

This, then, is one of his Principles ; both because it runs through good part of his 3d and 4th Books, as also because 'tis Equivalent to this Universal, [ *All Certainty of Principles depends, &c.* ] Now, this is so far from Self-evident, that it needs Examination enough ; and is one of those I judge not Certain ; and, therefore, can be no Ground or Principle at all : Nor is it possible it should, unless the Word [ *Idea* ] be cleared to mean *Spiritual Notions* in our Mind, and not meer Resemblances, or Material Representations in our Fancy ; to clear which, ( tho' the whole Treatise needs it, ) no Provision is made ; but, on the contrary, those two vastly different things are rather carelessly confounded ; as is shewn in my First Preliminary. Another Principle seems to be this, [ *None ought, with a Blind and Implicit Faith, to Receive and Swallow Principles.* ] This is of Universal Influence, and Self-Evident ; and, therefore, in all Points well qualify'd for a Principle. For, Principles were not Principles, if they needed either Faith, or Deductions of Reason, to make them go down, since they ought to be Evident by their own Light. But, what Good can this do to any, but to such as have renounc'd Common Sense, even to Ridiculousness ? And, perhaps Mr. Locke had



had some such weak Writers in his Eye, when he advanc'd this cautious Position, as a Warning to Learners.

II. Now, the General Maxims and Principles, on which the Learned Part of the World has hitherto proceeded, can onely be overthrown (if they must needs be so) by other Principles, *more Evident* than themselves are; or else it will be but

*Mr. Locke's main Principle; which is to ascertain all other Principles, Inevident.*

a drawn Match; and so they may hope still to stand (as the Lawyers phrase it) *in their full Force, Effect, and Vertue*. We are to consider then, what Principle Mr. Locke has substituted in their room, when they are discarded; for, 'tis a very ill Case to be left without any Principles at all. 'Tis this, [*All Knowledge of the Certainty of Principles, and consequently, the Way to improve our Knowledge, is, to get, and fix in our Minds, Clear, Distinct and Compleat Ideas, as far as they are to be had, and annex to them Proper and Constant Names.*] Now, if the Ideas must be *Clear*, the Terms must be very *Simple*, and consequently (as was shewn above) *General* ones; and this will force us back upon *General Maxims*, which it was intended we should avoid, as *good for little*. To be *Distinct*, if we go to work like Artists, we must distinguish those General and Common Notions; which will bring us back into the old Road of those Ten Common Heads, called *Predicaments*; and, consequently, of *Genus, Species and Differences*, which was lately dislik'd; I suppose, because it was too much travell'd in, and beaten; tho', I think, such a Common Path should not be left, because some may have here and there laid a Block or Briar in the

way. Lastly, *Compleat Ideas* (as he grants) are not to be had of the *Species*, much less of the *Individuums*. And as for *Names*; 'tis not *we* that are to *annex* them, but the Common Usage of the Vulgar, or of the Generality of Learned Men, (in case they be Artificial ones;) for, these are they who gave them their *Constant* and *Proper* Signification. Whence is seen, that so many Difficulties are involv'd in this one *Thesis*, or *Principle*, (besides what is said above, of the Word [*Ideas*,]) that we can build no Degree of *Certainty*, nor *Improvement* of Knowledge upon it; especially, since Mr. *Locke* himself (according to his usual *Candour* and *Modesty*) declares here, he does but *think* it true. But, which is the hardest Case of all, to embrace this Principle, we must be oblig'd to quit all our *Self-evident Maxims*, as of little Use, upon which our selves, and all the Learned part of the World, have proceeded hitherto.

12. 'Tis a great Truth, that *it is a right Method of advancing Knowledge, to Consider our Abstract Notions*: But, if these be not the *Things*, nor (as Mr. *Locke's* *Complex Ideas* are) so much as *like them*, I see not but that, let us *Consider* them as much as we will, we shall be never the nearer attaining any *Real Knowledge* by such a Consideration. I add, that it is also as necessary to find out *Middle Terms*, that are *Proper*; without which, no Science can be had of any *New Conclusion*; nor, consequently, can we, without this, advance one Step in *Exact Knowledge*. 'Tis a certain Truth also, that *Morality is capable of Demonstration*; tho' I do not remember that any Author, but Mr. *Locke*, and my self, have been so bold,

bold, as openly to profess it. The Current of Slight Speculators having long endeavour'd to make it pass for a kind of Maxim, that [*there is no perfect Certainty to be had, but only in Lines and Numbers:*] Whereas, the Principles of Morality are as *Evident*, and the Notions belonging to such Subjects as *Clear*, as those in Natural Philosophy, perhaps Clearer; as this worthy Author has shewn most manifestly. 'Tis also True, that *Knowledge may be better'd by Experience*. But, if he means *Scientifical Knowledge*, which is the Effect of *Demonstration*, I must deny it, unless Common Principles of Nature do guide Experience, and give it Light of the True and Proper Causes of what Experience inform'd our Senses; for, without their Assistance, (as I have shewn in the Preface to my *Method*,) Experimental Knowledge can never produce any one *Scientifical Conclusion*. I add, that True Science would be a Thousand times more advanc'd, did Learned Men bend their Endeavours to begin with the *Primary Affections* of Body, and thence proceed gradually to *Secondary*, or *more Compounded* ones: For, this Method would furnish Studious Men with good Store of *Proper Middle Terms*, to deduce their Demonstrations. Lastly, 'Tis true, that *we must beware of Hypotheses, and Wrong Principles*: But, where shall we find any Sect of Philosophers, who, for want of Exact Skill in Logick and Metaphysics, are not forc'd to build upon *Hypotheses*, (and those generally False ones too;) but our *Anti-Ideists*, whom I take to be true Followers of *Aristotle*, in his main Principles, and the only true Understanders of his Doctrine. It being, indeed, scarce possible, that those who are not well qualify'd with *these two*



Sciences, should be 'capable to Comprehend his True Sense.

13. Mr. Locke judges, that a Man may pore long enough on those Maxims us'd by Euclid, without seeing one jot the more of Mathematical Truths. Self-evident Truths need not be por'd upon at all; nor were they ever meant for the attaining New Knowledges by pering on those Propositions, singly consider'd: Yet, these Maxims must be pre-supposed to be True, and admitted, or the Arguments would very often want their best Cement, that gives them an evident and necessary Coherence. They are prefix'd by Euclid at first, both because they may often come in play afterwards; as also, because it would throw off the Tenour of the Discourse, to mention them still expressly every time there needs Recourse to them: Whence it was judg'd fit by him, and others like him, to premise them at first, and then refer to them. Let Men but observe how, and in what Occasions, Euclid makes use of them, and it will then be best seen what they are good for: But, if they are good for nothing at all, I am sure it must be concluded, that both Euclid himself, and such Writers and Users of Maxims, were, all of them, a Company of vain, idle Fops, to amuse their Readers by proposing so solemnly such Ridiculous Trifles; and dubbing those Insignificant Baubles with the Honourable Titles of Maxims and Principles. To fix which Dis-repute upon him, and his Imitaters, will, I doubt, much Scandalize every True Member of the Commonwealth of Learning.



REFLEXION 21<sup>th</sup>.

## O N

*The Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth*  
CHAPTERS.

I. I Am sorry I must declare, that in Mr. Locke's 14<sup>th</sup> Chapter, which treats [Of Judgment] there is scarce one Line that I can yield to. I discourse thus: *Judgment* does most evidently import *The Point stated.* the *Fixure* of our Understanding in its Assent to the Truth or Falshood of any Proposition. For to say, *I judge a thing to be so*; is the same as to say, [*I am fully and firmly persuaded it is so.*] Now, this *Fixure* of the Mind may arise from *two* Causes; *Reason* and *Passion*. Under the Word [*Reason*,] taken at large, I comprehend all kind of *Evident Knowledge* whatever, that can belong to a *Rational Creature*. To *Passion* belongs all *Precipitancy* of Assent, from what Motive or Cause soever it springs. The Former makes us adhere to what we judge, upon such Motives, as by their *Evidence* do determine the Understanding to Assent, and fix it in that Assent; which Motives, therefore, can be only such as are purely *Intellectual*; or such as, by our Proceeding upon them, we see clearly the Thing *must be so*, or *not so*, as we apprehend. The Later springs from the *Will*, corrupted and byassed by some Interest or Pleasure, which inveigles our Understanding to adhere to it as a Truth, because the *Will would have it so*.  
Again,

Again, there are two sorts of Objects Man, as having two Natures in him, may be employ'd about, *viz.* *Outward Action* and *Inward Assent*. The former does (generally) concern the External Conveniences or Necessities of our Temporal Life here; the Later, the Interiour and Natural Perfection of our Soul; which is the Adhering to *Truth*, and rejecting of *Errour*. In the Former of these we can have *no* Clear Evidence, or very seldom; both because *Outward Actions* are employ'd about *Particulars*, of which we can have *no Science*; as also, because those Particulars about which we are to *Act*, are surrounded with almost Innumerable Circumstances which we cannot Comprehend, and way-laid by the Undiscoverable Ambushes of Fortune; so that we can seldom or never, with absolute Certainty, *know* whether they may, or may not prove *Successful*. Notwithstanding which Dangers, when there is Necessity or great Conveniency to *Act Outwardly*, we may, without disparaging our Reason, fall to acting upon a *Probability*; the Necessity obliging us to do so, and the Impossibility of *perfect Assurance* acquitting us of Imprudence. But, of *Assenting*, or of *Judging Inwardly*, that a Proposition is *True* or *False*, there can be *no Necessity*, unless *Evidence* forces us to it; in regard **God's** Goodness has furnish'd us with a Faculty of *Suspending* our Judgment in such Cases, lest we run into Errour; which is always prejudicial to our Nature; and, if the Errour does concern matters of high Moment, pernicious to our Souls Eternal Welfare. This I take to be *plain Reason*, nor do I doubt but that each Branch of this Discourse may be reduced to perfect Evidence. We come to exam-

min now what Mr. Locke delivers in this most important Point.

2. *First*, He Confounds *Outward Action*, of which there *is Necessity*, and *can be no Evidence* of Success; with *Interiour Judging and Assenting*, of which there *can be no Necessity*, if there can be no Evidence; and of which *Evident Knowledge* may oftentimes be had; as also concerning whose Truth or Fals-

Mr. L. confounds *Outward Action*, to which we may proceed upon a Probability, with *Inward Assent*, to which we may not.

hood, till Evidence appear, we may safely and honourably *suspend* our Judgment; nay, if, in such a case, we do *not*, we hazard to do our selves an Injury when we *need not*. That he thus confounds those two vastly *Different*, or rather *Contrary* Considerations, appears hence; that, § 1. he shews the Unreasonableness of *not eating*, and of *not going about our Business*, till we have a *Demonstration* that the Meat will nourish us, and the Business will succeed; which Instances evidently relate to *Outward Action*; but in § 3. he speaks in the same Tenour of *taking the Proposition to be True or False*; which clearly relates to *Inward Assent*. Secondly, **God's** Wisdom has indeed given us, generally, no more but *Probability* for our *Outward Actions* doing us good, or succeeding; but to think our all-wise Maker has given us no better Grounds to make us *Assent*; or rather, that he intended we should *Assent* upon Probabilities, which are still liable to be *False*; and, if they be *but Probabilities*, may all be *False*, is to think that God meant to expose our Souls to innumerable Errors; nay, allows and designs we should embrace Errors. For, if (as Mr. L. says) **God** has  
given



given as a Faculty to judge that to be *True*, which, the Reasons for their Truth being *but Probable*, may not be *True*; then, since **God** has most certainly intended we should make use of the Faculty he has given us, it must follow that *God* has exposed us to *Errour*, or design'd we should err; and that, (this Faculty, as he says, not being *Knowledge*) very frequently. Which is hardly consistent with the Reverence we do both of us owe to our Creatour, who governs his Creatures according to the Nature he has given them; which, is to avoid *Errour*, and never (as will shortly be seen this does) to admit a Contradiction.

3. What therefore I extremely admire, is, that Mr. *Locke* should say in express Terms, that *Judgment* is that Faculty, whereby the Mind takes any Proposition to be *True* or *False*, without perceiving a *Demonstrative Evidence* in the Proofs; and that this Faculty is given Man by *God* to enlighten him. For, First, *Judgment* does not enlighten us at all; as appears evidently, because *False* Judgments are *Errours*; which are so far from enlightning the Mind, that they manifestly darken it. All that *Judgment* does, is to Fix the Mind in the Perswasion it has, whether that Perswasion springs from *Clear Reason* or *Dark Passion*; and Mr. *Locke* seems to make good my Words, while he contradistinguishes *Judgment* to *Knowledge*; which later, and onely which, is our *Intellectual Light*. Secondly, The Words [Taking Propositions to be *True* or *False*] must mean *Assenting* to them as such; for every *Judgment* is not onely an *Assent*, but a full and firm *Assent*. Now, that no *Probability* can, with Reason, cause *Assent*,  
(and



( and certainly **God**, who gave us our Reason, has not given us a Faculty to use it *against our Reason* ) will be seen hereafter. *Thirdly*, Which is yet worse, by contradistinguishing *Judgment* and *Clear Knowledge*, he makes those Assents which spring out of *Clear Knowledge* to be *no Judgments at all*; whereas These are the *only Judgments* that we can be sure will do us good, and are according to our *True Nature, Reason*. He tells us indeed, in the Close, that when we judge *as things really are*, they are *Right Judgments*. But, how does this agree with his Contradistinguishing formerly [*Judgment*,] according to its whole Latitude, or in its General Notion, from *Knowledge*; unless we should say, that we only do right when we judge at Hap-hazard, or judge *Right by Chance*. *Qui quod æquum est statuit parte inauditâ alterâ, Æquum licet statuerit, haud æquus est tamen*: By which Rule, we are *ill Men*, even tho' we *judge right*; because we precipitate and *hazard* to embrace *Errour* when we need not. Besides, *Things are so really to us as we know them to be*: And, if we do *not know* them to be such, we cannot with Reason say or judge them to be such; and, if we *do*, we act *against* our true *Nature*; to do which **God** has given us *no Faculty*. *Fourthly*, Amongst the Causes mention'd here that make us judge, *Necessity* is reckon'd as *one*, when *Certain Knowledge is not to be had*: But, this can be *no Cause at all* to make us *Judge*. For, there can be *no possible Necessity*, forcing us to judge, but *Clear Evidence*. This, indeed, *obliges* us to *Interiour Assent*, and *compels* us to judge that the Thing is so as we see it to be. But, if *no Evidence* can be had, what *Necessity* is there

there at all of Judging one way or other? Cannot we *suspend* our Judgment till Evidence appears; or whether it does ever appear, or not? Why are we in such haste to hazard falling 'into Error? Or who bids us Judge *at all* till we see a good (or Conclusive) Reason why? I am sure, whatever many Men may do out of *Weakness*, neither **God** nor *Nature* ever impos'd upon any such an absurd Duty. *Lastly*, What means his making it *then* to be Judgment, when we have no *Demonstrative Evidence*? May we not judge a Conclusion that is *Demonstrated* to be *True*, because it is *Demonstrated*? Or that an Identical Proposition is *True*, because 'tis *Self-evident*? Or, rather, ought we not to judge all such Propositions to be *True* for this very Reason, because we *know* evidently they are so. So far then is *Certain Knowledge* from being *contradistinguish'd* from *Judgment*, that they are in some manner *the same*, as I have shewn in my *METHOD*, B. 2. *Less. 1. § 3.* where, I hope, I have set the Nature of *Judgment* in a Clear Light; as I have that of *Assent*, *Suspense*, and *Certainty*, B. 3. § 9.

4. I should be glad to think my self mistaken in Mr. *Locke's* Meaning, if his Express Words, the Tenour of his Discourse, and his next Chapter [*Of Probability*], which runs in the same Strain, would give me leave. Perhaps, he thinks that, since none can embrace Christianity without judging it to be *True*, and few *know* it to be so, we should exclude the Generality from the way to Salvation, if we do not allow such a Faculty given us by **God**, as  
*Judging*

*That God has provided due Motives of Enjoin'd Assent to all Mankind, if they be not wanting to themselves.*

*Judging without Knowing.* I Answer, 1. Those Gifts that come from Above, from the Father of Lights, are all Perfect, as being the Endowments of his Infinitely-bountiful Hand; and, that Men act imperfectly and foolishly, springs from the Limitedness of Creatures. Scarce a Faculty they have but has its Weakness when we come to act, as well as our Reason. When then any one is reduc'd to Christianity upon weak Motives, what's Good or Sincere in that Action is refunded into God the Author of all Good; what's Defective (as all Inconclusive Reasonings are) is to be refunded into the Imperfection of Creatures. Indeed, it belongs to God to lay and establish such Motives to embrace High and Concerning Truths, as are of their own Nature apt to convince, not only People of all sorts, but even the most Speculative Wit living; but it does not belong to him to provide, that every weak Man shall, untaught, penetrate them thoroughly; nor every Careless Man make use of them. Rude and Imperfect Motives are sufficient to move Rude and Imperfect Understandings.

2. This notwithstanding, God has furnish'd even the Rudest, who cannot Speculate at all, with a Power to understand such Motives, after some Fashion, called Practical Evidence; which teaches them, by a common Converse with Natural Things, and with Mankind, to know (dully at least) the Force of Witnessing Authority attesting the Miracles that abetted Christianity, and the Books that deliver'd it. But, what I chiefly insist upon is, that it teaches all Men, that the Nature of its Precepts, and of its Morality, is most Agreeable to our Reason; that it curbs Passion, which breeds such Turmoils in the World; and that, (if settled



settled in Men's Lives,) it would establish all the World in *Peace and Concord*; especially, since they cannot but see what Inconveniencies and ill Consequences do ensue the Breach of the Commandments. And this gives an *Entire Satisfaction* to every Man who is capable of Knowing Common Morality, (as, who is not?) and *assures* them, that the Doctrine it self is *True*; since they experience that Errour puts all into *Confusion and Disorder*. But, this on the By. In a Word, He must be a mean Speculator, who does not observe that **God** has laid Motives, and Solid Knowable ones too, for every Man to embrace *Christian Faith*, of what degree soever he be, if he be but so wise as to *doubt*, and *require* a Reason: If those Motives be not *apply'd* to *all*, 'tis either the Fault of those that do not *care* to be instructed; or of those who *should* inculcate and *explicate* to them those Motives, and *shew* how Solid and Clear they are. Let *them* then bear the Blame; **God's** Providence is justify'd, and his Wisdom and Goodness magnify'd, by his making ample Provision for such Negligent and Unworthy Persons. See *Method to Science, Book 3. Less. 8. §§. 18, 19.*

5. Hence, I have little to say to his 15th Chapter, which treats of *Probability*; *To assent upon a Probability, is against the Commonest Light of Reason.* \* having shewn from the Ground of all *Consequence*, (the Connexion of the Middle Term with the two Extreams,) that, when the *Medium* is *Proper* or *Immediate*, it causes *Demonstration*, and begets *Science*; when *Common* or *Remote*, it makes the Thing onely *Probable*, and begets *Opinion*; when *Unconcerning*, it causes *Improbability*;

\* See Method to Science, B. 3. L. 8.



lity; when clearly *Repugnant*, it breeds *Dissent*. I am therefore onely to reflect on those Expressions of Mr. *Locke* that seem to say we may *assent*, or judge the Thing *is so* upon *Probable Reasons*; or, as Mr. *Locke* expresses it, *assent as firmly as tho' the Thing were infallibly demonstrated, tho' it do but border near upon Certainty*. I have shewn in my *Method*, Book 3. *Less. 9. §. 12.* that no truly Wise Man does Assent or Judge upon Motives, tho' very highly *Probable*; nor can do so, tho' they be never so *Probable* and *Likely*, if he sees it but *Likely*, or *Probable*: For, all Reasons or Motives that are but *Probable*, permit that the Thing may not be so, or may not be; and to assent, or judge the Thing True, is to say in our Mind, that the Thing is: Whence, to Assent the Thing *is*, upon a Probability, is, equivalently, to hold, that, *it is possible the Thing may be, and may not be, at once*: It may be, because it is; and, it may not be at the same time, because the onely Grounds for its Being so, are but *Probable*. Which, therefore, being against a *First*, and *Self-evident* Principle, is the greatest Depravation that a Humane Understanding can be liable to, and (if put in clear Terms) absolutely *Impossible*; both because Contradictions being repugnant to the Nature of *Ens*, or *Thing*, are *Unintelligible*; as also, because it would make our Mind, which is Essentially *Intellectual*, to be not *Intellectual*, that is, *Chimerical*. For, 'tis impossible it should be *Intellectual*, if it denies *First Principles*.

6. This Ground laid, 'tis obvious to discern what is to be said to his 16th Chapter, [*Of the Degrees of Assent.*] For, 1. I must deny that any Assent at all that the Thing

There cannot be, in proper Speech, any Degrees of Assent.

*is so*, can be built upon the Sandy Foundation of Probability, without a most prodigious Perversion of Humane Understanding. 2. Hence I reflect upon the very Subject or *Title* of this Chapter; and I object against it, that it is an *Absolute Impossibility* there should be, in proper Speech, any *Degrees of Assent*. To *Assent* to any Truth, (as was lately shewn,) is to say interiorly, the Thing [*is* ;] and to *Dissent*, is to say the Thing [*is not*.] These two Notions then are evidently the *Objects* of those two *Acts*, which give those Acts to be *what they are*, or (as the Schools express it) do specify them. Wherefore, each of those two Acts consists in an *Indivisible*, as their *Objects* do; and, consequently, there can be no more any *Degrees of Assent*, than there can be any Middle between *is*, and *is not*; which is neither the one nor the other; or, in *part* the one, in *part* the other; whereas, being both of them *Indivisible*, *neither* of them can have any *Parts at all*. The *Degrees* then which can possibly be put in this case, and which I would be willing to think Mr. *Locke* meant, are the *Degrees of Bending or Inclining*, more or less, *towards Assent or Dissent*; that is, *Greater or Lesser Opinions* of the Things *Being*, or not *Being*. *Assent* then, and *Dissent*, or *is* and *is not*, in the Judging Power, are the two fixed Butts and Bounds of that large Field, in which Innumerable Swarms of Opinions, Probabilities, Likelihoods, Doubts, Decmings, and Uncertainties reside; driven perpetually up and down, in a Wild-Goose Chase, by those Unsteady Guides, *Probabilities*; now nearer, now farther off from those Immoveable Barriers. But, it is to be noted, that the De-

degrees of *Probability* and *Likelihood* may sometimes be so very great, that they may seem, even to the wisest Men, while they regard them *heedlessly*, to counterfeit Assent, till they come to take a narrower and stricter Re-view of the Grounds on which they are built; as I have shewn in my *Method*, Book 3. *Less. 9. §. 2.* Mr. *Locke* enumerates here many *Probable* Topicks, grounding *Opinion*; and I have done the same, in the place now quoted, §. 10. All which do agree in this, that they are *Common* or *Remote Mediums*: Whence they are, in true Reason, *Inconclusive*; and therefore, utterly unable to cause Assent in a Being that is *Rational*; there wanting in them that *Visible* and *Certain Connexion*, in which all the Force of *Consequence* consists, and which Mr. *Locke* puts to be onely known by *Intuition*. There may, indeed, be Degrees of Assent taken from the *Subject's* side, by which the Understanding Assents *more* or *less firmly*; according as the *Medium* is *more* or *less Evident*. Whence, *Metaphysical Mediums*, which approach nearest to *Self-Evidence*, cause a *firmer* Assent, than those which are taken from *Inferiour* Notions, which depend on the *other* for their Certainty: And, that *Medium* taken from the *Divine Authority*, does rationally beget the *Firmer* Assent of *all*: Yet, still, the Object of the Assent or Dissent is [*is,*] or [*is not.*] But this cannot be Mr. *Locke's* meaning here; because the least of these Assents is built upon *Clear Evidence*; which is impossible to be found, where the *Medium* is but *Probable*.

7. I am very apprehensive that this Discourse, and others such like will seem very Uncouth, and be very Displeasing to those short-sighted Speculators, who, either out of Disadvantageous Education, or out of Diffidence that there can be any *Certain Method to Science*, are *Sceptically* inclin'd: Especially to those of our Modern Schoolmen; who, not being accusom'd to demonstrate themselves, think it a Disgrace to them, and Incredible to boot, that any else should do it. One of whom, a Worthy Friend of mine, of an acute Understanding, and very Ingenious, but not yet wean'd from insignificant School-Terms, nor aware of their Trifling way of *Distinguishing*; upon my discoursing with him about this point, did imagin it might all be answered, and over thrown by an easy Distinction of *Assent*, into *Absolute* and *Probable*. Alledging that *Absolute Assent* had indeed [ *is* ] for its Object, and so consisted in an Indivisible; but that *Probable Assent* did *not so*; by which means the imputation of holding a Contradiction is avoyded. Thus he reply'd: Wherefore, it were not amiss for his sake, and others of the same pitch, to lay open the frivolousness of this insignificant *Distinction*; that, by reflecting on this, they may correct their carriage in all other like occasions. First then, he seems to join the Epithet of [ *Probable* ] to the *Act* of Assenting; which is perfect Nonsense. For, since every *Accident* or *Mode* has its Metaphysical Verity, by *which it is what it is*, as well as any *Substance*; it is equally against the First Principle [ *Every Thing is what it is* ] to apply that Distinction to any *Accident* ( of which



which *Assent* is one, ) as it would be to apply it to any *Substance*. Put case then we were discoursing concerning the Nature of a *Stone*, or of any other Substance or Body ; and were disputing whether its nature were *such* or *such* ; and he should go about to elude the whole force of this Discourse, by Distinguishing [ *Stone* ] into a *Probable Stone*, and an *Absolute Stone*, would it not be highly ridiculous : For the same Reason it would be *equally* Ridiculous to apply [ *Probable* ] to the *Act* of *Assenting* ; since that *Act* is as *absolutely* it self, as a *Stone* is a *Stone*, or any other Body *is what it is*. But, that I may not be too severe, let us imagin he meant to apply [ *Probable*, ] to the *Object* of the *Act* or some Proposition, as standing under *Motives* onely *Probable* ; whence, 'tis equivalent to this Proposition, [ *This Tenet is Probable* : ] Then, in case the Proof of that Tenet were onely a *Probable Medium*, that Proposition is a *plain Truth*, for what is inferr'd by a *Probable Medium*, is beyond all question, *Probable* ; and therefore the *Assent* to that Proposition, ought to be call'd *Absolute*, and not *Probable*, which quite spoiles the Distinction by making the two branches of it to be *one* and the *same*. 3. Hence, this Contradistinguishing *Probable* and *Absolute*, is faulty in another regard, because the two parts of it are *not* ( *some way* ) *Opposit* ; as they ought to be ; because the Defendent in the Schools uses to say, that according to *one* of them, he *grants* the Proposition, and according to the other *denies* it. Now, *Absolute* and *Probable*, are not at all proper *Opposites* : [ *Absolute* ] signifies *Consummate* or *Perfect* in its kind, and relates to the Minds perfectly yeilding or assenting that the Thing is

True; whereas, [*Probable*] must relate to the *Motives*, or the *common Medium* under which the Proposition stands, or else (as was lately shewn) it is meer Nonsense, and Ridiculous. The Proper Opposite to *Probable*, is *Improbable*; and, what has *Improbable* to do with *Absolute*? Lastly, granting he speaks of the Object or *Thesis* proposed to our Assent, it will appear evidently that my Assertion will stand good, and that the *Formal Object* of Assent is what is express'd by the Copula [*is,*] or the Connexion of the two Terms, in which *Truth* (which onely is to be *assented* to) consists. For example; When we say that [*A Thesis prov'd onely by a Common Medium, is Probable;*] the Truth, even of *this* Proposition, is onely express'd by the Copula [*is,*] and consists in an Indivisible; so that you no sooner step out of [*is Probable,*] but you must run into its Contradictory, [*is not Probable.*]

8. This Instance will give us occasion to note the Vanity and Folly of Innumerable Distinctions, which pass current amongst Disputants; in which, if examin'd strictly, sometimes the two parts of them are not *Opposit*, but onely oddly *Disparate*; sometimes *Coincident*; sometimes they are applied to such Terms as are *incapable* to admit them, without palpable Nonsense; very often when all is done, they are Impertinent: And, frequently, whereas the Distinction should *divide* the Notion of the *Genus*, and *include* it, one of the Members will perfectly *contradict* the whole Generical Notion, and pretend to pass for *one sort of it*, when it is point blank *Opposit* to it, and to *every part* of it;

*What kinds of Distinctions are Disallowable in Disputation.*

it: For example, I remember an Eminent School Divine, when ( honest Nature putting a scruple into me, when I was young ) I askt him how a Man could say he *had done* such a thing when he *had not done it*; he answerd very Soberly, that he had *done it intentionally*, tho' not *realiter*: Now, to do it ( as he call'd it ) *Intentionaliter*, is *only* to have an *Intention to do it*, which signifies *not to have done it*. So that [*Doing*] is, by virtue of a Distinction, divided into *Doing* and *not Doing*; and *not Doing* is made one sort of *Doing*. And I do assure my Friend his *Probable Assint* is not a jot wiser; but has more faults in it than had the other, 'Tis not enough then, nor at all Satisfactory, to give an Answer *fork'd* with a Distinction; but care must be had that the Distinction be *Pertinent*, and *well qualify'd*, as is hinted above. See other Distinctions of the same leaven with the former, laid open, *Method to Science*. B. 3. Less. 9. §§ 19. 20.

9. I heartily joyn with Mr. Locke in his Discourse about preserving *Mutual Charity*, and *Forbearance*. Tho' the Demonstrations of Learned Men do *much Good*, yet I am sure the want of Charity does *more*

*Charity to Sincere and Weak Misunderstanders is a Christian Duty.*

*Harm*. 'Tis in the highest manner Preternatural that Rational Souls should be *forced*, or dealt with any other way than by *Reason*; unless they come to wrong Common Morality, or the Peace of the Common wealth in which they live; both which are so evidently against the *Law of Nature*, that their Reason must needs *see* and *acknowledge* it, unless most wickedly *blinded* with *Passion* and *Vice*. Alas! what *Silly Reasons* do good Weak

People take for *Certain*, and are convinced by them as perfectly as we are by the *Clear*est Demonstration! And, (which more obliges us to pity them) if we propose to them *strong Reasons*, they are *too weighty* for their *weak* Strength to wield; and their own ridiculous ones do fute better with their Size and Pitch of Wit.

10. I am clearly of Mr. L's Judgment, concerning the *Degrees of Probability* in several matters; as also that in *Tradition built on meer Hearsay, has little or no Force.* *Traditional Truths, each Remove weakens the force of the Proof, if it descends meerly (as he expresses it) by the way of the Hearsay of a Hearsay.* The bare Narrative must either be supported by a *Consonant, Frequent, Open and Obligatory Practise*, and be strengthen'd by the *Acknowledged High Concern* of Perpetuating the Matter of Fact attested, or it may in time dwindle away into a feeble *Title-tattle*. And, I very much esteem his Remark, as both very *Acute*, and very *Solid*, that no *Probability in Historical Relation can arise higher than its First Original*; unless that *First Original* were afterwards abetted and corroborated by other Motives. His Allowance of the Validity of the Testimony for Miracles, is *Wise*, and *Pious*; and his making *Divine Revelation to be the highest Certainty*, is well becoming a *Christian Philosopher*: For, all our Knowledge whatever is taken from *Things*, made and establish'd by *God*, as the *First Cause*; and, therefore, if it be *Certain* that *God's* Revelation or Testimony stands engag'd for any Point, the Truth of that Point is prov'd by a *Nobler, Stronger and Higher Medium* than can be drawn from *Phy-*  
sicks,



sicks, or even Metaphysicks; that is, from the *Sovereign Cause* of all those Objects, whence those respective *Mediums* are taken; and, by whom onely they they have any Truth at all in them; no, not so much as their *Metaphysical Verity* it self.

II. It would not be impertinent on this Occasion, to present Mr. *Locke* with a short Story. A very Judicious *Cantabrigian* desir'd to know of me, whether we ought not to assent to a Point of Christian Faith, supposing it was *evidently Reveal'd*, more firmly than to any Scientifical Conclusion?

*A more Firm Assent is due to Points certainly known to be Reveal'd, than to Scientifical Conclusions.*

I answer'd, that *we ought*. He ask'd, *Why?* Alledging, that, since there could not be any greater Certainty that it was reveal'd than *Demonstration*, the Assent to the Conclusion could not, *in true Reason*, be more Firm than that which a Demonstration produces, or than the Conclusion of any *Science*: For, let the Syllogism be this, [Whatever God said, is True: But, God said there will be a Resurrection of our Bodies; Therefore, there will be such a Resurrection:] None can pretend (said he) any greater Certainty than that of *Science*, for the Certainty of the Authority that gave us the *Minor*; therefore, since *Conclusio sequitur deteriorem partem*, the Assent to the Conclusion can be, in true Reason, no greater than that of *Science*. I reply'd, that that Saying of the Logicians was meant of the *Particularity* or *Negativeness* found in the Premises, and not of the Force of the *Medium*. I alledg'd, that the *Major* had the greater

greater Influence upon the Conclusion, (whence that Proposition so called, had its Appellation,) than the *Minor*; which was onely an *Applier* of the Force of the *Major* to some Particular, or some other Notion, in order to *conclude* concerning it; and therefore, the Certainty of the Conclusion was chiefly to be rated from the Force of the *Major*: Whence, those *Enthymems*, which have the *Major* for their Antecedent, are more Natural than those which have the *Minor*. I insisted, that the Divine Authority being alledg'd for the onely *Medium* or Motive for all Revealed Points whatever, our Assent to the Verity of all such Points, was onely to be refunded into *It*; and, that it lost not its Force by its being *apply'd* by a weaker *Medium* to some Particular, provided that Supream Authority's standing engag'd for that Particular, were *close-ly Apply'd* to our Mind; which is done by absolute Certainty and Evidence. To illustrate which, I brought this Instance. Let there be two Agents, whereof the one is *Calidum ut octo*, the other *Calidum ut duo*, and both of them *apply'd* to the same Patient *equally*; it will not follow from this *Equal Application*, that they will have an *Equal Effect*; but the Heat produced by the *one*, will be more Intense than that which was caused by the *other*. So, supposing two Syllogisms, the *Minors* of which are both known by *Science*; but of the *Majors*, one is known onely by *Science*, the other by an infinitely higher Evidence, *viz.* by the Essential Veracity of the Divine Authority; it will not follow, from the *Equal Application* of it, by the respective *Minors*, to this or that Particular,

Sub-

Subsum'd under them, that the Assent to the two Conclusions, which is the *Effect* they are to produce in our Minds, will be *Equal*; but they will operate according to their *Several Forces*, provided the Force of both be but *Closely* apply'd to our Minds, so to make it work its *Full Effect*; which is done by seeing both the *Minors* to be Absolutely Certain and Evident. I have not Time to dilate on this high Point as it deserves, but leave it to the Sober Reflexion of all Judicious Lovers of Truth, who seriously desire that Christian Principles may approve themselves to be, in all respects, perfectly Rational. And 'tis a Duty we all owe to our selves, and to the World, to shew that Christian Faith does not *pervert* or *impair*, but *perfect* and *exalt* our Reason.

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## REFLEXION 22th.

## ON

The 17th, 18th, 19th, and Last  
CHAPTERS.

1. **T**HIS Learned Author states Reason very right in all its Parts; but, I believe, he mistakes the right End, Intention and Use of *Syllogisms*; and that, while he opposes them, he takes his Measures from the Modern School-way of Syllogistick Arguing, and the little Fruit it has yielded. Such Forms of Reasoning were, certainly, never intended for the Vulgar, as by his Discourse he seems to apprehend; nor for Men of good Mother-Wits, to attain Ordinary Knowledge, by *casting* their Thoughts in those *Exact Molds*. For, Mankind could *use* their Reason, and *improve* in it too; nay, could draw their Consequences (generally) very well, before Syllogistick Reasoning came in fashion; tho' they could not *so well make it out* to themselves or others, *why* the Consequence *must* follow, nor refund it into its *Causes*, and so set it above Contest, by *reducing it to Evidence*. Their own Natural Genius taught them to discourse right, very often *unreflectingly*; as it does also the Vulgar in Things within their Ken. In process of Time, *Aspeters* upon Nature, finding (as it were) by Experience, that some Discourses *were*

evi-

*How Syllogisms came  
to be invented at  
first.*



evidently Consequent, some *not*, they began to cast about and find out by what Virtue *some* Discourses came to be so evidently Conclusive *above others*. And, to this end (*Art*, if truly such, being nothing but a *deep Inspection into Nature*) they set themselves to anatomize and dissect a *Rational Discourse*, that so they might discover the hidden Nerves and Ligaments that gave Force and Connexion to the whole. They found that such a Discourse did consist of three *main* Parts, call'd *Propositions*; and each of these again, of three lesser parts, called by them *Subject*, *Copula*, and *Predicate*; all which had Distinct Natures and Offices in the Discourse. They discover'd that the Connexion of the two Terms in the Conclusion, in which consists the *Truth* of it, depended on their Connexion with a Third or Middle Term in the Premises; and that, if they be not *connected* with it or *Immediate*, but *Remote* from it, as all *Common Mediums* are, which beget *Probabilities*; nothing is *concluded*, and so the Conclusion may, (for any thing we know) be *False*. They observ'd hence, that there could be but *Three* Terms in such a Discourse; and that, were they more, it caused a Blunder and Inconsequence. Hence they took Care those three Terms should be so *placed*, as would render the Connexion of the other Two with the *Medium* most Clear at First Sight. This done, they treated of each of those *Greater* and *Lesser* Parts, that is, of *Propositions* and *Notions* singly and apart; adding such Rules as they saw convenient for each. From these Observations, laid orderly together, sprung the *Art of Logick*, and all the Rudiments belonging to it. All which have their Force from Nature, nor ought

ought any thing be esteemed *Art*, but what has honest downright *Nature* for its *Ground*: And, I hope, that in every Tittle of my whole *Method*, I have not one Argument in those many Trains of Consequences I have drawn there throughout it, that is not taken from the Nature of the *Thing* in hand. Now, things standing thus, who can think *Logick*, or *Syllogism* (the main End of it,) are to be slighted as of *little* or *no use*? Can any Man think that *Art* and *Reflexion* do add no Advantage to *Untaught Nature*? Or that our Rude, Natural, and Common *Reason* may not be Cultivated and Improv'd, as well as our Natural Voice, Walking and Handling, may be *better'd*, by being *taught* to Sing, Dance, or Play on the Lute *Artificially*.

2. I am very apt to think, that at first the Inventers of *Logick* and *Syllogisms* did never intend to use them *perpetually* themselves, nor to instruct others in any Science by using *constantly* that Method. Since neither *Aristotle*, nor any other Author I ever read, Ancient or Modern, ever went about to deliver a Scheme of Doctrine in a *Syllogistick* way: But that, after they had by Study and Reflexion, found out in what their Evidence lay, they made use of them as *Exemplars* or *Tests*, by which they might try whether their Loose and Dishevell'd Discourses had an Evident and Necessary Connexion of Terms at the bottom; or else, in some Signal Occasions, to confute and convince an Acute or Obstinate Adversary; especially, if the Auditory and Judges of the Dispute were Men of Learning. For which Reason that way is still continued in Learned Assemblies:

semblies : Such as the Schools *often are*, and *always should be*. But, when at length that way grew too common, and that Sophisters and Bunglers would needs constantly use *It*, and *it only*, in their *extempore* Disputes ; which could be managed right, and as they ought, by none but those who were exact Masters of Logick ; it came at length to degenerate into insipid Artless Wrangle and Talking at random. For, the Multitude of ill-understood and barbarous School-terms encreased, frivolous Distinctions (as I lately instanced) grew rife ; Principles were either neglected, or else supplied by their Masters *αὐτὸς ἔφα* ; the Natures of Things, and the Ways dictated by Nature, were left off ; and hence it came, that no Progress was made in *Science* ; nor any Point decisively concluded.

3. In divers parts of this Discourse I doubt not but Mr. *Locke* agrees with me :

What I disagree with him in is :

*Objections against  
Syllogistic Argu-  
ing clear'd.*

1. I deny that in Learned and Philosophical Discourses, ( for which Syllogisms were intended ) *the Mind can perceive the Connexion of the Proofs where it really is, as easily, nay perhaps better, without them.* Certainly, the seeing the middle Term placed in the middle, as it ought, will make a Reflecting Man see better the Connexion of the Terms ; whence, besides its own aptness to connect, it comes, even by vertue of its place, to be seen to be Immediate to each of the Extremes ; and, so, more apt to connect them. Again, In a Syllogism there is no Necessary Word left out, nor one Unnecessary Word put in ; whereas in *Loose* Discourses this last is always wanting : And, can we think it adds

no degree of Clearness to the Discourse to keep it from being pester'd with many *Unnecessary* Words, in many of which there will not want Ambiguity? Nor is this all, for in *Loose* Discourses, the fine Language and Plausible Tricks of Rhetorick do too often dazle the Eye of the Mind; and make that seem excellent Reason, which, brought the Test of a Syllogism, will be seen to be plain Foolery and Ridiculous Nonsense. *Lastly*, Good Logicians, who are skill'd in the Solid Reasons *why* the Conclusion follows, do, while they discourse Syllogistically, guide their Thoughts all along by *steady* and (generally) *Self-evident Rules*; and see *a priori*, and this, by the Highest Causes, *why*, and by *what means* the Conclusion *must* follow; which conduces in a high measure to *Demonstration* and *Science*: Whereas, those that have only the Assistance of their Uncultivated Natural Reason, do both want this *knowing* Satisfaction to *themselves*, and are utterly Unable to give it to *others*. I grant then, that the Untaught Vulgar in Common Conversation and obvious Affairs can need no Syllogisms; and that the Gentlewoman he speaks of, may have Wit enough to avoid catching Cold, tho' neither her self, nor any for her, do put the Reason of it into a Syllogism; and so does a Milk-maid, without the help of Mathematicks, know certainly that the Diameter of her Pail is Shorter than the Circumference of it; nay, both of them would be blunder'd, and know those Truths *worse*, were the true Reasons for them put into the uncouth Garb of a Syllogism; for Art is not their Talent: But to think that Learned Men and Disputants gain *little* or *no* Advantage by them above the  
Vulgar,



Vulgar, is to maintain, that Art, tho' never so Solidly Grounded, is good for nothing.

4. Secondly, To say that *Syllogism helps little in Demonstration*, is, I am sure, against Reason and Experience both. He might as well have said in one Word, *they are good for nothing at all*. For it cannot be thought they are good to know *Principles*, they being *Self-evident*; and, it is manifest they cannot help us in *Probabilities*; for a Syllogism that does not *conclude* is not worth a Straw; and no Medium that is meerly *Probable* (it being a *Remote* one) can be connected with the Extremes, nor consequently can it *conclude*. 'Tis left then, that if they help little in *Demonstration*, they do not help us much in any thing. We need then very strong Arguments to make us yield to such a Paradox. Mr. Locke confesses *Syllogism is sometimes good to discover Fallacies*: I take leave to say they are *always* good for that End: And does this help *us little in Demonstration*? All Argumentations are either *Conclusive* or *Inconclusive*; Conclusive ones have a middle Term immediately connected with the Extremes; *Inconclusive* ones either are aim'd to deceive us, by bringing a *Bad Medium*, or by using a *Bad Form*; and those are the *worst* sort of *Fallacies*, or of such Syllogisms as lead us into *Errour*; most of those Fallacies noted in common Logick-books, being but Trifles. If then the Syllogistick way *discovers Fallacies*, it cannot be deny'd but it exceedingly helps *Conclusive* Argumentation, or *Demonstration*. He grants too, that it *sets the absent Proposition* (and, so, the whole Argument) *before the View in a Clear Light*. I infer; therefore without it, we should

*Syllogisms are useful for Demonstration.*

not have had so *Clear* a Knowledge of the Proof, nor consequently of the Conclusion; and is this nothing? But he thinks this good is over ballanced by this, *that it engages the Mind in the perplexity of Obscure, Equivocal and Fallacious Terms.* Let us blame then those Logicians, who multiply Terms and needless Crotchets, (which I have endeavour'd in my *Method*, to lop off as *Superfluous*) and those Authors who do not *define* those Terms they use; and not *Syllogism* nor *Artificial Logick*, which tells them they ought to do it. I know no more, properly and peculiarly belonging to *Syllogism*, but a Middle Term rightly placed; as is usually done in the *First Figure*, and according to the *First Four Moods*. Nor do I see any thing in these that in my **Method** is not reduced to Clear Evidence. 'Tis confest too that it is adapted *to the attaining Victory in Disputes.* Now, if this be so, then the Champion of Truth, by means of *Syllogism*, will make Truth *Victorious*; and then, how it can be deny'd (as Mr. Locke does) that it *confirms Truth in fair Enquiries*, is to me Unintelligible; unless by *Fair Enquiries* he means *Loose Discourses*, which are not *Syllogistical*, nor reducible to that Form; which I think is an Improper and Lukewarm expression; For, a Philosopher ought to esteem no Discourse *Fair*, which is not *Clear and Conclusive*.

5. Indeed Mr. Locke says very well, that *Syllogism is of no use at all in Probabilities.* And there is very good Reason *why.* For *Syllogism* shows an Infallibly-Certain way of Concluding; whence nothing can bear that Test but what *does Conclude*; Whereas *Probabilities*

*Syllogisms are of no use in Probable Discourses.*

*ties* being grounded on *Common Mediums*, do not conclude *at all*; and therefore it would do Probability a Great Disservice to bring it to the Touchstone of all True or Conclusive Reasoning, a Syllogistick Form. This would quickly lay open the Incoherence of the Terms, and consequently, show those Men to be *less Rational* who do Assent, or say interiourly, *The Terms do cohere, or the Thing is True*, upon a Probable Argument, in which they do *not Cohere*. 'Tis then by *Sagacious Prudence*, and not by *Syllogisms*, that the Degrees of Probability are to be weighed and try'd. He grants also that Syllogism serves to fence: And so it does, tho' not in Mr. Locke's sense of that word. For, as an expert Fencer easily Wounds, and overthrows an Enemy, who is not Skilful in that Art: So a Man who is Skilful in Syllogism, which is the Art of Concluding evidently, will quickly confound and overthrow an Adversary of Truth. But why he should think it does not serve to increase Knowledge, is a strange Riddle; the whole Design of Artificial, or Syllogistick, Reasoning being to Deduce Conclusions *not yet known*, from Premisses which are either perfectly Foreknown, or at least better known.

6. Mr. Locke has then good reason to say, that Other Helps should be sought: But, if Syllogism be discarded, where any other Help can be found to make the force and Clearness of the Consequence better appear, or upon more evident and more Certain Grounds, not the Wit of Mankind can Imagin: And I defy any Man to bring me any Reason, that is a good one, or

Other Mistake about Syllogism Clear'd.



Conclusive, but I will show him that it is equivalently a Syllogism ; and I will undertake to reduce it to that Form ; and manifest that it has all its Strength and Evidence from the same Principles which give a Syllogism to be *clearly Conclusive*. I know not what Authors Mr. Locke may have met with, who say we cannot Reason about particulars, or, that *No Syllogistick Reasoning can be right and conclusive, but what has at least one General Proposition in it* : I am sure I have shown the contrary in my Method. B. 3. L. 2. § 21. Indeed I show § 22. and § 24. that such Syllogisms are not Instrumental to Science, as are those which have one or more, *Universal* Premisses : For, all Science is of Inadequate or *Abstracted* Notions, which are *Universal* ones, and not *Particulars* ; for who can pretend to have Science of the *whole* Complexion of Accidents, which constitute any Particulars ? And, to let my Reader farther see, that the Knowledge of *Particular* Conclusions cannot reach Science, I desire him to reflect, that if a Physician knew onely that *this* Particular *Individual* Herb is good for such a Disease, and not that *all* of that *Sort* or *Kind* is so, he could not pretend to have Science of the Nature of Herbs ; or, if a Mathematician knew onely that this *Individual* Triangle, which he is describing in Paper, has three Angles equal to two Right ones, but knew not that *any other*, or *all*, had so, none would much praise him for his Science in Mathematicks. The so much neglected and abus'd *Aristotle*, who had too much, and too well-grounded Sense to be rightly understood by those who did not much regard Grounds, nor the *Highest Causes* of Things, told



us that *Singularia non perficiunt Intellectum*; the Knowledge of Singulars does not perfect the Understanding. Since then Science is a Perfection of our Soul, it must be employ'd about the understanding *Universals*: Plain Reason abetting his saying, as I have shown Ibid. § 22.

7. I cannot let this Chapter pass, without reflecting particularly on Mr. L's saying, that *Inferences or Consequences in Words*, are a great part of Reason, tho' the Agreement, or Disagreement of *Ideas* be the Principal. Now, it is evident by those expressions that he speaks of *Words Abstractedly* or *Contradistinctly*, from the *Ideas* signify'd by them; that is, from their *Sense*; taking *Words* in which sense they are no more but meer *Sounds*. Whence I see not but Black-smiths striking orderly and regularly upon their Anvil, may make as good *Consequences*, as those he speaks of, and puts them to be a great part of our Reason. I have observ'd that this Acute Author fancies Unintelligible Mysteries in the *Annexing Words* to his *Ideas*; Nay, (as appears here) in *Words* taken without *Ideas*, or the *Sense* of them; that is in *Senseless Sounds* or *Characters*. Whereas my weak Speculation, tho' I bend my sight never so strongly, cannot discern any Annexion other than this, that Men have agreed that such Words, shall signify such and such Things or Notions; all other Annexion being Unaccountable. Nor, can I see how in such sayings as this, Mr. Locke does (as Philosophers ought) guide himself by the Natures of the Things in hand, viz. *Words*, and

*Inferences and Consequences of Words, abstracting from their Sense, is strangely against all Reason, and Preposterous.*

*Reason.* For *Words*, abstracted from his *Ideas*, which he puts to be signify'd by them, are meer *Articulate Sounds*, and out of the *Mind*; whereas *Reason* and all its Acts are compleated in the *Mind*, and *Sense*. How then the *Consequence of Words* (thus understood) should be a great part of *Reason* which is *Sense*; or what *Reason*, which is an *Internal* and *Spiritual* Power, has to do with those *External* and *Material* Sounds or Motions of the *Ayr*, more than to know their Signification, and to take care they be not Ambiguous, quite surpasses my Understanding. The *Complexion of Ideas*, he speaks of, which the Words are to signify, is confessedly made first by the Understanding; and, the Memory can retain our *Notions* as well, or better than it can *Sounds*; and tho' such Sounds, thro' the use of the Words are apt to re-excite the Memory, yet all this amounts to no more but their Aptness, thro' use, to signify our Notions, let them be what they will: Which is plain *Sense* and easily Understood; Whereas the *Consequence of Sounds*, Abstracted from our Notions, is very Amusing, and utterly Unintelligible.

8. The 18th Chapter [Of Faith and Reason, and their distinct Provinces] is admirably Clear, and in great part very solid. I grant no new Simple Ideas, that are proper ones, can be Convey'd by Traditional Revelation.

The Author of Nature gave us our Natural Notions, and the Author of Grace, (who is the same Person,) brought no unheard-of Objects of our Senses to increase the Stock, already sufficient for all our Knowledge; yet, if the Points thus

thus convey'd are *Spiritual* ones, as most points of the *Revealed Faith* are, there will be convey'd new *Metaphorical* Notions, translated from our *Natural* ones which are Proper. I grant too, that *Revelation cannot be admitted against clear Evidence of Reason*. I wish, that instead of the word [ *Revelation* ] he had rather said [ *Pre-tence of Revelation* ] for, otherwise, some Readers may hap to take his words in a Dis-edifying sense; as if it were a possible Case, that *Revelation it self* may be supposed to be opposit to *Clear Evidence* of Reason; and ( which is worse, ) in case they hap to *contract*, must *truckle* and *submit* to it. My Judgment in the Point is this, that supposing the Revelation is grounded on the Means laid by *God* to assure us he has Reveal'd such and such Points, ( which therefore cannot but be *Certain to us*, or *Evident*, at least to those who are Guides to others ) the Case imply'd here is impossible; because it is impossible that *God*, who gave us our Nature, *should* ( as Mr. L. well expresses it ) *will us to admit any thing for true, in a direct Contradiction to the Clear Evidence of our Understanding*. I add, not to admit it as *True*, if the Motives be *but Probable*, or ( which is the same ) if the Thing *may be False*. What I am here to note, is that, Two Cautions are necessary in this occasion.

The one, that since *God* does nothing *needlessly*, therefore the Points Reveal'd by *God* are such

*The First Caution  
to be observ'd, in  
order to this Point.*

as *Humane Reason* could not other ways attain to; whence they being such as those Mr. *Locke* holds to be *above Reason*, hence they must oft look very oddly to those *Low Conceptions* which the

Course of *Nature* affords us: Whereas the *Motives* laid by God for Mankind, to embrace Christian Faith, do, for that very regard, *lie level* to our Natural Reason. Wherefore, in our Enquiry what we are to embrace, what not; we *ought not* to begin our quest, by scanning the *Points* propos'd to us as Reveal'd; but, by examining whether the *Motives* to judge they are Reveal'd, be *Certain* or *no*. Otherwise, we shall Neglect to employ our Reason, in such Things as *are suitable* to her Capacity, and in which she *can have Evidence*; and task it to Consider what's perhaps *above her reach*, and of which, consequently, she *can have no Evidence*; which way of Proceeding is *clearly Irrational*. How many are there in the world who are reputed for Learned men, and yet have no Principles which are not taken from *Fancy*? Let then such short Speculators loose, to judge of the Verity of Points (perhaps) Incomprehensible to our Natural Reason, they will be apt to fancy twenty Contradictions in the *Trinity*, the *Incarnation*, a *Virgins Conceiving*, the *Resurrection*, and in many other main Points of Christian Faith: And, were it allowable for any to begin his Search after Truth on this preposterous manner, the Persons must be highly Qualify'd to decide what is a Contradiction, what not, ere their Sentiments can be thought to have any kind of weight. They must be excellent Logicians to know the *force of a Consequence*, and how many things go to make a *Contradiction*. They must be acute Metaphysicians to know all the many several *Respects* belonging to Things; without which it will be hard to determin certainly what

Notions



Notions are in all respects Contradictory, which not : And, if they be not thus Qualify'd, their Skill is Incompetent for such a Performance. Again, if the Point do concern the Nature of Body, they must be able to Comprehend the Nature of that Subject. And, in a word, unless they can demonstrate their own Opposit Tenet, plain Terms give it that they can never show the other side to be a Contradiction : For, since both sides of a Contradiction cannot be True, they must demonstrate their Tenet to be True, or they cannot demonstrate the other to be False and Contradictory ; for 'tis one labour to do both.

9. The other necessary Caution is, that men do not take the *Bad Explications* of some weak Divines for the Point of Faith it self. For, such men, as Mr. L. well notes, being

*The second Caution  
to be used in this  
Point.*

very forward to stop the mouths of all Opponents by crying out such a Position *is of Faith* ; and, withall, having a high Opinion of their own Sentiments, and *Miscall'd Authority* ; are apt to fancy that all is *of Faith* which belongs to their own Explication of it, or seems to them Consequent from it, or Connected with it ; which is no better, in Effect, than to obtrude their *own Skill in drawing Consequences* upon Men for *Divine Revelation*. Now, if the Explicater be not truly Learned and Candid, then in stead of showing the Point of Faith, *Conformable* to Nature, as a Solid Divine *ought* ; he may hap to represent every Point of Faith so *untowardly*, that it may have Twenty Contradictions in it. 'Tis therefore the Duty of every Ingenuous Man, to distinguish such *Explications* from the Point it self ; and not to

pro-

pronounce too hastily of it, till it appears it cannot possibly bear any *other* Rational Explication, and such a one as is *Agreeable* and not *Contradictory* to the true Principles of *Reason* and *Nature*. Which I the rather Note, because I have observed that scarce any one point of Faith that is *Controverted* has escap'd this Misfortune; nay more, that *Metaphorical* Expressions have *often* ( I may say, *generally* ) been mistaken for *Literal* ones: In a word, let but the Grounds for GOD's Revealing Christian Faith be held and shown *Absolutely Certain* ( and the Motives lay'd by GOD to that end, cannot but be such ) and the Divine Authority, thus *Evidently Engaged*, and *closely Apply'd* to our Mind, ought to subdue our Understanding to *assent*, notwithstanding our *seeming*-Rational Dissatisfactions. I say, *Seeming*; For, to put the *Grounds* and *Motives* we have to know God revealed it to be *thus Certain*, and yet that there is *Clear Evidence* against the *Point reveal'd*, is to put a perfect Contradiction, or Impossibility. Which makes me something apprehensive that those Authors, who put such a Case ( however their meaning may be good and pious, and they see not the Consequence of it ) do deem that the Grounds we Christians have for GOD's Revealing our Faith, are not altogether *Certain*, but *Probable onely*; which leaves all our Faith in a *Possibility of being False* for any thing any man living knows; that is, of being *perhaps not True*.

10. Hence I think 'tis but a very slight deference to Divine Revelation to affirm, that in *Matters where Reason cannot judge, or but probably,*  
*Reason is not to be rely'd on in things beyond its Sphere.* Reve-

*Revelation is to be hearken'd to: But that in Matters where Reason can afford certain Knowledge, Reason is to be hearken'd to. For, tho' it were so that Reason can do this, yet Experience tells us that Reason does not actually, ( and this very often ) what it can do, or all that lies within the Compass of that power; but that we may often presume we have certain Knowledge when we have none. Especially since of the two it is far more likely our Reason may discourse wrong of the Points that are Reveal'd, than of the Motives which God has lay'd for Mankind to know they are so; the later being within its Sphere, the other oft-times not.*

II. The 19th Chapter treats of *Wrong Assent, or Error.* This Learned Author

seems here not to speak constantly of the same Point. To *Assent* to any Proposition, is to say interiorly, [*It is True;*] or, that the Thing is so as the Proposition exhibits it. Now, these Propo-

*The Notion of [is True,] must be distinguish'd from the Notion of [may be true, or may not be true.]*

sitions may be of two Sorts: The one is express'd thus, [*The Thing is so, or is True:*] The other thus, [*The Thing is Probable.*] Hitherto, and in some places here, he speaks of the Former, or of Assenting to the *Truth* of the Thing; or, of *taking* the *Probable* Proposition to be *True*: In other places here, he seems to speak of the Latter; as, when, §. 6. he complains that *Probable Doctrines are not always receiv'd with an Assent proportionable to the Reasons which are to be had for their Probability*: Which clearly makes the Object of Assent to be the *Probability* of the Thing, or as it stands under such Motives as make it to a higher Degree



Degree *Probable* ; or, ( which is perfectly Equivalent, ) that *Propositions to such a Degree Probable, are to be assented to, as to such a Degree Probable.* Now, this is an *Evident* Proposition ; and the *Assent* to it, most *Rational*. For, since we call that *Probable* that stands under *Probable Motives*, it is as perfect a Truth, and as firmly to be assented to, as 'tis to assent, that *what's Probable, is Probable* ; or, *what's Probable to such a Degree, is Probable to such a Degree* : Both which Propositions being evident, nay, the Terms of it as closely connected as they are in this Proposition, [ *What is, is,* ] we not onely *may*, but are *forced* to assent to them, as being both of them *Self-evident*. But, I much fear this is not Mr. *Locke's* meaning ; but, that he means, we must assent to a Thing *as True*, or that the Thing *is*, upon a Proof which, of its own peculiar Nature, and as it is distinguish'd from *Evidence*, is so far from *Concluding it is*, that it permits and allows it *may not be, or be False*. In which case, to assent, is both against *Clearest Reason*, and even ( as was shewn above ) against a *First Principle* of our Understanding.

12. What confirms me in this Apprehension, is, his making way to his ensuing Discourse with these Words ;  
*Therefore, that no Assent ought to be built on Probable Mediums, is Demonstrable.* [ *If Assent be grounded on Likelihood, and if the Proper Object and Motive of our Assent be Probability, &c.* ] Now, both those Hypothetical *ifs* I must Categorically declare against ; and positively affirm and maintain, that *Likely Motives* can onely, in true Reason, make us assent the Thing is *Likely* ; and that *Motives but Probable* cannot, without highly wronging our Reason,  
 cause



cause us to assent the Thing is *more than Probable*: Lastly, That [*may be, or may not be,*] cannot be a good Argument that the Thing *is*. I affirm farther, that this Position of mine is clearly Demonstrable: For, all Motives or *Proofs* affecting the Conclusion, and our *Assent* to it, according to their *Different* Nature and Force; therefore, as *Evident* Motives make the Thing *Evident*, so *Likely* Motives can onely prove the Thing to be *Likely*; and *Probable* Motives can onely prove the Thing to be *Probable*; and that, the Proof being the Cause of the Conclusion, and those Proofs being Proper, and adjusted to those respective *Effects*, 'tis as perfect a Demonstration, drawn from the Proper Cause to its Proper Effect, that they can make the Conclusion no more than *Probable*; and, consequently, our Assent to it (if Rational) no more than that it is *onely Probable*; as it is that an *Agent* which is Hot but to such a Degree, can onely cause Heat to such a Degree; and this is as Evident, as that *no Cause can act beyond its Power to act, or can do what it cannot do*; which is an Identical Proposition, and *Self-evident*.

13. 'Tis in vain then to start this Question, *How Men come to give their Assent contrary to Probability, till this Question be first satisfy'd, Why Men should assent at all upon meer Probability?* But, this being supposed without any Proof; and, it being allow'd by me, that Men may assent contrary to Probability all the Ways he alligns, I am not to pursue that Point any farther, because it is quite besides my Aim; which is, to concern my self onely with what *promotes true Science*; with which, Probability, as being both

*All Error comes by Assenting upon Probability.*

both *Uncertain*, and *Inevident*, has nothing at all to do, but to *Injure* it, ( if it meets with *Rash Concluders*, ) by *Ill-grounded Assents*. But, casting my Eye on the Title of this Chapter, which is, [ *Of Wrong Assent, or Errour*, ] I observe, that he has not so much as touch'd upon one main Cause of Errour, which has an unhappy Influence even upon some Wise and Good Men, and oft proves Prejudicial to their best Concerns ; I mean, the Assenting *absolutely* upon very high *Probabilities* ; or, ( as Mr. Locke expresses it, ) *as firmly, as if they were infallibly demonstrated*. We are, indeed, *more often* deceiv'd by Assenting on *slight Probabilities* ; but, we are far *more grossly* deceiv'd, when a *very High*, and *very Likely* Probability fails us : Whence, in such occasions, Men use to say, [ *Who could ever have thought or imagin'd it ?* ] or, [ *I was never so abominably deceiv'd in my Life.* ] I will explain my self by one Signal Instance, shewing how dangerous it is to yield up our Reason, by Assenting *Absolutely* upon *very Great Likelihoods*, and even the *Highest Probabilities*. Which Discourse may, I hope, *edifie* some, and thence *convince* others, that such an Assent is Irrational.

14. A Man who is at this Instant in perfect Health, is apt to assent absolutely,

*The Tenet, that we ought to Assent upon Probability, is highly prejudicial to Piety, and to best Christian Morality.*

that he shall not die suddenly of an Apoplexy before Morning ; that a Tile shall not fall from a House, and kill him when he walks the Streets ; that his House shall not fall on his Head, and crush him ; that a Drunken or Quarrelsome Russian shall not, without Provocation, run him thorow ; that a Bit of Meat, a Crum,

Crum, or a Bone, shall not choak him ; or any such *sudden* Disaster befall him *that* Day ; and 'tis *very highly Probable* they will not. Now, the greatest Concern we can have in this World, is, to die well prepared for the other. Put case then, a Man of a *Loose Life*, (such Men being most apt to *presume*, and lull themselves in a blind Security,) *assents firmly* and *absolutely*, upon such a high Probability that he shall not be taken off suddenly, but shall have Time to die Penitent, haps to be surpriz'd by some such unlucky Accident, without having any Leisure to repent ; the case of his Soul is very desperate. Now, 'tis evident, that that this Eternal Loss of Happiness lights to such Men thro' their acting contrary to their Reason ; and their Assenting ; and Relying *firmly* upon the Frail Assurance of a Probability : For, had they used their Reason right, it would have naturally suggested to them these Thoughts : I can see no Bottom nor Foundation for Assenting so *fully* that I shall not die *very shortly*, or *suddenly*. How many Men, who thought themselves as secure as I do now, have, notwithstanding, been taken away in an Instant ! Every Man living is liable to these, and a Thousand other Unforeknowable Mischances : Nor have I any kind of Privilege above others ; nor know I any reason *why* those Sinister Chances that happen'd to *other* Men, may not as well be *my Lot*. This plain and obvious Discourse, join'd with the Infinite Concern of the Thing, might have conduced to make those carelessly secure Men rectifie their Wanderings, and endeavour to keep a good Conscience, lest they should be suddenly Arrested by Death, with their Debts uncancell'd : Which good Thoughts and Motives they



they had wanted, had they assented upon a high Probability that they should not die suddenly, as *firmly as tho' the Thing were infallibly demonstrated.* This Infallible and Irrational Security, I say, would, in all likelihood, have made such weak Souls *run on in Sin, defer the Amendments of their Lives, and put it off with a dangerous presuming on Death-bed Repentance.* Hence I infer two Things; one, that our Position, that we ought not to *assent* upon a high Probability, but to retain *some Degree of Suspence,* is a Great and very Important *Truth,* since it has so great an Influence (not to speak of our many other Concerns) upon the *best* and most Important Part of Christian Morality. *Error* does not use to be so favourable to *Goodness and Piety,* no more than Ignorance is the Mother of Devotion; whereas *Truth* reduced to *Practice,* is ever the Genuin Parent of *Virtue.* The other, that to *Judge* or Assent *without Knowledge,* springs from our Weakness, or else from Passion; and that *Judgment* taken in this Sense, is not (as Mr. Locke affirms) the *Gift of God.*

15. He proceeds to the Reasons why *Men take wrong measures of Probability,* and so come to *assent wrong* or *Err.* But, it appears evidently from what's said, or rather indeed, it is evident out of the very Terms, that all *Error* or *Wrong Assent,* does *onely* Spring from Assenting at all upon *Probable Motives.* For, did they Assent *onely* upon *Evidence,* it is Impossible they should ever *erre*; since Evidence for an Error is in it self impossible. Or, did they *sus-*  
*pend*

*To apply our selves  
to the Right Me-  
thod to find out  
Truth and Sci-  
ence is the onely  
Antidote against  
Error.*



pend their Assent, or not Assent when the Thing is but Probable, 'tis again impossible they should Err; for, it is impossible they should Err, or Assent wrong, when they do not Assent at all. Whence follows, that (excepting Invincible Ignorance, which concerns not our Point in hand) all Wrong Assent, or Errour, springs from our Assenting upon Probability. The Reasons he assigns, why Men take wrong Measures of Probabilities, serve better to shew why Men do not assent upon Evidence; viz. *Doubtful and False Principles, Receiv'd Hypotheses, Predominant Passions, and Authority*; by which last, I suppose, he means, such Authority as may deceive us. All these are so many *Remora's* to the Advancement of Science, and Motes in our Intellectual Eye, hindring it from seeing Evident Truth. Yet, none of them, but has some kind of Probability, (as the World goes;) or, at least, will furnish Men with probable Arguments: For, a very slight Thing serves to make a Thing Probable. So that the Upshot is, that the Chief, and most Effectual Way for Men to avoid Wrong Assents, or Errours, is to instruct them in the Way how to conclude evidently; which is the sole End and Aim of my *Method to Science*; and, particularly, of that part of it which treats of the Self-evident Conclusiveness of *Syllogisms*, in which no Man can possibly be deceiv'd. For, this shews, that the Inference or Consequence of the Conclusion, when the *Medium* is Proper, is as Certain as Self-Evidence can make it; and, that *Common Mediums*, (such as all Probable ones are,) can never Conclude; and, therefore, such Conclusions cannot be assented to, or held True, without wronging our Reason. Whence follows, that the Way to avoid

*Wrong Assent*, is, to exclude Probability from having any Title *at all* to our Assent ; it being highly and manifestly *Irrational* for any to judge, a Proposition *not at all* Demonstrated or shewn to be True, should be assented to as firmly as if it were infallibly demonstrated : For, this is directly to judge a Thing to be such as it is not ; which is a manifest Error, or Untruth. Nor, matters it what most People do out of Weakness : Man's true Nature, which is *Rational*, is to be rated according to the Conformity we ought to conceive it had from the Idea of it in the Divine Understanding, its true Essence ; where none can doubt but it was Perfect, till it came to be slubber'd and sully'd by the tampering of Second Causes, and their Never-uniform Circumstances. The Natural Perfection, then, of a Rational Creature being to arrive certainly, or without missing, at Knowledge and Truth, which cannot be had without Evidence ; hence, 'tis his true Nature to be guided in his Way to acquire those Interior Perfections of his Mind, onely by Evidence ; without which, he is liable to fall, every Step he takes, into the Precipice of Error. Nay, 'tis so clear a Truth, that Man's true Nature is onely to be guided in his Interior Assents by Evidence ; that, even in our Outward Actions, which do not directly concern the perfecting our Soul, and in which we can have no Evidence of their Success, or of the Good they will certainly do us ; yet, still we must (unless we will incur the Note of Folly) have Evidence that it is better to act, or better to venture ; otherwise, we shall clearly act with some Precipitancy, and against our true Nature, Reason.

16. Besides, it is extream hard to take Right Measures of Probability. Every Measure is a *Certain Standard*; whereas, Probabilities are not capable of any; but, like desultory *Ignes-fatui*, whistle now to this side, now to that; doubling, and re-doubling; so that none can take their just Dimension, or Proportion. They vary *every Day*, oft-times every *Hour*; and, what's *more Probable*, this Minute, may, by some new Circumstance lately come to our Knowledge, become less Probable; the next, perhaps, *Improbable*. Even the *Highest Probabilities* are not exempt from this Frailty, and Fickleness. I may think my House will *certainly stand*; nor do I see any Reason to make the least Doubt of it: A prudent Neighbour, whom I take to be more Judicious than my self in such Things, spies a Flaw, or Crack, near the Foundation, which he thinks weakens it; which makes it now *Improbable* it will stand, and *Probable* it will fall. Hereupon, I send for an expert Master-Builder, who has ten times the Skill of the other; and he assures me, that late Formidable Crack is nothing at all to the Firmness of the Foundation, and therefore it will certainly stand: Which said, the Motive shifts Faces again, and it becomes *very Probable* it will *not* fall. Amongst School-men, some hold, that the Opinion of *Three Doctors* makes a Point *Probable*; some think, the Opinion of *Two* is sufficient; some say, *One*, who has maturely weigh'd the Point, will serve; and, in the mean time, perhaps it is *scarce Probable*, at most *but Probable*, that any of these say *True*. But then, these Later

*No possible Way, or Certain Standard, to take the Just Measures of Probabilities.*



say, that it is certain that what *Seven* Learned Men agree in, is *Probable*: Let then these *Seven* Learned Men agree that what some *One* very Learned Man, whom they nominate, says, makes the Thing Probable; that *One* Man has the Virtue of all the *Seven* center'd in him; and, therefore, that one single Learned Man's Opinion makes it Probable enough in all Conscience. Where then shall we fix the Bounds, or whence take any Certain Measures of Greater and Lesser Probabilities? Whoever peruses, and considers well the several Sorts of Probable Motives, enumerated in my *Method*, B. 3. L. 2. §. 10. and by Mr. *Locke* here, in his 15th and 16th Chapters, will see, (tho' we have not reckon'd up half of them,) by reflecting on their Variety, and their Crossness to one another, (abating the several Degrees of each,) how insuperable a Task it is to settle any fix'd Limits by which we can be constantly assur'd, which sort of Probability is Greater, or Lesser. 'Tis a Thousand times easier to establish absolutely certain Rules of *Demonstration*, were Men but as zealous to pursue Truth, as they love to talk at random; either because they think that Noblest Quest not worth their Pains; or, perhaps, because Palliated Scepticks inveigle them into a Conceit, that Science is unattainable. To obviate which Calumny, has, these Fifty Years, been the Butt of my Endeavours.

17. As for *Authority*, this one Maxim, pursu'd home, secures us from being deceiv'd by relying on it; viz. [No Authority deserves Assent, farther than Reason gives it to deserve.]  
*The Certain Rule, not to be misled by Authority.*  
 So that all the Certainty of *Authority* is to be refunded into *Intrinsic Arguments*, taken from the Nature



Nature of *Mankind*, the Attesters; and the Nature (I mean, the Notoreity and Concern) of the Things attested; and, thence ascertaining the Attesters Knowledge, and Veracity: Which, if they can be demonstrated, or put beyond Probability, (for, till then, none who are able to raise Doubts, and see the *Medium* is *Inconclusive*, can be bound in Reason to assent upon any Testimony,) even the *Wiseſt* Men may rationally Assent to what they attest; otherwise, *not*; tho' weaker Arguments (as I hinted above) may suffice for the Vulgar, and for our Outward Actions.

18. To close my Reflexions on this Chapter, I am apt to think that this Learned Author is here drawn aside from using his Excellent Reason to his best Advantage, by apprehending some Things to be *onely Probable*, which (or the Certainty of the Authority for them) are *perfectly Demonstrable*; as, in particular, that of the Existence of *Julius Caesar*. The same I judge of these, *viz.* That *Alexander* the Great conquer'd *Asia*; that there are such Cities as *Rome*, or *Paris*; that the same Chances cannot light often upon a Hundred Dice; that I shall not think over again, in order, the same Thoughts next Year, as I did this; and a Thousand such like. Which, perhaps, many will take to be but *highly Probable*; whereas I, upon good Reason, cannot but judge they are all of them *Demonstrable*. But I am weary, and hasten to an End.

*Mr. Locke seems to take some Things for onely Probable, which (or the Authority for them) are Demonstrable.*

19. The last Chapter bears for its Title, [*Of the Division of Sciences.*] The two

*The Members of Mr Locke's Division of Sciences are partly Co-incident, partly not belonging to Science at all.*

First General Branches of this Division are, in my opinion, *Co-incident*; as will be seen hereafter. However, the Learned World is much oblig'd to the Author, for putting *Ethicks* to be capable of *Demonstration*, and a *true Science*.

But, as to his Third Branch, which he calls *οὐκ ἐπιστήμη*, or the *Doctrine of Signs*, I must confess, I do not well know what to make of it: For, to make the *Doctrine of Words* to be a *Science*, or part of *Philosophy*, is to make *Philosophy Wordish*. He defin'd *Philosophy*, in his Preface, to be *The Knowledge of Things*; and here he seems to make the *Knowledge of Words* a part of *Science*, or *Philosophy*, taken distinctly from the *Knowledge of Things*; which is his First Branch. All *Science* is *Connected Sense*, and both *Sense* and *Science* are in our *Minds*. The *Common Agreement* of Men gives Words to be *Signs*; *Common Usage* shews this Agreement; *Grammar* helps them with *Congruity*; *Critick* gathers from Authors, or Derivations, the *Genuine Signification* of such Words as are not so much worn by *Common Use*, but mostly used by the Learned: For, when they are *thus Common*, *Critick* is *Useless*. *Logick*, which is to *direct* our Reason, and *define* our Notions, so to keep our Thoughts or Discourses *steady*, takes care they be not *Ambiguous*; or, if they be, gives Rules to detect their Double Sense, lest the *Ill-understood Signs* lead us astray from the Point. But, all begins and ends in this, that we be sure our Words do signify our Notions, *rightly*, and *sincerely*.

*Sincerely.* Sometimes we have *Simple* Notions; and then we use such Words as signify *them*: Sometimes we join many *Simpler* Notions in a *Complex* one; and then we make use of such a *Word* as signifies that *Complex* Idea, or Motion: Sometimes we connect divers Notions affirmatively, and frame Judgments, or *Mental Propositions*; and then, *Verbal Propositions* signify that *Verbum Mentis*, or Interiour Saying. We may fancy that Words do *ty together* many *Simple Ideas* in a *Complex* one; (for, there is nothing which Men of Wit, by much bending their Thoughts, cannot fancy;) but 'tis *We* who *ty* our Notions together in our *Mind*; nor can meer Articulate Sounds any more Connect *Simple Ideas*, than they can connect or identify our Notions which are the Terms of a Proposition: nor can they do *this*, any more than they can frame a Judgment; that is, *judge*, or *Know*. We may fancy too, that they record our Thoughts, which otherwise would be lost: 'Tis true, that after we have agreed such *Words* should signify such *Things* in our Mind, they have an order to one another, and do ordinarily *come together* into our Thoughts; and so the Word *infers* the Thing; but so does the *Thing* infer the *Word* too, to which we, by our Agreement of its Signification, do relate it; and, of the two, the *Word* is sooner lost out of the Memory, and more needs a *Recorder*, than the *Notion* does; especially, when our Memory is of *Connected Sense*. How often do we remember very well the *Sense* of an Author we have read, and yet cannot at all call to mind his *Words*! My self, when I was young, had *Words*, and great Variety of them, at my Tongue's End; my Expression was *Copious*, and

*Florid*, and now I am *old* and past my Autumn, my stile is dry ; and the *Flowers* and *Leaves* fall off, when the *Fruit* is ripe; and tho' I still retain and increase my stock of *Thoughts*, I have lost that Multiplicity and Choice of *Words* I had formerly. But, I must complain that it is a great Injury to that Excellent and most Useful Science, [ *Logick* ] which treats of the *Operations* of our *Understanding*, and of the way how to manage them, to make it nothing but the *Doctrine of Signes*, or *Words*; and to pretend it has its Name thence. As if λογική did not signify *Ratio*, and *Uerbum mentis*, as properly as it does *Vox*; and λογικός far more often [ *Rationalis*, ] than it does *Sermone utens*. But, above all, I am sure, ἡ λογική is never found to signify the *Art* or *Doctrine of Words*, but the *Art of Discoursing* or *Reasoning*.

20. I cannot but think that the *Subordination of Sciences*, is as Useful and Necessary to be known, as their *Division* or *Distinction*, in *Philosophy*; they being the *Exact Knowledge of Things*, taking this last word in its largest sense, as it *Comprehends Rem* and *Modum rei*. Also every Notion being the *Thing* inadequately conceiv'd, and having a kind of *Distinct Nature* peculiar to it self in our Minds; and all Sciences ( they being *Distinct* and not *Confused Knowledges*, ) having, consequently, for their Object, the Thing as thus *Distinctly* or *Inadequately* consider'd, ( by which Objects they are *Specify'd* and *Distinguish'd* ; ) it follows, that there may be as many *Sciences* as we have such *Distinct Notions* of the Thing; and that each of them is got by looking more penetratively into those *Distinct*

Na-

*The Connatural way  
how Sciences are  
to be Divided,  
and Subordinat-  
ed.*



*Natures* in our Mind, or *Distinct Notions*: Science being in reality nothing but Descants (as it were) on those *Notions*, and grounded entirely on their Metaphysical Verity. Whence follows likewise that the *Subordination of Sciences* is grounded on this, that those *Notions* (their *Objects*) are *Subordinate*; or that one of them is *more Universal* or *General*, others *more Particular*. To instance; The Highest Science in the Line of that General Notion we call *Substance*, is that which treats of the *Supreme Genus*, or of *Ens* as *Ens*, and of what belongs to it *as such*; and this we call *Metaphysicks* or *Trans-natural Knowledge*. The immediate Notion under *Ens* is *Corpus*; and this is the Object of *Natural Philosophy*, or *Physicks*. Next under That is *Vivens*; which (as its Object) Constitutes the Science or Knowledge of *Living Things*, and what belongs to them as such. Under that is *Animal*, which is the Object of the Science that treats of *Sensitive Things*, as they are *Sensitive*, and of what appertains to them, *as they are such*. The Lowest of our Notions in that Line, which are in any degree Common or General, is that of *Homo*; which treats of *Humane Nature*, of its Operations proper to *Man*, as *Man*; and Chiefly of his Primary Operation *Reasoning*; and then, the Science which shows how to order those Operations right that belong to his *Understanding*, is *Logick*; as that Science which shows how to order those Operations right that belong to his *Will*, is call'd *Ethicks*. Lower than this, Science proceeds not; *Individuals*, by reason of the Complexion of Innumerable Accidents that Constitutes them, not being knowable to us, *as such*, so as to give us Exact Knowledge of their *Singularities*.

Corollary.

Corollary I. From what's said it appears; that Mr. *Locke's* two First Branches fall into one. For his First Branch being [*The Knowledge of Things as they are in their own proper Beings, their Constitutions, Properties and Operations*] and his second, viz. *Ethicks*, having for its Object the Operations of Mans Will; and *Logick*, the Operations of his Understanding, which proceed from him as Man, (all Outward Actions that proceed not from his Interiour Knowledge and Will, being meerly *Animal*; ) it follows that *Ethicks*, which is his *Second* Branch, is coincident with his *First*. For Man is a Thing, and has a *Proper Being* of his own, and his *Understanding* and *Will* are his *Properties*; and *their Operations* are his *Operations*.

Corollary II. Each of the Subordinant Sciences deduces Conclusions about its Proper Object: Which, tho' Conclusions *there*, are the Principles to the immediately Inferiour or Subordinate Science: so that none can know exactly what *Homo* is, who is *such an Animal*, if he be Ignorant what *Animal* is; Nor what *Animal*, which is *such a Living Body*, is, if he knows not what *Living Body* is: Nor what *Living Body*, which is *such a Body*, is, if he knows not what *Body* is; Nor, what *Body*, which is *such an Ens*, is, if he knows not what *Ens* or *Thing* is.

Corollary III. Hence is seen evidently, how Necessary, and according to Nature it is, that those Notions which are *most Universal*, should be *most knowable* or *Clear*; in regard the *Inferiour* ones cannot be known but by *them*; and that being *most Clear*, they must (as was often shown above) be also *most Simple*.

Coroll.

Corollary, IV. Hence is seen also how all *Sciences* conversant about our Gradual Notions in the Line of *Substance* ( and the same holds in all the other Lines ) come to be connaturally *Subordinate* to those which have a *Superiour Notion* for their *Object* ; and how *Perfect Knowledge* or Skill in the *Inferiour Science*, is Unattainable without Knowledge or Skill in the *Superiour*.

Corollary V. Hence is demonstrated, that *Metaphysicks* is absolutely the *Highest Science* ; and that, without Knowledge or Skill in it, none can perfectly understand the *Inferiour Sciences*, so as to resolve them into their *First, and most Evident Principles*,

Corollary VI. And, since the *Greater Clearness* of that *Notion*, which is the *Object* of any Science, gives a greater Clearness and Evidence to the Science it self ; and the *Greater Clearness* of any *Notion* arises from its being *more Simple* ; and the *more General* they are, the *more Simple* they are ; and the *Notion* of *Ens* is Evidently *more General* than all the rest : It follows demonstratively that the Science of *Metaphysicks*, which treats of *Ens* as *Ens*, is the *most Clear* of any others ; and, in the *Highest Degree*, Evident ; and that they who think otherwise do guide themselves by *Fancy*, to which such very Abstract *Notions* are Unfuitable.

Corollary VII. And, since Evidence determines our Understanding to *Assent*, and therefore *Certainty* which is the Determination of our Judging Power, follows Evidence as its Proper Cause ; it follows, that, as no *Inferiour Science* can be Evident without Knowledge in *Metaphysicks*, so neither can our Knowledge of any of them be perfectly,

fectly, (or in the *Highest Degree*,) *Certain*, but by virtue of *It*, or of such *Maxims*, or *First Principles*, as belong to *It*.

*Corollary*, VIII. The same Discourse that is made here of *Objects* found in the Line of *Ens*, and their proper *Sciences*; may be made and have Equal force in the *Objects* belonging to all the Lines of *Accidents*, and the *Sciences* Proper to *them*.

*Corollary* last. Hence the Doctrine of *Words* is no part of *Philosophy*, taking them as aparted from our *Notions*; because it has neither for its Object, *Rem* nor *Modum rei*; nor any thing found in *Nature*, or Belonging to it; since *Words* are merely *Signes*, appointed by our *Voluntary Designation*, to assist us in Communicating our Conceptions to others, which can be no part of the *Knowledge of Things* or true *Philosophy*; Words being neither Simple nor Complex, Adequate or Inadequate *Notions*, nor in any Manner taken from the *Things themselves*.

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19. *Prov'd from our Natural Desire of Happiness.*
20. *The Appearance of Good is of Greatest Weight; but, in a manner, disregarded by Mr. Locke.*
21. *Putting this Appearance, his Reasons do not conclude.*
22. *Prov'd, because Ease is not the Perfection of a Soul.*
23. *The Truth of this Point stated.*
24. *Mr. Locke omits here the Idea of Power to be a Thing, tho' Nature suggests and forces it.*

### Reflexion Thirteenth.

- § 1. **O**UR Mixture of our Notions is Regular; Mr. Locke's, Irregular, and Disorderly.
2. *Without knowing what Substance or Thing is, we cannot pretend to Philosophy.*
3. *All our Notions, and, amongst them, that of Substance, or Res, is taken from the Thing.*
4. *We cannot be Ignorant of the Notion of Substance, or Thing.*
5. *We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things less perfectly.*  
*And, Individual Essence, the least of all.*
6. *To gain a Distinct Notion of Substance, or Thing, we must consider it abstractedly from its Modes, singly Consider'd.*
7. *The Literal Truth, how Substance and its Accidents, or the Thing and its Modes, are exactly known.*
- § 8. 'Tis

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- § 8. *'Tis impossible not to know Extension, it being in a manner, Self-evident.*
9. *The Cohesion of Extended Parts is above Physical Proofs, and can only be known by Metaphysics.*
10. *Whence, 'tis in vain to seek for Natural Efficient Causes for those Effects that depend on Formal Causes.*
11. *We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion.*
12. *The Reason why, and the Manner how.*

### Reflexion Fourteenth.

- § 1. **T**HE Mind alone does not collect Notions, or compare them.
2. *Verbal Relations come not from Defect in our Language, but for want of a Real Ground.*
3. *What Causality is, and what Grounds the Relations of Cause and Effect.*
4. *The Knowing the Principle of Individuation must antecede the Knowledge of Identity and Diversity.*
5. *What gives the Ground to specific all Notions.*
6. *What gives the Ground to our Notions of the Individuum.*
7. *How Individual Men are constituted.*
8. *Existence cannot possibly be the Principle of Individuation.*
9. *The Outward Circumstances of Time and Place cannot conduce to constitute the Individual Essence.*
10. *An Individual Man is formally an Individual Thing of that Kind, and an Individual Person too.*

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- § 11. *The Essence of Things not to be taken from the Judgment of the Vulgar, nor from Extravagant Suppositions.*
- 12. *Consciousness cannot constitute Personal Identity.*
- 13. *That Consciousness is Inseparable from every Individual Man.*
- 14. *Yet Angels, who are pure Acts, are Constituted in part, by the Act of Knowing themselves.*
- 15. *No Soul is Indifferent to any Matter.  
The Notion of the Individuum is Essential.  
The Substance is the same, tho' some Quantity of the Matter does come and go.*

## Reflexion Fifteenth.

- § 1. **T***hat is onely True Virtue, which is according to Right Reason.*
- 2. *How we come to have Confus'd Ideas, or Notions.*
- 3. *The VVhole Thing, as it needs not, so it cannot be known clearly.*
- 4. *The Metaphysical Reason why this Complexion of Accidents, which constitutes Individuums, should be almost infinitely Various.*
- 5. *VVe can Sufficiently know Things without Comprehending fully this Complexion.*
- 6. *No Formal Truth or Falshood in Ideas or Notions.*

## Reflexion Sixteenth.

- § 1. **W***Hence Proper and Metaphorical Notions and VVords have their Origin.*
- 2. *The General Rules to know the Right Sense of VVords.*

§ 3. *VVords*



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- § 3. *Words of Art most liable to be mistaken.*
4. *The Way how to avoid being mistaken in Words of Art.*
5. *Even in Terms of Art, the Thing is chiefly signify'd.*
6. *Metaphysical Words not Unintelligible, but most Clear.*
7. *This Third Book concerning Words seems Unnecessary.*
8. *VVhence J.S. is not much concern'd to reflect on it.*
9. *Nature teaches us to define by a Genus, and a Difference.*
10. *Those who oppose this Method, must be forced to use it.*
11. *The Mind does not frame Universal Notions designedly; but is forced to it by Nature.*
12. *Nominal Essences Groundless and Catachrestical.*
13. *Aristotle's Definition of Motion defended.*
14. *Aristotle's Definition of Light most Proper.*
15. *The Cartesian Definition of Motion Faulty.*
16. *Individuums under the same Species differ Essentially.*
17. *Whence we must take our Measures of Simple and Compound Notions.*
18. *The same Rule holds in Accidents as well as in Substance.*
19. *The Idea or Notion can never be in Fault when we Name Things wrong.*
20. *Confused Notions may have more Distinct ones annex'd to their Subject.*
21. *Confused Notions do not exclude but include those Distinct ones which are yet Undiscover'd.*
22. *We must not judge which Notions are Simple, which Compounded, from Clear or Obscure Appearances they make to our Fancy, but from the Rule given above, § 18, 19.*

§ 23. *Shewn*

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- § 23. *Shewn hence, because those Men conceit that Metaphysical Notions are Obscure, whereas they are evidently the Clearest.*
24. *Not the Design of avoiding Different Significations of Words, but Plain Nature forces us to put Real Essences.*
25. *Words are not Ambiguous for want of Settled Standards in Nature.*
26. *The Thing signify'd is not to be blam'd for the Abuse of Words; but their Ambiguity, ill Contexture or Misapplication.*
27. *Imperfect Knowers agree in the Thing and not in the Name only.*
28. *The Knowing Things by Abstract Notions promotes and not hinders Science.*
29. *By Mr. Locke's Principles, there is no way to remedy the Abuses of Words.*
30. *Mr. Locke's Sentiment, after all, Ambiguous.*

## Reflexion Seventeenth.

- § 1. **O**F the Second Operation of our Understanding.
2. *Mr. Locke's Definition of Knowledge in many respects Faulty.*
3. *Knowledge cannot consist in the Connexion or Disagreement of Ideas.*
4. *The True Definition of Knowledge.*
5. *Our Definition of Knowledge farther maintain'd.*
6. *Hence, there is but one sort of Connexion, in which Knowledge consists; viz. that of Co-existence.*
7. *The Degrees of our Knowledge assign'd by Mr. Locke, very Solid.*

§ 8. Every

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- § 8. *Every Step we take in Demonstrative Knowledge, or every Consequence, must be grounded on Self-Evidence.*
- 9. *The great Usefulness of this last Position.*
- 10. *Scepticism and Dogmatism are, both of them, highly Prejudicial to Science.*
- 11. *We have Sensitive Knowledge of other Notions besides Existence.*
- 12. *Onely Principles and Demonstration, and not Experiments, can give us any Intelligible Explanation of Natural Qualities.*
- 13. *Short Hints of the true Aristotelian Grounds.*
- 14. *How all Secondary Qualities come to be made.*
- 15. *The Course of Nature is fundamentally built on the Admission of Rarity and Density.*
- 16. *That by these Grounds, the Nature of Secondary Qualities is Demonstrable.*
- 17. *The True Reason why some Men think them Inexplicable.*
- 18. *The Possibility of Demonstrating them shewn by the Instance of Colour.*

## Reflexion Eighteenth.

- § 1. THE State of the Question.
- § 2. *How we know the Things by Means of Ideas, Inexplicable.*
- 3. *The Idealists must be forc'd to grant, that the Thing known is in the Mind.*
- 4. *The Necessity of the Things being in our Mind, farther enforced.*
- 5. *Mathematical and Moral Knowledges are grounded on the Thing in the Mind.*
- 6. *All Essential Predicates, and Accidental ones too, are truly the Thing, and the whole Thing imply'd confusedly.*
- § 7. *That*

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- § 7. *That our Complex Notions are Regular, and Well-grounded ; Mr. Locke's not so.*
8. *In what manner we compound such Notions.*
9. *All Pleas fail the Ideists, unless they perfectly distinguish Phantasms from Notions.*
10. *Odd Miscarriages of Nature ought not to shock Natural Principles.*  
*The Cartesians are concluded against by J. S. as well as other Ideists, or rather more.*
11. *All Truth consists in Joining or Separating Partial Conceptions of the Things ; and not in Joining or Separating Ideas.*
12. *The Distinction of Truth into Mental and Verbal, Extravagant ; and the Parts of it Co-incident.*

### Reflexion Nineteenth.

- § 1. **U** Niversal Propositions in the Mind are easily Knowable, Antecedently to Words.
2. *'Tis not necessary to know the precise Bounds and Extent of the Species.*
3. *Unnecessary Knowledge not to be Coveted, nor the Want of it Complain'd of.*
4. *The Nature and Use of General Maxims mistaken by Mr. Locke.*
5. *The Terms of General Maxims Clearer than those of Particular Propositions.*
6. *Such General Maxims are never used to deduce Conclusions from them, but to reduce Inferiour Truths to them.*
7. *The Absolute Necessity of First Principles Asserted.*
8. *How other General Maxims do govern all our Actions and Sayings.*
9. *The Discarding General Maxims destroys all Science.*

*This*



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*This Error springs from Men's taking Wrong Measures, in judging what Notions are Clear, and what Confused.*

- § 10. *That not General Maxims, but their Abuse, breeds Danger to Science.*
- 11. *His Instance, that General Maxims are fit to prove Contradictions, shews he quite mistakes the Notion of Body.*
- 12. *Ideism is the Genuin Parent of Enthusiasm in Philosophy.*
- 13. *Identical Propositions not to be ridicul'd.*
- 14. *The Right Way how to use them; and that Mr. Locke himself does, and must rely upon them.*
- 15. *Neither Ideas nor Names can be Predicate, or Subject; but the Thing it self, as conceiv'd by us, in whole, or in part.*
- 16. *Mr. Locke's new Instructive Way is utterly Insignificant.*
- 17. *That the Signification of Words is the Meaning of them; their Meaning is our Notion; and our Notion is the Thing.*

### Reflexion Twentieth.

- § 1. **U** *Niversals must relate to the Existence they have in the Mind.*
- 2. *To put any Knowledge in Brutes, is against the Nature of Things, and Implicatory.*
- 3. *Mr. Locke confounds Material and Spiritual Natures.*
- 4. *Mr. Locke's Principles confound Humane and Brutal Natures.*
- 5. *To Create, is the Peculiar Effect of Self-Existence.*
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- § 7. *The Notion or Nature of the Deity being once settled to be Self-Existence, all that can be said of it follows Demonstratively.*
8. *We can know there are Angels, tho' they do not operate on us.*
9. *We know at first our own Existence, in the same manner as we know the Existence of other Things; i. e. by Sensation, and not by Intuition.*
10. *No Improvement of Science, without some General Principles.*  
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11. *Mr. Locke's Main Principle; which is to ascertain all other Principles, Inevident.*
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- § 2. *Mr. Locke confounds Outward Assent, to which we may proceed upon a Probability; with Inward Assent, to which we may not.*
3. *A strange Character of our Judging Faculty.*
4. *That God has provided due Motives of Enjoin'd Assent to all Mankind, if they be not wanting to themselves.*
5. *To Assent upon a Probability, is against the Commonest Light of Reason.*
6. *There cannot be, in Proper Speech, any Degrees of Assent.*
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- § 9. *Charity to Sincere and Weak Mis-understand-ers is a Christian Duty.*  
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 § 2. *The True Use and Abuse of them.*  
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 4. *Syllogisms are useful for Demonstration.*  
 5. *Syllogisms are of no Use in Probable Discourses.*  
 6. *Other Mistakes about Syllogisms Clear'd.*  
 7. *Inferences and Consequences of Words abstracting from their Sense, is strangely against all Reason, and Preposterous.*  
 8. *What is due to Reason, what to Divine Revelation.*  
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 11. *The Notion of [is True,] must be distinguish'd from the Notion of [may be True, or may not be True.]*  
 12. *Therefore, that no Assent ought to be built upon Probable Mediums, is Demonstrable.*  
 13. *All Errour comes by Assenting upon Probabilities.*  
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- §15. *To apply our selves to the Right Method to find out Truth and Science, is the onely Antidote against Errour.*
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